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ABSTRACT
As a former colony of the UK, Kenya inherited its current regulatory framework of
directors from the UK. Since the regulatory framework was inherited, it has not been
modified in any way to reflect the circumstances of the country. This thesis assesses
the suitability of the current regulatory framework of directors to Kenya by
examining the extent to which the regulation of directors facilitates commercial
activity and enables delivery of benefits to companies. This is assessed by analysing
whether:
• The rules properly regulate the key relationship between directors and
shareholders.
• The rules are easy to understand.
• Important areas of general law should be codified.
• Company directors should have non-statutory guidance to their duties and
responsibilities.
• Directors are properly appointed; directors have regard for their duties.
• Shareholders have adequate means of enforcing liability against miscreant
directors.
• Self-regulation by directors would be effective.
• There are enough safeguards to regulate directors of parastatals.1
• The current disqualification regime in Kenya is effective.
This thesis demonstrates that the Kenyan regulatory framework relating to directors
is weak, outdated, and a morass of complexity which causes much uncertainty. This
thesis establishes: the objectives of commercial laws still exist from colonial times
and, thus, do not conform with the present day's commercial activities; the power of
I Parastatals are entities earning their revenue from sale of goods and services. They have a separate
legal identity with the government owning a majority equity holding. They control key sectors such
as mineral and agricultural exports, transport and communications, manufacturing, and agricultural
trade. See SRI International and Mwanilci Associates, Parastatals in Kenya: Assessment of their
Impact and an Action Plan for Reform, Final Report, February 1992, p 19.
xviii
shareholders to control directors is minimal; the ineffectiveness of local and
international regulatory framework of directors has affected the performance of
companies; corruption affects the well-being of both corporate entities and the
economy of the country; the application of subjective rather than objective standards
to assess the liability of directors is ineffective; the corporate and collective nature of
the company makes it difficult for shareholders to enforce liability against errant
directors; that parastatals have performed poorly due to inadequate managerial
performance of directors; the disqualification regime needs to be more stringent in
order to deter miscreant directors.
It is the contention of this thesis that reforms of the current regulations are required
in order to achieve a framework which is modern, effective, transparent, straight-
forward and easy to understand. Whilst it seeks to make recommendations for a
regulatory framework tailored to local circumstances, it also draws from
developments in the UK and other Commonwealth countries, which would facilitate
enterprise, fair dealing, accountability, balance the interests of business with those of
shareholders and stakeholders, and contribute to the growth of the national economy.
Chapter One briefly traces the development of the Kenyan economy from the pre-
colonial to post-colonial period and outlines the origins of company law in Kenya. It
seeks to assess whether the objectives of commercial laws during colonial times are
relevant to the present day. It also analyses the theoretical framework of companies
with a view to establishing what objectives companies ought to serve.
Chapter Two examines the place of a director in a company. It addresses the
procedural requirements for appointments and the relationship of directors with
shareholders. It also considers how the autonomy enjoyed by directors of private
companies differs from that of directors of parastatals, which are corporations owned
and largely controlled by the State. The chapter shows that the autonomy of the
board enables it to make sound decisions on behalf of the company. However,
because the autonomy of the board of directors may sometimes be abused by
miscreant directors, the chapter analyses how the law regards directors as trustees or
agents of the company with a view to curbing abuse of their duties and responsibility
to the company.
xix
Chapter Three considers the obligations owed by directors to the corporate entity,
creditors, and other constituent groups. Although shareholders expect directors to
maximise their profits, this chapter shows that acting in the best interests of the
corporate entity alone can have detrimental effects on the profitability of a company.
This is because the failure to assume social responsibilities may have adverse effects
on good customer relations and the well being of the national economy.
The fourth chapter analyses the duties of care and skill owed by directors and
assesses their effectiveness. The chapter shows how the application of the subjective
standards of skill and care in Kenya enable directors to escape liability for
misconduct. It also examines the need to raise the standards of skill and care because
shareholders are not in a position to track continuously the conduct of directors.
Chapter Five analyses the ability of shareholders to enforce responsibilities owed to
companies by their directors. It shows how the Kenyan courts deprive both the
minority investors and the company of their rightful profits by failing to intervene in
the internal management of companies. The chapter demonstrates the need to strike a
balance between excessive regulation or control by the courts and lack of sufficient
control or judicial intervention in the internal management of companies. It is argued
in the chapter that the willingness of the courts to interfere in the internal
management of companies, where necessary, could promote the confidence of
investors, as they would be assured of effective monitoring of directorial activities.
Chapter Six assesses the extent to which the poor performance of parastatals can be
attributed to poor performance by directors. It shows how the operation of parastatals
is affected by overlapping regulations, political control and appointment of directors,
their role in supplementing the private sector, poor remuneration, and the policies of
international lending agencies. The chapter also addresses the effectiveness of some
reform measures, such as privatisation, which have been adopted by the government
to make parastatals profitable.
Chapter Seven considers self-regulation by directors and examines whether it would
be viable in Kenya. It explores whether self-regulation has some distinct advantages
over statutory regulation. It also considers how effective it would be in reducing
interference of the government in the market and the reluctance to punish miscreant
directors. The chapter explores the measures that might be adopted in Kenya to make
self-regulation by directors effective.
Chapter Eight analyses the disqualification regime and measures its effectiveness. It
shows that the practical consequences of disqualification provisions in Kenya are
limited and, therefore, do little to raise standards of the conduct of directors and to
protect the public from miscreant directors. The chapter assesses how shareholders
and creditors can be protected by broadening the scope of provisions, offences, and
grounds covered by the Act.
Chapter Nine analyses the results from a survey which was conducted between
October 2001 and January 2002 in Nairobi. The survey was conducted with a view to
establishing what aspects of the legal framework in Kenya need to be changed.
Chapter Ten makes recommendations for reform. It examines the extent to which the
codification of the duties of directors and other provisions would simplify legal
requirements and, thus, allow directors and the stakeholders of the company to
understand more easily the duties and responsibilities of directors.




1.1 The Setting for the Study
Companies comprise one of the many mechanisms that the "government encourages
and employs as a means for promoting the participation of citizens in the economic
development of Kenya." 1 Given that a limited liability company enables capital to
be accumulated and invested in risk-taking enterprises, companies create wealth and,
in turn, contribute to the expansion of the economy, provision of jobs, and
production of goods and services.
Given that the global economy is increasingly becoming integrated and
interdependent, competition and high standards of conducting business 2 are
increasingly demanding more input from company directors. As a result, the
initiatives adopted by the government to regulate business determines the success of
companies. For a country to draw economic benefits from the global system, the
legal regulatory framework has to conform to international commercial standards 3 in
order "to create conditions in which people can take advantage of the opportunities
and challenges of globalisation."4 The creation of a conducive environment attracts
I Hon T Mboya, "The Role of the Private Sector in Kenya National Development", in PA Thomas,
Private Enterprise and the East African Company, (Tanzania Publishing House, 1969) p 195.
2 The media and customers pressure on Shell's attempt to dispose of the redundant Brent Spar oil in
Mid -Atlantic compelled the company to dispose of the structure in a way that was much more
expensive than its original proposals. See Bamford, "Directors' Duties: The Public Dimension",
[2000] 2 Co Law 38.
3 A comparison of Kenya and Malaysia provides a good illustration of the effect that response to the
global economy can have on a country. In spite of the two countries obtaining independence in 1963
with roughly the same per capita income, Malaysia has become one of the Asian Tiger economies
due to implementation of policies while living standards in Kenya have hardly changed since
independence. See James, "Connecting to the Global Economy Through the World Trading System"
[2000] Sep-Dec, Professional Management Journal of the Institute of Certified Public Secretaries of
Kenya, at 10.
4 Ibid at 24.
both foreign and local investors 5 since investments can hardly be made "where there
are no prospects for reasonable return in a stable and predictable environment."6
Since independence, the Kenyan government has adopted various functions to
promote private enterprise. These include:
"Assisting in identification of opportunities for private
investment; stimulating the application of foreign and
domestic capital, knowledge and skills to these
opportunities; and enforcing an income policy, which
prevents exploitation and provides adequate incentives to all
that participate in the production process."7
Despite these measures, the number of companies becoming insolvent in the recent
past and those avoiding the Kenyan market has increased. For instance, Vodafone
Airtouch only agreed to enter into the Kenyan market8 after its commercial partner,
Safaricom Kenya, was exempted from the State Corporations Act. 9 Companies
avoiding the Kenya market tend to favour doing business in countries such as South
Africa due to a more favourable framework regulating directors and companies
generally. 10 The consequences of this trend in relation to the Kenyan economy have
reached alarming proportions." There is abundant evidence, however, which shows
that with prudent management of the affairs of the corporate bodies by directors, the
failure of some of the institutions could have been averted. In fact, in nearly all the
5 Foreign investments bring in capital, new technology, quality products and also make a strong
contribution to growth, implementations, exports, and government revenue. Similarly, domestic
investment helps in mobilising Kenya's own internal resources. See Ibid at 25.
6 Ibid at 25.
7 Hon T Mboya, op cit n 1, p 196.
8 Vodafone Airtouch observed that the current legislation would hamper its effectiveness
as a commercial partner of Safaricom Kenya. See Kisero, "Vodafone's Bid for Shares in Safaricom
Still Unclear", Daily Nation, 4 April, 2000.
9 Cap 446, Laws of Kenya.
I ° A survey conducted by the International Chamber of Commerce indicated that foreign ventures by
multinational corporations are likely to increase in Africa in the next three to five years. It noted that
some of the most favoured markets were South Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Uganda and Nigeria. See
Kassar, "Private Sector Growth is Good News out of Africa", Journal of Commerce, 23 March 2000.
I I Some 45 parastatals and companies in which the Government has shares have been placed in
receivership since 1980. See "45 parastatals, Govt firms in receivership" East African Standard, July
12, 2001.
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cases of commercial banks 12 and other companies that have gone into liquidation,
shareholders and directors have emerged among the leading debtors with huge
amounts of non-performing loans.
The abuse of the immense discretion entrusted to directors has occasioned prejudice
to shareholders and creditors. As such, many companies and parastatals have become
insolvent, such as the Kenya Co-operative Creameries (in receivership), as a result of
the interests of directors conflicting with those of their companies. This has involved
the making of irregular purchasing decisions in total disregard of all the rules of
competitive tendering. As a consequence companies have suffered losses and this has
impacted on many investors and creditors. This has caused subsequent loss to
companies, and left many investors and creditors with heavy losses. Some of the
factors that have contributed to breach of duties by directors are incompetence, the
uncertainty of regulations, and political interference. For instance, the boards of
directors, which are supposed to be the principal governing bodies of the parastatals,
companies that are critical to the Kenyan economy, are usually staffed with people
who have neither the professional competence nor the experience to exert any control
over chief executives. Also, since the responsibility for running parastatals is shared
between many people and institutions, 13 chief executives encounter difficulties in
choosing whom to obey and to whom they should report. Moreover, being
institutions that are governed by overlapping laws and regulations, the task of
governing parastatals is onerous. Although each parastatal is governed according to
the Act of Parliament under which it was established, they are also governed under
the State Corporations Act 14 and through administrative circulars frequently issued
by the Office of the President. This makes it difficult to enforce accountability of
officers in parastatals.
The mismanagement of companies has contributed to misuse of resources and
hindered the in-flow and out-flow of investment funds. This has in turn negatively
12 Owners and directors of banks are usually the main depositors, the major borrowers and, at the
same time full time executives.
13 People and institutions with such responsibilities include: permanent secretaries, ministers, board
of directors, the Treasury, and the Office of the President.
14 The Act attempts to bring all corporations under one uniform law.
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affected "the production of goods and services, employment trends and therefore the
standard of living of Kenyans." 15
Since directors have imposed on them duties of competently managing companies,
without taking undue advantage of their positions, they share heavy responsibilities
to shareholders, creditors, employees, customers, and the community. For instance,
they must act swiftly in using company resources profitably, maintaining proper
financial controls, ensuring payment to creditors, and above all initiating a good
working relationships with employees, regulators of the market, and the government.
Although investors in a company can influence its affairs by voting at general
meetings, their powers of controlling directors and their actions are limited, as most
powers of the company are vested in the board of directors. /6 Therefore, since
shareholders and other stakeholders are not in a position to keep track continuously
of the activities of directors, an effective regulatory framework is needed in order to
prevent errant directors from benefiting from their misconduct or causing loss to
companies by their incompetent activity.
It is against the background of the importance of companies in the national economy
and the crucial role played by directors in companies that this thesis intends to
analyse those aspects of Kenyan company law which affect company directors and to
make recommendations for reforms of the regulatory framework that purports to
regulate directors.
1.1.2 The Research Issues
As a former British colony, Kenya's current regulatory framework of directors, and
company law as a whole, was inherited. The Companies Act 1962" (the "Act")
15 K Kibwana et al, The Anatomy of Corruption in Kenya: Legal, Political and Socio-Economic
Perspectives (Nairobi: Claripress, 1996) p 5.
16 The immense powers of directors are exercised either directly or through appointees, such as
managers or otherwise. Duties owed by directors to the company also apply equally to any officer of
the company who is authorised to act on its behalf. See Bell v Lever Bros [1932] AC 161, (HL).
Although employees owe similar duties of fidelity, theirs, unlike those of directors, are dependent on
the contract of employment. See Reading v Att-Gen [1951] AC 507, (HL). Also see PL Davies,
Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, (Sixth Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997), p 598.
17 Cap 486, Laws of Kenya.
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and the State Corporations Act I8 are the basic statutes governing corporate
operations in Kenya. The Act regulates ordinary companies and the State
Corporations Act governs parastatals in which the government has controlling equity
interests. Under the State Corporations Act, a parastatal can be established as either
a statutory corporation or an ordinary company. Although a statutory corporation is
established as a body corporate, it is not registered under the Companies Act 1962.
A parastatal registered under the Companies Act 1962 is subject to it to the extent
that it does not conflict with the State Corporations Act.
The Companies Act is based almost entirely on the UK Companies Act 1948. The
UK Act was introduced in Kenya in 1959 and adopted in 1962 virtually verbatim.
Despite significant changes in the UK Companies Act since 1948 and substantial
economic development in Kenya since 1962, the current regulatory framework
applying to directors remains as it was in 1962. This has in turn affected the
competitiveness of the Kenyan economy. For example, the Nairobi Stock Exchange's
Chief Executive in February 2000 attributed the failure to implement a Central
Depository System to the absence of enabling legislation to make it work. He
observed that putting in place the system would attract foreign investors, as it would
eliminate paperwork in the transfer of ownership of the share certificate as evidence
of title. As will be seen, the current framework has become seriously outdated in key
respects.
The duties of directors in Kenya are not codified in the Act. The principles
underlying them are found in the common law that is largely inherited from England.
These principles are applicable in Kenya by virtue of the Judicature Act, which
stipulates, inter alia, that:
"The jurisdiction of the High Court and of all subordinate
courts shall be exercised in conformity with.. .the substance
of the common law, the doctrines of equity and the statutes
of general application in force in England on the 12 th August
"Ibid. The Act was enacted following the recommendations made by the Report and
Recommendations of the (Philip Ndegwa) Committee on Review of Statutory Boards, Republic of
Kenya, May 1979, 19, para 81.
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1897, and the procedure and practice observed in courts of
Justice in England at that date: Provided that the said
common law, doctrines of equity and statutes of general
application shall apply so far only as the circumstances of
Kenya and its inhabitants permit and subject to such
qualifications as those circumstances may render
necessary."I9
Whilst decisions of English courts given after the reception date are not of binding
authority in Kenyan courts, they are entitled to the highest respect if the English law
has not been subsequently modified. 2° Therefore, the current English judicial
pronouncements on company law are highly persuasive in interpreting the Kenyan
provisions.
Although there has been very little effort by the legislature to amend the Act in order
to make it more meaningful to Kenyan needs, it is noteworthy that a task force on
Companies, Partnerships and Insolvency was constituted by the office of the
Attorney General on 13 th August 1993. Its terms of reference were, first, to review
the law governing Companies, Partnerships and their operations; second, to review
the laws relating to insolvency, liquidations, and receiverships; third, to make such
further recommendations incidental to the foregoing as they may deem necessary.
The task force has neither made significant proposals nor submitted a final report.21
The lack of action is illustrative of inertia in the corporate field which has apparently
been encouraged by the Government. Although there has been no official
explanation for the delay, political pressure against enacting a restrictive statute
cannot be ruled out because directors of key companies are influential politicians and
civil servants who appear to use their positions to benefit fraudulently from
companies.22
19 Section 3-(1) (c), Cap 8 of the Laws of Kenya.
29 Ibid.
21 Hon Amos Wako, AG, "On Constitutional Review", [1998] Nov-Dec Professional Management
Journal of the Institute of Certified Public Secretaries of Kenya, 5 at 7.
22 onyango, "Super Rich Government Employees", Daily Nation, 9 June, 2002.
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The current regulatory framework for directors has multiple flaws which impinge
upon standards of corporate governance. These flaws affect the ability of companies
to contribute positively to the Kenyan economy. For instance, lack of codification
makes it cumbersome for directors to know what is expected of them when the
provisions of the Act are uncertain and insufficient. It is even more difficult for
directors with limited knowledge to comprehend their legal requirements.
The task of ascertaining in whose interests directors are supposed to act is also
rendered difficult by lack of codification. Although common law rules require a
director to act in the best interests of the company, a director, who takes into
consideration the interests of employees in order to promote the long-term interests
of a company, would not easily establish the legality of his actions.
Although the complexity of the business environment makes it difficult for
shareholders to track the conduct of directors, the Kenyan Parliament and the courts
have not played an active role in protecting shareholders. It is possible for directors
to go unpunished as a result of negligence arising from their ignorance or
inexperience. 23 The Kenyan Parliament and the courts have also not provided an
efficient dispute resolution mechanism that encourages shareholders to enforce the
liability of directors more readily. Although the State might be reluctant to enforce
strictly the liability of directors, it is doubtful whether directors would be able to
control themselves effectively if a self-regulatory mechanism was in place.
The Government also fails to offer adequate protection to shareholders and other
stakeholders by failing to implement an effective mechanism for disqualifying
miscreant directors. This leads to low levels of responsibility and accountability of
directors.
The role of the Kenyan Government in running parastatals has been largely
ineffective. The failure to have adequate management controls in parastatals has been
23The courts assess their liability subjectively. See Flagship Carriers Ltd v Imperial Bank Ltd, High
Court Civil Case No 1643 of 1999 (Unreported), Ruling per PJS Hewett at 11. Mr Hewett relied on
the rules laid down in Charlesworth & Morse, Company Law, (9th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1968),
277. The rules were originally formulated by Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co (1925)
Ch 407.
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caused by the politicisation of the appointment of directors by the State Corporations
Act.24 This causes directors to act in the interests of their appointors rather than the
corporation. The boards of directors can be made effective by giving autonomy to the
board by separating the State from parastatals.
Levels of the accountability and responsibility of directors may be raised by
reforming specific provisions of the Companies Act and the environment within
which companies operate.
Given that the outdated nature of the regulatory framework of directors continues to
affect standards of corporate governance and the economy of Kenya, the research
question for this thesis is: "what are the factors that impinge upon the performance of
directors and what reforms can be adopted to improve standards of corporate
governance?"
1.1.3 The Aims of the Study
The increase in the number of companies becoming insolvent, the avoidance of the
Kenyan market by companies, the outdated nature of the Kenyan regulatory
framework for directors, and the control exerted on directors of parastatals by the
executive call for the review of the existing law.
Therefore, the central aims of this thesis are to provide an analysis of the Kenyan law
as it affects directors and the way they are regulated. A supplementary aim is to
recommend appropriate reforms of the current regulatory framework relating to
directors. All of this is designed to produce a regulatory framework which would:
• Identify standards of good practice in the management of companies.
• Restrict the unlawful activities of directors and remove the unfit ones.
• Give directors room to work without unnecessary interference from other
stakeholders.
• Protect the interests of all the stakeholders in the company.
• Be modern, effective, and easy to understand.
24 Cap 446, Laws of Kenya.
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• Reverse the upward trend of the number of companies becoming insolvent.
• Facilitate commercial activity and therefore encourage economic growth,
investment and stability in Kenya.
• Provide incentives to both local and foreign investors for establishing business in
Kenya.
Although this thesis aims at developing a regulatory framework tailored to the local
circumstances, it will draw from the rich experience of the UK judiciary, in light of
the strong historical links between Kenya and the UK. Thus, analogically and
comparatively, English company law will be referred to and examined, as will the
law of other Commonwealth countries, such as Australia, New Zealand, Nigeria, and
Ghana.
1.1.4 Contribution of the Research
The need for this research was partly triggered by the realisation that there is at
present no comprehensive analysis of Kenyan company law. Moreover, there is no
significant research, save for a few non-comprehensive undergraduate dissertations
at the University of Nairobi, that has been undertaken to establish or make
recommendations for an effective regulatory framework for directors in Kenya. The
lack of research in this area could be attributed to the country's past political set up,
which might have posed risk to anyone exposing sensitive political issues. Given that
there is also a paucity of case law in this area, newspaper sources have been used on
a number of occasions to illustrate what is going on. Undoubtedly, lack of sufficient
case law and research has contributed to the existence of low standards of corporate
governance. 25 Given that gaps in this body of knowledge continue to affect the
standards of corporate governance, and in turn the economy, it is felt that this lacuna
warrants this research.
A further justification for this research is the establishment of a task force on
Companies, Partnerships, and Insolvency law to review the law governing
25 The respect of individual freedoms has improved since 1990 when the country became a multiparty
state.
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companies, partnership, and their operations. This action is illustrative of the dire
need to review company law in Kenya.26
Since this study scrutinises English principles of company law applicable in Kenya,
but uses the Kenyan circumstances, needs, interests, and experiences to measure their
effectiveness, it assists in producing rules, which are suitable for Kenya. The law
applicable in the UK27 would not necessarily be suitable for Kenya because of the
differing economic conditions and policies in the two countries. Besides, the nature
and size of business transacted by the two countries are different, 28 the people in both
countries whom company law seeks to protect have different standards of
sophistication and education. Moreover, the need to reflect EC directives adopted
under the EC Company Law harmonisation programme has changed the direction of
some parts of the UK legislation.29
1.1.5 Research Methodology
The research methodology adopted in this thesis is primarily doctrinal combined
with a review of the relevant theoretical literature and some significant empirical
research. The empirical research was conducted by use of a survey that was
undertaken between October 2001 and January 2002 in Nairobi. The data was
collected through questionnaires and interviews. A questionnaire was sent in October
2001 to 200 individuals who comprised of directors, advocates, company secretaries,
officials from the Attorney General Chambers and the Nairobi Stock Exchange,
company secretaries, auditors, academics, and Members of Parliament. Ten
individuals were also interviewed in Kenya between January 7 and January 25, 2002.
Analysis of the data obtained is contained in Chapter Nine. The survey sought to
establish whether aspects of the legal framework in Kenya need to be changed and, if
so, in what manner. It also sought to establish the main factors that have contributed
to their poor performance and investor avoidance of the Kenyan market. In addition,
26 Hon Amos Wako, op cit n 21, at 7.
27 Recent reviews of the companies' legislation have refused to follow UK's framework. Such
reviews have been carried out in Nigeria, Ghana, South Africa, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and
Hong Kong.
28 The presence of parastatals in Kenya is a striking difference.
29 Given that continental European traditions are more prescriptive and regulatory than the UK's, UK
law has adopted a different approach as a result of harmonisation. See The Company Law Review
Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework,
February 1999 p 10.
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it sought to establish whether the regulatory framework for directors protects the
interests of shareholders, is restrictive on the unlawful activities of directors, and
whether it offers adequate incentives to investors.
It was considered important to undertake this research because it appears that there
has been no such research previously conducted. The survey has identified problems
in the regulatory framework for directors. It has also indicated possible measures that
would, if adopted, facilitate commercial activity and therefore encourage economic
growth, investment, and stability in Kenya. The data obtained from the survey
appears to have opened up whole new areas for research, which will be of interest to
lawyers, company directors, company secretaries, auditors, and policy makers in
general.
Before examining specific regulatory factors that impinge upon the performance of
directors, it is important to analyse the theoretical framework of company law, the
historical perspectives of the country's economy, and the types of companies in
Kenya. This will validate the ideas discussed in this thesis and bring to the fore any




Analysts have often disagreed on whether a company is a private or a public
creation. Those who deem a company to be a private creation maintain that
companies are governed by the private law of contract. 30 Contractualists argue that
because companies are a private matter, the intervention of government through
regulation should be minimal. On the other hand, concession and communitarian
theorists argue that the company is a creation of the State and is therefore governed
by public law and regulation. The following section analyses theories that seek to
explain the functions of a company.
30 M Jensen and W Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and
Ownership Structure", (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305.
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1.2.1.1 Legal Contractualism
Legally, the company is a distinct entity and an artificial person. As an entity it is the
company that owns the assets of the business, enforces its legal rights, and incurs full
liability since the liability of members is limited. Shareholders, directors, creditors,
and employees become associated with a company voluntarily. 31 A company can
therefore be seen as a unit for all bargaining arrangements between stakeholders.
According to this theory, a company is born when two or more people enter into an
agreement to carry on commercial activities. The association of individuals is
characterised by contractual relations between all the participants. 32 As such, the
relationship is governed by the constitution of the company and, in turn, the private
law. According to this theory, corporate decisions and actions will be lawful if they
are made in accordance with contractual terms, 33 As a result, the impact of the action
or decision on the persons affected by them will not be relevant. 34 This has the effect
of limiting both the need for government intervention and the imposition of social
responsibility on the company.
1.2.1.2 Economic Contractualism
Due to the essential role played by companies in the creation of wealth, the economic
approach is readily used to examine the operation of companies. Given that
economics determine whether a company becomes successful or not, a company will
be profitable if there is a ready market for its products and services. 35 People also
purchase shares on the basis of economic considerations. The prospects of the shares
increasing in value attracts buyers because they are bound to derive profits.
Creditors also advance monies to a company on the basis that they will charge
interest and, as a result, make profits. Similarly, employees are likely to be attracted
to a company that would give them better returns.
31 BR Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure, and Operation, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997),
p 32.
32 S Bottomley, "Taking Corporation Law Seriously: Some Considerations for Corporate Regulation"
(1990) 19 Federal Law Review 203.
33 According to Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461, the majority decision of contractors represent
the will of the corporation.
34 J Dine, Company Law, (Sweet 8z. Maxwell, 2001) p 20.
35 BR Cheffins, op cit n 31, p 3.
12
Contractarian theorists argue against any public function of companies. The theories
are based on individualist philosophy which entails "a presumption against any
political action which denies or restricts anyone's freedom in any way." 36 These
theories presuppose that so long as an individual uses just methods to pursue his
interests he should be allowed to act freely despite the impact of his actions on
others. 37 This therefore implies that the activities of companies that have adverse
effects on the welfare of the society should not be regulated so long as companies
deal fairly. The application of this theory leads to a concentration of resources in the
hands of a few individuals. The resulting inequality is justified on the basis that men
are inherently unequal. 38 Rawls has argued that the inequality may be used to benefit
the least advantaged members of the society. 39 This is to be contrasted with the view
of people such as Cohen who argues that society cannot benefit unless individuals
act with an egalitarian ethic with a view to realising distributive justice.4°
Contractarian theorists regard a company as a unit for all bargaining arrangements
which the participants in a company seek to use with a view to maximising wealth
through beneficial bargains. 41 According to Jensen and Meckling, 42. the company is a
"nexus of contracts" without which it would not exist. 43 Neo-classical economists44
argue that the entity of a company reduces the costs of a complex market consisting
of a series of bargains, as the company provides a "standard form contract" similar to
the ones the participants would have entered into if bargains were carried out on an
36 J Raz, The Morality of Freedom (OUP, 1986).
37 FA Hayek, Law Legislation, and Liberty, 2nd ed, Vol 3, The Public Order of a Free People,
(Routledge, London, 1982) p 149. Cited in J Dine, op cit n 34, p 14.
38According to Rawls "deep inequalities. ..initial chances in life... .are inevitable in the basic structure
of any society. See J Rawls, A Theory of Justice (revised edition, OUP, 1999) pp 7, 10. Cited in Janet
Dine, op cit n 34, p 15.
39Ibid p 16.
40 G Cohen, If You're an Egalitarian How Come You're So Rich? (Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Mass, 2000) p 124.
41 Proponents of this theory are: Coase, "The Nature of the Firm", (1937) 4 Economica 386; Alchian
and Demsetz, "The Production, Information Costs and Economic Organizations", (1972) 62
American Economic Review 777; Jensen and Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior,
Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure", (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305; R Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law, 3rd ed., (Little Brown, Boston, 1986); Easterbrook and Fischel, "Contract
and Fiduciary Duty", (1993) 36 Journal of Law and Economics 425;and D Fischel, The Economic
Structure of Company Law (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 1991).
42 Jensen and Meckling, op cit n 30.
43 Easterbrook and Fischel, "Limited Liability and the Corporation", (1985) 52 University of Chicago
Law Review 89. Cited in J Dine, op cit n 34, p 26.
44 This term is used interchangeably with economic contractarian theorists.
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individual basis. 45 Thus, the creation of a company reduces the number of contracts
that would have been entered into. The contracts bind the participants who associate
with each other with a view to performing an economic purpose. For instance, the
relationship between the participants is governed by the articles of association.
Proponents of this theory do not regard shareholders as the owners of the corporation
or the prime beneficiaries of the fiduciary duties of directors. 46 According to Fama,
shareholders enter into a contract with the firm and agree to assume a risk-bearing
role by investing with a view to obtaining the difference between total revenues and
costs.47 Apart from this role, shareholders are not required to have any other role in
the firm.48 Contractarians argue that shareholders do not need a role in corporate
governance because they are protected by the board of directors, as an internal
monitor of the actions of the managers of the company, and other external monitors,
such as the stock market which facilitates the transfer of shares. 49 This theory
wrongly assumes that directors do not manipulate transactions or conceal
information which might prompt shareholders to transfer their shares. This is not true
because the management can impose excessive transaction costs on persons buying
shares. 5° It is also the case that directors can collude with auditors, as the Enron and
WorldCom scandals illustrated, to manipulate financial reports of a company and, in
turn, conceal vital information from shareholders.
According to contractarians, all participants in a company enter into contracts with
corporate management. It is these contracts which stipulate the extent of their claims
against the assets of the company. The firm is, therefore, seen as a "nexus of
contracts." The board of directors, being the agent for shareholders, purchases
managerial services and monitors the implementation of managerial policies and
performances.51
45 Coase, op cit n 41, at 386.
46 Fama, "Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm", (1980) 88 Journal of Political Economics
288. Cited in Bolodeoku, "Economic Theories of the Corporation and Corporate Governance: A
Critique", [2002] JBL 411 at 426.
47 Ibid at 427.
48 Fama & Jensen, "Separation of Ownership and Control", (1983) 26 Journal of Law and Economics
301.
Ibid.
5° Grundfest, "Just Vote No: Minimalist Strategy for Barbarians Inside the Gates", (1994) 45 Stanford
Law Review 857. Cited in Bolodeolcu, op cit n 46, at 431.
51 Fama, op cit n 48, at 433.
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The role of the State is seen as an enabling one rather than regulatory. As such,
company law is seen as enabling legislation which facilitates the organisation and the
operation of business. 52 For instance, it is the function of company law to fill the
gaps left by contractors who do not complete their contracts.
The relationship between the participants in a company is usually characterised by
conflicts of interests. For instance, conflicts may arise whilst dividing dividends or
financial losses, allocating responsibility for the performance of tasks, and
determining the level of care and skill expected from directors. Contractarian
theorists analyse these conflicts from an economic perspective and, thus, maintain
that an agency relationship arises when one individual relies on another. 53 In such a
scenario the person undertaking the duties is the agent and the affected party is the
principal. The principal incurs agency costs when the agent fails to act in the best
interests of the principal. To reduce agency costs, the principal may opt to incur
monitoring costs with a view to ensuring that the agent acts in the best interests of
the principal. 54 According to contractarians, there is an agency relationship between
shareholders and directors because the principal (shareholder) engages another
person (director) "to perform some services on their behalf which involves
delegating some decision making authority to the agent." 55 Given that shareholders
rely on directors to run a company efficiently in order to derive profits, any
misconduct on the part of directors imposes agency costs on shareholders.
Contractarians argue that the transactions of a company are justifiable so long as they
entail efficient allocation of resources in a manner that benefits shareholders. For
instance, if shareholders can benefit from a large-scale lay off of workers, the lay off
would represent a more efficient allocation of resources than retention of jobs by
workers. This type of efficiency, which entails that the net gain must be greater than
52 J Ballentine, Equity, Efficiency, and the U.S. Corporation Income Tax, (American Institute for
Public Policy Research, Washington D C, 1980), p 42. Cited in Janet Dine, op cit n 34, p 21.
53 This concept is referred to as the "agency cost". For a detailed analysis see Jensen and Meckling,
op cit n 30.
54 Ibid, at 308.
55 Ibid.
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the net loss, is referred to as Kaldor-Hicks 56 efficiency. It is founded on the premise
that a transaction is efficient if it results in sufficient benefits to those who gain such
that they can compensate the losers and still remain better off. In the event that a
bargain is entered into and one person gains but no one loses the transaction is said to
be Pareto efficient. 57 Thus, a transaction that leaves someone worse off will not be
Pareto efficient, but can meet the Kaldor-Hicks standard of efficiency. Pareto
efficiency is generally seen as unobtainable.
Given that the firm is seen as a nexus of contracts, and not as an individual,58
contractarians take the view that the firm cannot be regarded as a person with
"motivations and intentions." As such, the firm should not be expected to have a
social responsibility in same way would an individual.
Although stakeholders may suffer as a result of maximisation of the wealth of
shareholders, contractarian theories do not regard that as a sufficient basis for
affording legal protection because the parties can protect themselves through
contracts. 59 Economic contractarian theory does not recognise the inequality of the
bargaining power between the rational economic actors within a company. For
instance, it assumes that employees are in a position to bargain fairly with a
company. But there are flaws in such a view. For instance, it is doubtful whether
health and safety of employees would be safeguarded without the regulation of the
State. The theory does not either recognise the inability of shareholders to control
directors and the need for state regulation to protect shareholders. It wrongly
assumes that investors are always in a position to oust the management and seek to
obtain the control of the board of directors.6°
56 Kaldor, "Welfare Propositions of Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility", (1939) 49
Economic Journal 549 and Hicks, "The Valuation of the Social Income", (1940) 7 Economica 105.
57 The theory was named after the originator, Mr Vilfredo Pareto, who was a 19th Century Italian
economist. See BR Cheffins, op cit n 31, p 14.
58 Contractarians define the firm as "a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in
which the conflicting objectives of individuals are brought into equilibrium within a framework of
contractual relations." See Jensen and Meckling, op cit n 30, at 311.
59 D Millon, "Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies", in
Lawrence Mitchell (ed), Progressive Corporate Law (Boulder, Colorado, 1995) p 3.
69 R Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, (2nd ed, Little Brown, Boston, 1977), para 14.3. Cited in J
Dine, op cit n 34, p 27.
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1.2.1.3 Concession Theory
Concession theorists view the role of the State as facilitative in that it provides fair
and democratic corporate governance structures. The creation and operation of the
company is seen as a concession by the State. The ability to operate with limited
liability is seen as an incentive for entrepreneurs to take on risky ventures without
fear of personal liability. 61 These theories recognise that the company, as a creation
of the State, owes duties to the public and ought to have a social conscience.62
According to these theories, the interests of the company include, for instance, the
interests of shareholders, employees, creditors because they all benefit the company.
1.2.1.4 Communitarian Theory.
Corporate law has a traditional commitment to the primacy of the shareholder. This
entails a commitment on the part of the company and shareholders to maximise the
welfare of shareholders.63 As a result, the interests of shareholders are required to be
considered in the event that they compete with any other interests. The shareholder
primacy principle has been challenged by communitarians who recognise the
interests of non-shareholder constituent groups. Communitarians regard a company
as "an economic institution which has a social service as well as a profit-making
function"64 whose formation is encouraged by the law not only because they are a
source of profit to their owners, but because they service the community. 65 For
instance, parastatals were established in Kenya on this basis because they were
thought to be the most appropriate mechanism for providing services that were not
provided by the private sector.
Communitarian theorists are at odds with contractarian theorists because they do not
agree that the sole purpose of the board is to use its powers for the maximisation of
profits. 66 Instead, they regard the company as an entity having both a public role and
61 Re Rolus Properties Ltd & Another (1988) 4 BCC 446.
62 Campbell, "The Failure of the Market Failure", in Corporate Control and Accountability
(McCahery, Picciotto, and Scot eds, Clarendon, Oxford, 1993) p 103.
63 D Millon, op cit n 59, p 1.
64 Dodd, "For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?" [1932] 7 Harvard Law Review 1145 at
1148.
65 Ibid.
66 According to Berle that is the sole purpose of the board. See Berle, "For Whom are Corporate
Managers Trustees", (1932) 45 Harvard Law Review 1365; Dodd, op cit n 64.
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a private one. 67 Whilst contractarian theorists argue against legal protection of non-
shareholder constituencies, communitarian theories recognise the need to protect
non-shareholders on the basis that disparities in bargaining power and lack of
information prevent adequate protection of some non-shareholders through contracts.
As such, bargaining power cannot be the sole basis for protecting non-shareholders
because it is a function of wealth. As Professor David Millon observes:
"If shareholders' obligation is defined solely by reference to
consent, nonshareholders' ability to protect themselves from
the costs of shareholder wealth maximization will depend
entirely on their ability to bargain and pay for necessary
protection. ,,68
Since communitarians see the corporation as "a community rather than a mere
aggregation of self-seeking individuals whose relationships are defined solely by
contract", 69 they argue that "additional legal structures must reinforce and
supplement whatever gains people can achieve through contract." 79 For instance,
communitarian proponents suggest that the board of directors should be empowered
to consider shareholder and non-shareholder interests, such as employees and
creditors because they contribute immensely to the success of the company. 71 The
inequality of bargaining power between employer and employee has led to the
enactment of statutes which safeguard health and safety of employees. 72 Although
such legislation has recognised that companies owe to their employees the negative
duties of not prejudicing their health and safety, there is a growing feeling that
companies also owe their employers "the affirmative duty of providing them so far as
possible with economic security."73
Whilst the application of this theory has the overall effect of promoting social
welfare, it is doubtful whether the company, as a commercial tool, would continue to
67 Stokes, "Company Law and Legal Theory" in Legal Theory and Common Law (W Twinning, ed,
1986) pp 155, 162.
68 D Millon, op cit n 59, p 7.
69 Ibid p 4.
70 Ibid p 11.
71 'bid p 13.
72 Dodd, op cit n 64, at 1151.
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exist if it were required to consider a very wide range on interests. 74 As Deakin and
Hughes argue:
"If the category of stakeholding interests is widened to
include those of all potential consumers of the company's
products, for example, or to refer to the general interest of
society in the sustainability of the environment, there is a
danger that the idea of stakeholding will cease to be
relevant."75
It is, therefore, necessary to strike a balance between the competing theories. This
was done in the recent past by the UK's Company Law Review Steering Group. The
changes suggested in the review required directors to act in the interest of their
members but subject to their constitution and taking account of all relevant
considerations. 76 The study will, from time to time, evaluate the present law and
suggested changes by applying the above-mentioned theories
1.2.2 Historical Framework
1.2.2.1 Kenya in the Pre-colonial Period
Before the turn of the twentieth century, the economy of Kenya was almost entirely
at a subsistence level. Money, as we know it today, did not exist and, therefore, any
exchange of domestic production was done predominantly on a barter form of
arrangement. Trade with the outside world was almost non-existent except for some
Asian and Arab traders along the coast. The interest of the British government in
East Africa at that time was limited to eradication of the slave trade.
The subsequent increase in European capitalism gave rise to the need in Europe for
cheap raw materials, labour, and markets for products. This intensified European
" Ibid.
74 Howard, "Corporate Law in the 80s: An Overview", (1985) Law Society of Canada Lecturers.
Cited in J Dine, op cit n 34, p 29.
75 S Deakin and A Hughes (eds), Enterprise and Community: New Directions in Corporate
Governance, (Blackwell, 1997) p 4.
76 The recommendations rejected the "pluralist" or "stakeholder" view. See Modern Company Law:
Completing the Structure, (DTI, London) para 3.2; The Company Law Review Steering Group: Final
Report (DTI, London, 2001), p 41.
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interest in Africa. The increasing European interest in Africa led to conflicts
between European states over control of territories ("Scramble for Africa"). As a
result, European states organised a conference, namely the Berlin Conference of
1885, to solve the conflicts. The conference gave rise to the Anglo-German
Agreement of 1886, which formerly established Kenya as a British sphere of
influence. 77 This marked the beginning of British control of the country through the
Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC), which was incorporated in 1888.
However, the failure of the company to control the territory gave rise to the direct
involvement of the British government. As a result, the British government in 1895
declared the East African protectorate.
After becoming a British protectorate, the British government established the office
of the Commissioner, which was meant to t`kttC,SS t`ktC_Xl.tte, , k‘&kb.t:lN%, atd.
judicial powers. By virtue of the East African Orders in Council of 1897 and 1899,
the Commissioner had powers to administer the territory directly or appoint others to
do so. He could make laws, establish judicial bodies, and maintain law and order. In
1905, the position of the Commissioner was replaced 78 with that of a Governor.
Although the Governor was mandated to appoint all judicial officers, the 1905 Order
in Council established the executive council (Exco) and the legislative council
(Legco) to advise the Governor on general administration and pass laws respectively.
Although membership to the Legco was only possible through nominations by the
Crown, European settlers in 1919 were allowed to elect representatives. In contrast,
Indians and Arabs did not have the right to elect representatives until 1924. On the
other hand, the representation of Africans by others continued until 1944 when
Africans were allowed to elect their own representatives.
Since the need for cheap raw materials, labour, and markets for products had
intensified British interest in Kenya, Britain sought to acquire land for economic and
administrative activities in order to settle farmers from outside the territory to engage
in agricultural activities.
77 Ibid p 12.
78 By virtue of the 1905 Order in Council.
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Since the British government could not legally justify79 the acquisition of land, it
extended in 1896 the Indian Land Acquisition Act 1894 in order to compulsorily
acquire land for public purposes. Thereafter, the Land Regulations 1897 provided
land to settlers but limited their occupancy to ninety-nine years, except in the Sultan
of Zanzibar's dominions where settlers acquired freehold titles. To overcome the
limitation, the East African (Lands) Order in Council 1901 was passed vesting all the
land in the Crown thus making Kenyans "tenants at will". This was subsequently
followed by the Crown Lands Ordinance 1915, which sped up the acquisition of land
from Kenyans. It also sanctioned discriminatory policies of settlers, which kept non-
whites out of the fertile highlands. 8° The discriminatory policies were clearly
illustrated in the case of Commissioner for Local Government, Lands, and Settlement
v Kaderbhai. 81 In that case, Kaderbhai, a British Indian subject of the Crown, applied
to court for a writ of mandamus. He argued that the Commissioner of Lands 82 in
selling town plots by auction83 had no power to impose the conditions that Europeans
only should bid or purchase; that the purchaser should not permit the dwelling-house
or outbuildings which were to be erected to be used as a place of residence for any
Asiatic or African who was not a domestic servant employed by him. The East
African Court of Appeal allowed the appeal so far as it was claimed that Kaderbhai
should be allowed to bid and purchase the plots in auction, but otherwise dismissed
the right of occupancy claim.
1.2.2.2 Reception of English Law
The desire to end the slave trade saw the British government enter into treaties with
the Sultan of Zanzibar who controlled the East African coastal strip 84 and much of
the slave trade. Given that the interpretation of the treaties was required, the
agreements entered into were important in the development of the court system in
East Africa. Enabling legislation was also enacted to give effect to the treaties. This
factor led to the enactment of several statutes, which included the Slave Trade
79 The Crown's Law officers had established in 1833 that a declaration of a protectorate did not
entitle the Crown to alienate land in the Ionian Islands.
80 Commissioner for Local Government, Lands, and Settlement v Kaderbhai [1931] AC 652.
81 [1931] AC 652.
82 He was appointed under section 8 of the Crown Lands Ordinance 1915.
83 They are provided for under sections 15 and 18 of the Crown Lands Ordinance 1915.
84 The Sultan of Zanzibar had authority over an undefined portion of the East African coast and the
interior. See Ghai & McAuslan, Public Law and Political Change in Kenya (Oxford University
Press, 1970) p 3.
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(Muscat) Act 1848. This Act was instrumental in introducing the Indian court system
in East Africa. The expansion of the court system culminated in Zanzibar being
declared a district of Bombay, where all the appeals lay. The jurisdiction of the East
African courts was meant to be exercised in accordance with Indian legislation. As a
result of the Indian influence on the legal system of East Africa, Indian
administrative and legislative precedents became applicable in East Africa.85
The Indian precedents continued to apply in Kenya until the reception clause came
into force thus obliging courts to apply English law. After the reception date, it was
mandatory to apply English precedents even if the basic law governing a legal issue
was an Indian Act. For instance, the Indian Contract Act was applied in Kenya until
1960 when it was repealed and replaced with the English common law of contract,
which still applies today as the Law of Contract Act 1960. 86 The Government
adopted this Act on the basis that it would have been difficult at that time to ascertain
what the Indian law of contract was because the country had attained independence
and, thus, was no longer bound by English law. 87 The Government ignored similar
difficulties that Kenyans would encounter in establishing what the English law was.
It also ignored the fact that Indian law, which grew from the Indian conditions, was
more likely than English law to be relevant in Kenya.
The 1897 and 1905 East Africa Orders in Council gave the Commissioner power to
establish courts and appoint judicial officers. The first judicial system applied more
to Europeans than Africans and Asians. The system comprised surbodinate courts,
the High Court (later the Supreme Court) and the Judicial Committee of the Privy
Council. The East African Court of Appeal (EACA) was created in 1902 and
abolished in 1962, after the formation of East African Common Services
Organisation in 1961. EACA was an instrument of the colonial regime and its judges
were appointed by the Crown. The reliance on English law was intensified by
decisions of the East African Court of Appeal and the Privy Council. The latter had
85Ibid p 128.
86 Cap 23. Similarly, the English Occupiers Liability Act was enacted in Kenya in 1962 as Occupiers
Liability Act No 21 of 1962, Cap 34. Similarly, the Limitation Act No 21 of 1968 was similar to
English Limitation Act 1939. The Registered Land Act 1963 introduced concepts of English land law
in Kenya.
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an obligation to unify the common law throughout the British Empire. 88 Given the
overwhelming influence of these courts, little was done to encourage the growth of
Kenyan common law.
1.2.2.3 Colonial Period
The declaration of the East African protectorate in 1895, marking out of boundaries,
construction of the Uganda Railway, and increase in the number of white settlers,
culminated in the declaration of Kenya as a British colony in 1920.89
Given that the driving force behind the coming to Kenya of white settlers was the
creation of a colony that would offer opportunities for settlement, supply raw
materials and a ready market for Britain, the settlement marked a major development
in the Kenyan economy. For instance, the settlers introduced plantation agriculture,
with the main crops being: coffee, tea, sisal, wheat and pyrethrum. They also
introduced livestock ranching, money, and banking, which led to an increase in the
trading and development of service and manufacturing industries.
The colonial government also established parastatals 9° on the understanding that they
would provide the most appropriate mechanism for providing services that were not
provided by the private sector. As public enterprises, they were also designed to
curb the exploitation of consumers. As such, infrastructural services, such as ports,
railways, airlines, post and telecommunication, were under the control of parastatals.
Similarly, crop marketing boards were established to market the produce of settler
farmers.
Since emphasis was on production of primary agricultural commodities, which were
needed as raw materials for industries in Europe, the majority of the industries that
developed were agricultural. To discourage competition with industries in Britain,
87 The change followed British, rather than Kenyan, recommendations made by the British Institute of
International and Comparative Law. The only legislation that did not follow English legislation was
copyright law. See Ghai & McAuslan, op cit n 84, pp 377, 379.
88 Ibid p 172.
89 H Okoth-Ogendo, Tenants of the Crown: Evolution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya,
(Nairobi, ATS Press, 1991) 10-17. Cited in K Kibwana, op cit n 15, p 14.
90 See Chapter Six for a detailed analysis of parastatals.
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the colonial government discouraged the development of any local industry, which
threatened their home industries.91
Therefore, the economic development initiated by the colonial government, like
infrastructural and human development, was intended to achieve the narrow
objective of serving the colonial government and the settler community. For
instance, any form of education given to the African community was intended to
produce a low-level, unskilled labour force. This being the position, consequently the
political and economic set-up during the colonial period did not have any interest in
the local circumstances of Kenyans.
Although trading was a reserve for settlers, Africans started to get involved in trade
towards the end of the colonial period, as they were eventually permitted to grow
minimal cash crops. This was as a result of the increasing agitation in the 1950s
within the Legco and labour movements for independence. This gave rise to
constitutional conferences, 92which eventually led to independence in 1963. 93 The
conferences deliberated on the distribution of political power, property ownership,
and economic development. The issues agreed upon in the conferences are still
reflected in the present political and economic systems." For instance, the British
government and the settlers demanded in the 1962 Lancaster House Conference that
the colony should receive independence under a constitution fashioned from the
Westminster mode1. 95 The intention for retaining the Westminster model was to
preserve the British common law system and in turn secure British interests in the
country. As Ghai and McAuslan observe:
"Since the European had an overwhelming say in the
direction of government policy,....Economic and political
91 D Gachuki, The Regulation of Foreign Investment in Kenya, 1963-81: An Empirical Study
(University of Warwick, PhD Thesis, 1982) p 21.
92The conferences were held in 1960, 1962, and 1963.
93 Kenya was under British rule from 1897 to 1963. It became a republic in 1964.
94 D Sifuna, "Nationalism and Decolonisation", cited in K Kibwana et al, op cit n 15, p 16.
95Changes subsequently took place and by 1970 Kenya did not have the Westminster model founded
on "multipartysm, the central role of Parliament, the Executive's accountability to Parliament, and
independence of the judiciary." The constitutional safeguards that existed were replaced between
1965 and 1970 with concentration of power in the Executive. See "Restructure the Office of the AG,
Law Don Recommends" Daily Nation, 11 September, 2001; Wabwile, "Reflections on the Future of
the Common Law in Kenya", Law Africa <www.lawafrica.corn/Articles>
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development was looked at from a European perspective and
legislation was designed to further that development with
little or no regard to the economic or social effects that such
furtherance would have on Africans."96
1.2.2.4 Post-Colonial Era
During the negotiations for independence, a lot of attention was focussed on the
political system, rather than the economic system, which the country was to inherit.
However, a few economic issues, such as protection of property rights, were
considered and enshrined in the Bill of Rights of the constitution enacted at
independence. 97 It was agreed at the 1962 conference, which preceded the passing of
constitution, that:
"The Bill of Rights would limit the public purposes for
which land could be compulsorily acquired, and would also
provide for payment of full compensation on acquisition,
with right of access to the courts to determine the legality of
the acquisition and the adequacy of the compensation."98
The failure to deal adequately with the economic system that was suitable for the
country led to the inheritance of "a basically capitalist socio-economic system,
which the colonialists had been building for about seventy years or so."99
One reason that can be attributed to the continuation of the colonial economic system
was that African leaders thought that political liberalisation could change the
economic system. As the former president of Tanzania, Julius Nyerere, observed:
"During our political struggle, some of us thought that
independence would be the end of the process of
liberalisation. We were now beginning to discover that
political independence, alas, is not enough. You have to have
96 YP Ghai and J McAuslan, op cit n 84, p 96.
97 Section 75 of the present constitution.
98 Report of the Kenya Constitutional Conference 1962 (London, HMSO, cmnd 1700) at 10.
99 K Kibwana eta!, op cit n 15, p 21.
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economic independence, and it is vital that the problems and
areas of economic domination should be politically
perceived before we can push the process of liberalisation to
its logical conclusion. We perceived the problems of
colonisation in its correct perspective. We saw colonisation
as a wrong. That wrong was perceived politically by the
leaders of the nationalist movements. Not all of us realised
that we were also economically colonised. That wrong was
not politically perceived. There was an underlying belief that
political liberation would take care of economic
independence too. loo
In addition, the colonial government sought to continue their economic policies by
enlisting the support of African leaders who in turn benefited from positions of
power. Therefore, after independence the African elite stepped into the shoes of the
colonial master and perpetuated the colonial policies. A clear illustration of this
contention was seen when the British government sought to Africanise the white
highlands to meet political objectives. Although the Kenyan government was given
a large aid package to buy land from settlers, most of the fertile land was acquired by
the elite regardless of the resultant indebtedness of the country. 101
Despite the reluctance of the leaders to change, the government made the first
attempt in 1965 to define the Kenyan socio-economic system in a policy document
entitled "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya." 102 However,
rather than defining African socialism, the document continued to affirm the
economic system developed by the colonial government, 103 which emphasised, in the
interests of finance capital, private ownership of the means of production,
government intervention through limited public ownership and a wide range of
government subsidies and control.'"
..n...,...
too Nyerere 1979, cited in D Gachuld, op cit 91, p 2.
Jo' Many of the loans advanced to the government had not been repaid by 1978. See Auditor
General's Report 1978 in Gachuld DW, ibid, p 37.
IN sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965.
103 Kibwana K et al, op cit n 15, p 16.
26
As Ghai and McAuslan observe:
"What has not occurred is an attempt to create a more
African legal system for Kenya to blend together African
legal system and English legal ideas and rules such as was
sometimes rather half-heartedly attempted in the colonial
period. The government seems to have decided that such
attempts were still-born, and a modern unified legal system
can only be built on the imported English base."1°5
Since the organisation of trade and commerce and the nature of commercial laws
were not altered after the change of the political status of Kenya, the Kenyan laws, as
Mutunga observes:
"Express the will of the international bourgeoisie first and
foremost, the interests of the comprador bourgeoisie being
championed because they primarily serve those of the
former. Any interests derived by the Kenyan petty-
bourgeoisie under this set of affairs are simply incidental and
accidental too. Our political institutions, religious
institutions, correspond to bourgeois views and ideology." 106
When Kenya became independent, the suitability of other legal systems was not
assessed. Therefore:
"The retention of the common law at independence was
dictated by political expediency rather than the quality of the
system itself. In fact there was no study of the merits of the
common law, in comparison with alternative legal
systems. " 1°7
104 Ibid p 22.
105	 •Ghat & McAuslan, op cit n 84, p 359.
106 mutunga, "Commercial Law and Development in Kenya", (1980) 8 IJSL 1 at 3.
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Given that the reception of English law was not preceded by any planning, it can be
argued that Kenya lost the chance of effecting measures that would have made the
foreign law work. As Wabwile notes:
"Planned reception of foreign law allows for modification to
be made to the content of the foreign law and prepares the
receiving country to assimilate it. In the history of Kenyan
private law these aspects of quantitative analysis and
conscious synthesis of a legal system are lacking. It is a
story of imposition of a legal system by a colonial master.
Until now there has not been any critical assessment of the
suitability of the common law legal system to this country
and our legal destiny has been left to the dictate of fate."oos
The heavy reliance on the English common law has not only been experienced in
company law but in other fields as well. For instance, the Law of Contract Acti°9
provides that the "common law of England relating to contract as modified by the
doctrines of equity shall apply to Kenya."
As opposed to the colonial times and the 1960s, the economy of Kenya today is
characterised by a few salient factors, which include:
• High reliance on agriculture, especially agricultural export production.
• Government reliance on foreign capital for both investment and expenditure.
• High reliance on imported capital and consumer manufacturers.
• High population growth rate.
• High social stratification resulting in huge gaps between: the wealthy and the
poor, urban and rural areas, and different regions of the country.
107 Wabwile, op cit n 95.
108 Ibid.
109 Cap 23.
11 ° Section 2 (1).
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Given that the circumstances of Kenya have greatly changed, it remains arguable
whether the law made in England during the "nineteenth century to satisfy the needs
of capitalists operating in a laissez-faire environment, and later amended to cater for
a highly sophisticated industrial society which increasingly emphasises big business,
can be considered suitable to regulate the commercial organisations of" Kenya.
This being the position, Kenya can only rid itself of such drawbacks by nurturing its
own common law.
1.3 Types of Companies
There are five types of companies in the Kenyan legal system. These are:
• Companies limited by guarantee
• Unlimited companies
• Companies limited by shares
• Parastatals
• Foreign corporations, which are largely multinationals.112
1.3.1 Companies limited by guarantee
Section 4 of the Act 113 allows the formation of a company limited by guarantee. In
this type of company, the memorandum limits liability of its members to such
amounts as the members may respectively undertake to contribute to the assets of the
company in the event of being wound Up. 114 Clubs, trade associations and societies
formed to promote social objects usually fall under this category. These companies
may operate with or without share capital.
1.3.2 Unlimited Companies
By virtue of Section 4(2) (c) of the Act, a company not having any limit on the
liability of its members may be formed. The characteristic of this type of companies
implies that the members can be called upon to pay the full extent of their assets in
order to meet the liabilities of a company.
n..."
11I PA Thomas, op cit n 1, p viii.
112 Foreign companies are required to be registered in Kenya by virtue of section 367 of the Act.
113 Subsection (2) (b), Cap 486, The Laws of Kenya.
114 Ibid.
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Although an unlimited company need not have a share capital, it must have a
memorandum of association which should state the amount of share capital, if any,
and the number of members with which the company proposes to be registered.
Whilst an unlimited company may be registered as limited, its rights or liabilities in
respect of any debt or liability incurred, or any contract entered into before the
registration are not affected.' 15
1.3.3. Companies Limited by Shares
These types of companies form the bulk of companies in Kenya and this thesis will,
therefore, mainly deal with such companies. A company registered with limited
liability may either be private or public. The Act requires a minimum of two
members for the formation of a private company and seven members in case of a
public one. 116 The constitution of a private company restricts the right to transfer its
shares, limits the number of its members to fifty, and prohibits any invitation to the
public to subscribe for its shares or debentures to the public for subscription. 117 On
the other hand, a public company has no such restrictions. If a private company fails
to comply with these restrictions, it loses its privileges and is treated as a public
company. If, however, non-compliance was inadvertent or accidental a court may
relieve the company from the consequences of non-compliance. 118 Most companies
usually register first as private companies and then alter their constitutions to convert
them to public companies before issuing prospectuses. This allows companies to
avoid the requirements relating to commencement of the business 119 and having to
hold statutory meetings before commencement of business.
1.3.4 Parastatals
These are corporations that are owned or primarily run by the state. They are either
created by a special Act of Parliament or under the Act. Public corporations created
by an Act of Parliament are operated within the objects set out in the Act creating
115 Section 18.
116 Section 4 (1).
117 Section 30.
118 Section 3 1 .
119 Section 111 of the Act restricts the commencement of business of a company with a share capital
unless "every director of the company has paid to the company, on each of the shares taken or
contracted to be taken by him and for which he is liable to pay in cash, a proportion equal to the
proportion payable on application and allotment on the shares offered for public subscription."
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them.120 Most parastatals 121 are charged with the duty of carrying out special
governmental functions in the national interest. The executive subjects these
functions to some degree of control, while the corporation remains, to some extent,
an independent entity. For instance, the State Corporations Act 122 vests the power of
appointing a board of directors in the President 123 and the Minister. 124 The President
is also empowered to "give directions of a general or specific nature to a board with
regard to the better exercise and performance of the functions of the state
corporation and the board shall give effect to those directions." 125
Corporations created by an Act of Parliament have no shareholders to subscribe the
capital. Borrowing, which is guaranteed by the Treasury, raises the capital
12 Although the property of the parastatals can be attached by its creditors,
if it is unable to pay its debts, it cannot be wound up on the application of any
creditor.
1.3.5 Multinational Corporations
Multinational corporations contribute to foreign investment in Kenya by
supplementing domestic savings and transferring technical know-how and business
experience. Government policies designed to encourage foreign investment allow,
among other protection measures: approved industries to repatriate earnings and
capital; full and prompt compensation in the event of nationalisation; and industries
receive an allowance for a return on capital invested in Kenya (investment
allowance).'"
While foreign investment may have some positive effects on the Kenyan economy, it
is undoubtedly the case that heavy reliance on the same allows economic decisions
affecting the economic future of the country to be dominated by foreign rather than
I20 In Eastern Counties Rly v Hawkes (1885) 5 HLC, 331, 348, Lord Cranworth observed that: "it
must be now considered as a well settled doctrine that a company incorporated by Act of Parliament
for a special purpose cannot devote any part of its funds to objects unauthorised by the terms of its
incorporation, however desirable such application may appear to be."
121 Examples of parastatals include: Kenya Tea Development Authority, Maize and produce board,
Kenya Seed Company, Kenya Coffee Planters' Union etc.
122 Cap 446, Laws of Kenya.
123 'bid s 6 (1) (a), the President appoints the chairman.
124 Ibid s 6 (1) (e), the minister appoints the chief executive officer and other members of the board.
thid s 7 (1)
126 A Hussain, A Textbook of Company Law in Kenya, (EAEP, 1980) p 3.
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domestic considerations. Being companies that are controlled and financed by
foreign shareholders, profit motives of multinational corporations regulate their
relationship with the Kenyan public. The same cannot be true of the shareholders of
companies that are resident in Kenya. According to an empirical study conducted by
Bornschier and Stamm, I28 entry of multinational corporations in a market contributes
to short term economic growth, but reduces long term growth performance. Although
globalisation theorists consider multinationals to be rootless entities, they often
"display strong ties to their countries of origin, and their primary focus is on national
and regional markets in the developed world due to the existence of sophisticated
markets, infrastructural features and political stability." 129
The need to increase domestic participation in economic affairs is, to some extent,
hampered by the presence of multinational corporations. Given that foreign
investment does not make a direct contribution to the domestic ownership of assets,
the government has in the past encouraged the Kenyanisation of the public sector.
However, with the advent of globalisation, non-Kenyan ownership, management,
and control of private enterprises has increased. In a bid to reduce some of the
disadvantages linked to multinationals, the government requires foreign investors to
tap domestic capital as part of their capital requirements, provide training facilities to
Kenyans, and employ Kenyans where personnel with requisite skills and experience
are available.I3°
1.4 Conclusions
The regulatory framework of directors has affected adversely the standards of
corporate governance in Kenya. This has, in turn, contributed to low investment in
the economy and poor living standards for Kenyans. One of the reasons for this state
of affairs is the fact that the regulatory framework of directors, having been inherited
from the UK in 1962, has become seriously outdated. The current regulatory
127 Hon T Mboya, op cit n 1, p 195.
128 V Bornschier and H Stain, "Transnational Corporations" in The Law of the Business Enterprise (S
Wheeler, ed, OUP 1994), pp 333-334.
129 L Pauly and S Reich, "National Structures and multinational corporate behaviour: enduring
differences in the age of globalisation", [1997] International Organisation, 51:1, 1-30. Cited in
Moran Jon, "Bribery and Corruption: the OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business Transactions", [1999] 8 (3) Business Ethics: A European
Review, 141 at 143.
13° The Immigration Act, 1967 (No 25 of 1967).
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framework reflects the principles applicable in the UK in the colonial era and
mirrors colonial policies in Kenya.
The compulsory acquisition of land from 1897 onwards by the colonial government
marked the beginning of the use of political and economic power for improper
purposes. 131 This resulted in the concentration of power during the colonial era on
the institutions of the Commissioner and Governor, who were powerful and could
hardly be questioned. Given that the Kenyan leaders who assumed positions of
power at independence perpetuated the colonial policies, it appears that the colonial
policies did influence the emergence of a highly centralised political system and a
presidential institution, which remains unaccountable for appointing ineffective
directors and failing to monitor the operation of parastatals.
Although the government encourages investment by enabling individuals to invest in
risk taking enterprises through the medium of a limited liability company, it is not in
doubt that the effectiveness of the limited liability company as a medium for wealth
creation is rendered ineffective by the failure on the part of directors to act in the best
interests of the company.
Apart from encouraging the creation of wealth, the government also enables the
formation of companies, such as companies limited by guarantee and parastatals, to
pursue social objectives. Whilst companies limited by guarantee may be established
to promote certain social objectives, some parastatals have the responsibility of
carrying out special governmental objectives in the national interest. Given that the
government encourages the maximisation of wealth by limited liability companies
and the performance of social functions by parastatals and companies limited by
guarantee, it appears that the government adopts both the contractarian and
communitarian theories in enabling the formation of companies. However, it is
doubtful whether directors of limited liability companies are required to act in the
131 The first anti-corruption laws were enacted during the colonial period.
K Kibwana et al, op cit n 15, p 23.
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interests of constituent groups, rather than the corporate entity, given that the law
requires them to act bona fide in the best interests of the company. 132
Since the circumstances of Kenya have greatly changed since independence there is a
need to adopt a regulatory framework that is modern and effective. Effective reforms
of the current regulatory framework would make it more relevant to the
circumstances of Kenya and improve the performance of companies. This study
seeks to examine how this might be done.
132 Trevor Price and Another v Raymond Kelsall [1957] EA 752. This issue is discussed in more
detail in Chapter Three.
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CHAPTER TWO
2.0 THE ROLE OF DIRECTORS
2.1 Introduction
A registered company allows investors to profit from the company without
managing it. Since a company, being an artificial person, cannot manage its own
affairs, l human agents are endowed with the responsibility of management. These
agents, referred to as "directors", must manage the company efficiently to ensure
that investors derive profit from the company. Poor management results in low
returns, as a company can hardly attract new investors. 2 Apart from the losses that
might be occasioned to investors and the company, failure of directors to exercise
powers in the interests of the company3 might lead to insolvency.4 For instance,
directors have contributed to the insolvency of companies in Kenya due to the
commissioning of projects without competitive bidding, paying themselves
excessive salaries, making excessive payments to external consultants, failing to
undertake feasibility studies to determine the financial viability of investments, and
sometimes using the entire board of directors, consciously or unconsciously, to
rubber-stamp and ratify decisions. 5 As a result of such occurrences, the poor
performance of a vast majority of companies and the economy of the country 6 is
traceable to poor performance of the boards of companies.
'Cairns L.I in Ferguson v Wilson (1866) LR 2 Ch App 77, observed that "the company itself cannot
act on its own person, for it has no person; it can only act through directors, and the case is, as
regards those directors, merely the ordinary case of principal and agent."
2 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London: Gee 1992),
çara 1.6.
 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421.
" The insolvency of Kenya National Assurance Company led to loss of millions of shillings by
individuals and institutions that were insured by the company. See "Government Making Efforts to
Save KNAC, says Okemo", East African Standard, April 3, 2001.
5 The Inspector of State Corporations attributed these factors to the insolvency status of the National
Housing Corporation and recommended that the corporation should be put in liquidation. See "NHS
Insolvent, Top Official Warns Government", East African Standard, April 27, 2000.
6 For a detailed analysis of how companies' performance affect a country's economy see BR
Cheffins, Company Law; Theory, Structure and Operation, (Clarendon Press, 1997) p 606.
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This chapter examines the role played by directors in a company and demonstrates
why they need to be regulated. In addition, it addresses the procedural requirements
for appointment of directors as well as the qualification criteria for appointment and
the effect of having shadow, alternate, and assignee directors. The chapter goes on
to highlight the legal nature and scope of the powers of directors.
2.2 Parastatals
Parastatals were established by the colonial government on the understanding that
they would provide the most appropriate mechanism for providing services that were
not provided by the private sector. Thus, most parastatals 7 are charged with the duty
of carrying out special governmental functions in the national interest.
The position of directors in Kenya differs considerably from many other countries
due to the presence of parastatals. 8 As opposed to a body corporate registered under
the Companies Act (hereinafter referred to as the "Act"), parastatals do not have
general meetings. 9 The government performs some of the functions of the general
meetings by issuing directives or appointing members of the board of directors.I°
The outstanding organs of control in a parastatal organisation are the government
and the parent Ministry. The State Corporations Act' I vests the power of appointing
boards of directors in the President 12 and the Minister. 13 The President is also
empowered to:
"Give directions of a general or specific nature to a board
with regard to the better exercise and performance of the
functions of the state corporation and the board shall give
effect to those directions." 14
7 Examples of parastatals include: Kenya Tea Development Authority, Maize and Produce Board,
Kenya Seed Company, Kenya Coffee Planters' Union, Kenya Railways Corporation, National
Housing Corporation, National Bank of Kenya, Kenya Commercial Bank, Kenya Power and
Lighting, Agricultural Finance Corporation etc.
8 Detailed analysis of parastatals is tackled in Chapter 6.
9 Internal control of ordinary companies usually lies in the general meeting or in the board of
directors as may be provided in the articles of association.
1 ° James and Ligunya, "Organisational Relationship and the Control of Parastatals in Tanzania",
(1972) 5 East African Law Review 39 at 52.
11 Cap 446, Laws of Kenya.
12 S 6 (1) (a), the President appoints the chairman.
13 S 6 (1) (e), the Minister appoints the chief executive officer and other members of the board.
14 s 7 (1).
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Being wholly appointees of either the President or the Minister, I5 board members
often conform to the directions from the appointer. It is not uncommon, therefore,
to find directives / 6demoralising the board and compromising their duty to act
competently and in the best interests of the corporation. I7 Indeed, the sound financial
performance of Mumias Sugar Company has been attributed to the management of
the company's affairs by an independent agent, which has successfully resisted
interference from the Government.I8
2.3 Private Companies
2.3.1 Appointment of Directors
Directors are appointed through an ordinary resolution by shareholders in a general
meeting. Whilst the Act provides for a minimum limit on the number of directors .
that a company must have, I9 it contains no provisions relating to the appointment of
directors. The articles of the company therefore govern such appointments. Article
75 of Table A states:
"The number of directors and the names of the first directors
shall be determined in writing by the subscribers of the
memorandum of association or a majority of them and until
such determination the signatories to the memorandum of
association shall be the first directors."
Both the general meeting 2° and the board of directors2I have the power to fill any
casual vacancy arising out of death, resignation, retirement, or removal. Any
15 The Ndegwa Committee cited poor selection process as one of the factors affecting performance of
parastatals. Report and Recommendations of the (Philip Ndegwa) Committee on Review of Statutory
Boards, Republic of Kenya, May 1979, para 1.8. p 3.
16 The Government in 2000 issued a directive, which allowed 16 parastatal directors to continue
serving despite attaining the mandatory retirement age for civil servants. See "Government Retaining
16 Parastatal Heads Aged over 55 Years", East African Standard, May 10, 2000.
17 Section 3 of the State Corporation Act (Cap 446) empowers the President to appoint board
members of parastatals. Under section 7, the President may also "give directions of a general or
specific nature to a board."
16 "Mumias Privatisation and the Bigger Picture", Daily Nation, September 30, 2001.
19 Section 177 requires every company to have at least two directors, and at least one for private
companies.
2° Article 97, the company may make such appointment by ordinary resolution.
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director so appointed is required to hold office only until the next following annual
general meeting.
The Act requires every public company registered on or after 1st January 1962 in
Kenya to have at least two directors, and every other company registered before the
appointed day as well as every private company to have at least one director. 22 This
requirement allows private companies to operate with one director when their
functions are not entirely different from public companies. While the UK might
have declined to implement the Jenkins Report's recommendation on having a
minimum of two directors in its 1967 Companies Act, on the basis that the
restrictions already in place made it difficult for a single director to act
fraudulently, 23 having two directors still minimises the risk which exists where there
is only one director because, as argued by Gower:
"If a single person could be sole member and sole director
there would be little hope of preserving the separation of the
company's property from that person's property or of
safeguarding the assets of the company on the death of that
person.„24
The UK's position has since changed and its Companies Act 1989 requires a
minimum of two directors for a public company and one for a private company.25
2.3.2 Restrictions on Appointment
Although one is not required to have any qualifications to be appointed as a
director, 26 the Act restricts certain persons from being appointed directors. These
include, for public companies having share capital:
21 Article 95.
22 Section 177.
23 J Katende, "Company Law in East Africa: Present and future, with particular reference to Tanzania
Mainland”, (1969) 2 East Africa Law Review 149.
24 Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Working and Administration of the Present
Company law in Ghana, 1961, p 129 (Drafted by Professor Gower).
25 Section 282.
26 In Marquis of Bute's Case [1892] 2 Ch 100 an infant was appointed as a director.
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• Anyone who has not complied with conditions laid down in Section 182 (1)
regarding consenting in writing to act as such director.
• Anyone who does not hold a specified share27 qualification.28
• Anyone who has not attained the age of twenty-one or has attained the age of
seventy. 29
• Anyone who is an undischarged banIcrupt.3°
• And anyone convicted of any offence in connection with the promotion,
formation or management of a company.31
It is worth noting that although the Act imposes an age limit on directors, it is still
possible to exclude the effect of the age limit by having the appointment approved
by the general meeting. It is also possible for a person above the age limit to serve as
a director where the articles expressly permit it. 32 Moreover, if a director were
ineffective by reason of age, it would still be possible to remove him through a
special resolution under Section 185 of the Act.
Although the Act disqualifies 33 some people34 from being appointed as directors,
companies in Kenya continue to be run by incompetent, negligent, and fraudulent
directors. A survey conducted between October 2001 and January 2002 in Nairobi
indicated that the disqualification regime in Kenya is ineffective. 35 Eighty-nine
percent of the respondents felt that there is little chance of directors being sued for
breach of duties when companies enter liquidation. Ninety-two per cent of the
respondents took the view that disqualification orders are extremely rare.
27 It is considered likely for directors without a stake in the company to manage a company less
efficiently. See Mayson et al, Company Law, (Seventeenth edition, Blackstone Press, 2000) p 437
28 Section 183.
29 Section 186. This provision does not apply if the company's articles provide otherwise or where
special notice of the resolution to appoint the director was given to the company.
39 Section 188 makes it a criminal offence to so act.
31 Section 189.
32 Private companies are not subject to the age limit. See Section 186 (5).
33 Disqualification of directors is considered in detail in Chapter 8.
34 Directors must be natural persons, minors may not be appointed as directors, and directors should
also have share qualifications. See sections 183 (1) and 186 of the Act.
35 The results of the survey are discussed in detail in Chapter Nine.
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The failure to prevent such persons from being appointed has made it possible for
people who have contributed to the insolvency of companies 36 not only to be
appointed to other directorships, 37but also to serve as Government Ministers and
Assistant Ministers. 38 For instance, in spite of some 45 parastatals and companies in
which the Government has shares being placed in receivership since 1980 some
directors who were responsible for the collapse of such companies have not only
been appointed to other positions of directorships but they have also been appointed
to the Cabinet. For example, despite the allegations levelled against the former
managing directors of the defunct Kenya National Assurance and Kenya Posts and
Telecommunications Corporations, Henry Kosgey and Kipng'eno arap Ng'eny
respectively, the two were appointed to direct other companies and subsequently
appointed to the Cabinet.
The Act does not provide any criteria for share qualification of directors. It leaves
the qualification to be fixed by the company in general meeting. 39 This not only
prevents directors from using their votes to influence the decision of the general
meeting, but also makes it possible for directors who are unwilling or incapable of
investing in a company, to work for it. It may be argued, however, that such
directors are not better placed to safeguard the interests of the company, since they
have no stake in it. Although it is true to say that directors with a stake in a
company tend to be more efficient, as their rewards are tied to the prosperity of the
company,4° it is also the case that a sizeable stake would enable them to influence
voting in general meetings.41
36 "45 Parastatals, Govt Finns in Receivership", East African Standard, July 12, 2001.
37 "The tragedy in Kenya is that those who have mismanaged the Government, the Development
Finance Institutions, and even multinational corporations are those who continue to circulate in and
out of Government as ministers, assistant ministers, advisers and so on." See Nyong'o, "How Bad
Governance Strangles Business", Daily Nation, June 10, 2001.
38 "How Bad Governance Strangles Business", Daily Nation, June 10, 2001.
39 Article 77, Table A. Companies that do not adopt Table A of the Act can impose conditions of
share qualification. If this is done, the conditions must be fulfilled.
°Riley, "The Company Director's Duty of Care and Skill: The Case for an Onerous but Subjective
Standard", (1999) 62 MLR 697 at 704.
41 In Bushell v Faith [1970] AC 1099, the Court of Appeal held that since section 184 of the
Companies Act, 1948, did not prevent certain shares from having special voting rights attached to
them on certain occasions, it did not invalidate an article giving the shares of a director loaded voting
rights.
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2.3.3 Types of Directors
The Act defines a director as "any person occupying the position of a director, by
whatever name called". 42 Although this definition ensures that a person who is not
appointed as a director, but who acts as a director, does not escape liability, it casts
some doubts as to where the actual powers of company management lies, as any
officer in the company to whom powers have been delegated might be referred to as
a director. As such, the definition includes in its ambit persons who are not duly
appointed by the company as directors, as it operates to include any person whose
work, duties, and obligations to the shareholders are similar to those of a director.
2.3.3.1 Alternate Directors
Section 139 of the Act allows a company to authorise a person to act as its
representative at any meeting of the company or at any meeting of any class of
members of the company. The representative is usually referred to as the "alternate
director." The alternate director may be another member of the board or a different
person. His appointment must be approved by a resolution of directors. Although an
alternate director acts on behalf of the appointing director, he is not an agent of the
appointor. As such, he is responsible for his own acts and is not bound to vote
according to the instructions of the appointor. His appointment ceases when the
appointor vacates office.43
Although having alternate directors may be deemed inappropriate on the basis that
some alternate directors may not normally qualify to be directors under usual
circumstances, it is not in doubt that they can play a crucial role in the management
of the company, as they serve as deputies of directors in their absence and get the
experience of running companies.
Section 139 permits a corporation, if it is a member of another corporation, to
"authorise such person as it thinks fit to act as its representative at any meeting of
the company." Given that this provision allows various persons to represent the
corporation in various occasions, it might be difficult to attach liability to any one
person. As a result, it is desirable for a corporation to appoint a permanent
42 Section 2 (1) being a director is categorised as "holding office rather than being an employee." See
McMillan v Guest [1942] AC 561.
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representative, duly approved by the general meeting, on the board so as to cure the
defects of multiple representation of a corporation, a problem envisaged by the
Jenkins Report.44
2.3.3.2 Company Chairman
A company chairman is endowed with the responsibility of supervising and
presiding over board meetings. In the event that votes become tied in a board
meeting, the chairman has the right to a casting or second vote.45
2.3.3.3 De Facto Directors
Instead of being appointed to a directorship, a de facto director performs duties,
which are usually performed by a director. A person may therefore be regarded as a
de facto director where:
"Clear evidence that he had been either the sole person
directing the affairs of the company (or acting with others all
equally lacking in a valid appointment) or, if there were
others who were true directors, that he was acting on an
equal footing with the others in directing the affairs of the
company. 1,46
Tasks performed by a manager below board level are not sufficient to make one a de
facto director, as the functions in question must relate to tasks ordinarily performed
by a director. 47
A de facto director is treated as an ordinary director for all purposes. This was
illustrated in the case of R v Ivan Arthur Camps 48where the respondent was charged
with several offences, including failure to acquire necessary share qualification,
under the Act. The East African Court of Appeal considered whether the respondent
43 Artcile 6, Table A of the Act.
44 Report of the Company Law Committee, Cmnd 1749, Para 99 (1962).
45 Article 60, Table A.
46 Re Richborough Furniture [1996] 1 BCLC 507 at 524, per Timothy Lloyd QC.
47 Re Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 183; Re Kaytech International Plc Portier v Secretary
of State for Trade and Industry [1999] BCC 390.
48 [1962] EA 403.
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could be regarded as a director given that he had not acquired the qualifying shares.
The Court held that:
"(i) The word director in the Companies Ordinance includes
a de facto director unless the context otherwise requires, and
looking at the mischiefs at which the sections in question is
aimed a de facto director is as much a person whose conduct
should be the subject of the sections as a person who has
been duly appointed as a director.
(ii) The respondent was validly and duly appointed a de jure
director but he ceased to be a de jure director two months
later as he failed to acquire his share qualification within that
time.
(iii) If the respondent acted as a director after the expiration
of two months from his appointment he was then a de facto
director and he was a director for the purposes of those
sections of the Companies Ordinance which it was alleged
he contravened:49
2.3.3.4 Managing Director
Article 107 of Table A provides that "the directors may delegate any of their powers
to committees consisting of such member or members of their body as they think fit;
any committee so formed shall in the exercise of the powers so delegated conform to
any regulation that may be imposed on it by the directors." This article empowers
the board of directors to appoint one director, the managing director, to run the daily
affairs of the company.
2.3.3.5 Non-Executive and Executive Directors
A non-executive director is a person who is involved in the management of a
company, but who does not devote his whole working time to the company. Due to
this consideration, a non-executive director receives less remuneration than an
executive director. He receives remuneration at the discretion of the general meeting
and the company's articles determine the length of his term of office.
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Ideally, non-executive directors play a supervisory role on the board. Since they are
usually experienced individuals, they are able to ensure that a board of a company
acts in the interests of a company rather than that of the board members.5°
Sometimes, their role can become ineffective if a powerful managing director
overshadows them. 51 It is for this reason that the UK's Principles of Good
Governance and Code of Best Practice ("Combined Code") provides that:
"The board should include a balance of executive and non-
executive directors (including independent non-executives)
such that no individual or small group of individuals can
dominate the board's decision taking."52
Given that non-executive directors may be liable for breach of their duties to the
company, they have the responsibility of keeping abreast of the activities of the
board.
In contrast, an executive director devotes all his time discharging specific functions
to the company and, in turn, receives more remuneration. 53 The appointment and the
setting out of the terms of service of an executive director are the responsibilities of
the board of directors.
2.3.3.6 Nominee Directors
A majority shareholder in a private company can appoint one or more directors to
represent him on the board. 54 Such a director is referred to as a "nominee director."
A nominee director must act bona fide and in the best interests of the company. In
addition:
"He may take into account and act on the wishes of his
appointor provided he exercises a real discretion and that, in
so doing, the nominee director honestly and reasonably
49 [1962] EA 403 at 404.
50 BR Cheffins, n 6, p 604.
51 Re Polly Peck International Plc (No 2) [1994] 1 BCLC 574.
52 Principle A.3.
53 S Griffin, Company Law: Fundamental Principles (Third edition, Longman, 2000) p 227.
54 Mayson et al, Company Law, (Seventeenth edition, Blackstone Press, 2000) p 449.
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believes he is acting bona fide and in the best interests of the
company. 115 5
The fact that nominee directors are required to disregard the interests of their
appointers, in favour of the shareholders as a whole, may result in them coming into
a collision course with appointors.
Therefore, requiring a nominee director to act only in the interests of the company is
an impossible feat to achieve because he can hardly ignore the instructions and
interests of the appointor.56
2.3.3.7 Shadow Directors
Section 201(9) (a)57 recognises, as directors, persons with whose directions or
instructions58 the directors of a company are accustomed to act. This presupposes
that shareholders at a general meeting do not necessarily appoint directors. A
company must, therefore, have directors whether it appoints them or not, because
those who manage its business will be occupying the position of directors and so
regarded as directors by the law. 59 These persons are referred to as "shadow
directors". 6° Shadow directors61 differ from de facto directors in that shadow
directors are not held out as directors. Also, the degree of control over company's
affairs required for a person to be regarded a shadow director is more than that
required for a de facto director. 62 Shadow directors can be held liable for breach of
their duties as directors.63
55 Crutchfield, "Nominee Directors: The Law and Commercial Reality", (1991) 12 Co Law, 136.
56 'bid at 137.
57 The Act. UK's Companies Act 1985 also recognises shadow directors under section 741 (2).
58 Advice given in a professional capacity does not make the adviser a shadow director. See Mayson
et al, Company Law, (Seventeenth edition, Blackstone Press, 2000) p 437.
59 Section 2 (1) defmes a director as "any person occupying the position of a director, by whatever
name called."
60 A shadow director is different from a de jure and a de facto director. For a distinction see Re
Hydrodam (Corby) Ltd [1994] 2 BCLC 180. Also see the discussion in Griffin, "The Characteristic
and Identification of a De Facto Director", [2000] Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review
126.
61 The UK legislation recognises shadow directors, albeit taking a different approach by
distinguishing them from other directors by using the term "shadow director." See s 741 (1) UK
Companies Act 1985.
62 S Griffin, op cit n 53, p 231.
63 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3) [1968] 1 WLR 1555.
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It is important for all directors to be accustomed to act regularly 64 in accordance
with the instructions of a person for that person to be termed a shadow director.65
Thus, the following conditions needs to be met for a person to be called a shadow
director:
"It is not necessary to show that the person gives directions
or instructions on every matter on which the directors act,
but it must be shown that the person has a real influence66 in
the company's corporate affairs; whether any particular
communication should be classed as a direction or
instruction is for the court to determine objectively; advice
(provided it is not professional advice) may be a direction or
instruction; it is not necessary to show that the directors
adopted a subservient role or surrendered their discretion;
despite the use of the term "shadow director" it is not
necessary to characterise the person as 'lurking in the
shadows'. It is possible for a person to be a shadow director
quite openly."67
Due to the difficulty that might be encountered while determining whether a person
is a director, it would be more appropriate to define directors specifically as persons
appointed by the company or those held out by the company as directors and make
provision for their appointment by the general meeting to avoid the possibility of
shareholders being misled by the wide definition.68
2.4 Powers of Management
2.4.1 Division of Powers Between Members and Directors
It is incumbent upon directors, as agents for the company, to perform their duties
collectively as a board and not individually. The central role played by directors in
64 Re Unisoft Group Ltd (No 3) [1994] 1 BCLC 609 at 620.
65 Kuwait Asia Bank EC v National Mutual Life Nominees Ltd [1991] 1 AC 187 at 223.
66 Deciding which cheques drawn by the company would not be submitted to the bank was sufficient
interest to render an accountant a shadow director in Re Tasbian Ltd (No 3) [1992] BCC 358.
67 Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v Deverell [2000] 2 WLR 907 (CA).
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steering a company calls for the highest performance and competence. Failure by a
director to act diligently may warrant either removal by the shareholders or the
initiation of a court action for any fraud or breach of duty.
The company vests some of its management powers in the directors, 69 subject to the
articles of the company, while others are reserved to the general meeting. 7° The
board of directors is the body that has the power to make decisions and determine
the delegation of powers. The board transacts business through board meetings that
are regulated by the articles of a company. Given that the board is able to delegate
its powers to one or more directors, 71 it is able to carry out its regular functions
without having to pass resolutions.
Being independent from shareholders, directors are not servants to obey directions
given by shareholders as individuals, because they have the ability to exercise the
powers that are vested in them by the articles.72
The power of the board to manage the company was upheld by the East African
Court of Appeal in Peter G Ellis v NG Bailey & Co (East Africa) Ltd 73 where the
appellant challenged the termination of his directorship by other directors. The
ground upon which the director challenged the termination was that the resolution
by directors had not been passed in a general meeting, as required by clause 68 of
Table A of the Act. Finding that the directors had power to dismiss the appellant, the
Court held that the power of management of directors was not affected by the power
of the general meeting to determine the appointment of the appellant in general
meeting. Newbold JA observed:
68 Nigeria Law Reform Commission, Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law:
Volume 1-Review and Recommendations, 1987, pp 174.
69 Table A, arts 102, 107-109 provide for the delegation by the board of their powers to committees of
one or more or to a managing director.
7° Table A, Article 80 of the Companies Act Cap 486 provides that "the business of the company
shall be managed by the directors, who may pay all expenses incurred in promoting and registering
the company, and may exercises all such powers of the company as are not, by the Act or by these
regulations, required to be exercised by the company in general meeting..."
71 Table A, article 72.
72 "I cannot see anything in principle to justify the contention that the directors are bound to comply
with the votes of resolutions of a simple majority of an ordinary meeting of shareholders. It is not
true to say that directors are mere agents. Directors are managing partners." See Automatic Self-
cleansing Filter Syndicate Co Ltd V Cunninghame [1906] 2 Ch 34 per Cozen-Hardy LJ at 44.
73 [1962] EA 26.
47
"Table A gives to the directors a power to appoint a
managing director on such terms as may be agreed. Such
terms could include a provision that the managing director
was to continue as such for a specified period or a provision
that he was not to be dismissed without reasonable
notice.. .there remains the overriding power of the company
in general meeting to terminate the appointment. But, subject
to the dismissal not being contrary to any terms, express or
implied, of the appointment, the directors by having the
power to appoint, inherently also have the power to
dismiss."74
Shareholders can only control the exercise of powers vested in the directors 75 by
altering the articles. 76 A shareholder may, nevertheless, enforce the articles against
the directors by means of the general contractual right to compel the company to
conduct its affairs in accordance with the Artieles. 77 The division of powers
between shareholders and directors clearly separates ownership of companies from
their control. However, although directors are independent from shareholders, they
remain fiduciaries of the company. As such, the courts can control their powers to
ensure that they act in the interests of the company.
There are two opposing views regarding whether Article 80 of Table A 78 vests
exclusive management competence in the directors. 79 Article 80, which explains the
power to manage a company states:
74 Ibid at 30.
75 The Articles of association provide for the regulation of the internal administration of the company.
76 Section 13 of the Companies Act gives powers to the Company to alter or add to its Articles by
passing a special resolution. It states that 'any alteration made in the Articles shall, subject to the
provisions of the Act, be as valid as if originally contained therein.'
77 Wedderbum, "Shareholders' Rights and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle", [1957] CUJ 194, 212.
78 Table A is part of the Act.
79 The two views are discussed by Homby, "The Relationship Between the Board of Directors and the
General Meeting in Limited Companies", (1977) 93 LQR 569; A Berle and G Means, The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932) [Reprint,
Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 1991].
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"The business of the company shall be managed by the
directors who may... exercise all such powers as are not by
the Act or by these regulations, required to be exercised by
the company in general meeting, subject nevertheless, to any
of these regulations, to the provisions of the Act and to such
regulations being not inconsistent with the aforesaid
regulations or provisions as may be prescribed by the
company in general meeting."
The minority view relating to the interpretation of this Article recognises that
directors have the authority to manage a company subject to the constraints of the
articles, 80 the provisions of the Act, and regulations prescribed by the company in
general meeting.8I
On the other hand, members are seen, under the majority view, 82 to have no
authority to give directions on how the company affairs are managed. 83 They cannot
also overrule any decision arrived at by the directors in the conduct of its business.84
While it is the case that shareholders in general meeting can give controlling
directions to the board in matters of management by passing ordinary resolutions,85
such intervention is "subject to the proviso that the management function must
reside in the directors." 86 Any shareholder intervention87 that is too frequent to
80 Marshall's Valve Gear Co Ltd v Manning, Wardle & Co Ltd [1909]! Ch 267, 274.
81 For a detailed comment on the need for directors to be controlled by members see, Sullivan, "The
Relationship Between the Board of Directors and the General Meeting in Limited Companies",
(1977) 93 LQR 569.
82 PL Davies, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, (Sixth Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997)
p 632.
83 The power derived from Table A, article 70 that permits directors to litigate in the name of
registered company cannot be controlled by members. See John Shaw and Sons (Salford) v Shaw
[1935] 2 KB 113.
84 Dowse v Marks (1913) SR (NSW) 332.
85 If the shareholders pass a resolution directing the board to invest in one manner rather than another,
the board must manage the company in such a manner as gives effect to the resolution. Traditionally,
shareholders could not remove directors in the UK unless those articles provided for powers to
dismiss. (Imperial Hydropathic Hotel Co; Blackpool v Hampson (1882) 23 Ch D 1). However, this
position has since changed and members of a company can dismiss company directors by passing
ordinary resolutions. See Table A of the Companies Act 1985, article 70 and section 303 Companies
Act 1985.
86 Homby, "The Relationship Between the Board of Directors and the General Meeting in Limited
Companies", (1977) 93 LQR 569 at 578.
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exclude discretion in the implementation of policy will, therefore, be unjustified.
While it may seem that the ultimate authority of the company is the board of
directors, it remains true that such authority lies in the constitution of the company.
Therefore, although the members may regard the company as "their company"
because they own it, they cannot override the powers that the directors have been
given by them in Articles. Unless members change the articles by special resolution
or change the directors by ordinary resolution, they must yield to the authority of
directors. 88 Moreover, a general meeting is incapable of retrospectively reversing or
annulling the boards acts or decisions.89
The management powers vested in the general meeting include: election of directors,
remuneration of directors, declaration of dividends, and removal of directors from
office.
2.5 Relationship with the company
2.5.1 Are Directors Trustees or Agents?
The constitution of a company, which has contractual effect as between the
members and the company, govern the rights and obligations of directors.9°
The Act does not indicate the precise relationship that the directors bear to the
company, but common law and equity principles provide some guidelines. Common
law deems directors as "commercial men managing a trading concern for the benefit
of themselves and of all the shareholders in it. They stand in a fiduciary position
towards the company in respect of their powers and capital under their control."91
87 Ibid at 579. Hornby observes that the right of intervention under Article 80 is largely theoretical
because the shareholders are usually too numerous to act effectively as a body, and have largely
acquiesced in effective control by the board of directors.
88 In Scott v Scott [1943] 1 All ER 582 it was held that a unanimous resolution by all the members to
declare a certain dividend was of no effect unless the directors approved it.
89 Loose et al, The Company Director, Seventh Edition (Jordans, 1993) p 97.
90 Section 22 of the Companies Act Cap 486 state that "the memorandum and articles, when
registered, bind the company and its members to the same extent as if they had been signed and
sealed by each member and as if they contained covenants on the part of each member to observe all
their provisions."
91 Re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Company (1878) 10 Ch D 450 per Jessel MR at 452.
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In some key respects, the general principles of principal and agent regulate the
relationship of the company and its directors, 92 as directors are deemed to be agents
of the company. For instance, in relation to contracts entered into by a director, it is
normally the company and not the director who is liable. 93 If he exceeds his
authority he may be liable to a third party for breach of warranty of authority.94
Similarly, like other agents he must account to his principal for any personal profit
made by him out of his position. 95 Despite these similarities with an agent, a
director, however, differs from other agents in that he is in control of the affairs of
his own principal.
Although they have been seen, traditionally, as agents of the company, in respect of
the transactions entered into on behalf of the company, 96 some modern writers do
not agree with this classification. Gower observes:
"The directors have ceased to be mere agents of the
company. Both they and members in general meeting are
primary organs of the company between whom the company
powers are divided."97
Since directors also manage the affairs of the company for the benefit of the
shareholders, they are sometimes referred to as trustees. 98 For instance, they can be
regarded as mere trustees, 99 in respect of the money and property they are entrusted
with, the exercise of all powers which they are authorised to exercise on the
company's behalf, such as allotting shares, entering into contracts, making calls etc.
As such, directors who occasion losses to a company by acting beyond the authority
92 Ferguson v Wilson (1866) LR 2 Ch App 77.
93 Briess v Wolley [1954] AC 333; Elkington &Co v Hurter [1892] 2 Ch 452.
94 Firbank's Exors v Humphreys [1886] 18 QBD 54.
95 In Allen v Hyatt (1914) 30 TLR 444, directors were held liable to members for making undisclosed
profit from the sale of members' shares. Also see Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley
[1972] 2 All ER 86.
96 GE Railway v Turner (1872) LR 8 Ch App 149.
97 PL Davies, op cit n 82, p 632.
98 Romilly MR in York and North Midland Rly V Hudson (1853) 16 Beav 485 saw it as an office of
trust which, if they undertake, it is their duty to perform fully and entirely.
99 In law, trustees are persons in whom the legal ownership of assets is vested, which they must
administer for the benefit of the beneficiaries who can enforce their interests by suing the trustees.
See A Hussain, Company Law in Kenya, (East African Educational Publishers, 1993), p 104.
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conferred upon them are accountable for the misapplication on ordinary trust
principles.
Directors could therefore be rightly described as trustees on the basis that any assets
in their hands are held on trust for the company, 1 °° their powers must be exercised
for the benefit of the company, i ° and that they are in a fiduciary position and their
personal interests must not conflict with their duties to the company.
102 However,
directors differ from trustees because the trust property is not vested in them, their
duties of management involve taking risks as opposed to those of a trustee, and their
duties of skill and care are lower than those of ordinary tnistees. 103 In addition, a
trustee, unlike a director, can only resign from the trust when he has carried out his
duties to the courts' satisfaction. On the other hand, the role of a director, such as
initiating the venture of a company, is almost wholly discretionary. 104
Despite the difficulty in classifying directors, it is not in doubt that directors exercise
their duties for a corporate body, which implies a relationship akin to an agency-
principal relationship. Given that shareholders entrust them with the management of
the enterprise, monies, and property, m5 their relationship with directors resembles
that of beneficiaries and trustees. This was clearly summed up by Romer J in Re City
Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd:
"It has sometimes been said that directors are trustees. If this
means no more than that directors in the performance of their
duties stand in a fiduciary relationship to the company, the
statement is true enough. But if the statement is meant to be
an indication by way of analogy of what those duties are it
appears to me to be wholly misleading.", 106
100 Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3) [1969] 2 All ER 1073.
101 In Piercy v S Mills & Co Ltd [1920] 1 Ch 77, it was held that directors must not issue shares for
the purposes of maintaining their control.
102 Scottish CWS Ltd v Meyer [1958] 3 All ER 66.
103 Loose et al, The Company Director, Seventh Edition (Jordans, 1993) p 32.
104 Sealy, "The Director as Trustee", [1967] CU 83 at 89.
105 In GE Ry v Turner (1872) LR 8 Ch App 149, Lord Selboume held that directors are mere trustees
or agents of the company, that is, trustees of the company monies and property, and agents in the
transactions which they enter into on behalf of the company.
106 (1925) Ch 407, 426.
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Although they are not trustees in a strict sense it is clear that directors stand in a
fiduciary relationship, as trustees of money, which come into, their hands or which
is under their control. Therefore, they must exercise their powers not in their own
interest, but honestly in the interests of the company. 1 °7 A fiduciary relationship is
imposed upon them and this means that directors owe duties of loyalty and good
faith, similar to those imposed upon a trustee. As agents, directors are under an
obligation to exercise due diligence and skill in exercise of their powers. 108 The
exact ambit of these powers has to be derived from a mass of judge-made law,
which is not clear.
2.5.2 Power to bind the company
Any contractual transaction entered into by directors which goes beyond the
constitution of a company is treated as ultra vires, 109and therefore void. Directors in
Kenya are able to bind their company if they act within their powers and within the
constitution. A person involved in a transaction with a company is deemed to have
constructive notice of the objects clause of a company."° The constructive notice
rule deems anyone dealing with a company as having notice of the contents of the
public documents filed in the Companies' Registry. The application of the rule was
illustrated in The Commissioner General of Income Tax v Ivory Safaris Ltd 111 where
the Kenyan Commissioner General of Income Tax granted Mr York a clearance
certificate enabling him to leave the country on the belief that he was not indebted to
the Commissioner. The Commissioner issued the clearance certificate on the
strength of a surety bond for Kenya shillings 10, 000 (£100) allegedly signed by
Ivory Safaris Ltd. The seal of the surety bond was affixed in the presence of a
managing director, rather than in the presence of a director and a secretary or a
second director, as required by the constitution of the company. Subsequently, the
Commissioner sued Ivory Safaris Ltd for the surety when it appeared that Mr. York
was indebted to the Commissioner in a sum of Kenya shillings 3685 (£ 40). The suit
was, however, dismissed on the premise that the bond was not valid as its seal was
101 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421.
l °8 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co [1925] Ch 407.
I" The ultra vires rule was effectively abolished in the UK by section 110 of the Companies Act
1989.
"0 astern Counties Railway v Hawkes (1885) 5 HLC 331.
111 [1972] High Court of Kenya Civil Appeal No 113 of 1971.
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affixed in the presence of the managing director, rather than two people, as required
by the Articles of Association. The court relied on the principle that the
Commissioner, as a person dealing with a limited company, ought to have had
notice of the regulation of the company. The court also noted the provisions of Table
A, Article 13 112 vIhich reads:
"The directors shall provide for the safe custody of the seal,
which shall only be used by the authority of the directors or
of a committee of the directors authorised by the directors in
that behalf; and every instrument to which the seal shall be
affixed shall be signed by the director and shall be
countersigned by the secretary or by a second director or by
some other person appointed by the directors for the
purpose."
However, an outsider is not affected by a defect in the internal management
procedures of the company, where the affairs of the company are seemingly
conducted in accordance with the constitution of the company. This was illustrated
in Emco Plastica International Ltd v Freeberne 113 where a company appointed a
Secretary by resolution of the board for a minimum term of five years. The
managing director signed the letter containing the terms of his employment. When
the company purported to dismiss the respondent, before the expiry of his term, he
sued for benefits under the contract. The company contended that the managing
director did not have the authority to make the contract, as he was not authorised by
the board or the company's articles. The court found that the contract was binding,
as it was made within the scope of the ostensible authority of the managing director.
Finding that the respondent was not obliged to enquire whether the Articles of
Association had been complied with, Lutta JA observed:
112 Similarly, Section 180 of the Companies Act was noted:"A provision requiring or authorising a
thing to be done by or to a director and the secretary shall not be satisfied by its being done by or to
the same person acting both as director and as, or in place of, the secretary." The court relied on
Royal British Bank v Turquand [1856] All ER 435 and Panorama Developments (Guildford) Limited
v Fidelis Furnishing Fabrics Ltd [1971] 3 WLR 440.
113 [1971] EA 432.
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"Someone had to represent the appellant company in the
conduct of its business, particularly at the initial period, and
such person must surely have authority to bind the appellant
company. Thus a third party dealing with the appellant
company was entitled to assume that there was authority on
the part of that person to bind the appellant company. The
question as to whether or not the Articles of Association or a
resolution of the board empowered the chairman or any other
director to enter into a contract binding the appellant
company was not a matter into which the third party should
have inquired as long as he acted on a representation that the
chairman or director had authority to bind the appellant
company. ..the respondent, being the Secretary of the
company, was not placed in a position different from that of
an outsider, who is entitled to assume in the absence of
knowledge to the contrary that a director signing a contract
has authority to do so."114
2.6 Conclusions
Directors occupy the most important position in a company. As such, whilst their
failure to discharge their duties properly can impact on a company negatively, due
diligence and efficacy on their part can result in benefits. To ensure that a company
realises profits, directors must exercise their powers in the interests of the company
rather than their own.
The board of directors, being independent from shareholders, has significant powers
to conduct the affairs of the company. Although the autonomy of the boards of
private companies helps them to make sound decisions on behalf of companies
without unnecessary interference from shareholders and other stakeholders, it is also
true that the autonomy can be used for the benefit of individual directors rather than
the company. It is because of such risks that the law requires directors to act in the
best interests of the company.
114 Ibid at 436.
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The autonomy of the boards of private companies is different from that of
parastatals. The boards of parastatals are under obligations to obey directives from
the ministers and the President. Given that they have no autonomy to determine the
policies of parastatals, they tend to be ineffective in the discharge of their duties.
This factor, coupled with the failure to have strict restrictions for appointment of
directors, has made it possible for miscreant directors, who have been responsible
for the insolvency of other companies, to continue serving as directors.
It is now appropriate to move on and examine the obligations that directors owe to
their companies. The next chapter addresses this issue.
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CHAPTER THREE
3.0 OBLIGATIONS OF COMPANY DIRECTORS
3.1 Introduction
Although Kenyan law makes some provisions regarding the obligations of directors,
it is often difficult for directors to know what is expected of them, as some
provisions are somewhat uncertain and insufficient, and the scheme of the law is
cumbersome. This chapter assesses the clarity, certainty, and sufficiency of the law
in preventing breaches of fiduciary obligations and conflicts of interests by directors.
It also considers whether Kenyan law allows directors to consider community
interests when making decisions in an effort to enhance the reputation of companies.
As investors, shareholders expect companies that they invest in to give them a return
on their investment. To achieve this objective, directors of a company seek to
maximise the profits of a company because the failure to do so may lead to their
dismissa1. 1 As observed in Chapter One, contractarian theorists justify wealth
maximisation on the basis that the firm is a unit for all bargaining arrangements
which the participants in a company seek to use so as to maximise wealth through
beneficial bargains. So, shareholders, as participants in a company, are considered by
contractarians to have no other objectives apart from profit maximisation. Besides,
the firm is considered incapable of having other objectives, such as social
responsibility, because it is a nexus of contracts, and not an individual 2 with
"motivations and intentions."
Although stakeholders may suffer when the sole objective of directors is to
maximise the wealth of shareholders, contractarian theories do not regard that as a
sufficient basis for affording legal protection because corporate stakeholders, such
i S Griffin, Company Law: Fundamental Principles, Third Edition (Pearson, 2000) p 245.
2 Contractarians define the firm as "a legal fiction which serves as a focus for a complex process in
which the conflicting objectives of individuals are brought into equilibrium within a framework of
contractual relations." See Jensen and Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency
Costs and Ownership Structure", (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics, 305 at 311.
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as creditors and employees, are considered capable of protecting themselves through
contracts. 3 This view does not recognise the inequality of bargaining power between
rational economic actors within a company. It is for this reason that communitarian
theorists regard the company as an entity having both a public role and a private
one.4 The communitarian theory recognises the need to protect non-shareholders on
the basis that disparities in bargaining power and lack of information make it
impossible for some non-shareholders to protect themselves through contracts.
Whilst profit maximisation may well benefit shareholders, it may also harm them
when the profitability of a company suffers because of its bad reputation. 5 The
reputation of companies that are not socially responsible can be damaged easily by
the widespread consumer activism in the global market. For example, Del Monte
Kenya suffered heavy losses when the workers' unions, local NG0s, and the
representatives of the Catholic church organised a boycott of its products in Italy, a
key destination of the company's products, as a result of the failure on the part of the
company to heed the concerns of employees and the local communities. 6 Although
Del Monte paid its employees relatively well and offered some social facilities, 7 the
wider community felt that the company was not doing enough. As a result of the
publicity of the boycott, the company suffered great losses, 8 which could have been
avoided by reducing the conflict between the management of the company, its
employees, and the community.
In addition to the effect that the failure to take societal interests into account has on
the profitability of companies, breaches of duties of directors also affect the overall
performance of companies, especially when directors of a company impose on the
3 D Millon, "Communitarianism in Corporate Law: Foundations and Law Reform Strategies", in
Lawrence Mitchell (ed), Progressive Corporate Law (Boulder, Colorado, 1995) p 3.
" M Stokes, "Company Law and Legal Theory" in W Twinning (ed), Legal Theory and Common
Law (Twinning ed, 1986) pp 155, 162.
5 According to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), the
environmental consciousness in the developed world contributes to the high number of companies
following its "best practice" code. There are only two companies in Africa that are following the
code. These are South African companies, South African Breweries and Eskom. See Otieno, "Why
Corporate Bodies are Turning Green", Daily Nation, September 20, 2001.
6 The boycott was called off when the company bound itself to invest in social facilities, like schools,
health and education to benefit the workers, their families and the neighbouring communities. See
"Lobbies call off Products Boycott", Daily Nation, 18 March 2001.
7 Such as housing and education for employees' children and healthcare. See Kent, "CSR Investment




board decisions that are against the interests of the company. The 1999 audit report9
on Kenya Tea Development Authority indicated that the decisions of the company to
award tenders are usually made outside the boardroom largely because of the
interests that directors have in them. The report gave one example where the
members of the board became divided over an attempt by some directors to impose a
decision on the entire board. To win the support of the directors who dissented, the
company which won the tender sponsored a fully paid up trip to Finland for three
directors, managing director, two senior officers and two farmers. The audit report
also established a host of reasons bedevilling the corporation. These included:
irregular tendering and procurement of goods and services, inadequate budget
controls, splitting of invoices and under selling of tea, disposals of assets at throw
away prices, using company's resources to finance mismanagement in general,
especially unnecessary and irregular acquisition of assets. In all, these factors have
contributed to the low returns borne by farmers. The returns as a proportion of the
value of delivered tea dropped from an all time high of 97 percent in 1993 to 64
percent in 1999. A total loss of 167 million Kenyan Shillings (£1.67 million) was
borne by farmers through irregular procurement procedures between 1995/96 and
1998 99 when some 206, 000 metric tonnes of fertilisers were imported. I°
3.2 The Kenyan Context
As noted in Chapter One, the duties of directors in Kenya are not codified in the
Companies Act (the "Act"). / I As such, the principles underlying them are found in
the English common law. 12
3.2.1 The Nature of Responsibilities
As observed in Chapter Two, duties of directors share some similarities with the
duties of trustees. I3 However, whilst trustees of a will or settlement are under a duty
to be cautious and to avoid risks, directors must take risks for the purposes of
9 Mogusu, "Audit Report Uncovers Massive Graft at KTDA", East African Standard, I March, 2000.
to Mogusu T, Ibid.
ti Chapter 486, Laws of Kenya.
12 Section 3 (1) (c), Judicature Act, Cap 8 of the Laws of Kenya.
13 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co [1925] Ch 407, per Romer J at 426.
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earning profit for the company. As such, the duties of directors embrace not only
the fiduciary duties of loyalty and good faith, but also duties of skill and care. 14
To ensure that companies are administered fairly, Kenyan company law requires
directors to act bona fide in the best interests of the company. They are also required
to act for proper purposes and not to make secret profits or allow their personal
interests to conflict with their duties to the company. These principles are illustrated
in the East African Court of Appeal 15 decision in Trevor Price and Another v
Raymond Kelsa11, 16 where the first appellant (Trevor) and the respondent (Raymond)
made an oral investment arrangement before incorporation of a company. They
agreed to obtain leases of two tea estates and transfer the leases to the company
upon incorporation. Raymond successfully applied for the two leases as agreed, and
both parties agreed in 1947 to transfer the estates to the company when it was finally
incorporated. Despite these arrangements, Raymond intentionally failed to include
Kiko estate in their agreement. He (Raymond), however, renewed the lease of Kiko
on the strength of a licence which had been issued to the company to plant tea, and
developed the estate with the company's money. The lease was issued in his own
name rather than the company's. The new lease of Kiko was given in 1953 and it
obliged Raymond to plant tea and erect a factory in accordance with the licence held
by the company. Trevor learnt in 1956 that Kiko was not held in the name of the
company and, therefore, brought an action to protect the company.
The court established that the balance sheets of the company, dating from 1948
onwards, which Raymond had signed, referred to Kiko in their entries. The estate
had largely been developed with the funds from the company. Raymond averred that
the oral agreement for the transfer of Kiko to the company was made before the
incorporation of the company and it could not therefore ratify it when it came into
existence. 17
14 PL Davies, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, (Sixth Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997),
p 599.
15 The East African Court of Appeal served as a common appellate court for Kenya, Uganda, and
Tanzania between 1967 to 1977 when the East African Co-operation (EAC) existed. The EAC was
an inter-governmental organisation with the mandate to promote regional integration and
development among the three republics.
16 [1957] EA 752.
17 The court found that certain circumstances allow it to infer the creation of a new contract, after
ratification, to the effect of the previous unratifiable contract. The court adopted the dictum of Jessel,
M R, in Re Empress Engineering Co (1880), 16 Ch D 125 at 128.
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The East African Court of Appeal held that Raymond in his role as a director was in
a fiduciary position relative to the company. As such, any benefits he had, he held
on a constructive or resulting trust in favour of the company. This was attested to by
the fact that Raymond had for years deliberately concealed from the company, its
accountant, its auditor, and his co-director, that he had in 1953 obtained a lease of
Kiko in his own name. The court' 8 observed that Raymond held the title to Kiko on
trust for the company because:
"The respondent [Raymond] was in a fiduciary position vis a
vis the company from the start; in order to obtain the lease he
made use of the licence issued to the company, he spent the
company's money on development and in breach of duty
acquired a title to Kiko in his own name....If I am wrong in
thinking that the respondent [Raymond] stood in a fiduciary
position towards the company as a promoter even before its
formation, he certainly stood in a fiduciary position vis a vis
the company from his appointment as one of its directors and
as its resident manager. The respondent [Raymond] was not
in a position himself to develop Kiko as a tea estate. In order
to obtain the lease, he made use of the licence, which had
been issued, not to him, but to the company. In breach of his
agreement with the first appellant [Trevor] and the company
and in breach of his duty towards the company, he acquired a
title to Kiko in his own name concealing that transaction. He
spent the company's money on development. He attempted
to make out of this a pecuniary advantage for himself. It
seems clear to me that a court of equity should decree that he
holds the title to Kiko on trust for the company."19
Other aspects of the fiduciary duties owed by directors are illustrated in the case of
Flagship Carriers Ltd v Imperial Bank Ltd, 2° where the directors of Flagship
18 The court followed the judgement in Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas
1218 at 1236. The court also referred to Gluckstein v Barnes (8) [1900] AC 240 at 256, which relates
to promoters as fiduciaries.
19 Trevor Price and Another v Raymond Kelsall [1957] EA 752 at 753, Per Sir Kenneth O'Connor, P.
20 High Court Civil Case No 1643 of 1999 (Unreported), Ruling per PJS Hewett.
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Carriers sought a temporary injunction to restrain its receivers from dealing with any
assets of the company. They also sought the appointment of an impartial and
competent receiver on the basis that the receivers, appointed under a debenture held
by the defendant, had failed to carry out lucrative contracts, failed to manage
Flagship's business profitably, and allowed their interests to conflict with those of
Flagship. The directors contended that one of the receivers was closely associated
with a competitor of Flagship. On the other hand, the receivers averred that the
directors had refused to co-operate with them and, in turn, had hidden some
vehicles, allowed vehicles to be repossessed by outside financiers, and refused to
surrender accounts and the statement of affairs. Finding that the directors were in
breach of their obligations, the High Court maintained that directors had obligations
to the company and to the receivers to:
"act bona fide in the interest of and for the benefit of the
company as a whole...; act for proper purposes and in a
proper manner; act in a sense as quasi-trustees for the
company assets so that they can, for example, be held liable
should they misapply any of the same; not to make secret
profits, and to avoid conflicts of interests and duty." 21
Dismissing the application, Mr. PJS Hewett, Commissioner of Assize 22 observed
that:
"had there been on the evidence one clear proven example of
the receivers acting improperly that would have been
sufficient... If the company is such a good and valuable
operation, why hide some of the vehicles and keep back
from the receivers matters which would undoubtedly help
them to make a better judgement as to the wisdom or
otherwise of continuing the transport business.. .1 am not
satisfied that the directors have acted in good faith." 23
21 Ibid at 5.
22 The term refers to a part time judge.
23 Op cit n 20, at 11.
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To permit a conflict of the duties of directors and their personal interests would
probably be detrimental for a company, 24as it encourages competition with the
company and misuse of the property, 25 information or opportunity of the company.
The rules governing directors will now be considered in turn.
3.2.2 Duty to act in good faith.
Directors have a duty to act "bona fide in what they consider, not what a court may
consider, is in the interests of the company and not for any collateral purpose".26
While this duty may seem to suggest that a subjective test is invoked to establish
honesty, directors may still be liable where they have acted honestly, but failed to
direct their minds to the question whether a transaction was in the interest of the
company. 27 If directors, for instance, are found not to have acted in the interests of
the company, their honesty is irrelevant. 28 Unlike the collective duties of a board of
directors, the duties of good faith are owed 29 by each director3° individually31 to the
company alone.32
24 According to the decision in Movitex Ltd v Bulfield (1986) 2 BCC 99, 403 at 99, 449 directors do
not owe duties to the company not to make unauthorised profits and not to be in a position in which
interests and duty conflict. Instead, the no-conflict and no-profit rules allow the courts to give the
company a remedy when a director makes any unauthorised profit from the directorship. However,
the no conflict and no profit rules are regarded as duties of loyalty in the USA. See Mayson et al,
Company Law (16th Ed, Blackstone Press, 1999) p 519.
25 Directors are not allowed to exploit business opportunities specifically rejected by their companies.
See Regal Hastings Ltd v Gulliver (1967) 2 AC 1347.
26 Per Lord Greene MR in Re Smith v Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304.
27 Re W & M Roith Ltd [1967] 1 WLR 443. A pension transaction made by a director solely for his
widow was held to be not binding on the company because no thought had been given to the question
whether the arrangement was for the benefit of the company.
28 Bowen LJ in Hutton v West Cork Railway Co (1883) 23 Ch D 654 at 671.
29 Both the Cohen (Cmnd 6659, paras. 86 and 87) and the Jenkins' (Cmnd 1749, paras 89 and 99 (b))
Committees criticised this position and the latter rejected it. The position taken in Lindgren v L & P
Estates Ltd [1968] Ch 572 suggests that even directors of a holding company do not owe duties to its
subsidiary when the latter has an independent board of directors.
3° Although the duties of directors only attach from the date their appointment takes effect, they
extend beyond the end of their appointment. In Lindgren v L &P Estates Ltd [1968] Ch 572, a
"director-elect" was held not to be in a fiduciary relationship to the company. A director may not
detrimentally use any information acquired during the subsistence of an appointment after
resignation. See, also, Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley (1972) 2 All ER 162.
31 PL Davies, op cit n 14, p 599
32 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421. Directors may, however, stand in a fiduciary relationship to
the members if members authorise them to negotiate on their behalf. See Briess v Wolley [1954] AC
333; Peskin v Anderson [2000] 2 BCLC 1, [2001] 1 BCLC 372.
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The case of Leisure Lodges Limited v Yashvin A Shretta33 illustrates the nature of the
duty to act in good faith. In that case the respondent, in a petition for winding up,
obtained an interim liquidation order from the High Court after satisfying the court
that Leisure Lodges Ltd was being managed corruptly, illegally, not for the benefit
of all the shareholders, and with the total exclusion of minority shareholders from its
management. The respondent, who held ten percent of the company shares, claimed
that the directors, who were entirely drawn from the majority shareholders, were:
• Manipulating foreign exchange rates, whereby the income of the appellant
company [was] deliberately kept in a secret account in a bank which [was] owned by
the families of the majority shareholders.
• Arranging for a part of the revenue of the appellant company to be paid to tour
operators in foreign bank accounts controlled by the members of the majority
shareholder's family.
• Collecting from foreign debtors of the appellant company money and failing to
account for it to the appellant company.
• Collecting monies belonging to the appellant company and failing to account for
it.
• Entering into contracts with the hotel and club to supply items, such as TV sets
and safes, without disclosing their interests.
• Amending the Articles of Association at the behest of the majority shareholders
and permitting new people to become shareholders in disregard of the articles of
association.
The Court of Appeal upheld an ex parte order for an interim liquidation order and
observed that the directors had failed to act in good faith and as a result the
"company's property was in danger of dissipation, misappropriation, and wasting
from those in control."34
33 Civil Appeal No 10 of 1997 (unreported) in Winding Up Cause No 28 of 1996 (Court of Appeal,
Kenya).
34 Per Justice Tunoi PK Civil Appeal No 10 of 1997 (unreported)
in Winding Up Cause No 23 of 1996.
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For a transaction to be in the best interests of the company, it must be a bona fide
one, be reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the business of the company, and
be done for the benefit, and to promote the prosperity, of the company.35
3.3.3 Exercise of power for proper purpose
The duty to act bona fide in the interests of the company requires directors to
exercise their powers for the purpose for which they are given and not for collateral
purposes. As such, they must keep within the proper limits and avoid using powers
given to them for one purpose for a totally different purpose. 36 Any exercise of the
powers of directors for an improper purpose can be set aside even though the
directors may honestly have believed that they were acting in the interests of the
company. 37
Exercise of power for collateral purposes, 38 as opposed to acting bona fide in the
interests of the company, prompted the Court of Appeal in Kenya to make a
liquidation order in Leisure Lodges Limited v Yashvin A. Shretta39 on the basis that
directors exercised the powers conferred on them for their own benefit.
In the UK, the courts use an objective test 40 to assess whether an intelligent and
honest man in the shoes of a director would have "reasonably believed that the
transactions were for the benefit of the company." 41 As such, the objective duty to
exercise power for the proper purpose supplements the subjective duty to act in good
faith.42 Given that the objective test is more rigorous than the subjective one, the
35 The test does not apply where the powers of the company are explicit. See Bell Houses Ltd v City
Wall Properties Ltd [1966] 2 QB 656 CA Charterbridge Corporation v Lloyds Bank Ltd, [1970] Ch
62 per Pennycuick J. Eve J limited the application of the test to instances where a company's powers
could only be implied. If an intelligent and honest man in the position of a director could have
reasonable believed that the transaction were for the benefit of the company, the said act ought to be
considered bona fide for the interest of the company.
36 Re Cam erons Coalbrook Steam Coal, and Swansea and Lougher Railway Co, Bennet '.c Case
(1854) 5 De GM and G 284 at 298 per Turner U.
37 Australian Growth Resources Corp Pty Ltd v Van Reesema (1988) 6 ACLC 529, 538-539 per King
CJ.
38 Directors are not expected to act on the basis of what is for the economic advantage of the
corporate entity disregarding the interests of the members. See PL Davies, op cit n 14, p 577.
39 Civil Appeal No 10 of 1997 in Winding Up Cause No 23 of 1996 (Court of Appeal, Kenya).
40 The proper purpose test allows the acts of directors to be reviewed by the courts upon a more
objective basis than that applies to bona fides. See Darval (1989) 7 ACLC 659, 676 per Kirby P.
41 Charterbridge Corporation Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1970] Ch 62 per Pennycuick J.
42 In spite of acting honestly, directors may still be held liable if they have exercised their powers for
a purpose which is different from the one power was conferred. See Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Ltd
[1974] AC 821.
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objective duty to act for the best interests of the company has enabled courts to
maintain control over boards of directors in English companies, as opposed to other
Commonwealth countries.43
Since the duty to act in the best interests of the company requires directors to use
powers conferred on them by the articles of association, construction of the articles
determine the criteria used by the courts to determine whether a particular purpose is
proper." In the event that the articles are not explicit, proper purpose, according the
decision in Re The Highlands Commercial Union Limited, may be implied from the
"general obligations and duties which directors incur by the very nature of their
appointment: 45 For instance, when directors are given powers to raise capital
through allotment of shares, such allotment would be improper if its sole objective is
to ensure that directors or other persons gain control of the company. 46 It is worth
noting, however, that the fact that a director's exercise of power benefits him does
not necessarily amount to invalidation of the exercise of power if the benefit accrued
was not the dominant purpose. 47 A scenario of such circumstances may arise where
the directors' exercise of a power leads to two or more effects. If the achieving of
one effect would be a proper purpose, while achieving the other would be improper,
the court determines the overall purpose by considering whether the achieving of
what is regarded as improper" was the substantial purpose or the dominant
purpose.49
In all, the proper purpose test fosters the accountability of directors by allowing
courts to monitor the directors' decision-making more closely.
3.3.4 Unfettered discretion
As trustees of their powers, directors cannot fetter their exercise of powers by
agreeing to vote in a particular way at future board meetings. This principle also
43 Harlowe's Nominees Pty Ltd v Woodside (Lake Entrance) Oil Co (1968) 42 ALJR 123.
44 Re Smith & Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 at 306.
45 Re The Highlands Commercial Union Limited [1957] EA 851, at 858 Per Crawshaw J. Directors
ought to conduct the affairs of the company in an honest and reasonably business-like manner.
46 Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 77, 84.
47 Hirsche v Sims [1894] AC 654; Richard Brady Franks Ltd v Price (1937) 58 CLR 112; Mills v
Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150.
48 Acting bona fide in the interests of the company cannot absolve a director who has acted for a
dominant improper purpose in his own interests. See Ashburton Oil NL v Alpha Minerals NL (1971)
123 CLR 614 at 627 per Menzies J; Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Ltd [1974] AC 821.
49 Whitehouse v Carlton Hotel Pty Ltd (1987) 162 CLR 285 at 294.
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applies where "there is no improper motive or purpose and no personal advantage
reaped by the directors under the agreement." 5° However, where directors are
exercising their discretion in good faith and have entered into a contract on behalf of
the company, they can agree to take any actions necessary to carry out that
contract. 51 Similarly, a nominee director52 can be appointed to a board of another
company by his principal and required to vote in a particular way. To eliminate the
effect of such fettering, the law requires nominee directors to ignore the interests of
the nominator. 53 Due to the impracticability of such a requirement, Ghanaian
Companies Code 1973 requires directors to "give special, but not exclusive,
consideration to the interests" of the nominator.54
Given that directors would not legally fetter their discretion under most
circumstances in Kenya, they are not in a position to benefit from the advantages
that the relaxation of the no fettering rule would have. First, it enables companies,
just like individuals, to enter into beneficial long-term contracts. 55 Second, the
principle allows directors to enter into a contract regarding future advice given to
shareholders on a matter within the shareholders' power of decision. 56 In instances
where shareholders are dependent upon the advice of their directors, the rule allows
directors to give them advice, which reflects the situation as seen, by directors "at
the time it fell to the shareholders to take their decision."57
3.3 Interests Protected by Directors
3.3.1 Obligations to the Corporate Entity
The Act does not specify whether the duty to act bona fide in the interests of the
whole company58 requires directors to consider the interests of the corporate entity59
and present and future members or the company as a whole, including employees.
50 PL Davies, op cit n 14, p 608.
51 Thorby v Goldberg (1964) 112 CLR 597, (Aust HC).
52 The term refers to a director not elected by the shareholders generally but appointed by a particular
class of security holder or creditor to protect their interests.
53 Boulting v ACTT [1963] 2 QB 606 at 626, per Lord Denning MR.
54 PL Davies, op cit n 14, p 608.
55 Ibid.
56 Ibid, p 609.
57 Ibid.
58 Evershed MR in Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas [1951] Ch 286, CA; Peters American Delicacy
Co v Heath (1939) 61 CLR 457.
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Any act considered to be bona fide by the director must be geared towards
promoting the business. 60 The Kenyan Court of Appeal in Zephrine Simon
Muchunguzi and Others v Geoffrey Makana Asayo61 held that it was not in the best
interests of the company to allow receivers and managers to manage the affairs of a
company due to the exorbitant fees payable to them. In that case, Kenya
Commercial Bank appointed the applicants as receivers and managers to sell or
manage the assets of Kwanza Motors pursuant to the provisions of a debenture
which the company had executed. The respondents, who were shareholders and
directors, sought an order to lift the receivership of Kwanza Motors Ltd on the basis
that the receivers were not acting in the best interests of the company as a separate
entity. The Court of Appeal found that the management of the company ought to
revert to the directors. Although this case was concerned with receivers, it clearly
illustrates that receivers, as agents of the company, ought to manage the property of
a company with due diligence and good faith, 62 as would directors.
Gratuitous payments or gifts out of the assets of the company and provision of a
pension to a widow of a former employee 63 have been rendered not to be in the best
interests of the company. 64 Similarly, crediting sums to directors as a "bonus" at a
time when there were no profits available for such purposes was held in Re The
Highlands Commercial Union Limited 65 to amount to breach of trust or duty
because it was not in the best interests of the company. In Re The Highlands
Commercial Union Limited the liquidators of the company applied to court under
section 270 of the Tanzanian Companies Ordinance for an order requiring the
respondents, who were at one time directors of the company, to repay certain sums
of money which the liquidators alleged had been wrongfully credited to the accounts
of the respondents with the company. The sums were credited to the directors as a
59 In Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1951] Ch 286, 291, the benefit of the company as a whole
was interpreted to mean the corporators as a general body.
60"The law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, but there are to be no cakes and ale
except such as are required for the benefit of the company." Per Bowen LJ in Hutton v West Cork Rly,
(1883) 23 Ch D 654 at 672.
61 Civil Application No NAI 316 of 1997 (Unreported), 16th January 1998, Ruling by PK Tunoi, AB
Shah, and GS Pall (Judges of Appeal).
62 Medforth v Blake [1999] All ER (D) 546.
63 Re Smith v Fawcett Ltd [1942] Ch 304 (CA).
64 Parke v Daily News Ltd [1962] Ch 927. A gratuitous payment to the employees of a company who
had become rendudant on an amalgamation was held ultra vires for not being in the best interest of
the company. Gratuitous gifts out of a company's assets for the purposes of education, charity and
politics were allowed in Evans v Burner Mond & Co [1921] 1 Ch 359.
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"bonus" at a time when there were no profits available for the same. The liquidators
alleged that this act constituted a breach of trust.
The Court relied on the provisions of articles 89 to 96 of Table A to the Companies
Act to find the directors liable. It particularly singled out article 91 which provides
that dividends should not be paid otherwise than out of profits. 66 It also observed
that failure to pass any resolution authorising the payment was contrary to the
articles, which provided that the remuneration of directors shall be fixed from time
to time by the company in general meeting. Due to the fact that not every single
possible duty of a director can be contemplated or be provided for in the articles of
association, the court observed that reliance must be placed on the general
obligations and duties which directors incur by the very nature of their appointment
as directors. The Court also recognised that these duties varied according to the
nature and size of the business, and noted that they would only vary in degree.
Crawshaw J observed, inter alia, that:
"It must be implicit, though by implication only, in all cases
that their duty in general is to conduct the affairs of the
company in an honest and reasonably business-like manner
... It seems to me that as soon as directors are registered as
such they immediately become subject not only to the
specific provisions of the articles of association but, by
implication of law, to the duties and obligations which the
very nature of their appointment carries with it, and they
must be read as part of the contract."67
Equating the term 'company' with present and future members has not been received
well by some commentators. 68 The critique centres on the fact that equating the
company with present and future members cannot apply to non-profit companies.69
While this justification is true in respect of instances where the interests of members
only mean the financial interests of members, it cannot apply where the company in
question is not a money-making enterprise. 70 Also, it has been argued that equating a
65 [1957] EA 851.
66 Section 55 (2) of the Act makes a similar prohibition.
67 Re The Highlands Commercial Union Limited [1957] EA 851 at 858.
68 Instone , "The Duty of Directors" [1979] JBL 221, at 227
69 Ibid.
79 Birds, "Making Directors do their Duties" [1980] Co Law 67, at 71.
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company with present and future employees is undesirable, as it implies that
directors would rightly act for themselves in their capacity as shareholders.71
Although this is partly true, Lord Evershed's definition of "company as a whole" in
Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd72has the effect of invalidating any act favouring
one section of shareholders. In view of the controversy relating to interpretation of
the term "company as a whole", the British Company Law Review Steering Group
proposed that the statutory codification of directors' duties should require directors
to "promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole."73
The Final Report of the Company Law Review Group recommended that a director
should act in what he decides is the way most likely to promote the success of the
company. In making such a decision, he is required to consider relevant factors, such
as relationships with employees, suppliers and customers, impact on the community
or environment or the good reputation of the company.74
Unless a company is insolvent, 75directors owe their duties to the company as a
whole. However, this does not imply that directors owe their duties to the
shareholders rather than to the company at other times. As such, directors are
expected to take wider interests, such as payment of dividends to members, into
account since they are "not required by the law to live in an unreal region of
detached altruism and to act in a vague mood of ideal abstraction from obvious facts
which must be present to the mind of any honest and intelligent man when he
exercises his powers as a director."76
3.3.2 Directors' Responsibility to Constituents
As noted in Chapter One, although directors owe their duties to the corporate entity,
there is a general perception among communitarians that directors should undertake
some social responsibilities because a company is "an economic institution which
71 Instone, op cit n 68, 225.
72 [1951] Ch 286, 291.
73 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework (URN00/656)
London: DTI, 2000) para 3.51.
74 The Company Law Review Steering Group: Final Report, (DTI, 2001), Clause 304.
75 Interests of creditors are paramount then. See Walker v Wimborne (1976) 50 ALJR 446;
Multinational Gas and Petroleum Co v Multinational Gas and Petroleum Services Ltd [1983] Ch
258, per Dillon U.
76 Mills v Mills (1938) 60 CLR 150, Aust HC, per Latham CJ at 164.
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has a social service as well as a profit-making function." 77 Taking certain
community interests into consideration may benefit companies in the long-term. For
instance, taking employees interests into consideration might boost their
productivity and, in turn, reinforce the profitability of a company. As Mboya notes:
"Co-operation in Kenya between the public and private
sectors in not a one-way flow from Government to industry.
Private firms are also expected to assume in good faith a
number of social responsibilities necessary to effective
progress and growing participation of citizens in economic
activity.”78
However, it is notable that obliging companies to perform social roles can also
reduce their profitability. This has been the case with the mandatory rural
electrification scheme undertaken by Kenya Power and Lighting Company, the
Kenya Commercial Bank's plan to open a branch in every district, and Kenatco's
provision of security escort services to the entire trucking industry. 79 In a bid to curb
losses suffered by such companies, which were all monopolies, the Working Party on
Government Expenditure recommended that payment for such social spending be
made only by explicit budgetary allocation.80
Although communitarians would justify the financing of community benefits by
firms with monopolies in the market, 81 contractarians would be against such an
initiative on the basis that it reduces shareholder profits, rather than maximising
them.
3.3.2.1 Obligations to Creditors
Although the duties of directors are owed to the company, courts have recognised
that the interests of creditors ought to be considered when the company is in
77 Dodd, "For Whom are Corporate Managers Trustees?" [1932] 7 Harvard Law Review 1145 at
1148.
78 Hon T Mboya, "The Role of Private Sector in Kenya National Development", in Thomas PA,
Private Enterprise and the East African Company, (Tanzania Publishing House Ltd, 1969) p 200.
79 B Grosh, Public Enterprise in Kenya: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why, (Reimer Publishers,
1991) p 160.
80 The 1982 Working Party on Government and Expenditure, Republic of Kenya, 1982, p 42. Cited in
B Grosh, ibid, p 160
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financial difficulties. In such circumstances- creditors become major stakeholders
because the company may well be trading with the creditors' money. 82 In spite of the
protection offered to creditors by contracts, it is important to offer fiduciary
protection to creditors so as to ensure that directors are liable if they risk creditors'
money in risky businesses.83
Although the English common law84 and the courts of other Commonwealth
jurisdictions85 recognise that directors owe a duty to creditors, the Act and Kenyan
courts are yet to recognise this duty. 86 Creditors in Kenya are bound to suffer grave
financial loss if directors continue prioritising other interests despite the inability of
a company to meet its legal liabilities. As such, it is important to ensure that the
assets of a company in such a state are employed to service its liabilities rather than
attempting to make profits. Failure to consider the interests of creditors should be a
basis of directors' liability. 87
The codification of this duty should clarify at what point of financial difficulty the
duty ought to be triggered. 88 Whilst requiring directors to have regard for interests of
creditors while the company is solvent could make them over-cautious and, in turn,
interfere with their decision-making, it is also the case that requiring directors to
consider the interests of creditors when the company is already insolvent might be of
little help to creditors, as they may have already suffered detriment. 89 It is therefore
necessary for a codifying clause to strike an appropriate balance between the need to
81 Ibid, p 159.
82 Brady v Brady (1987) 3 BCC 535.
83 Keay, "The Director's Duty to Take into Account the Interests of Company Creditors: When is it
Triggered?" (2001) 25 Melbourne University Law Review 315 at 318.
84 Lonrho Ltd v Shell Petroleum Co Ltd [1980] 1 WLR 627; Brady v Brady (1987) 3 BCC 535. The
Final Report of the Company Law Review Group recommended that a director should consider
relevant factors whilst deciding the way most likely to promote the success of the company. The
relevant factors may include: relationships with employees, suppliers and customers, impact on the
community or environment or the good reputation of the company. See The Company Law Review
Steering Group, op cit n 74, Clause 304.
85 For instance, see Ring v Sutton (1980) 5 ACLR 546; Re Avon Chambers Ltd [1978] 2 NZLR 638.
86 Under section 189 (1) (b) (ii) of the Act, a director may be disqualified for fraud or breach of duty
if the company is in the course of winding up.
87 Section 214 of the British Insolvency Act requires a director or a shadow director of a company in
liquidation to consider the interests of creditors. Failure to do so may make a director liable to
contribute to the assets of the company if the director knew or ought to have concluded that the
company had no reasonable prospect of going into insolvent liquidation and failing to take every step
to minimise loss to creditors. See Hicks, "Disqualification of Directors-Forty Years On" [1988] JBL
27 at 46.
88 Keay, op cit n 83, at 318.
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protect creditors and allow directors to perform their duties without unnecessary
interference. As Professor Andrew Keay suggests:
"the most appropriate trigger would be where the
circumstances of a company are such that its directors know,
or can reasonable expect, that the action upon which they are
going to embark could lead to the insolvency of the
company. If this were adopted, then the point of liability
would not be the same across the board as the court would
have to take into account the circumstances of each
company, so that the more obvious it is that the creditors'
money is at risk, the lower the risk to which directors are
justified in exposing the company."9°
3.3.2.2 Obligations to Employees
To a certain extent, some companies already consider interests of employees by
encouraging them to purchase shares, offering gratuities, and medical attention.91
Although the Act has no provisions requiring directors to consider the interests of
employees,92 directors can still take such interests into consideration if the interests
are reasonably incidental to the carrying on of the business of the company.93
However, taking the interests of employees into account is unlawful if doing so
conflicts with the interests of a company. 94 Despite these considerations, failure to
formulate statutory obligations requiring directors to perform social duties increases
social injustice and exploitation.
Although employees have a right to join trade unions, their capacity to make
demands from companies is undermined by discretionary powers that the Minister
for Labour has to declare strikes illega1. 95 As such, the efficacy of trade unions as
89 Ibid at 329.
" Ibid at 334.
91 PA Thomas, op cit n 78, at 29.
92 Sections 309 and 659 of the British Companies Act require directors to consider the interests of
employees.
93 "Can anything be more reasonable than that when employers have had a good year they should
encourage the workmen to increased exertions?" Per Jesse! MR in Hampson v Price's Patent Candle
Co (1876) WR 754. See, also, Hampson v Price's Patent Candle Company (1876) 45 U Ch 437
94 Instone, "The Duty of Directors" [1979] JBL 221, 228-230.
95 Trade Disputes Act, Cap 234, Laws of Kenya.
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representatives of employees is questionable. Employees are also vulnerable because
there is no statutory protection which permits directors to offer compensation by
making ex gratia provision for employees. 96 Moreover, directors are not under any
obligation to establish pension schemes for employees or to safeguard the long-term
interests of employees by running a company efficiently.
It is notable that, both British 97 and Ghanaian98 companies legislation, require
directors to have due regard to the interests of employees of the company. However,
section 309 of the British Companies Act has rarely been invoked in Britain because
the duty is not enforceable by employees, as it is owed to the company.
Although requiring directors to consider employees' interests might be beneficial to
workers, the British Company Law Review Steering Group deems such a
requirement unnecessary because consideration of the interests of employees
undermines the principle of shareholder supremacy. 99 Although such a requirement
might undermine the supremacy of shareholders to some extexik, Av.s.e. is a. ate& to
recognise and protect such class interests m within the public because of the
inequality of the bargaining power between the employees and the company.
Although contractarians argue against such protection, it is submitted that they
96 This is allowed in the UK. See section 719 of the Companies Act 1985 and section 187 of the
Insolvency Act 1986.
97 Sections 309 and 659 of 1985 Act. Before the enactment of this provision, it would have been
considered ultra vires for a director to take into considerations the interests of employees. See Parke v
Daily News Ltd [1962] Ch 927.
98 Section 179 of the Ghanaian Companies Code provides: "In considering whether a particular
transaction or course of action is in the best interests of the company as a whole, a director when
appointed by or as a representative of a special class of members, employees or creditors may give
special, but not exclusive, consideration to the interests of that class".
" The group avers that employees' interests should only be considered if they promote shareholders'
interests. As such, section 309 of the Companies Act 1985 is regarded as undesirable. See Modern
Company Law for a Competitive Economy: the Strategic Framework (London: DTI, 1999) Paras
5.1.20 to 5.1.23. Reacting on the proposals made by the Commission on Public Policy and British
Business, Promoting Prosperity: a British Agenda for Britain (London: Vintage, 1997), the Company
Law Review Steering Group also felt that such a requirement would make directors unaccountable to
anyone. See Committee on Corporate Governance, Final Report, (London: Gee, 1997) Para 1.17.
IQ° Many States of the USA have enacted enabling provisions for directors to consider interests of
employees, customers, creditors, suppliers, and the communities in which they operate. For instance,
it is possible for a company to use such provisions in defence of a hostile take over bid where the
company raider is unlikely to consider such interests. See Mayson et al, op cit n 24, p 519 See, also:
Dodd, "op cit n 77, at 1145; White, "How Should we talk about Corporations? The Language of
Economics and of Citizenship" (1985) 94 Yale LI 1416.
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assume wrongly that workers are in a position to protect themselves through the
contracts entered into with the company. 101
The Nigerian Law Reform Commission also declined to recommend the adoption of
a provision obliging directors to have regard to the interests of employees on the
basis that it would affect adversely the developing economy of the country and, in
turn, lead to loss of jobs, as the requirements would deter foreign
investors. 102Although this might be true in part, it is should be borne in mind that
foreign companies are not always factors in the promotion of developing economies,
as their success is usually at the expense of local companies and the economy. In
fact, direct and indirect employment gains made by foreign companies may be offset
by induced job losses in the local companies. 103 Besides, the failure to consider the
interests of employees affects their productivity and, in turn, the performance of a
company. In view of the long-term employee loyalty 1 °4that companies would enjoy,
if directors took employees' interests seriously, the initiative of considering
employees' interests would ultimately be in the best interests of companies. In fact,
57 percent of respondents to a survey conducted in Nairobi in 2001-2002 (the
"Survey") 105 felt that directors ought to consider social responsibilities so as to
facilitate participation of employees in economic activities.
The interests of employees that might need to be respected by a company include:
consideration and consultation expectations; financial matters, such as salary and
pensions; and the opportunity to enjoy continued employment with the business.106
Requiring directors to have regard to the interests of employees would not be
difficult to implement because there already exists some legislative measures to the
same effect. Such legislative measures regulate "minimum wages, maximum hours,
1 ° 1 D Millon, op cit n 3, p 3.
102 Nigeria Law Reform Commission, Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law: Volume 1-
Review and Recommendations, 1987 pp 203-204.
103Griffiths & Wall, Applied Economics: An Introductory Course, Sixth Edition, (London and New
York: Longman, 1995), p 158.
104 In Japan, the much praised and successful 'just-in-time' (or Kaban) production processes and
'quality circles' rely on employees loyalty to their companies. This loyalty is reinforced by lifetime
employment and a shared set of values, which emphasise collectivism. See Griffiths & Wall, Ibid, p
156
105 The survey data is analysed in detail in Chapter 9.
106 D Milman, " From Servant to Stakeholder: Protecting the Employee Interest in Company Law", in
D Feldman and F Meisel (eds), Corporate and Commercial Law: Modern Developments, (Lloyds of
London Press, 1996) p 147.
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employment of women, children and young persons, industrial accidents,
hospitalisation, and payment in cash as opposed to kind."1"
3.3.2.3 Donations
Given that donations made by a company may enhance its image, 108 it may be
argued that some donations further the interests of the company as a whole. Such
wider interests remain intra vires the company since "the law does not say that there
are to be no cakes and ale except such as are required for the benefit of the
company. 9/109
Although donations can further the interests of a company, they can also be
detrimental to its well-being. It is notable that thirty-nine percent of respondents in
Question 2 of the survey questionnaire felt that donations encourage corruption.
Fifteen per cent of respondents felt that donations enhance the image of companies
and 46 per cent took the view that donations promote certain purposes, such as
charity and education. Those who felt that donations encourage corruption attributed
their views to the fact that directors of parastatals in Kenya are known to give
donations for political reasons in return for political favours, such as appointment to
lucrative government positions. 11 ° In fact, KCC (Kenya Co-operative Creameries)
(in receivership), which has given large donations, has been a good springboard into
political positions, as many of its former directors have gone on to become Members
of Parliament. 111
As a safeguard against abuse of donations, there is a need to limit the amount of
money that can be donated by directors, oblige directors to disclose donations in the
accounts of the company, 112 or require the consent of shareholders to be given
before substantial donations are made.
--
107 PA Thomas, op cit n 78, p 22. Such legislation includes: The Employment Act, Cap 226, The
Employment of Women, Young Persons and Children Act, Cap 227, The Regulation of Wages and
Conditions of Employment Act, Cap 229, The Shop Hours Act, Cap 231, The Workmen's
Compensation Act, Cap 236, and The Factories Act, Cap 514.
108Evans v Burner Mond & Co (1921) 1 Ch 359.
1 °9 Hutton v West Cork Rly (1883) 23 Ch D at 673 Per Bowen L J.
110 Appointments to parastatal directorships are made by the President and Ministers.
" 1 "Politics is killing the dairy industry", Market Intelligence Business and Finance Journal, June 21,
2000 <http://www.mi.co.ke/archive/september/industry.html>
112 In the UK companies have a statutory duty to disclose donations for political purposes in excess of
E 200 in the report of directors. See Companies Act 1985, s. 235.
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3.3.2.4 Multinational Corporations
Although multinational companies create employment and enhance the transfer of
technology to host countries, they also contribute to low standards of health, safety,
and environment by transferring environmentally unsound production systems113
and materials. 114 At the moment there is no institution, at either national or
international level, that is endowed with the responsibility of regulating the activities
of multinationals. 115 As a result, multinational corporations in Kenya rarely adopt
the same responsibilities that they have in other countries. This view was supported
by 45 per cent of respondents in the survey. Only 33 per cent of respondents felt that
multinational corporations assumed such responsibilities. The remaining 22 per cent
had no view on the matter.
Given that the influx of multinationals partly undermines the economic sovereignty
of Kenya, the failure to require them to take societal interests into consideration does
not foster the economy of Kenya. In spite of the positive contributions
multinationals make to the economy of Kenya, failing expressly to oblige them to
honour societal interests is both biased and discriminatory" 6 because it exonerates
many of them from standards that they have to meet in other countries.
Such discrimination is an attack on the fundamental principle underlying the State's
obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR) 117 and Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, which is
113 Multinational companies in oil production, road transport, Chlorofluorocarbon (CFC) production,
electricity generation, metals production and agriculture account for roughly 50% of the greenhouse
gas emissions. See, "Treaty on Transnational Corporations: Democratic Regulation of their Conduct",
The NGO Alternative Treaties (NGO Steering Committee to the UN), Global Forum, Rio de Janeiro,
June 1-15, 1992. <http://www.igc.org/csdngo/alttreaties  AT16.htm>
114 Multinational corporations have been involved in transferring to Africa unsafe pesticide and drugs
banned in the countries of origin, polluting industries, dumping of radioactive waste, adopting lower
safety standards leading to disasters, such as the Bhopal disaster in India.
115 "Treaty on Transnational Corporations: Democratic Regulation of their Conduct", The NGO
Alternative Treaties (NGO Steering Committee to the UN), Global Forum, Rio de Janeiro, June 1-15,
1992 <http://www.igc.org  csdngo/alttreaties/AT16.htm>
116 Article 26 of ICCPR states that all persons are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law and that "the law shall ... guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
111 Australia ratified the Covenant on 9 December, 1975, Kenya on 30 April, 1972, Nigeria on 28
July, 1983, UK on 19 May, 1976, Japan on 20 June 1979, Germany on 16 December 1973, France on
30 November 1980 etc. Ghana and USA, in spite of its many multinational corporations, have not
ratified the Covenant. See Amnesty International - Report - AMR 51/18/99, March 1999, United
States of America; 1999 UN Commission on Human Rights: "Making Human Rights Work: Time to
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given treaty effect by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICC P R). " 8 The ICESCR guarantees "the right of everyone to form trade unions and
join the trade union of his choice, subject only to the rules of the organisation
concerned, for the promotion and protection of his economic and social interests."119
On the other hand, ICCPR provides that human rights are everyone's birthright and
apply to all without distinction. Since the protected rights under ICCPR I2° include
the social rights of employees , 121 the present laws and practices are not in
conformity with the covenant. 122 Conformity with human rights international
standards can only be achieved by obliging companies to consider the economic
interests or rights of employees.I23
Multinational companies should also be required to have regard to community
interests because of the difficulties encountered by litigants affected by the acts of
the companies. I24 In most cases, litigants are unable to sue multinational
Strengthen the Special Procedures Appeal Case: United States of America."
http: www.amnesty.org ailib aipub 1999 AMR, 25101899.htm; United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights < http: www.unhchr.chipdUreport.pdf>
118 The General Assembly of the United Nations adopted the Covenant in 1966, 20 years after the
adoption of the Universal declaration. The intervening period was taken up by the member states of
the United Nations to work out detailed treaty provisions, which might best give effect to the
principles of the Declaration in their different legal systems. The Covenant came into force in March
1976. By virtue of Articles 28 to 32, The Human Rights Committee supervises the implementation
of the Covenant. Article 40 requires States parties to submit regular reports on the measures they
have adopted which give effect to the Covenant rights and on the process made in the enjoyment of
those rights. This exercise helps in the evaluation of the compliance of each state party with the
obligations it has undertaken under the covenant. See Lallah, "Notes on the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights and Some of its Case Law" 119923 18 CLB 1276, at 1278.
"9 Article 8, Clause 1. Article 7 obliges the State Parties to the convention to "recognise the right of
everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable conditions of work which ensure, in particular:
remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with: fair wages; a decent living; safe and
healthy working conditions; equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment to an
appropriate standard; rest; and leisure."
120 Most countries have ratified the Covenant. The USA, for instance, ratified it in 1992.
121 The preamble to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights states that
"the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if
conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well
as his civil and political rights."
122 The international instruments that bear direct relevance to Kenya are; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, ICCPR, European Convention on Human Rights (Kenyan bill of rights was modelled
using it), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. See J Palamagamba, Human
Rights Jurisprudence in East Africa: A Comparative Study of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of
the Individual in Tanzania, Kenya and Uganda, (1 Aufl Baden-Baden: Nomos Verl-Ges, 1995) p 27.
123 In some instances, it might not be easy for employees to prove that directors have not given their
interests adequate consideration. For instance, it is possible for directors' meetings to be minuted to
the effect that due consideration was given to the views and interests of the employees. See Boyle,
"The Companies Act 1980 (4)" [1980] 1 Co Law 280 at 284.
124 "Regulatory agencies experience considerable difficulty in international cases in terms of
detection, evidence, prosecution, jurisdictions, sanctions and co-operation between authorities and
governments." See M Punch, Dirty Business: exploring corporate misconduct, (London : Sage,
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companies 125 in foreign courts, due to difficulties relating to choice of forum and
choice of applicable law. 126 For instance, in Re Union Carbide Corporation Gas
Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in December 1984, 127 the victims of a lethal gas leak
were denied the opportunity to sue the American subsidiary in the courts of the
United States despite there being evidence that complainants were unlikely to
achieve an adequate and just solution in the Indian courts, due to lack of
commitment on the part of the Indian Government to take tough action against the
Corporation.
Given that there is no system to provide a readily available source of funds from
which compensation can be paid, 128failure to oblige companies to consider social
interests and the inability of affected victims to sue the companies in appropriate
fora works against good corporate responsibility in Kenya.
Whilst international human rights law protects any legal person from abuse of its
rights by a state, 129 the legal person is not required to observe similar standards in
the course of its business. As a result, a multinational corporation can only be
subjected to international rights and duties by virtue of a Convention between states
because a Convention can oblige state authorities to protect individuals from one
another.13°
1996). Cited in J Moran, "Bribery and Corruption: the OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery
of Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions", [1999] 8 , (3) Business Ethics: A
European Review, 141 at 142.
125 Since multinational companies comprise of a series of national companies or branches, they do not
have separate legal personality at international law. See Brownlie, Principles of Public International
Law (4th ed, 1990) p 67. Cited in Muchlinski, "The Accountability of Multinational Enterprises and
the Right to Development: The Compensation of Industrial Accident Victims from Developing
Countries," [1993] Third World Legal Studies, 189 at 190.
126 Difficulties that prevent plaintiffs from compensation include: whether the foreign parent
company should be responsible for the acts of its subsidiary and whether liability should be strict or
based on fault; failure of the of the corporation to meet its liability as a result of being underinsured;
over protection of respective nationals by home and host countries that may undermine legal
impartiality. A host country, for instance, may fail to support litigation against a foreign corporation
on the basis that such an act would be construed to be hostile towards foreign investors. See
muchlinslci, op cit n 125, at 194.
127 MDL Docket No 626, US District Court, Southern District of New York, Ordered November 8,
1985.
128 op cit n 126, at 194.
129 Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that every natural or
legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. See, also, Muchlinski, op cit n
125, at 190.
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It therefore follows that the only acts of directors which amount to a violation of
international human rights law are international crimes 131 committed on behalf of a
private legal person. 132 As such, common breach of the duties of directors cannot be
enforced under this head.
Although it has been argued that "constitutionally protected fundamental human
rights, whose main purpose is to protect the individual from the State, can also be
invoked in relations between individuals, particularly against large-scale private
organisations holding considerable economic and social power", 1331ack of any
authority to establish this desired position continues to make individual applications
directed against private persons of no effect.134
Given that the Act does not specify in whose interests directors are supposed to act
and to whom they owe their duties, there is a need for the Act to define expressly the
term "company as a whole" to mean the interests of all shareholders or other
requisite interest groups, such as employees, creditors, and the society within which
the company operates. The drafting may follow the developments in the USA, where
courts have held that a board of directors owes duties not only to shareholders, but
also to the corporate enterprise, including creditors, when the company is in the
vicinity of insolvency. 135 Also, some states in the USA have passed legislation
requiring directors to consider non-shareholder interests. Effecting such changes
would effectively deal with the problem associated with the interpretation of the said
term and subsequently enable directors to ascertain their obligations easily.
130 Article 17 and 13 of the European Convention on Human Rights. See, also, Muchlinslci, ibid, at
192.
131 Examples of the crimes include genocide and other war crimes.
132 The Nuremberg Trial considered Gestapo and SS to be criminal organisations. See Brownlie,
Principles of Public International Law (4th ed, 1990) p 561-564. Cited in Muchlinslci, op cit n 125, at
190.
133 A Drzemczewski, European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law (Oxford University
Press, 1983) Ch 8; Muchlinski, ibid, at 191.
134 Article 25, European Convention on Human Rights.
133 Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederlander NV v Pathe Communications Corporation (Unreported,




Given that corruption contributes to the stagnation of an economy, inadequate
physical and social infrastructure, and poorly functioning political systems, 136 the
failure to curb corrupt practices in Kenya 137 has contributed to loss of foreign
investment and general economic instability. 138 In fact, investors prefer to do
business in less corrupt countries, such as Uganda.139
To reverse this trend the Kenyan Government in 2000 tabled a bill, entitled the Anti-
Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill 2000, which intended to repeal the Prevention
of Corruption Act. Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Cap 65, Laws of
Kenya, defines corruption as "receiving, agreeing to receive, or soliciting some form
of material advantage from someone for the performance or non performance of
their public duty." Given that this definition is only limited to public bodies and
public servants, the Kenya Anti-Corruption and Economics Crimes Bill 2000 seeks
to widen the scope of the definition to include the priNakt stam.140 VI‘Ndex t.
 are not only required not to compromise the interests of companies by
accepting gifts or donations, but they are under a duty not to corrupt others with
donations irrespective of their intended benefits to the company. Breach of these
duties has the effect of terminating the services of perpetrators 141 and barring them
from holding office for 10 years.
While it may be partly true to say that any benefit that accrues to a company is
"reasonably incidental to the carrying of the company's business..., and is done for
136 Kimberly, "The Problem of Corruption: A Tale of Two Countries (Kenya, Uganda)", [1998] 18,
(12) Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 524 at 524.
137 "Corrupt practices abound within government offices, corporate bodies, private institutions." See
K Kibwana et al (ed), The Anatomy of Corruption in Kenya: Legal, Political, and Social Economic
Perspectives, (Nairobi: Claripress, 1996) p 34.
138 When the International Monetary Fund (IMF) suspended lending to Kenya in 1997, the IMF and
World Bank approved Uganda, due to its reforms strategy, to benefit from the Highly Indebted Poor
Countries (HIPC) initiative. As a joint initiative of the World Bank and the IMF, HIPC assists highly
indebted poor countries that have a track record of servicing their debts and implementing sound
economic policies. See A Boote & K Thugge, Debt Relief for Low-income Countries: The HIPC
Initiative, IMF Pamphlet Series No Si, at 15-16 (1997). Cited in Kimberly,op cit n 136, at 530.
139 Uganda's economy grew by an average 6.6% annually between 1990 and 1995. This is one of the
highest rates of growth in sub-Saharan Africa. See Kimberly, ibid, at 529.
14° Hon A Wako, "The Kenya Anti-Corruption Bill 2001: Memorandum of Objects and Reasons."
<http://www.lawafrica.com/specials/memorandumofobjects.htm >
141 The Bill covers all public officials, including Chief Executives and even heads of departments in
state corporations. See "Ethics Bill to curb graft in public service", Daily Nation, 29 June, 2000.
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the benefit of and to promote the prosperity of the company" , 142 there can be no
doubt that benefits procured through corrupt means by directors amount to breach of
their fiduciary duties. This is because directors are under a duty not to "abuse their
office, engage in bribery, fraud, embezzlement, misappropriation of public funds,
and breach of trust."143
Although contractarian theorists might justify pursuit of corrupt practices by
directors on the basis that the objectives of the firm are to maximise profits, 144rather
than acting in a socially responsible manner, there can be no doubt that corrupt
practices cannot be pursued for the proper purpose because they undermine the
economic well being of the country. 145 Thus, acting on the basis of what is for the
economic advantage of the company in such circumstances may not only be
detrimental to the country but also to the company. This is because the profitability
of companies is also affected by the well being of the national economy.
Besides, it can be argued that corrupt practices by directors are not in the interest of
the company on the basis of their illegality. The articles of association cannot confer
powers on directors to pursue illegal practices. Given that directors are required to
exercise their powers for the purpose for which they are given and not for collateral
purposes, there can be no doubt that corrupt practices by directors do not fall within
lawful objectives of the articles of association.
Directors of parastatals are more prone to breach of their fiduciary duties due to the
overwhelming discretion and control the government has over appointments of
directors and the operation of parastatals. 146 As such, countries with more open and
market-oriented economies are likely to experience less instances of corruption than
their counterparts with more closed and regulated economies."' Similarly, countries
142 Per Eve J in Re Lee, Behrens and Co Ltd [1932] 2 Ch 46 at 51.
143 The Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill 2000 defines corruption in these terms.
144 Jensen and Meckling, op cit n 2, at 311.
145 Corrupt practices of great magnitude can threaten international peace and prosperity, facilitate
drag trafficking, money laundering, and distortion of international trade. See Kimberly, op cit n 136,
at 524-
' 46 Kimberly, ibid, at 525.
147 According to an index of corruption prepared by Transparency International (TI) in mid 1990s,
Nordic countries, New Zealand, Canada, and other European countries were listed as the least
corrupt. However, developing countries and economies in transition, such as Russia and China are
listed as the most corrupt. (TI is a Berlin based non-governmental organisation established in 1993 to
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with stronger democratic frameworks are less prone to corrupt practices, as
politicians are more accountable to voters and policy-making processes are more
transparent. 148
The high level of corruption in developing countries is often attributed to: low
public-sector wages; poverty; illiteracy which makes it easier for literate directors
and managers to exploit others; inadequate management controls and lack of
adequate technology for monitoring; poor recruitment and selection procedures
(including nepotism); poor working conditions and facilities; lack of public
information; and inadequate capacity to meet the demand for government
services. 149Similarly, social attitude towards government institutions fuels
corruption because in new post colonial states "the idea of national interest is weak
... [and] the state and its organs were identified with alien rule and were proper
objects of plunder." 15°
The lack of clarity in the rules governing fiduciary obligations and poor enforcement
policies by the Attorney General and the Judiciary also help to entrench corruption
in Kenya. For instance, in the early 1990s, the Government lost $ 400 million in
public funds to a company, Goldenberg International Ltd, trading gold and
diamonds that Kenya does not produce. Although some directors have been
prosecuted, some senior government officials in charge of the Ministry of Finance
and the Central Bank have not been investigated. 151 In that case, a Nairobi company,
Goldenberg International Ltd, requested from the Ministry of Finance sole rights to
export diamond jewellery and gold from Kenya. The company asked for a grant of
35 per cent export compensation on these items instead of the 20 per cent provided
for under the Local Manufacturers (Export Compensation) Act. 152 Despite the
statutory requirement, the Ministry of Finance approved payment at the rate of 35
combat corruption around the world). See Freedom House, Freedom in the World: The Annual
Survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties, 1995-1996 (1996). Cited in Kimberly, op cit n 136, at
526.
148 The extent to which political rights and civil liberties are protected has a correlation to how
transparent and accountable policy making processes are. See Ibid p 526.
149 L Rance, Bureaucratic Corruption in Asia: The problem of incongruence between Legal Norms
and Folk Norms. Cited in Kimberly, op cit n 136, at 527
ISO Colin, "What is the Problem about Corruption?" 3 Journal of Modern African Studies, 215, 224
(1965) . Cited in Kimberly, op cit n 136, at 527.
151 Holman & Wrong, "Moi Weighs Tough Corruption Probe", Financial Times, 28 July, 1997.
152 Cap 482, Laws of Kenya.
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per cent. Subsequently, the Auditor General declared the additional 15 per cent
payment illega1. 153 He questioned the payment on the basis that gold and other
precious metals did not originate from Kenya. As a result, the Parliamentary Public
Accounts Committee 154recommended the recovery of the payment and
investigations of the circumstances under which the entire compensation was paid.
The initial failure on the part of the Attorney General to prosecute those implicated
in the scandal prompted the Law Society of Kenya to institute a private prosecution.
Although the Attorney General subsequently took over the proceedings and
prosecuted some directors, cases of the individuals who were prosecuted are still
pending in court!"
Another case that illustrates gross corruption is the awarding by the Government of
the contract to construct Turkwel Gorge dam without competitive tender. The
project cost many times its original estimate due to kickbacks paid to government
officials. As a result, international donors declined to fund any other power projects
in Kenya, leading to inadequate capacity and frequent power failures.156
Most corrupt practices arise when directors allow their interests to conflict with
those of the company. This may arise, for instance, when directors compete with a
company or use the property or information of a company to benefit themselves.
Corrupt practices also arise when directors contract with a company and when they
accept or give bribes. These instances are analysed in the following section.
3.4.1 Use of a company's Property, Information or Opportunity
A director who benefits from having personal interests that conflict with his duties
to the company can be held liable to account for the losses suffered by the
company. 157 Since his judgement is likely to be biased when there is a conflict,
losses incurred by the company as a result of the conflict are recoverable, at the
instance of the company. For instance, in Leisure Lodges Limited v Yashvin A
153 Report of the Controller and Auditor General for the Year 1990 91cited in K Kibwana et al (ed),
op cit n 137, p 90.
154 Deliberations of the Public Accounts Committee (PAC) regarding Government of Kenya
Accounts for the Years 1990 91 and 1991/92 in K Kibwana et al (ed), op cit n 137, p 92.
155 "Appear for your Cases, Goldenberg Group Told", Daily Nation, 11 April, 2002; Thoya, "Chief
Justice Declares Goldenberg Scam Debate "Contemptuous", Daily Nation, 24 July 1999.
156 Wrong, "Defiant Kenya is running out of Steam", Financial Times, 25 October, 1995.
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Shretta 158 the respondent, in a petition for winding up, obtained an interim
liquidation order from the High Court on the basis that Leisure Lodges Ltd was
being managed corruptly, illegally, not for the benefit of all the shareholders, and
with the total exclusion of minority shareholders from its management. It was
contended that directors put the "company's property.... in danger of dissipation,
misappropriation, and wasting" 159 by allowing their own interests to conflict with
the interests of the company. The supply of TV sets and safes by directors to a hotel
owned by the company was held to constitute a breach occasioned by a conflict of
interests, as they had failed to disclose their interests. For that reason, the Court of
Appeal upheld an ex parte order for an interim liquidation order and observed that
the directors had failed to act in good faith.
Making substantial profits through the sale of shares, for which the company was
unable to subscribe fully, rendered the directors of the company liable in Regal
Hastings Ltd v Gulliver. 160 The basis of liability was that the directors utilised their
position and knowledge to profit themselves. It was irrelevant that the directors had
entered into the transaction in good faith. 161 The important issue was whether their
actions were related to the affairs of the company and whether they utilised their
opportunities and special knowledge as directors. Besides, it was also important to
establish whether their actions resulted in a profit for themselves. 162
In addition to being unlawful for a director to benefit from the exploitation of a
business opportunity rejected by a company, he is under a duty to disclose to the
company the opportunity obtained, which he must not utilise even if the company
either is unable to pursue the opportunity or rejects the opportunity. 163
157 Boardman v Phipps [1965] Ch 992 at 994, per Lord Denning.
158 Civil Appeal No 10 of 1997 in Winding Up Cause No 23 of 1996 (Court of Appeal, Kenya).
159 Per Justice Tunoi PK Civil Appeal No 10 of 1997.
in Winding Up Cause No 23 of 1996.
160 [1967] 2 AC 1347.
161 The Canadian Supreme Court in Peso Silver Mines Ltd (NFL) v Cropper [1966] 58 DLR 1 (2d)
absolved a director from liability on the basis that they had acted in good faith in purchasing mining
claims, which his company had declined to purchase due to its poor financial position. For a detailed
analysis on the different approaches adopted by the English and Canadian courts see Prentice, "Regal
pasting Ltd v Gulliver-The Canadian Experience" (1967) 30 MLR 450 at 451;Beck, The Saga of
Peso Silver Mines, (1971) 49 Can B Rev 80; 100-2 DD.
162 [1967] 2 AC 1347.
163 Regal Hasting Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 1347.
85
Although these rules are useful in terms of providing stringent conditions that
protect the company, the effects of the rules can be avoided if a director makes a
disclosure of his interests to the company in a board meeting. 164If a director makes
disclosure before engaging in a transaction, a company can decide whether to forgo
the opportunity. However, the rejection of an opportunity does not entitle a director
to utilise the opportunity to his own advantage, as "that might impose too great a
strain on their impartiality." 165A director may, therefore, be liable for pursuing an
opportunity which has been rejected by a company even if he discloses his interests
to the board and refrains from attending and voting, I66unless the company has
authorised the act of a director in a general meeting or under the articles of the
company. However, in some instances, a board of directors may permit a director to
get involved in an opportunity which it has rejected, provided the board takes a bona
fide decision to reject an opportunity.I67
To curb the abuse of the opportunities of companies, the UK's Jenkins Committee
required directors not to "make use of any money or other property of the company
or any information acquired by virtue of his position as a director or officer of the
company to gain directly or indirectly an improper advantage for himself at the
expense of the company". 168 The Final Report of the Company Law Review Group
also recommended that a director should not use the company's property
information, or opportunity, unless such use is authorised by an ordinary resolution
or, where the constitution permits, the board of a company.
169
Companies legislation in British Columbia m has a similar provision which states
that where a director or officer holds any office or possesses any property which
might give rise, directly or indirectly to conflicts with his duties to the corporation,
he must disclose the fact and the nature of character and extent of such conflict.
164 Ibid.
165 PL Davies, op cit n 14, p 594.
166 Benson v Heathorn (1842) I Y &CCC 326, Per Knight-Bruce V-C at 341-342.
167 The board's decision to reject the opportunity must have been taken bona fide in the interests of
the company and not in the interest of the director. See Queensland Mines Ltd v Hudson (1978) 52
AL.IR 379, PC.
168 Report of the Company Law Committee, Cmnd 1749, Para 99 (1962).
169 The Company Law Review Steering Group: Final Report, (DTI, 2001), Clause 308.
1717 British Columbia Companies Act, ss 146, 160.
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The Ghanaian Companies Code obliges a director not to "use for his own advantage
any money or property of the company or any confidential information or special
knowledge obtained by him in his capacity of director." 171
The use of the term 'confidential information', appears to be inappropriate because
what matters is not the confidentiality of information, but the use to which a director
puts it, 172 As such, inappropriate use of any information obtained in the course of
directorship can be a basis for liability. However, the Ghanaian code makes an
appropriate distinction between information, opportunity and company assets. It,
therefore, avoids the confusing interpretation of 'information' as property that was
advanced in Phipps v Boardman: 73 In that case, Lord Denning held that a director
would be accountable if he benefits himself from information or knowledge "which
he has been employed by his principal to collect or discover, or which he has
otherwise acquired, for the use of his principal for such information or knowledge is
the property of his principal." On the other hand, Lord Upjohn took a contrary
view 174 in his dissenting opinion, and stipulated that information is not property at
all so long as the knowledge acquired was incapable of being used for a director's
benefit to injure the trust. 175 The Ghanaian Code avoids this ambiguity by
recognising improper use of both property and information as a basis for liability.
3.4.2 Competing with the company
Despite the operation of the no conflict rule in Kenya, directors are able to compete
with their companies by holding severa1 176 directorships.177
Although it may appear undesirable to allow directors to hold multiple directorships,
the Act enables companies to weigh the practicability of having a director who has
other directorships by requiring particulars of all directorships to be contained in the
171 Act 179.
172 Beck, The Saga of Peso Silver Mines, (1971) 49 Can B Rev 80.
173 [1965] Ch 992 (CA).
174 Professor Beck was also of the opinion that the important question is not whether the information
acquired by the agent is the property of the trust, but whether the agent used his position to make a
profit without the informed consent of his principal. See SM Beck, The Saga of Peso Silver Mines,
(1 971) 49 Can B Rev 80.
175 [1967] AC 46, 127-129, per Lord Upjon.
176 London & Mashonaland Exploration Co. v New Mashonaland Exploration Co [1891] WN 165.
177 Multiple directorships are recognised by both the Companies Act and Table A, article 78.
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register of directors and secretaries. 178 As such, companies can, if they wish, use
non-executive directors as "a good source179 for non-executive talent." 180 Although
the rule against profiting"' prevents abuse of multiple directorships by requiring
directors to obtain "approval of all the companies within whose line of business the
opportunity in question fell," 182 limiting the number of directorships that a director
may hold might reduce the chances of competition with the company. It is also
necessary to require a director to obtain consent from his company before he can
hold more than two directorships and prohibiting executive directors from becoming
non-executives of any competing companies.
3.4.3 Contracts with the company
As a fiduciary, a director must not contract with his company without the approval
of the board of directors. 183 The principle applies both to transactions directly
connected with the director and those in which they are interested in any way. It is a
rule meant to protect the company and cannot, therefore, be used to protect a
director against a third party.I84
In Leisure Lodges Limited v Yashvin A Shretta, I85 one of the grounds relied upon by
the Court of Appeal in granting an interim liquidation order was the failure on the
part of directors to disclose their interests when they supplied the hotel and club with
TV sets and safes.
-
Section 201, the Act.
17913oth the Greenbury's Report (Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group chaired by Sir
Richard Greenbury, 1995) and Cadbury Committee (Report of the Committee on the Financial
Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992) underscore the supervisory role of the non-executive
directors.
180 Davies PL, op cit n 14, p 623.
181 It is not wrong to have competing directorship if there is no possibility of conflict. See Boros,
", The Duties of Nominee and Multiple Directors Part 11" (1990) 11 Co Law 6.
182 FL Davies, op cit n 14, p 608.
183 Section 200 (1), The Act. Unlike section 320 of the British Companies Act 1985, the Act does not
have a provision prohibiting a company from entering into substantial property transactions with a
director. Under section 320 of the British Companies Act, a company is prohibited from entering
into an arrangement whereby a director acquires an asset worth 100,000 or 10% of a company's
assets•
184 Transvaal Lands Co v New Belgium (Transvaal) Land and Development Co [1914] 2 Ch 488,
(CA) The same principle applies to promoters.
185 Civil Appeal No 10 of 1997 in Winding Up Cause No 23 of 1996 (Court of Appeal, Kenya).
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Although the failure to disclose such interests entitles a company to avoid the
contract, I86 it does not entitle the other party to enforce it against the company.
Provided that a director has contracted with the company without due disclosure, a
company is entitled to avoid the contract, even in instances where it would have
benefited from it, I87or ratify the same. This is because the director is in breach of
general duty of directors not to make a profit out of his position.I88
A director, including one who is holding a major shareholding, interested in a
contract is not precluded by equity from voting in a meeting where his interest and
the contract are being discussed.'" Although the minority would be able to bring an
action, should the votes be misused to defraud them, directors still have unfettered
freedom in the absence of fraud.
The Act, however, counters the undesirable effects that would result from the
exercise of the aforesaid unfettered freedom by requiring further disclosure to the
board of directors. 19° Where a director becomes interested after the contract has been
made, the declaration is required to be made at the first meeting of directors held
after the director became interested.19I A director who fails to comply with this
requirement is liable to a fine not exceeding two thousand Kenyan shillings.192
Although the requirement to make disclosure when the contract or proposed contract
is brought before the board ensures that no contract is made without the knowledge
of the board, it becomes ineffective when contracts are not brought before the board
in practice. In addition, disclosure to the board offers inadequate protection to
shareholders when directors take a lenient stand towards a fellow director, especially
if they are likely to disclose their own interests in the future.193
186 Aberdeen Rly v Blaikie (1854) 10 Macq HL 461.
187 Ibid.
188 Regal Hasting Ltd v Gulliver [1967] 2 AC 1347.
189 North West Transportation v Beatty [1887] 12 App Cas 589.
19° Sections 200 (1), (2) requires a director who is in anyway interested in a contract or proposed
contract with the company to declare the nature of his interest at a meeting of the directors of the
cotnPanY.
191 Section 200 (2), The Act.
192 Section 200 (4), The Act.
193 It was held in Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd v Fitzgerald [1996] Ch 274 that a single
director could constitute a meeting for the purposes of Section 317. The Section imposes a duty on a
director, who is in any way interested in a contract to declare the nature of his interest at a meeting of
directors.
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Whilst article 84(3) 194 suggests that directors who make their disclosures to the
board 195 are excluded from liability where they receive profits, contrary to section
200 of the Act, this ambiguity is countered by section 206 of the Act which provides
that:
"[A]ny provision contained in articles of a company or in
any contract with a company or otherwise, for exempting
any officer of the company...from...any liability which by
virtue of any rule of law would otherwise attach to him in
respect of any negligence, default, breach of duty or breach
of trust of which he may be guilty in relation to the company
shall be void."
Although section 206 of the Act might appear to have the effect of invalidating any
provision contained in the articles which has the effect of exempting a director from
liability, it can be argued that articles exempting directors from liability arising from
conflict of interests situations are valid because the breach of the conflict of interest
rule does not necessarily result in a breach of duty. This view was favoured by
Vinelott J in Movitex Ltd v Bulfield and Ors 196where he took the view that it is
possible for an article to relax the conflict of interest rule and still comply with
section 310. 197 Thus, whilst liability arising from a breach of the conflict of interests
rule may be exempted by disclosure to the board, it is not possible to exempt a
director from liability arising from a breach of duty.
Due to the ambiguity relating to the effect of article 84 (3) on section 200 (1) of the
Act, the articles needs to be amended in order to prohibit directors from entering
into conflicts of interest situations or to permit them only in clearly regulated
situations.
194 Table A. The equivalent of article 85 of the 1985 British Act.
195 Section 317 of the British Companies Act 1985 was enacted to ensure that articles did not
dispense with disclosure to the board altogether. The section makes disclosure to the board a
minimum duty.
196 [1986] 2 BCC 99,403.
197 )3ritish Companies Act 1985. See S Griffin, op cit n 1, p 259.
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3.4.4 Bribery and Gifts and other secret benefits
Common law prohibits a director from accepting a bribe, a gift, a commission, or a
share in the profit of a third party to any transaction. 198 Where a director breaches
this duty, the benefit accrued is recoverable from him or the third party who may be
in possession of the benefit. 199 The company can also sue the director and the third
party jointly and severally for damages sustained.200
A director may keep his personal profit where members in general meeting ratify
it . 20 ' However, he cannot keep the profit if the directors were in the majority and
used their powers to pass the resolution.202
Although a company can recover profits received after retirement, provided the
director had breached his fiduciary duties, 203 the company has little hope of
recovering profits obtained by a director when the director leaves office prior to
contracting with a third party. 204
3.4.5 International Regulatory Framework
While changes in the Kenyan law and institutional reforms of the judiciary and civil
service may help alleviate corrupt practices associated with fiduciaries, the changes
would not have full impact without the international community implementing the
OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions. 205 Due to the increase of corruption in the post
Cold War period as a result of the scramble for new markets, industrialised countries
198 Phipps v Boardman [1967] 2 AC 46, 123 per Lord Upjohn.
I" Grant v Gold Exploration & Development [1900] 1 QB 233.
200 Salford Corporation v Lever [1891] 1 QB 168; Phipps v Boardman [1966] 3 All ER 721.
201 Re Gee &Co (Woolwich) Ltd [1972] 2 WLR 515.
202 Loose et al, The Company Director Power and Duties, (7 th Edition, Jordans, 1993) p 185; Cook v
Deeks [1916]1 AC 554.
203 Industrial Development Consultants Ltd v Cooley [1972] 2 All ER 162.
204 Island Export Finance Ltd v Umunna [1986] BCLC 460. A director may be liable if his
resignation was made in order to acquire for himself the opportunity sought by the company, or
where his position, rather than fresh initiative, led to the opportunity. See Canadian Aero Service Ltd
v O'Malley [1974] 40 DLR per Lord Laskin J.
205 The Convention was passed on November 21, 1997 in the Organisation of Economic Co-operation
and Development (OECD). Since the convention cannot pass laws directly, the Convention only
works through committing member states to pass legislation outlawing bribery of foreign public
officials. United States criminalised transnational bribery in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in
1977. It has also enacted the Organisation of American States' Convention Against Corruption. See
Gantz, "Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The Emergence of a New International Legal
Consensus", 18 Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business 282 (1997). Cited in
Kimberly, op cit n 136, at 530.
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have increasingly allowed their multinational companies to engage in corrupt
practices. In some countries, such as Germany and Belgium, bribes 206 have been tax
deductible. Sometimes, companies that are under strict regulations have lost out on
competitive businesses abroad.207
The Convention remains unenforceable in countries that have not incorporated it
into their domestic legislation. 2" In general, a vast majority of foreign governments
have been reluctant to legislate against bribery of foreign public officials. The
German Chamber of Commerce once observed that:
"It is not the duty of the German lawmaker to ensure the
rectitude of officialdom in foreign countries. Corruption is
not a legal problem but a cultural one. In certain countries
presents and payments are tolerated as privileges by the
state." 209
The Convention does not outlaw facilitative payments that are made to bureaucrats
to speed up existing processes. Instead, national governments are expected to
legislate on such issues. 210 Given that gifts, intentional offers or promises can
amount to bribery under the Convention, it can be argued that facilitative payments
are no different from gifts.211
206 OECD Convention defines the offence of bribery as, "any intentional offer, promise or gift
bestowing any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through an intermediary to a
foreign public official, for that official or for a third party in order that the official act or refrain from
acting in relation to the performance of official duties in order to obtain or retain business or other
improper advantage in the conduct of international business." See Low L, "The International Anti-
corruption Standards of the OECD and OAS: A Comparison with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act." Cited in Moran, op cit n 124, at 143.
207 Between 1994 and 1995 the US lost $ 36 billion of business deals due to bribery and corruption by
its competitors. See Graf Lambsdorf J 1998, "An empirical investigation of bribery in international
trade"in M Robinson (ed), Corruption and Development, (London: Franl Cass). Cited in Moran, op
cit n 124, at 142.
208 "The provisions of a treaty entered into by the Government... do not become part of the municipal
law... save in so far as they are made such by laws of that country. See East African Community v R
[1970] EA 457.
209 Moran, op cit n 124, at 147.
210 
Low,
o, "The International Anti-corruption Standards of the OECD and OAS: A Comparison with
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act." Cited in Moran, op cit n 124, at 143
211 Ibid.
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The Convention also fails to restrict the value of gifts given to foreign officials. 212
This displays a great variation from the standards set for multinationals in their
home countries. In the U.S.A., for instance, some regulations prohibit private
individuals or companies from giving gifts of more than $ 50. 2 " Failure of the
Convention to have similar requirements reflects negatively on its effectiveness in
the fight against corruption.
Despite these shortcomings, some measures adopted by the Convention would
reinforce the accountability of directors. For instance, obligation is imposed on
signatories to ensure the "prohibition of 'off the books' accounts, inadequately
identified transactions, the recording of non-existent expenditures, the entry of
liabilities with incorrect identification of their object, and the use of false documents
to either pay or conceal bribes." 214Moreover, auditors are required to "report
infringements to the regulatory authorities." 215As a result, companies have to
"examine their existing audit and review procedures, including due diligence
procedures relating to the financial and ethical screening and monitoring of agents,
other representatives and/or consultants employed by a company in a foreign
country. r1216
Although the OECD Convention requires states to implement high business ethics
and standards, 217 States with weak economies are unlikely to implement strict
standards, as they are likely to be considered hostile towards strong foreign
investors. As such, the only solution to the problem is for a Convention to impose
uniform universal conditions requiring multinational corporations to uphold high
business ethics. In addition, the recognition of multinationals, under international
212 According to the OECD Convention, "a foreign public official means any person holding a
legislative, administrative or judicial office, of a foreign country whether appointed or elected; any
person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a public agency or public
enterprise; and any official or agent of a public international organisation." See OECD 1997 in
Moran, ibid, at 143.
213 Ibid.
214 Cockroft, "Can Accountants cope with off-shore Bribery?" [1998] Dec Accountancy, 78. Cited in
Moran, ibid, at 146.
215 Control Risks Group, "Corruption and Integrity: Best Business Practice in an Imperfect World",
[1998] Control Risks Group. Cited in Moran, ibid, at 146.
216 Moran, ibid.
217 Article 3 (2) provides that in the event that, under the legal system of a Party, criminal
responsibility is not applicable to legal persons, that Party shall ensure that legal persons shall be
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law, as subjects with obligations towards good governance, environment, and
society would enable multinationals to be held to account for their misconduct.
Making Kenya's legislation effective might also help to reduce corrupt practices
because some foreign companies only engage in corrupt practices where the law is
lax. For instance, although British Petroleum (BP) requires its group of companies
outside the UK not to accept gifts or entertainment during a competitive bid or
tender exercise, it requires its regional directors and country managers to "put in
place local rules to cover the giving and acceptance of gifts and entertainment,
which reflect expectation and local custom".218
Thus, there is an urgent need for Kenya to tackle regulatory grounds that breed
breach of fiduciary duties. Given that a vast majority of multinational companies
are already subjected to stringent conditions in their home countries, the
enforcement of similar requirements should be possible.
3.5 Conclusions
Although shareholders may sometimes benefit when directors ignore the interests of
corporate stakeholders, they also stand to incur long-term losses when the reputation
of a company suffers. Thus, honouring community interests might be in the best
interests of a company. This is because such responsibilities nurture good customer
relations, motivate employees, and contribute to the well being of the national
economy. Since the Act does not specify in whose interests directors are supposed to
act and to whom they owe their duties, there is a need for the Act to define expressly
the term "company as a whole" to mean the interests of all shareholders or other
requisite interest groups, such as employees, creditors, and the society within which
the company operates. Effecting such changes would enable directors to ascertain
their obligations easily.
subject to effective, proportionate and dissuasive non-criminal sanctions, including monetary
sanctions, for bribery of foreign public officials.
218 =+,
m.r What We Stand For: Our Business Policies, (London: BP, 1998). Cited in Moran, op cit n
124, at 147.
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To raise the status of employees, it is submitted that companies can give the
employee219 full voting rights within the company. This can be achieved by
allowing employees to nominate representative directors to the board, 22° Giving
employees voting rights would overcome the enforcement problems encountered in
some countries, such as the UK, where the general duty to consider the interests of
employees is owed by directors to the company. At the moment it would appear that
employees have no locus standi to sue as employees. Although they could sue if
they were shareholders, they would still have to obtain a majority to do so.221
The duty of directors to act in the best interests of the company and for a proper
purpose, should be expanded to include matters that are not only related to the
company, but other incidental matters, such as corruption, that are a danger to the
society. This would, in turn, promote corporate citizenship, as companies would
have regard for national sovereignty, health, environment, and other incidental
matters.
Although the honouring of some social responsibilities by directors may benefit the
company in the long-term, some actions, such as the giving of donations, ought to be
closely regulated because they are prone to abuse by corrupt directors. Abuse of
donations can, for instance, be controlled by limiting the amount that can be given
by directors or requiring prior consent of shareholders before the donations are
given. Corrupt practices by directors can also be reduced by having strict rules that
would discourage directors from entering into conflicts of interest situations. Such
rules should, for instance, seek to reduce the number of directorships a director may
hold and require directors to disclose their interests to the General Meeting rather
than merely to the board of directors.
Although making changes in the Act might well discourage breach of duties by
directors, there is also a responsibility on the international community to regulate
multinational corporations effectively. This is because reliance on Kenya's
219 The term employee should be clearly defined to mean those with a contract for service. Failure to
do so, may lead to misleading interpretation that would imply independent contractors, such as
consultants. Boyle, op cit n 123, at 285.
229 Vagts, "Reforming the 'modem' Corporation: Perspectives from the German", (1966) 80 Harvard
Law Review 23. EC Steelfel and B Von Falkenhausen, "The New German Stock Corporation Law",
(1967) 52 Cornell Law Quaterly, 518, 537. Cited in PA Thomas, op cit n 78, p 30.
221 Boyle, op cit n 123, at 285.
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legislation to curb abuse of power by multinational corporations and corruption may
not be sufficient given that the economic power of multinational corporations enable
them to disregard principles of good corporate citizenship.
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CHAPTER FOUR
4.0 THE CONDUCT OF DIRECTORS: DUTY OF SKILL AND CARE
4.1 Introduction
As the countries and economies of the world become more integrated and
interdependent due to globalisation and competition, high standards of conducting
business' are increasingly demanding more input from company directors. As such,
the steps adopted by individual governments to regulate business determine whether
the global system is harmful to the economy of a country. For a country to draw
economic benefits from the global system, the legal regulatory framework has to
conform to international commercial standards. 2 It is therefore imperative for any
government "to create conditions in which people can take advantage of the
opportunities and challenges of globalisation." 3A conducive environment attracts
both foreign and local investors,4 since investments can hardly be made "where
there are no prospects for reasonable return in a stable and predictable
environment."5
Realisation of the benefits accrued from the global system has prompted major key
players in the economy of Kenya to create new partnerships6 across the world.
'The attempt by Shell to dispose of the redundant Brent Spar oil in Mid -Atlantic was met with
pressure from the media and from consumers, who actually begun to boycott its products.
Eventually, Shell was compelled to dispose of the structure in a way that was much more expensive
than its original proposals. See Bamford, "Directors' Duties: The Public Dimension", [2000] 2 Co
Law 38.
2 A comparison of Kenya and Malaysia provides a good illustration of the effect that response to
global economy can have on a country. In spite of the two countries obtaining independence in 1963
with roughly the same per capita income, Malaysia has become one of the Asian Tiger economies
due to implementation of policies while the living standard in Kenya has hardly changed since
independence. See J James, "Connecting to the Global Economy Through the World Trading
System" [2000] Sep-Dec Professional Management Journal of the Institute of Certified Public
Secretaries of Kenya, at 10. Mr Jeffrey James is a former British High Commissioner to Kenya.
3 Ibid at 24.
4 Foreign investments bring in capital, new technology, quality products and also make a strong
contribution to growth, implementations, exports, and government revenue. Similarly, domestic
investment helps in mobilising Kenya's own internal resources. See Ibid at 25.
5Ibid, at 25.
6 Factors that favour mergers and strategic alliances include: growth in market economies, the
liberalisation or deregulation of matters such as exchange control interest rates, privatisation, and de-
monopolisation. The said factors are often triggered by falling trade barriers caused by regional
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Illustrative of such integration is the partnership of Kenya Airways and KLM. The
partnership has not only boosted the workforce of the company in order to meet the
expanding business, but it has made significant contributions to the Kenyan
Exchequer, instead of operating at a loss as in the days when Kenya Airways was a
parastata1.7
In spite of the benefits accruing from globalisation, the integration and diverse
geographical locations of companies erode the decision-making power of
shareholders. Directors also find it difficult to keep track of the affairs of a company
that conducts its business in a variety of geographical locations.
It is against this background of the changing business environment that this Chapter
aims to assess whether the standards of care, skill, and diligence expected from
directors in Kenya meet the developing and rising business standards of the global
economy.
4.2 The Nature of the Duty of Skill and Care
4.2.1 Liability of Directors for Negligence
Apart from the fiduciary duties owed by directors to a company, they also owe to
their companies a duty of care and skill 8 at common law. 9 Negligence in the
performance of duties attaches liability to a director. 1 ° Any damages occasioned to
integration policies, the influence of WTO, single currencies, corporate restructuring and
globalisation. See Kamau, "Building Partnerships for Business Success" [2000] Sep-Dec
Professional Management Journal of the Institute of Certified Public Secretaries of Kenya, at 10.
'Ibid.
Skill has been defined as "that special competence which is not part of the ordinary equipment of
the reasonable man but the result of aptitude developed by special training and experience which
requires those who undertake work calling for special skill not only to exercise reasonable care but
measure up to the standards of proficiency that can be expected from persons undertaking such
work." See Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438, at 500 Per Clarke and Sheller JJA.
9 Directors owe the company a duty of care both at common law (legal duties) and equity (equitable
duty). Per Lindley MR in Lagunas Nitrate Company v Lagunas Syndicate [1899] 2 Ch 392 at 435.
I ° Negligence needs to be gross or culpable for it to attach any liability to a director. For the
distinction between gross and mere negligence see Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd
[1911] 1 Ch 425, Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407; Wilson v Brett (1843) 11
M & W 113; Turquand v Marshall (1869) 4 Ch App 376; Overend, Gurney & Co v Gibb (1872) LR 5
HL 480
(HL); Re National Bank of Wales Ltd [1899] 2 Ch 629 at 671 (CA); and Re Brazilian Rubber
Plantations and Estates Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 425.
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the company by a negligent act are recoverable by the company." The duty of care
owed by a director to a company emanates from the assumption of responsibility for
the property or affairs of the company. 12 The Kenyan Companies Act" (the "Act")
prohibits the exemption of directors from liability which would attach to them in
respect of any negligence or breach of duty.14
4.2.2 Origins of the Duty
The duty to exercise skill, care, and diligence arises from fiduciary obligations,
contractual obligations, I5 Donoghue v Stevenson 16 principles, or statutes. The duties
arising from fiduciary relationship (equitable) and common law (legal) are
occasionally intertwined. Illustrative of their distinction is the Australian case of
Permanent Building Society v Wheeler" where the court considered whether a
director of a building society owed fiduciary duties to it to exercise a reasonable
degree of care and diligence. While the counsel for the Building Society sought to
characterise the claim as a breach of fiduciary duty and alternatively a claim in
negligence, Ipp J saw much merit in the argument that directors owe duties to
exercise care and skill at law.I8
4.3 The Standard of Skill and Care Required in Kenya
To determine whether a director is in breach of the duty of skill and care, the
Kenyan courts follow the rules laid down by Mr PJS Hewett, Commissioner of
Assize l9 in Flagship Carriers Ltd v Imperial Bank Ltd." As discussed in Chapter
Three, Mr PJS Hewett found the directors liable for breach of fiduciary duties and
also laid down the rules governing their duty of skill, care, and diligence as follows:
Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing [1989] BCLC 49. Directors who had left all their duties to a
fellow director were held liable for negligence when the active director issued unenforceable loans.
12 Per Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Henderson v Men-et Syndicates Ltd [1995] 2 AC 145 at 205.
13 Cap 486, Laws of Kenya.
14 Section 206.
15 Lister v Lamford Ice and Cold Storage Co Ltd [1957] AC 555.
16 [1932] AC 562.
17 (1993-1994) 11WAR 187, 235.
18 Permanent Building Society v Wheeler (1993-1994) 11 WAR 187, 235. Although it was concluded
that the director owed the building society a duty in law and equity to exercise reasonable care and
skill, the equitable duty was recognised to be distinct from a fiduciary duty (p 239).
19 A Commissioner of Assize is a part time judge.
20 High Court Civil Case No 1643 of 1999 (Unreported), Ruling per PJS Hewett.
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• They must exercise the degree of skill which may reasonably be expected from a
person of their knowledge and experience, but they are not liable for errors of
judgement.
• They are not bound to give continuous attention to the company's affairs.
• In case of duties properly left to an official of the company they are, in absence
of grounds for suspicion, justified in trusting that official to perform his duties
honestly.
• Apart from the general duties summarised above, their duties depend on the
nature of the company's business and the manner in which the work is
distributed between the directors and the others officials of the company,
provided that the distribution is reasonable and not inconsistent with the
provisions of the articles.21
Given that a director is only required to exhibit a degree of skill and care that may
reasonably be expected from a person of his knowledge and experience, the courts
apply a subjective test to assess the liability of directors for breach of the duty of
skill and care. In doing so, the courts must consider the knowledge, skills and
experience22 of a director.23
The application of subjective standards presupposes that a director cannot be held
liable for "honest mistakes" of judgment. 24 It is true to say that subjective standards
to exercise skill and care are "remarkably low" and "light" 25 because a director
would, for instance, not be found liable in negligence for being in total ignorance of
the business of the company. 26 It is notable that there are no statutory provisions in
Kenya requiring directors of a company to have expertise and experience in the
21 Ibid, at 11. Mr Hewett relied on the rules as laid down in Charlesworth & Morse, Company Law,
(9th edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1968), 277. The rules were originally formulated by Romer J in Re
City Equitable Fire Insurance Co (1925) Ch 407.
22 The courts often take into consideration the part time nature of most directorships and the lack of
special skills by directors. See Turquand v Marshall (1869) 4 Ch App 376.
21 Professor Gower, however, argues that the test laid down by Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire
Insurance Co Ltd is partly objective and subjective. See LCB Gower, Gower's Principles of Modern
Company Law (5th ed, Sweet &Maxwell London, 1992) p 551.
24 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 at pp 429 (Per Romer J). Sealy also
observes that a pure objective test cannot be applied with respect to directors' duties of care and skill
since the subjective test is necessary and cannot be ignored. See Sealy, "Reforming the Law on
Company Directors' Duties" [1991] 12 Co Law 175.
25 Op cit n 23.
26 Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd [1911]! Ch 425.
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management of its business. 27 As such, the application of subjective standards
implies that there is no minimum reasonable amount of skill required from directors.
In fact, the results of the survey conducted in Nairobi between October 2001 and
January 2002, indicated that directors do not take their duty of skill, care, and
diligence seriously (54 percent of respondents took that view).28
The low standards 29 of care and diligence required from directors in Kenya can be
traced back to the traditional reluctance of the English judiciary to treat differently
directors who were part time officers and figureheads devoid of any particular
executive skills and executive directors. The English courts felt that imposing
onerous standards of care and skill on them would be unreasonable. 3° The courts
were also reluctant to "interfere with the internal management of companies acting
within their powers" 31 because they sought to have shareholders who appointed
amateur directors bear the consequent risks. 32 This view clearly ignored the negative
impact of directorial misconduct on creditors, employees, and society.33
Due to public expectations and exigencies of today's business, the courts in some
jurisdictions have continuously changed their attitude towards the low subjective
standards set in earlier cases. 34 As a result, they have sought to raise the standards
by suggesting that the relevant test of the duties of a director involves not only a
subjective element but also an objective one which requires a director to possess the
skill that "may reasonably be expected from a person undertaking those duties".35
27 Although it is a requirement under the London Stock Exchange, Listing Rules, paras 3.8, there is
no reasonable standard of general management. Directors are not under a duty to deliver services
with reasonable care and skill because they are exempted from s 13 of Supply of Goods and Services
Act 1982.
28 The results of the survey are analysed in detail in Chapter 9.
29 In Daniels and Others v Anderson and Others (AWA case) (1995) 16 ACSR 607, 658 the New
South Wales Court of Appeal observed that old cases which imposed the subjective tests and the need
for gross negligence were outdated. The subjective duty of care, skill, and diligence expected from a
director was described as remarkably low.
313 JH Farrar et al, Farrar 's Company Law 3rd ed, (London: Butterworths, 1991), p 396.
31 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, 93 per Lord Davey. In Pavlides v Jensen [1956] Ch 565 the court
declined to intervene in a sale of company assets at an undervalued price. Also see Charitable
Corporation v Sutton (1742) 2 Atk 400, per Lord Hardwicke.
32 Per Lord Hatherly in Turquand v Marshall (1869) 4 Ch App 376 at 386.
33 Op cit n 30.
34 The courts are adopting a more interventionist approach to the internal management of companies.
See Editorial comment, "Directors-True or False?" (1997) 18 Co Law 129 at 129.
35Norman v Theodore Goddard [1991] BCLC 1028. Hoffmann J observed that "a director who
undertakes the management of the company's properties is expected to have reasonable skill in
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For instance, the Nigerian Law Reform Commission 36 sought to raise the low
standards set by Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co 37 by requiring directors to
conform to a professional standard of care, just as doctors or lawyers must. This
approach followed the objective standard adopted by the Lawrence Committee
(Ontario) in 1967, which provides that:
"Every director of a company shall exercise the powers and
discharge the duties of his office honestly, in good faith and
in the best interests of the company, and in connection
therewith, shall exercise that degree of care, diligence and
skill which a reasonably prudent director would exercise in
comparable circumstances." 38
4.3.1 Standard of Skill and Care required in the UK
The present English case law suggests that the relevant test for the duties of a
director involves an objective element. A director is therefore required to possess the
skill that "may reasonably be expected from a person undertaking those duties".39
For instance, in Re D'Jan of London Ltd,4° Hoffmann J equated the objective
standard set by section 214 (4) 41 of the Insolvency Act 1986 42 with the common law
duty of care owed by present day directors.
property, but not in off shore tax avoidance." See Hicks, "Directors' Liability For Management
Errors", (1994) 110 LQR 390, at 390.
36 Nigeria Law Reform Commission, Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law: Volume 1-
Review and Recommendations, 1987 p 219.
37 (1925) Ch 407.
nibid.
39 Hicks, op cit n 35, at 390.
40	 -[1993] BCC 646.
41 The section sets out the requirements for wrongful trading as (a) that the company has gone
insolvent liquidation; (b) that at some time before the commencement of the winding-up the person
concerned knew or ought to have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company
would avoid gong into insolvent liquidation; and (c) that the person concerned was a director or
shadow director of the company at that time.
42 The wrongful trading provision introduces an objective element in assessing directors' liability
once the company has entered insolvency by requiring a reasonably diligent person having both (a)
the general knowledge, skill and experience that may reasonably be expected of a person carrying out
the same functions as are carried out by that director in relation to the company, and (b) the general
knowledge, skill, and experience that that director has.
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Similarly, in Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing 43 a non-executive director failed
to attend any board meetings and sought to justify his inactivity by alleging that non-
executive directors could allow an executive director to have absolute control, and
they could also rely on auditors to do a proper job. Foster J rejected this argument
and held that under the Companies Act the duties of executive and non-executive
directors were the same, where both have similar experiences. 44 The court
considered that they failed to perform their duties and to exhibit the necessary skill
and care.45
It is notable that despite the attempts by the English Judiciary to raise the standard of
skill and care, there is still no existing statutory duty reflecting the judicial attitude.
The final report of the Company Law Review Steering group has recommended that
a director ought to exercise the care, skill, and diligence reasonable to be expected of
a director in his position and with any additional knowledge and experience which
he actually has.46
In the UK, stringent standards of care, skill and diligence exist in relation to
wrongful trading. The Insolvency Act 1986 requires the conduct of a director to be
assessed against that of a reasonably diligent person with the general knowledge,
skill and experience that director has. 47 Company Directors Disqualification Act
1986 (UK) also imposes similar stringent standards. 48 English courts have
43 [1989] BCLC 498.
44 The executive and non-executive directors had relevant accountancy experience.
45 Per Foster J in Dorchester Finance Co Ltd v Stebbing [1989] BCLC 498, 505.
46 The Company Law Review Steering Group: Final Report, (DTI, 2001), Clause 306.
47 Section 214. Also see comment in D Prentice, "Creditors' Interests and Directors' Duties" (1990)
10 OJLS 265.
48 In Re Continental Assurance Co of London Plc [1996] BCC 888 a senior bank official who was a
non-executive director of the subsidiary company and its parent company was disqualified. The
wholly owned subsidiary had made a number of cash advances to the parent company which were
contrary to provisions relating to prohibitions on financial assistance towards the purchase of shares.
After collapse of both companies, the Secretary of State obtained an order disqualifying the director.
Although the director did not realise that there was indebtedness between the two companies, he was
nevertheless held liable, as his background should have prompted him to read and understand the
company's statutory accounts.
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recognised recent legislative developments° and construed this standard to be the
appropriate50 one expected from modern directors.51
Further changes were effected by Hoffmann J in Norman v Theodore Goddard52
where he applied an objective test to observe that a director must possess the skill
that may reasonably be expected from someone undertaking those duties. This
position would appear to be different from the one proposed in Re City Equitable
Fire Insurance Co53 because a degree of professional management or skill on the
part of a director is required. Hoffmann LJ in Re D 'Jan of London 54 also recognised
that the duty owed by a director is properly stated in section 214 (4) of the
Insolvency Act 1986. As such a qualified or experienced director is judged by higher
standards than an inexperienced one. 55
4.3.2 Standard of Skill and Care Required in Australia
A high sense of responsibility is required from directors in Australia. Australian
judicial decisions have recognised the objective element of the standard of care and
diligence owed by a director at common law. 56 The common law decisions were
taken into consideration in the amendment of Australian Corporations Law. Section
180 (1), codified the objective duty requiring directors to exercise the degree of care
and diligence that a reasonable person in a like position would exercise. 57 In spite
of the codification of the objective standard of care, it is worth noting that the
49 This statutory intervention has been rendered as "one of the most important developments in
company law this century." See Prentice, op cit n 47, at 277.
50 It has been noted that the present position is likely to prompt directors to exercise greater care and
skill in order to avoid liability and disqualification under the Insolvency Act 1986 and Company
Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (UK). See R-1 Farrar et al, op cit n 30.
51 Hoffmann LJ in Re D'Jan of London Ltd [1993] BCC 646.
52 [1992] BCC 14 at 15.
53 [1925] Ch 407 at 429 Per Romer J.
54 [1993] BCC 646 at 648-9.
55 It requires a standard that is expected from a reasonably diligent person having having both (a) the
general knowledge, skill, and experience that may reasonably be expected from of a person carrying
out the same functions as are carried out by that director in relation to the company (b) the general
knowledge, skill, and experience that that director has.
56 Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley (1990) 2 ACSR 405; Commonwealth Bank of Australia v
Friedrich (1991) 5 ACSR 115; Awa Ltd v Daniels (1992) 10 ACLC 933; Group Four Industries
Property Limited v Brosnan (1992) 8 ACSR 468.
57 The section provides that "[a] director or other officer of a corporation must exercise their powers
and discharge their duties with the degree of care and diligence that a reasonable person would
exercise if they: were a director or officer of a corporation in the corporation's circumstances; and
occupied the office held by, and had the same responsibilities within the corporation as, the director
or officer.
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Australian Parliament obliged the courts to consider (i) the special background,58
qualifications and management responsibilities of the particular director; and (ii)
such matters as the state of the financial affairs of the corporation, the size and
nature of the corporation, the urgency and magnitude of any problem, the provisions
of the corporation's constitution, and the composition of its board.59
Whilst assessing negligence of directors, 60 the Court of Appeal of New South Wales
in Daniels v Anderson 61 held that directors must bring an informed and independent
judgement to the board. This entails reasonable familiarity with the affairs of the
company and a requirement to possess a degree of professional management.62
The present position in Australia formulates no rule of universal application in
regard to director's obligations in all circumstances. Instead, the duty of care
depends on the particular function a director performs, the circumstances of the
particular case, and the terms on which the director was appointed. So, every act is
objectively63 assessed to establish whether shareholders would reasonably expect
directors to pursue a course of action considering the risk of harm and the potential
benefits. 64
A director may still escape liability under certain circumstances where it would be
unreasonable to expect every director to have equal knowledge and experience of
every aspect of the activities of the company. For instance, where directors are
appointed to attract customers, to add to the prestige of the company, or for the
special skill possessed, such subjective factors may be taken into consideration to
offer protection to directors.65
58 Courts are obliged to consider the circumstances prevailing at the time of the act complained of
without the benefit of hindsight. A court relying on such hindsight can apply too severe standards.
See In re Horsley & Weight Ltd [1982] Ch 442, 455 per Templeman U.
59 Finch, "Company Directors: Who Cares about Skill and Care?" (1992) 55 MLR 179 at 189.
60It followed the conditions applicable in the USA, particularly Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation v Bierman (1993) 2 F 3d 1424 (7th Cir); Francis v United Jersey Bank (1981) 432 A 2d
814 (NJ); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v Stanley (1991) 770 F Supp 1281 (ND Ind).
61 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438.
62 Ipp, "The Diligent Director" (1997) 18 Co Law 162.
63 Section 180 (1) of the Corporation Law reinforces the objectivity of the duty of care owed by a
director.
64 Permanent Building Society v Wheeler [1993] 11 WAR 187; Ipp, op cit n 62, at 166.
65 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438 at 501.
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4.4 Standard of Diligence Required in Kenya
There is no statutory duty in Kenya to attend board meetings. However, Table A of
the Act66 requires a director to vacate his seat if he has been absent for more than six
months without permission from meeting of directors held during that period.
Although Table A may appear to make mandatory requirements for directors to
attend board meetings, it is notable that Table A, being optional, may not be part of
the constitution of a company. Besides, the requirements in Table A are not stringent
enough, as permission can be granted easily to a director who has a good working
relationship with the others. In addition, it is not inconceivable that the company
might not hold any meetings within the period, during which a director is absent.67
The Kenyan courts have not recognised the need to make it mandatory for directors
to attend board meetings. This was illustrated in Flagship Carriers Ltd v Imperial
Bank Ltd 68 where Mr PJS Hewett, Commissioner of Assize, held that a director is
not bound to give continuous attention to the affairs of the company. The courts
therefore treat lack of diligence and neglect 69 or omission of duty at board meetings
differently. 7° A director is required to attend board meetings when he is reasaaab2y
able to do so. 71 As such, his failure to attend board meetings regularly is not
necessarily a basis for liability. 72 In the absence of a contractual obligation on
66 Table A Article 88 (f) which is similar to Nigeria's Table A, Article 87 (f).
67 A director who had been party to a resolution initiating an ultra vires lending policy but was absent
from subsequent meetings where specific loans were made pursuant to the policy was held not to be
liable in Cullerne v The London & Surburban General Permanent Building Society (1890) 25 QBD
485.
" High Court Civil Case No 1643 of 1999 (Unreported), Ruling per PJS Hewett.
69 In re Denham & Co (1884) 25 Ch D 752 a founding director was held not to be liable in negligence
for recommending a payment of a dividend from capital. In spite of not attending a single board
meeting for four years he was absolved from liability.
70 1n re Cardiff Savings Bank [1892] 2 Ch 100, the Marquis of Bute had been appointed to the board
of the bank at an age of six months, upon assumption of the title of president when his father died.
He only attended one board meeting in 39 years even after attaining the age of 21. Despite the failure
of the bank as a result of mismanagement, he was held not liable since directors "are only bound to
use fair and reasonable diligence in the management of their company's affairs" and failing to attend
meetings is not "the same thing as neglect or omission of a duty which ought to be performed at those
meetings." Per Stirling J at 109.
71 This position follows Romer J's proposition in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch
407 at 429. This position has also been recognised in recent English and Australian case law. See
Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell (No 2) [1994] 1 All ER 261, 263-264 Per
Hoffmann LJ; Permanent Building Society v Wheeler (1993-1994) 11WAR 187, 235; and Daniels v
Anderson (1995) 13 ACLC 614, 662 per Clarke and Sheller JJA.
72 Re Denham & Co (1884) 25 Ch 752 and Re Marquis of Bute's Case (1892) 2 Ch 100. In both
cases, the two directors involved attended board meetings once in four years and 38 years
respectively. They were, however, not held liable for the fraud and irregularities in their companies.
Stirling, J in Re Marquis of Bute's Case (1892) 2 Ch 100 observed that "neglect or omission to attend
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directors to perform specific duties, a company director is only liable for negligence
in what he does but not for omitting to attend to the business of the company. 73 A
director who fails to prevent other directors from making unwise decisions by his
absence from a board meeting is also not liable for negligence.74
Although it may be argued that the principles followed by Mr PJS Hewett do not
apply to executive directors given that they originated from Re City Equitable Fire
Insurance Co Ltd,75 a case which was concerned with non-executive directors,76
there can be no doubt that they apply to both executive and non-executive directors
in Kenya because Mr PJS Hewett did not make a distinction between the two]7
Moreover, given that the case of Flagship Carriers Ltd v Imperial Bank Ltd 78 was
only concerned with executive directors, the findings of the judge could not have
been made in reference to non-executive directors.
The need to impose a duty on directors to attend board meetings cannot be
overemphasised. The need for such a duty is demonstrated by the high quality
performance expected by the common law in board meetings. For instance, the
assertion in Ashurst v Mason79 by Bacon VC that "it would be in the highest degree
dangerous to permit directors to say when any particular incident arises.. .1 was
thinking of something else" demonstrates how important board meetings are. It is
true to say that a director who takes part actively in the business of the company
which results in a loss to the company would be liable in negligence, whereas, he
meetings is not, in my opinion, the same thing as neglect or omission of a duty which ought to be
performed at those meetings," Contrast with recent judicial authorities in Australia and the UK,
namely Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438 where it was recognised that today a director is
expected to attend all meetings unless exceptional circumstances, such as illness or absence from the
state, prevent him from doing so.
73 Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations and Estates Ltd [1911] 1 Ch 425.
74 Re Forest of Dean Coal Mining Co [1878] 10 Ch 450 at 452; Huckerby v Elliot [1970] 1 All ER
189. In Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 at 429 a director who was living in
Aberdeen and who found it difficult to attend board meetings in London was exonerated from any
liability.
75 [1925] Ch 407 at 429.
76 Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 at 429 was concerned with non-executive
directors rather than professional directors. See Hicks, op cit n 35, at 392.
77 The rule was first set out by Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co [1925] Ch 407. Although the
case was concerned with a non-executive director, Romer J did not distinguish whether the rules would only
apply to non-executive directors. The Nigerian Law Reform Commission also considered that the rules set out
by Romer J would apply to both executive and non-executive directors. See Nigeria Law Reform Commission,
op cit n 36, at 173.
78 High Court Civil Case No 1643 of 1999 (Unreported), Ruling per PJS Hewett.
79 (1875) LR 5 Ch App 763, 770.
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would not if he abstains from the meeting. 8° It seems inequitable to absolve
directors, on one hand, from liability for non-attendance of board meetings and hold
them liable, on the other, for not being attentive when they attend.
To resolve this unfairness, the Nigerian Law Reform Commission recommended
that directors should be bound by the decision of the board unless it appears to the
court that any director should be exonerated. 81 It also recommended that directors
should have a duty to attend meetings unless there is a good cause for the director
not to attend.82
Similarly, the Australian law requires a director to attend all meetings unless
exceptional circumstances, such as illness or absence from the State, prevent him
from doing so. 83 The Court of Appeal of New South Wales in Daniels v Anderson"
has also maintained that "directors are not excused for shutting their eyes to what is
going on around them. In particular, they may not shut their eyes to corporate
misconduct and the claim that, because they did not see the misconduct, they did not
have a duty to look."85
Requiring all directors to be bound by the decision of the board, unless there are
special circumstances 86 to exonerate a director, appears to be appropriate because it
promotes the diligence of directors.87
4.5 Reliance on Others
Whilst some management powers of the company in Kenya are vested in the board
of directors, 88others are reserved to the general meeting. 89 Due to exigencies of
80 Nigeria Law Reform Commission, op cit n 36, p 173.
81 Ibid p 221.
82 Ibid p 220.
83 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438; Vrisakis v Australian Securities Commission (1993) 1
WAR 395 at 405 per Malcom CJ.
84 (1995) 37 NSWLR 438.
85 Ipp, op cit n 62, at 163. In the UK, Hoffmann J in Bishopsgate Investment Management Ltd v
Maxwell (No 2) [1994] 1 All ER 261 held that a director was liable for lack of activity and taking an
interest in the affairs of the company.
86 Such as illness or absence in the interest of the corporation.
87 Australian reformers recommended that it should be a rule of law that a director must attend all
board meetings unless he has reasonable excuse. Professor Sealy differs with them on the basis that
any liability to pay damages or compensation depends on establishing a causal link between the
directors' decision and loss to the company rather than inattentiveness or absence. See Sealy,
"Reforming the Law on Directors' Duties", [1991] 12 Co Law 175, at 176.
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business, 90 both the Act91 and the courts accept that a director can delegate his duties
to another official or a sub committee of the board 92and he is therefore not liable for
the negligence of his delegates. 93 However, directors do not have the power to
delegate the powers of management unless the articles of association authorise them
to delegate. Article 81 of Table A94 allows directors to delegate their powers to any
company, firm, persons or body of persons. Unless a director suspects fraud, he is
not under any obligation to monitor the conduct of the officers to whom he delegates
his powers. As such, proper delegation to a committee of the board may be a
defence for a director who is not a member of the committee.95
Although directors are allowed to rely on others, they are also required to pay
attention to all the documents placed before them.96 Such attention ranges from
obligations to verify whether the board has authorised a cheque to be signed 97 to
having a complete list of the assets of their company assets before declaring
dividends. 98 While the default of one director does not necessarily impose liability
on the others, failure to make enquiries when there are suspicious circumstances
may be a basis of liability for an innocent. director . 99 Therefore, for the reliance of a
director on others to be reasonable or justified, the circumstances of delegation are
required to give him no ground for suspicion. 169 As such, a director in Kenya would
escape liability for delegating his duties where grounds of suspicion do not exist. It
88 Article 80 of Table A of the Act.
89 Article 47 of Table A of the Act.
913 Per Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 at 429.
91 Article 81 of Table A.
92 Land Credit Co of Ireland v Lord Fermoy (1870) 5 Ch App 763.
93 Dovey v Covey [1901] AC 477,485 the court observed that reasonably wide powers of delegation
and reliance are necessary in order not to "render anything like an intelligent devolution of labour
impossible.
94 The Act.
"Land Credit Co of Ireland v Lord Fermoy [1870] LR 5 Ch 763 where a director was exonerated
from liability after relying on a sub committee of the board. The sub-committee of the board had
used the funds of the company to buy company's shares in a bid to keep up their price. To do this the
sub-committee obtained loans whose purpose was concealed from the board.
96 Per Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 at 471.
97 Romer J even suggested that a director should obtain a board's resolution confirming the signature
before signing it. However, he suggested that a director could trust the assurances of the relevant
officers as to purpose for which the payment was sought. See Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co
Ltd [1925] Ch 407 at 471. Signing a blank cheque was held to be negligent. See Dorchester Finance
Co Ltd. v Stebbing in [1980] I Co Law 38.
98 Chairman and auditors' assurances in relation to company's assets are insufficient. See
Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 at 471-2.
99 Re Lands Allotment Co [1894] 1 Ch 617.
100 Per Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 at 429.
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is notable that a director is under no obligation to supervise his delegates l ° 1 or to
give continuous attention to the affairs i °2of the company. 1 °3 Thus, it is difficult to
hold a director accountable for unreasonably delegating his powers because he is
unlikely to know of any suspicious circumstances, and he is not required to keep
abreast of the affairs of the company or supervise his delegates.
This position is different from the approach adopted by the English courts. The
English Court of Appeal has held that each director of a company has a duty to keep
abreast of the affairs of the company. 104 Similarly, Australian courts do not absolve
directors from liability when they fail to make the appropriate enquiries. 105
Directors in Australia are required to act in good faith and make proper inquiry of
the competence of the source, where the circumstances indicate need for it.106
Directors are also required to exercise a reasonable degree of diligence and honesty
and "try to understand or discover sufficient of the company's financial affairs."I°7
The New South Wales Court of Appeal in Daniels v AWA Ltd also held that reliance
is unreasonable where the circumstances reasonably awaken suspicion. Clarke and
Sheller JJA applied the objective test i °8 to conclude that directorial conduct is to be,
"ordinarily measured by reference to what the reasonable man of ordinary prudence
would do in the circumstances."I09
Dm Dovey v Cory [1901] AC 477 at 493. In Huckerby v Elliot [1970] 1 All ER 189 delegation of the
task of obtaining a licence exonerated a director from liability when a club operated without a proper
licence.
102 According to Halsbury LC in Dovey v Cory [1901] AC 477 at 485 "the business of life could not
go on if people could not trust those who are put into a position of trust for the express purpose of
attending to details of management."
103 Per Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 at 429-9. The case
formulated three principles, namely (i) the subjective test of skill which does not require a director to
exhibit, in the performance of his duties, a greater degree of skill than may reasonably be expected
from a person of his knowledge and experience, (ii) a director is not bound to give continuous
attention to the company's affairs, (iii) a director can trust an official to perform duties that can be
entrusted to him in accordance with the articles.
1" Re Westmind Packing Services Ltd [1983] Ch 258.
105 Daniels v Anderson (1995) 13 ACLC 614 at 663-666 per Clarke and Sheller JJA. This position
was followed in the UK by Jonathan Parker J in Re Barings Plc (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433.
106 Section 189.
107 Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley (1990) 2 ACSR 405.
108 Flint, "Non Executive Directors' General Duty of Care and Delegation of Duty: But Do We Need
a Common Law Duty of Care?" (1997) 9 Bond LR 198, at 212.
109 (1995) 13 ACLC 614, 665.
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The standards of care expected from executive directors were also considered and
raised in Daniels v Anderson."° Executive directors were held to have been
negligent for failing to establish a proper structure of internal controls, failing to
maintain a proper system of records, failing to supervise adequately a particular
manager, and failing to act on the warning of the auditor. To avoid liability,
directors in Australia have to be involved in the internal supervision of the affairs of
the company. In spite of this requirement, non-executive directors are still entitled to
rely on managers to "carry out the day to day control of the corporation's business
affairs" and to go carefully through relevant financial and other information of the
corporation, to alert the board of any matter requiring attention. Besides, they are
also entitled to rely on the Chairman to discharge the "primary responsibility for
selecting matters to be brought to the board's attention"" l and advice of properly
appointed auditors."'
Although Hoffmann J in Norman v Theodore Goddard 1 " recognised that directors
are entitled to rely on others, " 4 the Australian approach differs from this because
directors in Australia are required to keep abreast of the business of the company. It
would therefore appear that where a risk is obvious, directors in Australia are not
entitled to rely on the judgement of others."' The approach adopted in Australia is
more stringent that the English one because directors in Australia have the additional
obligation of maintaining an awareness of the affairs of the company and
undertaking personal investigations. Additionally, directors are not entitled to rely
on the integrity of officials to whom responsibilities are delegated.
lo (1995) 37 NSWLR 438.
111 Per Rogers J in Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438 at 1015.
112 Ipp, op cit n 62, at 165.
113 [1992] BCC 14 at 15.
114 "A director who undertakes the management of the company's properties is expected to have
reasonable skill in property management, but not in off-shore tax avoidance. See Norman v Theodore
Goddard [1992] BCC 14 at 15 Per Hoffinann J. In absence of reasonable grounds for suspicion,
directors are entitled to rely on others, as business cannot be carried out upon principles of distrust.
This position is similar to that proposed by Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd
[1925] Ch 407 at 429-9.
115 Under certain circumstances, a director might escape liability in Australia for relying on others.
Such circumstances include where a director has no cause to check on the source of information. See
Biala Property Ltd v Mallina Holdings Ltd (No 2) (1993) 11 ACSR 785.
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4.6 Subjective v Objective Standards
Although English and Australian courts adopt objective standards H6 to assess the
liability of directors, they also recognise that it is impossible to expect a director to
exhibit greater degree of skill than may reasonably be expected from someone
undertaking such duties. 1/7 As such, subjectivity 118 still applies to skill, knowledge,
and experience of a director."' For instance, Hoffmann J in Norman v Theodore
Goddard 120 favoured the view that the knowledge, skill, and experience of a
director should nevertheless be taken into consideration while assessing what a
director might reasonably know. He proposed that the objective test should be
applied in light of the subjective circumstances of the director concerned.'
The Federal Court of Australia Full Court in Cummings & Anor v Claremont
Petroleum NL 122 also retained a subjective element on the grounds that, "directors
do not form a homogeneous category and necessary skills vary according to
differences in sizes and purposes of companies, complexities of management
structures, reliance on expert advisers and roles of the particular directors."123
Thus, English and Australian courts apply both subjective and objective standards to
assess the negligence of directors. The application of both standards is desirable as
it ensures that standards of skill and care are raised without ignoring the individual
circumstances of a director. It would be both inequitable and onerous to judge all
directors by the same standards as it would, for instance, hinder small businessmen
from exercising their free will in selecting directors of private companies. Isaacs and
"6 Recommendations were made in Australia to have the duties of care and skill stated in objective
terms. See Report of the Australian Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs
(November 1989) (Cooney Report). Cited in Sealy, "Reforming the Law on Directors' Duties",
[1991] 12 Co Law 175, at 176.
"'Theodore Goddard [1992] BCC 14. The court considered whether Quirk, a former director of a
property company was liable for the money stolen from the company by his co-director Bingham,
partner in Theodore Goddard. Hoffmann J held that he had taken reasonable care but taking "into
account the knowledge, skill, and experience which he actually had in addition to that which a person
carrying out his functions should be expected to have" (at 15).
I ' s Interpreting the provision introducing the objective standard, an Australian court in Byrne v Baker
[1964] VR 443, 450-451 observed that the subjective standard could not be ignored. See Sealy,
' , Reforming the Law on Directors' Duties", [1991] 12 Co Law 175, at 177.
119 'pp, op cit n 62, at 163.
1 20 [1992] BCC 14 at 15.
121 Similar steps had been taken in Australia and the USA.
122 (1993) 11 ACLC 125.
123 finch, op cit n 59, at 203.
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Rich JJ in Gould v The Mount Oxide Mines Ltdi24 appreciated the impossibility of
having an objective standard of the reasonably competent director due to the
diversity of companies and businesses. They state that:
"[NJ° rule of universal application can be formulated as to a
director's obligation in all circumstances. The extent of his
duty must depend on the particular function he is
performing, the circumstances of the specific case, and the
terms on which he has undertaken to act as a director."125
On the other hand, the consideration of objective elements requires directors to have
some degree of common intelligence. It is notable that the application of an
objective standard of care in Kenya would make many directors liable in negligence
because directors are not required to have any special qualifications to assume
office. It would therefore be appropriate to prescribe minimum standards for
directors in order to maintain high standards of skill and care. I26 This would
introduce professionalism to the board.
4.7 Conclusions
Whilst community, commercial, and company structure 127 changes have influenced
Australia,' UK, Nigeria, and Canada to raise the standards of care, skill and
diligence expected from directors, neither the Kenyan Parliament nor the courts
have, so far, addressed the need for changing standards. At the moment, there is no
Kenyan authority to suggest that the Kenyan courts would apply the objective test
applied in the UK or Australia. In fact, it is true to say that subjective standards are
124 (1917) 22 CLR 490
1251bid, at 531. The Cooney Report also recognised the difficulty of having an objective common law
standard of a reasonably competent director since "activities of companies are diverse and
consequently a range of skills and experience is useful on the boards. See Cooney Report of the
Australian Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional Affairs (November 1989), p 28.
126 Butcher, "Directors' Duties in the Twenty-First Century: A New Beginning?" [2000] 2
International Comparative and Corporate Law Journal 197, at 205.
127 Rogers CJ attributed evolution of modem company legislation to "demands of changing company
structures and commercial practices. See AWA Ltd v Daniels (1990) 10 ACLC 933 at 1013.
128 Australia has enacted legislation that has breathed life into, and raised, standards expected from
directors. See Corporations Legislation Amendment Act 1991 (Cth); Corporate Law Reform Act
1992 (Cth); First Corporate Law Simplifications Act 1995 (Cth); Financial Sector Reform
(Amendments and Transitional Provisions) Act 1998 (Cth) and Corporate Law Economic Reform
Program Bill 1998 (Cth).
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applicable in Kenya because Mr PIS Hewett, Commissioner of Assize, in Flagship
Carriers Ltd v Imperial Bank Ltd 129 did not appreciate the different approaches
adopted by English and Australian courts.
The subjective standards of skill and care applicable in Kenya enable directors to
escape liability for misconduct. Assessing liability subjectively overly protects
directors I3° as they are able to go unpunished by pleading ignorance and
inexperience. 131 Since the courts expect directors to exhibit a degree of skill that is
commensurate with his experience, a board with skilful directors would be expected
to exhibit a higher standard of skill, care, and diligence.
It is important to raise the standards of directors because shareholders are not in a
position to track continuously the conduct of directors. They are therefore less
effective as policy makers, decision takers, and regulators of directors in the
traditional sense.
Although it is impossible to set a universal objective standard, which is required
from all directors, as a board consists of directors with diverse qualifications and
experiences, it is appropriate to introduce some professionalism on the board in
order to raise standards. Given that there is no minimum qualification criteria set lot
directors, requiring them to be qualified and adopting objective and subjective
standard, whilst assessing what they had done in exercising skill and care would
raise their standards.
The approach adopted in Australia in respect of delegation of the powers of directors
is more stringent and appropriate. This is because directors would not escape
liability if they simply relied on the integrity of others, as they have the additional
129 High Court Civil Case No 1643 of 1999 (Unreported), Ruling per PJS Hewett.
130 In Dovey v Cory [1901] AC 477 Cory, a director, wrongfully assented to certain payments and
advances having honestly relied on the advice given by Chairman and General Manager of the bank.
He was found not to be negligent of his duties after due consideration of his company's business and
his position in relation to it. Similarly, Neville J in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd
[1911] 1 Ch 425 at 437 was of the view that directors are under a duty to exercise reasonable care
having regard to their knowledge and experience, which "an ordinary man might be expected to take
in the same circumstances on his own behalf"
131 Nolan, "Company Lawyer Briefing; Maxwell Improper Purposes" (1994) 15 Co Law 85 at 87.
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obligation of maintaining an awareness of the affairs of the company and
undertaking personal investigations.
It is also necessary to bind directors to the decision of the board unless there is a
good cause for the director not to attend. This would promote diligence among
directors."2
132 Australian reformers recommended that it should be a rule of law that a director must attend all
board meetings unless he has reasonable excuse. Sealy differs with them on the basis that any
liability to pay damages or compensation depends on establishing a causal link between the directors'
decision and loss to the company rather than inattentiveness or absence. See Sealy, "Reforming the
Law on Directors' Duties", [1991] 12 Co Law 175, at 176.
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CHAPTER FIVE
5.0 ENFORCEMENT OF LIABILITY
5.1 Introduction
Companies serve as strategic media for the conduct of business, which in turn boosts
the economy. Companies achieve this objective by being involved in production,
transportation, employment and payment of taxes. In spite of their positive role,
dishonest and negligent directors, as illustrated in the foregoing Chapters, continue
to exploit the existing legal loopholes for personal ends, and this prejudices
stakeholders in companies as well as the economy.
Appropriate corporate governance can hardly be realised unless a legal system has in
place a mechanism that facilitates prompt and expedient resolution of disputes
within a company. In fact, lack of an effective mechanism encourages dissipation of
the resources of a company and time in protracted litigation. Moreover, it makes it
easy for directors to escape liability after failing to discharge their obligations,
especially when directors are able to influence the general meeting. For companies
to remain competitive and profitable, investors ought promptly to recover moneys
due to them and also recoup losses suffered by them as a result of the action of
directors. The efficiency of the Kenyan regulatory framework in relation to directors
and in ensuring directorial duties are enforced effectively is examined in this
chapter. The analysis is carried out by examining how the Kenyan Companies Ace
(the "Act") and the judiciary have sought to protect the rights of investors 2 by
providing an effective enforcement mechanism.
5.2 Instituting Proceedings
In general, members of a Kenyan company do not control the company and its
operations, as the management is vested in the board of directors. 3 As such,
'Chapter 486, Laws of Kenya.
2 Since shareholders are not in a position continuously to keep track of directors' activities they have
been regarded as having "exchanged control for liquidity." See N Wolfson, The Modern
Corporation: Free Markets Versus Regulation, (Free Press, 1984) p 20.
3 Table A of the Act, Article 80.
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shareholders cannot exercise powers of management vested in a board of directors.
The only opportunity available for them to exercise directorial powers is by altering
the articles or "by refusing to re-elect the directors of whose actions they
disapprove."4 However, given that shareholders might not muster the requisite
numbers at a meeting to change the articles, the dissenting minority are bound to
accept the decision made by the majority unless they are able to prove oppression by
the majority. Where this is the case, shareholders can redress the wrongs of
directors by relying on legal remedies.
On various occasions, the Kenyan courts have refused to review the merits of lawful
decisions made by shareholders. 5 The courts have been instrumental in allowing
shareholders to settle disputes within a company and to comply with majority
decisions. The courts have also been reluctant to entertain internal disputes for the
purposes of discouraging multiplicity of claims. As a result, if a wrong is done to a
company, only the company may institute proceedings for redress, as the legal rights
of the company belong to it rather than to the members.6
In spite of the contract that exists between a member and a company, and provided
for under the Act, 7 courts have refused to recognise8 that a member has a contractual
right to compel the company to act in accordance with all the provisions of the
memorandum and articles of association. The rationale for this is the reluctance of
the courts to interfere in the internal management of companies. 9 On the other hand,
where the intention of the majority shareholders on a matter within the powers of the
company is clear, it is not possible for a shareholder to sue in order to rectify any
irregularity. 10 Illustrative of the reluctance of the courts to interfere in the internal
4 Per Greer LI in John Shaw and Sons (Salford) v Shaw [1935] 2 KB 113 at 134.
5 Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others [1966] EA 390; Mohamed Mitha and Others v Ibrahim
Mitha & Others [1967] EA 575; Re Elyeza Bwambale & Co Ltd [1969] EA430. Also see the
remarks of Scrutton Li in Shuttleworth v Cox Brothers and Co (Maidenhead) Ltd [1927] 2 KB 9 at
22-4.
6 Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others, op cit n 5; Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461;
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1982] Ch 204.
i s 22 (1).
8 Courts, however, recognise an individual member's right where the acts complained of injure a
member or are either fraudulent or ultra vires. See Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others, op cit n
5.
9 Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others, op cit n 5.
I ° Per Lord Davey in Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83, PC, at 93-4.
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management of companies is the case of Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others."
Here the East African Court of Appeal examined whether the plaintiff's control of
the activities of the company had been defeated by a change in the articles.
Sir Udo Udoma CJ observed that:
"It is an elementary principle of the law relating to
joint stock companies that the court will not interfere
with the internal management of companies acting
within their powers, and, in fact, has no jurisdiction to
do so. It is also clear law that in order to redress a
wrong done to the company or to recover moneys or
damages alleged to be done to a company, action
should prima facie be brought by the company itself._
it is true that as a general rule a suit by an individual
shar eh ol der OT illdiN i &al Shal thOldZIS ".‘11 2A1
incorporated company, complaining of an injury to the
corporation, cannot be maintained, if it appears that the
plaintiffs have the means of procuring the suit to be
instituted in the name of the corporation itself."12
In that case, the Court considered whether the plaintiff; who was the chairman, a
director, and the largest shareholder of a limited company, could sue another
director and members for depriving him of his offices by special resolutions passed
as a result of changes in the articles of the company. Article 48 of the said Articles
of Association was changed with a view to defeating the control of the activities of
the company by the plaintiff. While the article originally read "each member shall
have one vote for every share held by him", it was changed to read as "each member
shall have one vote irrespective of the shares held by him." These changes were
made at meetings convened by members and non-members who had insufficient
shares to requisition the meeting or to alter the Articles. In addition, the plaintiff
averred that false returns had been submitted to the Registrar of Companies.
I I [1966] EA 390.
12 Ibid at 396. The position taken here appears to conform to the principles laid down in Foss v
Harbottle, op cit n 6.
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Subsequently, the plaintiff lost his post of director and of chairman. The company
was neither a co-plaintiff nor a co-defendant to the action brought by the former
chairman. The defence relied on the authorities of Foss v Harbottle, 13 Mozley v
Alston, 14and Heyting v Dupont 15to argue that the court had no jurisdiction to
entertain the suit because the plaintiff was not entitled to the relief sought.
Although the court observed that courts have no jurisdiction to interfere with the
internal management of companies acting within their powers and that a company
itself ought to sue in order to redress a wrong done to the company or to recover
money due to the company, it relied on Burland v Earle 16and Atwool v
Merryweather i7to invoke the exception to the said rule. The exception allows a
shareholder to sue in his own name if a majority of the shares are controlled by those
against whom relief is sought provided that the acts complained of are either
fraudulent or ultra vires. As a result, the court upheld the fact that "majority
shareholders have no rights to use their votes in such a way as to compromise a suit
instituted for the benefit of the company and to retain the benefits obtained by the
compromise for themselves, to the exclusion of the minority. ,,18
In finding that the plaintiff was properly before the court, Sir Udo Udoma, CJ
observed, inter alia:
"He has what is commonly called a right of action, and these
decisions which say that, where a wrong is done to the
company by the exclusion of a director from the board
meetings, the company may sue, and must sue for that
wrong, do not apply to the case of a wrong done simply to an
individual ... therefore I conclude that I am satisfied that this
suit is maintainable in law by the plaintiff in his own right,
13 (1843) 67 ER 189.
14 (1847) 41 ER 833.
15 [1964] 2 All ER 273, (CA).
16 [1902] AC 83.
17 (1867) LR 5 Eq 464.
18 Menier v Hooper's Telegraph Works (1874) 9 Ch App 350. Similarly, in Simpson v Westminster
Palace Hotel Co (1860) 2 LT 707, Lord Campbell, LC, observed that the funds of a joint stock
company established for the purposes of one undertaking cannot be applied to another. If an attempt
to do so is made, such an attempt would be ultra vires even if it is sanctioned by all he directors and
by a large majority of shareholders. Thus, any single shareholder has a right to resist it and the court
of equity will interpose on his behalf by injunction.
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and that this court has jurisdiction to entertain it as the action
is brought for injury done to the plaintiff personally by his
co-directors and other members of the company."19
Generally, it appears that, unless a wrong is done to an individual, the company is
the only entity entitled to sue a delinquent director, 2° as his duties are only owed to
the company.21
The decision to sue must be decided by the board of directors, which has the
authority to institute proceedings in the company's name. In Bugerere Coffee
Growers Ltd v Sebaduka 22 an action instituted by an advocate in the name of the
company without any resolution of the company or directors was dismissed. In that
case a meeting of the members was requisitioned under section 132 of the Act by
shareholders holding more than one tenth of the paid up capital. This was as a result
of directors failing to call a meeting. At the meeting, a resolution was passed
removing all directors and appointing others. An action was thereafter brought in
the name of the company challenging the appointment of the new directors. The
defendants objected at the outset that the action was incompetent, as the company
had not given authority for it to proceed.
Dismissing the action Youds J stated that:
"I find that the letter which Mr. Dholakia handed into the
court was and is a highly suspect document, that it is not
worth the paper it was written upon as an authority from the
company and could not possibly constitute a lawful and
proper authority from the company to the firm of advocates
19 Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others op cit n 5, at 398. The court granted the plaintiff leave to
amend his plaint in order to join the company as a co-defendant as failure to do so was bound to
result in multiplicity of suits. It is notable, however, that the director was also a shareholder of the
company. Thus, the judgement of the court was not against the English position which permits only
shareholders to enforce liability. See section 14 of the UK's Companies Act 1985.
20 Proceedings may be instituted against a de facto or shadow director as well as a retired director,
estate of a deceased director, and a bankrupt director. See Curtis's Furnishing Stores Ltd v Freedman
[1966] 2 ALL ER 955.
21 Foss v Harbottle, op cit n 6.
22 [1970] EA 147. Also see, Breckland Group Holdings Ltd v London and Suffolk Properties Ltd
[1989] BCLC 100.
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whereby they were to act and commence legal proceedings
in the name of the company and on its behalf. When
companies authorise the commencement of legal
proceedings, a resolution or resolutions have to be passed
either at a company or Board of Directors' meeting and
recorded in the minutes." 23
It follows therefore that if directors command a majority role in a company, it is
possible for them to 'right' some of their own wrongs at a general meeting. 24 So, a
legal action against a director in control cannot be maintained unless control changes
hands or a director ceases to be a member of the board.
While shareholders cannot pass an ordinary resolution requiring a board of directors
to abandon litigation initiated by the board, unless the articles of association give
them the right to instruct the board on such matters, they can pass an ordinary
resolution requiring a company to initiate litigation regardless of the opposition of
the board.25
Shareholders are usually faced with an onerous task when the directors form, and
hence control, the majority of the shareholders. In such a scenario, directors can
escape liability unless the minority shareholders are able to sue on behalf of the
company. The rule in Musa Misango 26 maintains that minority shareholders have
no right to sue for wrongs done to the company. 27 One of the reasons behind the
restriction is the fact that empowering shareholders to enforce directors' duties
would encourage wasted litigation.28
23 [1970] EA 147 at 154.
24 In the past, it appeared that if a wrong done to a company cannot be ratified by interested votes
then it cannot be ratified at all. Presently, it seems that a wrong which cannot be ratified by interested
votes can be ratified by disinterested votes. See Smith v Croft (No 2) [1988] Ch 114.
25 This is so even in instances where articles do not empower shareholders to give instructions to the
board.
26 [1966] EA 390.
27 For more on Foss v Harbottle and minority shareholders see Wedderburn, "Shareholders Rights
and the Rule in Foss v Harbottle" [1957] CU T 194.
28Ibid.
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It is worth noting that minority shareholders cannot sue directors, on behalf of the
company, when a breach of directors' duties is ratifiable. 29 In Grant v UK
Switchback Railways,30for instance, the court held that since directors' acts which
had exceeded their powers were ratifiable by the majority shareholders, they could
not be the subject of a minority shareholders' action. Despite this drawback, the rule
is helpful because it prevents multiple actions, fruitless actions, and underscores the
principles of majority rule and separate legal personality. Commenting on an
application made by the plaintiff in Musa Misango to amend the plaint in order to
join the company as a defendant, Sir Udoma observed that:
"I am also of the view that such an amendment is
necessary in the interests of justice as it would avoid
multiplicity of suits and enable all matters in
controversy between the parties to be determined once
and for att."33
Whilst it is true to say that reasonable restrictions on shareholders' rights to institute
actions against directors help in forestalling multiplicity of suits and checking
against frivolous suits, there is no doubt that shareholders' access to justice may be
unfairly restricted where wrongs are committed against them by directors and they
are unable to command a majority of the votes for the purposes of suing on behalf of
the company.
5.3 Rights of Shareholders to Sue
As injustice would flow from strict application of the majority decision rule, namely
denying minority shareholders recourse to legal protection, the courts have
developed several exceptions, which allow minority shareholders to litigate on
behalf of the company with a view to enforcing their rights. 32 Where a minority
shareholder has suffered personal loss in addition to the harm occasioned to the
29 Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83.
30 (1888) 40 Ch 135 (CA).
31 Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others op cit n 5, at 400.
32 Such an action is termed as a derivative action because the minority derive the right to sue from the
company's right. The company must be joined as a party in a derivative action in order to prevent the
company suing again in its own name and on the same facts. See Spokes v Grosvenor Hotel Co
[1897] 2 QB 124.
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company, the exceptions allow him to bring a representative action on his own
behalf and on behalf of other shareholders who have suffered similar harm. Personal
representative suits reduce the threat of multiplicity of suits. Other instances which
have traditionally seen the application of the exceptions include: where the wrong
complained of is an illegal or ultra vires transaction; 33 where the matter is one which
can be validly done or sanctioned not by a simple majority, but only by some special
majority; and where the majority is committing a fraud on the minority.34
Although the East African Court of Appeal has recognised the rights of shareholders
to institute suits in certain circumstances, 35 it is important to examine whether the
present state of affairs provides an effective machinery for redressing wrongs
committed by directors. At present, a shareholder who is desirous of suing a
director must do so within the exceptions laid down in Musa Misango v Eria
Musigire & Others. 36 The minority shareholders wishing to institute proceedings can
bring a personal action, a representative action, or a derivative action. A personal
action arises where there has been a violation of the rights that accrue personally to
the shareholder under the memorandum and articles of association. 37 A
representative action, on the other hand, refers to an instance where proceedings are
collectively instituted by a number of members having similar interests or rights
which have been infringed. 38 A derivative action originates from the right of the
company to sue in its corporate capacity. Although it seems to be similar to a
representative action, the plaintiff in a derivative action does not act as a
representative of other shareholders but as a representative of the company. To
assess whether these exceptions are exhaustive enough, we shall examine each one
of them in turn.
33 In Edwards v Halliwell, Jenkins LJ observed that any act which according to the articles of
association ought to be done by special majority fell outside the rule in Foss v Harbottle. He opined
that, "a company which, by its directors, had broken its own regulations by doing something without
a special resolution which could only be done validly by a special resolution, could assert that it alone
was the proper plaintiff in any consequent action, and the effect would be to allow a company acting
in breach of its articles to do de facto by ordinary resolution that which according to its own
regulations could only be done by special resolution." See [1950] 2 All ER 1064 at 1067. Since the
articles of association constitute a contract between the company and its members, derivative actions
provide an avenue for the shareholders to enforce contractual terms.
34 Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others, op cit n 5.
35Ibid.
36 Op cit n 5.
37 Nigerian Law Reform Commission, Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law:
Volume 1-Review and Recommendations, 1987, p 237.
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5.3.1 Personal Rights
Observing that a personal action could be brought by an individual shareholder in
his own right, Sir Udoma in Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others 39 stated that
section 13 of the Uganda Companies Ordinance,40 under which the defendant had
purported to act in altering the articles of the company, could not be a justification
for forcing the changed article on the minority because the proposed article was not
just and equitable or for the benefit of the company as a whole, but was simply for
the benefit of the majority.
Where a duty is owed to an individual shareholder, rather than a company, the
shareholder concerned has the discretion of enforcing his right. However, such a
shareholder would not be capable of correcting an irregularity, in the conduct of the
company's affairs, which is capable of ratification in the general meeting. 41 Where
ratification is possible it is not necessary to show that the defendant wrongdoers are
in control of the company. However, where the wrong complained of is a past ultra
vires act, the vindicated right ceases to be personal and becomes corporate. 42 Since
the memorandum and articles of association constitute a contract between the
company and each shareholder, a breach of the memorandum and articles confers
rights upon individual shareholders to maintain an action without being barred by
the rule in Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others. 43 In addition, any instance of
conducting the company affairs in disregard of the articles' provisions would
constitute a breach of a shareholder's personal rights to have affairs of the company
conducted properly. Notwithstanding the need to hold a company to the "procedures
which it itself has adopted in its constitution for its internal decision making,”44
courts do not recognise the conferment of enforcement rights to shareholders in
cases where an internal irregularity would be rectified in a general meeting. 45
" Ibid.
39 Op cit n 5.
4° No 1 of 1958.
41 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries (No) [1982] Ch 204 (CA).
42 Prentice, "Shareholders Actions: The Rule in Foss v Harbottle" (1988) 104 LQR 341 at 342.
43 [1966] EA 390.
44 PL Davies, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, (Sixth Edition, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997),
p 662. Also see Smith, "Minority Shareholders and Corporate Irregularities" (1978) MLR 147.
45 In MacDougall v Gardiner (1875) 1 ChD 13 the decision of the chairman of the shareholders'
meeting to refuse to request a poll, was held to be an internal irregularity which could be rectified in
the General Meeting. In Fender v Lushington (1877) 6 ChD 70 refusal of a chairman to recognise the
votes attached to shares held by nominee shareholders was held to infringe their personal rights.
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An individual action of a shareholder to enforce his rights would not be effective if
he seeks to have corporate relief. 46 However, where the source of the right of the
individual shareholder is not in the constitution of the company, a shareholder's
enforcement right cannot be affected. Therefore, there is a blurred distinction
between breach of the provisions of the articles which would infringe the personal
rights of a shareholder and the ones which would be forbidden by the rule in Foss v
Harbottle. It would appear that each member should have a prima facie right to
enforce any breach of duty whether it affects him alone or as part of the
membership.
5.3.2 Fraud on the Minority
Where a company fails to take action, for instance where the wrongdoer controls the
company, a shareholder may bring a derivative action47 in his own name, but on
behalf of himself and the company. 48 Although such a shareholder would be suing
on behalf of the company, rather than on behalf of the members, the members'
representative notion is congruent with the rule in Musa Misango v Eria Musigire &
Others,49 which seeks to avoid multiplicity of actions against the company.
The need to protect the minority was recognised by the Kenyan Court of Appeal in
LeisureLodges Ltd v Yashvin A Shretta s° where the respondent sought to have the
appellant company wound up on the ground that the minority shareholders had been
excluded from its effective management, and that they were being oppressed by
46 In Taylor v NUM (Derbyshire Area) [1985] BCLC 237 the plaintiff successfully restrained the
officials of the union from continuing a ultra vires strike, but his claim for an order requiring the
same officials to restore to the unions the funds already expended failed as he did not meet the
requirements of Foss v Harbottle. Such a right belonged to the company.
47 Order 15 rule 12 A (1) of the Supreme Court rules (UK) defines a derivative action as one "begun
by writ by one or more shareholders of a company where the cause of action is vested in the company
and relief is accordingly sought on its behalf"
48 A member who is instituting an action is required to join the company in the action as a defendant.
Where a company is under liquidation, the liquidator may sue for any breach of duty relating to the
company without commencing new proceedings. Jurisdiction extends to any person who has been
concerned with the promotion, formation, or management of the company. See similar provisions
under the British Insolvency Act 1986, s 212. Re Clasper Group Services Ltd [1989] BCLC 143
underscores the fact that liability does not extend to those who exercised clerical or other non-
management functions.
49 [1966] EA 390.
50 Court of Appeal (Kenya) on 18th April, 1997 (Coram: Omolo, Tunoi, and Shah JJA) Civil Appeal
Number 10 of 1997.
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directors. 51 It was contended that the company had amended the Articles of
Association and, as a result, permitted new people fraudulently to become
shareholders in disregard of the articles. The course of events made the minority
wary of the danger that assets may be stolen or wasted by the majority. The minority
shareholders contended that the majority were, among other things, collecting
money fraudulently from foreign debtors of the company and failing to account for
it. As a result, the court appointed a provisional liquidator to protect the property.
Although the rule in Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others52discourages
multiplicity of suits and wasted litigation by requiring the decision to sue to be taken
by majority shareholders in a general meeting 53 , there is room to argue that it may
also encourage errant directors to stifle the institution of litigation against them.54
This may, for instance, happen when the minority shareholders are not able to prove
that the majority shareholders are fraudulent. As such, although it is clear that
Kenyan courts would entertain a derivative action if there is fraud on the minority,
they might not adopt the same approach if what was complained of was negligence
rather than fraud. 55 In fact, 89 percent of the respondents who took part in a survey
conducted in 2001 in Nairobi agreed with the statement that there is no effective
enforcement of liability.56
Unlike the Kenyan courts, courts in other jurisdictions 52 have shown the tendency
not to apply the rule in Foss v Harbottle (Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others)
when it stands in the course of justice. The courts have been flexible enough to find
negligence, which not only harmed the company but also resulted in a profit to a
51 Section 211 of the Act enables a member of a company who complains of oppression in the
conduct of the affairs of a company to petition the court for a winding-up order.
52 [1966] EA 390.
53 PL Davies, op cit n 44, p 658.
54 Professor Bottomley observes that: "where the board or a majority of the members decide against
legal action then, generally speaking, under the rule in Foss v Harbottle, that is the end of the
matter." See S Bottomley, "Shareholders Derivative Actions and Public Interest Suits: two versions
of the same story?" (1992) 15 (1) University of New South Wales Law Journal 127 at 138. Cited in
Prince, "Australia's Statutory Derivative Action: Using the New Zealand Experience" (2000) 18
CSLJ 493 at 496.
55 Pavlides v Jensen [1956] Ch 565. Even gross negligence was not sufficient in Cook v Deeks
[1916] 1 AC 554.
56 The survey is discussed in detail in Chapter Nine.
57 Australia's Corporations Act 2001 provides for a right to bring a "statutory derivative action". See
as Pt 2F lA Companies Act 1993 of New Zealand has a similar provision. See s 165.
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director, to be fraud on the minority. 58 In Daniels v Daniels59 the need to show bad
faith on the part of the defendant was removed by Templeman J when he broadened
the exception thus:
"A minority shareholder who has no other remedy may sue
where directors use their powers, intentionally or
unintentionally, fraudulently or negligently, in a manner
which benefits themselves at the expense of the company."6°
In an attempt to overcome the barriers of Foss v Harbottle, New Zealand enacted
sections 165-168 of the Companies Act 1993, 61 which introduced a statutory
derivative action. The statutory provisions in New Zealand have abolished the need
to prove that a certain level of fraud has been committed before proceedings could
be brought. Similarly, it is not necessary to show that the "interests of justice" were
sufficient to attract relief. Instead, the statutory provisions focus on whether or not
the company is willing to take action to right the wrong done to it. They also
provide room for considering the company's interests and having the proceedings
controlled by someone else other than its directors or majority shareholders.62
Before introduction of the statutory derivative action in New Zealand, the courts had
already adopted a liberal approach to interpreting the rule in Foss v ffarbottle, as the
rule was considered to be an impediment63 to shareholders' rights of enforcement.
In fact, since the concepts of unfairness and interests of justice had replaced the
"fraud on the minority" exception, the courts allowed derivative as well as personal
causes of action where legitimate expectations had been breached.
58 Daniels v Daniels [1978] Ch 406 at 414.
59 [1978] Ch 406 at 414.
60 Ibid.
61 The Act was enacted in in July 1994. It followed recommendations made by the New Zealand Law
Commission in 1989; The Law Commission, Company Law Reform and Restatement, NZLC R9
(1989) para 564-571.
62 Berkhahn, "Derivative Action in Australia and New Zealand", (1998) 10 Bond LR 74 at 75.
63 Although the New Zealand Law Commission had actually expressed doubts whether the rule was
actually an impediment, it concluded that it was. See New Zealand Law Commission, Company Law:
A Discussion Paper, (1987), para 46-47 and 564.
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Ruling on the issue of standing in Berlei Hestia (NZ) Ltd v Fernyhough 64 Mahon J
observed:
"There can be no doubt that a shareholder in a company,
while having no purely statutory right to enforce compliance
by directors with their accounting duties, may yet rely on his
proprietary rights to bring about the same result."65
It is evident that judicial interpretations of the statutory provisions in New Zealand
strike a balance on the one hand between giving shareholders a reasonable
opportunity to right corporate wrongs, and on the other limiting shareholders'
actions when more suitable alternatives are available.66
In Australia, the Corporations Act 2001 adopts similar provisions which are geared
towards addressing the inadequacies of the common law action.67
The Western Australian Supreme Court in Cope v Butcher 68 recognised the "interest
and justice" principle 69 as an exception to the rule in Foss v Harbottle." Also, in
Bancorp Investments Ltd v Primac Holdings Ltd, 71 although the issue in question
was regarded as a matter of internal corporate procedure, McPherson I granted leave
to commence proceedings. 72 Similar facts might be sufficient in the UK to see the
granting of an opportunity to a shareholder to right the wrongs of a company under
section 459 of the Companies Act 1985.
64 [1980] 2 NZLR 150.
65 Ibid at 155.
66 Berkhahn, op cit n 62, at 100.
67 s 236.
68 (I 996) 20 ACSR 37.
69 A member may invoke the exception if directors' conduct is unfairly prejudicial to the interests of
the members.
70 The same exception is also recognised in New Zealand. See Berkhan, "The Derivative Action in
Australia and New Zealand: will the statutory provisions improve shareholders' enforcement rights"
(1998) 10 Bond Law Review 74 at 81-83. Cited in Prince, op cit n 54, at 497.
71 (1984) 9 ACLR 263.
72Berkhan, "The Derivative Action in Australia and New Zealand: will the statutory provisions
improve shareholders' enforcement rights" (1998) 10 Bond LR 74 at 88.
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5.3.2.1 Control
In Kenya, for an individual shareholder to pursue a suit on the ground of fraud on
the minority, he has to prove that the defendant has overwhelming control of the
company. 73 Other jurisdictions, such as New Zealand, have abolished the need to
prove control of the company by the defendant.74 Although early cases equated
control with voting rights, 75 some courts in recent times have held de facto contro176
by the wrongdoer to be sufficient. Such cases include cases where: shareholders are
offered inducements to vote in favour of the wrongdoer; 77defendants are able to
determine the outcome of a resolution in their own favour by use of proxy votes.78
The court can still exercise its discretion to deny a member the right to sue. For
instance, where a member has participated in the wrong, he is barred from suing. 79
However, the buying of shares with a view to being a plaintiff is not a ground for
denying a proposed plaintiff the right to sue. 8° This position is not entirely desirable
because it gives enough room to a litigious individual to use a company's resources
in vexatious lawsuits. It is important, therefore, to take into consideration the
circumstances under which the shares were acquired.8I
5.3.3 Ratification
A derivative action cannot be maintained in Kenya to enforce company's rights
where the wrong in question is ratifiable by the company in a general meeting by
ordinary resolution. Such an approach is in accord with the view expressed by Sir
Udo Udoma in Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others 82 where he observed that
an individual member of the company cannot sue where the alleged wrong is a
73 Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others, op cit n 5.
74 Prior to invoking the statutory derivative action in New Zealand, a plaintiff was required to seek
leave of the court before commencing proceedings in the name and on behalf of the company.
Section 165 (1), Companies Act 1993 (NZ).
75 Bur/and v Earle [1920] AC 83 at 93.
76 This kind of control may arise when a person having minority voting control is able to secure the
passing of an ordinary resolution in a meeting which is not attended by many shareholders. See
Griffin S, Company Law: Fundamental Principles, (3rd edition, Pearson, 2000) p 332.
77 Atwool v Merryweather (1867) LR 5 Eq 464.
78 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1981] Ch 257 at 324.
79 As an equitable right it can be denied, for instance, where the plaintiff is guilty of the wrong he
complains of or where the claim is pursued for ulterior motives rather than for the benefit of the
company. See Whitwam v Watkin (1898) 78 LT 188; Nurcombe v Nurcombe [1985] 1 WLR 370.
813 Whit-warn v Watkin (1898) 78 LT 188, Towers v African Tug [1904] 1 Ch 558, CA.
81 Ghana's Companies Act section 210 provides for that situation.
82 [1966] EA 390.
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transaction which might be made binding on the company and all of the members by
a simple majority of the members.83
A derivative action can only be brought where: the wrongdoers are in control of the
company; 84 ultra vires actions have occurred; or in cases involving special
majorities. 85 However, an action cannot proceed when a majority of those who
constitute the minority does not support the action. 86 The independent organ is not
necessarily composed of shareholders, as the composition varies "according to the
constitution of the company concerned and the identity of the defendants." 87 Thus, it
is possible for a board of directors to constitute an independent organ and, therefore,
rightly resolve not to bring an action. The recognition of the board's independence
may bar derivative actions, especially where members of the board are the ones in
breach of duties. Although courts in the USA and other jurisdictions have
maintained that a derivative action cannot be barred by a resolution of an
"independent litigation committee",88 the question has yet to be examined in the
Kenyan courts.
Under some circumstances, an individual shareholder can still sue even where the
wrong is ratifiable. 89 Allowing shareholders to maintain actions on ratifiable
questions may pose some danger to the company where the general meeting ratifies
the wrong before a judgement is entered, thus making litigation invalid and bringing
it to an abrupt end at the cost of all the parties involved.90
If the wrong is not ratifiable, it cannot be said that wasted litigation would arise.
The prime consideration in such a scenario is to find the appropriate collective body
to take decisions on litigation. While the general meeting may be left to litigate over
83 Jenkins LJ in Edwards v Halliwell [1950] 2 All ER 1064 at 1066.
84 Fraud on the minority. See Edwards v Halliwell [1950] All ER 1064 at 1066. The distinction
between fraud and other non-fraudulent wrongs lies in whether the breach of duty can be ratified by
the shareholders by ordinary resolution. Fraudulent acts are classified as wrongs done to the
shareholders rather than to the company. For a detailed analysis see Wedderburn, op cit n 27.
85 Edwards v Halliwell, ibid at 1066 Per Jenkins U.
86 Smith v Croft (No 2), op cit n 24.
87 Per Knox J in Smith v Croft (No 2) [1987] 3 WLR 405 at 459.
88 Prentice, op cit n 42, at 345.
89 Hogg v Cramphorn Ltd [1967] Ch 254 where it was held that unlawful exercise of power
constituted an abuse of the contractual obligation of a company to the shareholders and, hence, the
plaintiff shareholder was allowed to sue.
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fraud if the wrongdoers are not in contro1, 91 the "majority of the independent
minority"92 has the mandate to litigate when the wrongdoers are in contro1. 93 In spite
of fulfilment of the conditions requisite to maintaining a derivative action, it would
be erroneous to assert that individual member's rights to maintain an action, where a
wrong is not ratifiable, are unfettered. It will be seen, therefore, that a derivative
action remains a weapon of last resort rather than a "normal part of the enforcement
apparatus of the law."94
5.3.4 Statutory Protection
The Act has sought to protect minority interests in a company by enabling the courts
to intervene in the internal management of companies and offer protection to any
member without prejudicing the company's viability. 95 The Act gives shareholders
various rights for the purposes of protecting minority rights. These rights include:
• The rights of holders of special classes of shares to challenge the variation of the
rights attached to any class of shares in the company.96
• The right of the registrar of companies to investigate the company.97
• Protection of minority shareholders in the case of schemes of reconstruction and
amalgamation.98
• The right of the court to restrict alteration of the objects of the company.99
• The right of any member of a company who complains of the oppressive nature
of the conduct of the affairs of the company to some part of the members to
9° Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373 (CA).
91 Control has been illustrated in terms of de jure control, namely control of at least a majority of the
votes capable of being cast at a general meeting. See Pavlides v Jensen [1956] Ch 565. It has also
been construed to mean "a wide spectrum extending from an overall absolute majority of votes at one
end to majority of votes at the other end made up of those likely to be cast by the delinquent himself
plus those voting with him as a result of influence or apathy." See Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v
Newman Industries Ltd (No 2) [1981] Ch 257 at 291 Per Vinelott J.
92 For a detailed analysis see Prentice, op cit n 42, at 34; Davies, "Enforcement of Directors' Duties"
[1985] JBL 318.
93 Smith v Croft (No 2) [1988] Ch 114 Per ICnox J.
94 PL Davies, op cit n 44, p 676.
95 The Act, s 211.
96 Ibid s 74.
97 Ibid s 164.
98 Ibid s 267.
Ibid s 7.
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make an application to the court by petition for an order to regulate the affairs of
the company.
The last safeguard is the most useful in protecting shareholders' interests, as it allows
the courts to make a winding-up order and to exercise their discretion in making
other alternative orders as they deem fit if they are of the opinion that a winding-up
order would unfairly prejudice the members concerned. 101 The section allows any
member or the Attorney-Genera1 102 to make an application to the court.
Under the section, however, the courts can only interfere in the internal management
of the company if the affairs of the company are being conducted in an oppressive
manner and that it would be just and equitable to wind up the company. Moreover,
the court can only intervene when a course of conduct, rather than an isolated act, is
complained of. Also, it is not possible to invoke the section despite the hardship
suffered by directors, employees, creditor, or debenture-holder, as they are not
members. 103 As will be seen, corresponding provisions in others jurisdictions are not
as restrictive as these provisions.
While the section provides the courts with powers to protect oppressed shareholders,
the same protection is not afforded to shareholders who are unable to discharge the
onerous burden of proof on their shoulders, notably that it is just and equitable to
wind up the company and the affairs are oppressive. Given that the Act does not
100 !bid s 211.
1 ° 1 This position appears to be similar to that recommended by the Cohen Report, which culminated
in section 210 of the UK's Companies Act. The Report noted that the minority did not necessarily
benefit from a company's winding-up where they were being oppressed. It therefore recommended
empowerment of the courts to examine their discretion by prescribing alternative remedies to end the
oppression. Section 459 of the UK's Companies Act 1985 repealed section 210 of the UK's 1948
Act and enacted a new provision based on unfair prejudice rather than oppression. Under the new
section, it is not necessary to show actual illegality or invasion of legal rights. Under the section, a
single prejudicial act or omission which has taken place or proposed is enough to invoke the section.
102 The Attorney-General is empowered to petition when the case falls under section 170 (2), which
allows the Attorney General to petition for a winding-up order.
103 Section 26 of the Act refers to members as subscribers to the memorandum of association who
become members on its incorporation. It also refers to any other person who agrees to become a
member and whose name is entered in the register. In Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd [1970] 3
All ER 57 at 67, the term member was interpreted to include a deceased member's personal
representative. Also see Re Lundie (1965) 2 ER 692.
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offer guidance as to what might be termed "oppressive conduct", the natural
meaning of the term may leave little room for petitions to succeed.'"
The East African Court of Appeal has held that being outvoted is not in itself
evidence of oppression. In Re Eryeza Bwambale & Co ltd 105 the minority
shareholders sought the appointment of inspectors to investigate the affairs of the
company on the basis that the second respondent, the majority shareholder, was
dictatorial and had failed to give them sufficient information about the company's
affairs, and that the company had failed to declare a dividend.
Dismissing the application, Goude J stated that:
"There is no proof that the second respondent has prevented
the calling of any extraordinary general meeting. In fact one
was called and attended by sixteen members. The fact that
they could not by their vote do anything effective is another
matter. If they wish to contend that the affairs of the
company are being conducted in such a way as to be
oppressive to minority shareholders other possible remedies
are available to the minority, but the mere fact that they find
themselves automatically outvoted certainly is not in itself
evidence of oppression." I °6
Illustrative of the difficulty 107 in fulfilling the requirements laid down under section
211 is the case of Mohamed Mitha and Others v Ibrahim Mitha and Others 108
104 Only two successful petitions were made under section 210 of the Companies Act 1948 UK. See
Re Hammer Ltd [1958] 3 All ER 689 and Scottish CWS Ltd v Meyer [1950] AC 324. Following
recommendations made by the Jenkins Committee, Section 210 of the Companies Act, UK, was
amended to read "unfairly prejudicial conduct" instead of "oppressive conduct." Afterwards, several
Commonwealth countries amended their provisions as well. This was carried out in India, Canada,
New Zealand, and Australia. See The Report of the Company Law Committee, Chaired by Lord
Jenkins (1962) Cmnd 1749; Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law, op cit n 37, p
245.
105 [1969] EA430.
106 Ibid at 431.
107 Jenkins Committee (UK) also recognised that a case for winding-up under the just and equitable
ground was difficult to establish by contributories. It, therefore, ought not to be a condition for the
protection of the oppressed. See The Report of the Company Law Committee, Chaired by Lord
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where four brothers, who were the first shareholders of a company with a nominal
capital of 900 ordinary shares, were appointed permanent directors for life. One of
the brothers, Haji, was appointed the permanent managing director with a casting
vote. Subsequently, differences arose between the four brothers and by agreement
Haji and another brother, Alibhai, left the company and transferred their shares to
Ibrahim and Mohamed. After the transfer, the petitioners' (Mohamed, his wife, and
son, Sadrudin) shares totalled 360 while the respondents' (Ibrahim, his wife, and
two sons, Tajdeen and Sultan) totalled 540. Mohamed and Ibrahim appointed their
respective sons, Sadrudin and Tajdeen, to be co-directors and to fill the places left
vacant by the departure of Haji and Alibhai. However, a deadlock occurred between
the two groups, namely Mohamed and his son on the one hand, and Ibrahim and his
son on the other. To resolve the dispute a general meeting was held and an ordinary
resolution was passed by the majority (lbrahim's family) appointing Ibrahim's son,
Sultan, to replace Sadrudin. The passing of this resolution was challenged by the
petitioners on the basis that principles of fair management were not observed. As a
result, the petitioners claimed that the conduct was oppressive and sought to invoke
section 211 of the Act to redress the oppression. The petitioners feared that the
property of the company would be diverted to their detriment and, therefore, sought
to have the court order the respondents to sell their shares to the petitioners on such
terms as the court should think fit or the company be wound up.
In his judgment Russel J, first, considered whether the circumstances were such that
a winding-up order on those grounds would be justified. Second, he considered
whether it was just and equitable for the COMINZ&V (Ne, ‘NOMd '&S
step to granting the relief prayed for under section 211. Russel J held that the
petitioners had failed to prove any hardship or oppression. He also held that the
respondents had not acted without probity in the conduct of the company's affairs.
Since the petitioners were unable to prove that it was just and equitable to make a
winding-up order, the question whether any other order would be just and equitable
did not arise.
Jenkins (1962) Cmnd 1749; Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law, op cit n 37, p
246.
108 [1967] EA 575.
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Commenting on the resolution passed to appoint Sultan in place of Sadrudin, Russel
J observed that:
"This appears to have been a reasonable and businesslike
course to adopt in order to avoid perpetrating the dead lock
and so that the business of the company could be
contained 	  I am satisfied that the various decisions arrived
at by the company as set out in the said minutes are fully
capable of being regarded as being in the best interest of the
company and that there has not been any lack of probity by
the respondents in the conduct of the company affairs. The
petitioners have failed to satisfy me that there are any facts,
which would justify the making of a winding-up order on the
ground that it would be just and equitable to do so. As this is
an essential step preliminary to any order being made under
section 211 of the Companies Act and as I have already
come to a decision as to the other prayers I have no
alternative but to dismiss the petition with costs."I09
It would appear that the task of proving that a company ought to be wound up is not
an easy one. Similar difficulties in discharging the onerous burden are illustrated in
Sverre Haug and Others v Buhemba Mines. 11 ° In that case the respondent company
issued 1000 redeemable preference shares of which 988 were redeemed out of
profits. Subsequently in 1944 the company issued 900 redeemable preference shares
in place of 900 of the redeemed shares. Of the second issue, 847 shares remained
unredeemed. The appellants held 472 of the 847 redeemable preference shares. The
directors refused to redeem the shares and the appellants sought an order to wind up
the company, primarily to obtain a return of their capital. They claimed, in
proceedings initiated after 1950, that it was just and equitable that the company
should be wound up, as the 847 shares were redeemable not later than 1 January
1950. The failure to redeem the shares, coupled with a falling in arrears of the
1 °9 Mohamed Mitha and Others v Ibrahim Mitha and Others,op cit n 5, at 582.
110 (1953) 20 EACA 28.
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dividends on the said shares, meant that there were no means by which they could
receive payment of their capital and arrears of dividends, apart from liquidation.
Although there were no profits available to redeem the shares, the East African
Court of Appeal declined to issue a winding-up order for the reason that the
company was not insolvent, directors of the company had not acted without probity
or efficiency, and the irregularities referred to were insufficient to lead to the making
of a winding-up order. Pronouncing his judgment, Sir Hector Hearne CJ observed
that:
"There is no question of insolvency, or of the
substratum of the company having gone, or of the
company doing something which is ultra vires its
constitution. There is no allegation of a deadlock or of
fraud or want of bona fides or lack of commercial
probity or efficiency." I
Although an individual shareholder in Kenya seeking a relief under the ground of
oppression would have to prove that it is just and equitable for the company to be
wound up, such onerous conditions do not exist in other jurisdictions. In New
Zealand, for instance, shareholders are no longer required to show lack of probity or
want of good faith il2 on the part of directors."3
Australia also has a provision for oppressive remedy, 114 which abolished the need to
show lack of probity or want of good faith on the part of directors for the courts to
grant an oppressive remedy. Section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001 allows a
member to make an application in relation to a company if he believes the affairs of
the company are being conducted oppressively, unfairly, discriminatory, and
111 Sverre Haug and Others v Buhemba Mines (1953) 20 EACA 28 at 36.
))2 Thomas v HW Thomas Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 686 at 693.
113 This has been made possible by the liberalised approach adopted by the courts following
enactment of section 174 of the Companies Act 1993. Although the liberalised approach enhanced
shareholders' rights to remedy personal wrongs, it did not enhance shareholders' ability to enforce
corporate causes of action. See Berkhahn, op cit n 62, at 91.
114 Section 232 of the Corporations Act 2001.
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contrary to the interests of members.' 15 The section is wide enough to cover any
conduct that is detrimental to any shareholder. For example, it covers derivative
actions that might be instituted in respect of affairs being conducted in a manner that
is contrary to the interests of the members as a whole. I 16 While the section offered
relief to shareholders, it was considered to be inadequate because:117
"The definition of "affairs of the company" may not include
the act of a nominee director to a subsidiary; it may be
argued that a resolution of the company in general meeting
is not an act by or on behalf of the company; the question of
whether conduct can be considered to be unfairly prejudicial
or unfairly discriminatory if it affects all members of the
same; the fact that applicants for relief are limited to
registered shareholders and the ASC [Australian Securities
Commission]; the section does not deal specifically with the
issue of costs; the standard of proof of shareholders is
onerous."118
As a result of the foregoing difficulties, the Companies and Securities Advisory
Committee 119recommended the enactment of a statutory derivative action. As a
result, the Corporations Act 2001 provides for a statutory derivative action by
enabling:
"A person to bring proceedings on behalf of a company or
intervene in any proceedings to which a company is a party
for the purposes of taking responsibility on behalf of the
115 The section was derived from the UK legislation which was developed following the
recommendations of the Cohen committee. It is now contained in sections 459-461 of the Companies
Act 1985.
116 Jenkins v Enterprises Gold Mines NL (1992) 6 ACSR 539.
117 Companies and Securities Advisory Committee (CASAC), Report on a Statutory Derivative
Action (July 1993).
118 Griggs, "Specific Problems with the Oppression Section" (1993) 11 Companies and Securities
Law Journal 10. Cited in McDonough, "Proposed New Statutory Derivative Action-Does it go Far
Enough?" (1996) 8 Bond LR 47 at 53.
119 Report on a Statutory Derivative Action (July 1993).
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company for those proceedings or for a particular step in
those proceedings."12°
The section abolished the right of a person to bring a derivative action on behalf of a
company under common law, but required an applicant to seek leave of the court
before commencing proceedings.
In spite of the apparent similarities between Australia and New Zealand, their
provisions for derivative actions differ. While the right to apply for leave in New
Zealand is limited to current shareholders or directors, 121 actions by current or
former members of the company or a related body corporate or by an officer or
former officer of the company are allowed in Australia. 122 In Australia, persons who
are entitled to be registered as members are also allowed to apply for leave.I23
Whilst this provision gives shareholders a suitable avenue to achieve managerial
accountability, it raises some difficulties in respect of interpretation of the term
"entitled to be registered." On the one hand, the term could be interpreted to mean a
transfer upon which stamp duty has been paid, while on the other it could mean
registration of a transfer that has been refused by the directors.'
The class of persons covered by the term "members" for the purposes of suing on
behalf of the company, where affairs are being conducted in an oppressive manner,
was also widened in Nigeria to include "persons who have suffered or are likely to
suffer from conduct which is prejudicial to their interests." I25 Other persons
included in the definition of a member include:
• The personal representative of a deceased member.
• Any person to whom shares of a member have been transferred or
transmitted by operation of law.
• A director or an officer or former director or officer of the company.
• A creditor of the company.
1 " Section 245 A (1).
121 Section 165 (1) Companies Act 1993 of New Zealand.
122 Section 236, Corporations Act 2001.
123 Ibid.
1 24 McDonough, op cit n 118, at 57.
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• The proposed Corporate Affairs Commission in a case where the
Commission has received any adverse reports on the conduct of affairs of
any company as a result of any investigation carried out by it; and any
other person who in the discretion of the court, is a proper person."126
Whilst it can be argued that allowing a shareholder of a related body corporate to
make an application regarding a company in which he has no stake is undesirable,I27
there can be no doubt that there is a need to widen the class of persons that can seek
the oppression remedy from the court. Since creditors may also petition the court
for winding-up orders on such grounds, they should also be empowered to seek
relief under this section. Although it may be argued that such a step would open a
floodgate of claims, the assertion can be refuted on the grounds that the courts
would be able to strike out frivolous claims at the stage where leave is sought.
The Nigerian position limits shareholders' ability to bring proceedings by requiring
them to show that there is a serious question to be tried. A person entitled to be
registered or a former officer might find it onerous to garner enough evidence for
discharging the burden.128
In the UK, section 459 (1) of the Companies Act 1985, which allows a shareholder
to bring action if the conduct of directors is unfairly prejudicial, has been considered
to be insufficient as it :
"merely paid lip service to the recommendations of the
Jenkins Committee 129 by cautiously recognising only two
categories of persons who can petition in the case of conduct
which is unfairly prejudicial. These are members of the
company or a person though not a member to whom shares
125 Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law, op cit n 37, p 237.
126Ibid p 247.
127McDonough, op cit n 118, 58.
128 Ibid.
129 The Report of the Company Law Committee, Chaired by Lord Jenkins (1962) Cmnd 1749.
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have been transferred or transmitted by operation of the
law.11130
The UK Law Commission has suggested that a member:
"should be able to bring and subsequently maintain a
derivative action to enforce any cause of action vested in the
company against any person arising out of any breach or
threatened breach of duty by any director." 131
If this proposition were accepted it would abolish the need to demonstrate
wrongdoer's control of the shareholders and consideration of the views of the
independent minority for an action to be maintained by an individual. Although the
Law Commission proposes that only present members of a company should be able
to bring a derivative claim on its behalf, I32 the Company Law Review Steering
Group has recommended that a member of a subsidiary should be able to bring a
derivative claim on behalf of the parent company. 133 The Company Law Review
Final Report has also favoured the enactment of a statutory derivative action.I34
Further, the UK's Law Commission has proposed that:
"A member should be able to maintain proceedings about
wrongs done to the company only in exceptional
circumstances.. .shareholders should not be able to involve
the company in litigation without good cause. Otherwise the
company may be 'killed by kindness', or waste money and
management time in dealing with unwarranted
proceedings."135
130 Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law, op cit n 37, p 243.
131 Law Commission, Shareholders' Remedies, Consultation Paper No 142, 1996 par 16.1.
132 Shareholder Remedies (Law Corn No 246, Cm 3769) London: Stationery Office, 1997).
133 Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: Developing the Framework (URN 001656)
(London: DTI, 2000), para 4.133).
134 Final Report of the Company Law Review Steering Group (London: DTI, 2001) paras 7.33-7.40,
7.46-7.62.
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The Commission favours the use of judicial discretion 136 to balance considerations
for and against derivative litigation. 137 In granting leave, a court would have to
consider all the relevant circumstances and factors.
This approach is also favoured in other common law jurisdictions. For instance,
New Zealand's statutory provisions for a derivative action require the courts, in
granting leave, to consider the cost of the action against the relief likely to be
obtained. 138 This provision, therefore, ensures that New Zealand courts grant leave
for a derivative action in cost-effective cases.' 39
Ghana's Companies Act allows proceedings to be instituted by a company or any
member. I4° Although Ghana's Act allows shareholders to institute proceedings, the
same right is not extended to a shareholder holding non-voting preference shares
who is unable to convene or attend a general meeting. I41 However, being a bona fide
member, it seems unfair that such a shareholder should be denied similar rights.
To avoid the possibility of a director controlling the resolution of a general meeting
to sue, Ghana's Companies Act excludes defendant directors from voting on such a
resolution. 142
Although the Nigerian Law Reform Commissionmrecognised the danger of giving
broad rights to members to sue where the company ought to be the proper plaintiff,
it recommended the codification of the rule in Foss v Harbottle and the
135 Law Commission, op cit n 131, para 14.1.
136 In exercising its discretion, a court would have to look at the strength of the case, the applicant's
good faith, the interests of the company, whether the wrong was ratifiable or had been ratified, the
views of any independent organ of the company and the availability of alternative remedies, and
probability of success. See PL Davies, op cit n 44, p 677.
137 Under the Commission's proposals, leave of the court would be required to commence a derivative
action under the new principle. See Chapter 15 of Law Commission, op cit n 131.
138 See Companies Act 1993 (NZ), s 165 (2) (b).
139 Other factors that merit consideration include; the likelihood of the proceedings succeeding,
considering interests of the company, and the applicant's bona fides. See Prince, op cit n 54, at 408.
'40Professor Gower's Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Working and
Administration of the Present Company law in Ghana, 1961 s 210.
141 Pavlides v Jensen [1956] Ch 565.
142 See Gower's Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Working and Administration of
the Present Company law in Ghana, 1961 s 206.
143 Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law, op cit n 37, p 237.
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broadening 144 of its principles in order to give shareholders more control over
directors. The Commission also proposed the adoption of provisions I45 that would
control misuse of derivative actions. These provisions provided grounds upon
which a court would grant an application for leave to bring a derivative action. They
require:
"(i) That the complainant must have been a shareholder at
the time of the misconduct complained of;
(ii) That the alleged wrongdoers are in control of the
company and therefore would not permit the company to
sue;
(iii) That all damages or other compensation are paid to the
company;
(iv) That any settlement shall be subject to the approval of
the court."146
Since a shareholder who wishes to enforce successfully liability against an errant
director must adduce the necessary documentary evidence, it is important to
consider the enabling provisions which may help him in obtaining the evidence.
5.3.5 Inspection and Investigation
Although a shareholder has a right of access to certain documents, such as the
company's annual accounts, statutory minutes books and registers,' 47 he cannot
compel directors to make available to him any other documents, which are not
specified in the Act. Where a shareholder is faced with such hindrance, his only
recourse is to seek investigation or inspection of the company's affairs. Under the
Act, a court may appoint one or more competent inspectors to investigate or inspect
the affairs of a company. In the case of a company having a share capital, the
application is required to be made by either more than 200 members or of members
holding not less than one tenth of the shares issued. I48 In the case of a company not
144 Daniels v Daniels [1978] Ch 406.
145 The provisions were borrowed from the Canadian Business Act 1975.
146 Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law,op cit n 37, p 237.
147 Section 162 (1).
148 Section 165 (1) (a).
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having a share capital, the application ought to be made by more than one-fifth in
the number of persons on the company's register of members.149
A shareholder who is incapable of mustering the required majority cannot make an
application under this section. As a result, he would not be able obtain documentary
evidence for the purposes of enforcing directors' liability. As it stands, the provision
is too stringent and ought to be relaxed in order to accommodate more
investigations. Alternatively, shareholders should be entitled to have access to
relevant documents.15°
Section 170 of the Act gives powers to the Attorney General to institute proceedings
on behalf of the company. While this provision might appear to offer effective
machinery to circumvent stringent rules against individual suits, a member may still
be deterred from proceeding as he is required to provide the registrar of companies
with security for costs when he wishes the affairs of the company to be
investigated. 151 Given that there is no provision for contingency fees in Kenya, a
member who is unable to provide the security for costs would be deterred from
pursuing individual suits. To facilitate enforcement claims, the security required
prior to investigation should be abolished. 152 However, a member should be required
to seek leave of the court before proceeding with an action in order to avoid
multiplicity of suits.
5.4 Enforcing Liability in Parastatals
Parastatals 153 are bodies having a separate legal entity which earn their revenue from
the sale of goods and services and the government holds a majority shareholding in
them .154 Most parastatals are charged with the duty of carrying out special
governmental functions in the national interest. For this reason, the government
..--.^.-
149 Section 165 (1) (a).
15° Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law, op cit n 37, p 249.
151 The security required in Kenya amounts to Kshs 10, 000 (£ 100), which is a substantial sum.
152 The Nigerian Law Reform Commission also recommended the relaxation of Nigeria's inspection
ancl investigation provisions ( Sections 157-167 of the Nigerian Companies Act 1968) on the grounds
that they barred many shareholders from enforcing directors' liability. See Working Papers on the
Reform of Nigerian Company Law, op cit n 37, p 237.
153 Parastatals are discussed in detail in Chapter Six.
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exercises immense control over parastatals. This control is exerted in various ways.
First, there is the control of management and policy which is through ministeria1155
and Parliamentary control. Second, formal and legal control ensures that parastatals
conform to legal provisions. Third, there is informal control exerted by public
opinion and other bodies dealing with parastatals. Given that the state has a major
role to play in controlling parastatals, 156 the judiciary would be expected to play a
more active role in their internal management in order to ensure fair dealing.
Unlike the internal control of ordinary companies, which lies either in the general
meeting or in the board of directors, as may be specified in the articles of
association, the control is radically different in parastatals, as there are no general
meetings. To a large extent, the Government performs the functions of a general
meeting by, for instance, issuing directives or appointing directors. 157 As such, a
Minister may appoint whoever he pleases to the board of directors with no
requirements prescribed, except in the case of banks. I 58
Being appointees of either the President or his delegate, 'maid membets ast mQxt
likely to conform to the directives of the appointor. If, for instance, they are directed
not to institute any proceedings against a miscreant director they are unlikely to
commence proceedings.
Bearing in mind that the Government is often the main shareholder in parastatals,
minority shareholders, where they exist, are perpetually oppressed. First, it is
difficult to enforce liability in parastatal companies because the Attorney General,
being a political appointee, is usually reluctant to commence proceedings against the
Government. Second, the restrictions imposed on minority shareholders by the rule
I ' SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, Parastatals in Kenya: Assessment of their Impact and
an Action Plan for Reform; Final Report Prepared for Kenya Association of Manufacturers, February,
1992, p 49.
155 The State Corporations Act provides that the president shall provide for the management of every
public corporation established under the provisions of the Act.
156 All State Corporations fall under a Ministry. A minister may give directions of general character,
as to the exercise and performance by the organisation of its functions in relation to matters appearing
to the Minister to affect the national interest. Responsibilty of determining what general interest
entails is bestowed on the Minister.
151 James and Ligunya, "Organizational Relationship and the Control of Parastatals in Tanzania",
[1972] 5 East African Law Review 39, at 45.
158 Ibid at 52.
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in Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others 159 makes it difficult for shareholders to
enforce liability. Given that minority shareholders of parastatls are not in a position
to exert any kind of control on directors, relaxation of the rule in Musa Misango v
Eria Musigire & Others 16° would enable courts to intervene more readily in the
internal management of parastatals. Reluctance to intervene in the internal
management of companies does not augur well for Kenya, as shareholders in
parastatals do not have a voice in the disqualification of directors or the termination
of their appointments.
5.5 Conclusions
The foregoing analysis of the prerequisites for maintaining an action against a
director clearly shows that a shareholder's right to enforce liability is minimal. On
the understanding that restrictions might prejudice the interests of both the
shareholder and the company, it is important at this stage to examine measures that
Kenya might adopt so as to enable shareholders to enforce directors' liability
without compromising the corporate entity of the companies.
In spite of the commercial need to protect minorities against the oppressive power of
the majority, the fact that efficient conduct of business dictates that the majority
should prevail in the management of a company's business cannot be ignored. In
formula'ting elfective enforcement machinery, there ought to be a reasonable balance
of the competing interests. Although excessive regulation or control by the courts
wauld impede. efficiency in business conduct, lack of sufficient control or judicial
intervention in the internal management of companies would deprive both the
minority investors and the company of their rightful profits.
It has been demonstrated above how Kenyan courts apply the rule in Musa Misango
v Eria Musigire & Others i61 in order to discourage multiplicity of suits and wasted
litigation. The position in Kenya requires the decision to sue to be taken by a
majority shareholders in a general meeting. 162 The rule has been seen to have the
effect of protecting shareholders and creditors in bestowing the decision to litigate,
159 [1966] EA 390.
160 ibid.
161 ibid.
162 pi, Davies, op cit n 44, p 658.
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being a decision to commit company resources, on the general meeting. Besides, all
members may not share views of the individual shareholders. Although the rule in
Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others 163 plays the crucial role in preserving the
corporate and collective nature of the company, the rule overly restricts individual
shareholders' power to enforce company's rights. 164
It is apparent that a shareholder willing to bring an action against an errant director
in Kenya has to contend with numerous hurdles before he can be heard. A
derivative action is generally possible only if the applicant can invoke one of the
exceptions to the rule in Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others. While the
corporate entity demands that some threshold requirements should be a prerequisite
to suing a director, there ought to be less rigid rules prescribing when a single
shareholder should have a right to maintain an action on behalf of the company.
Given that companies have become the ultimate models of conducting business,
exercise of directors' discretion should be subject to more contro1. 165 Besides, whilst
the rule in Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others protects both shareholders and
creditors against frivolous use of company resources by litigious individuals, there is
room to argue that it may also encourage errant directors to stifle litigation against
them.I66
The present Kenyan position favours preservation of the collective nature of
corporate decision-making rather than enforcement of directors' duties. This makes
it difficult for director's duties to be enforced unless there is change of control of the
company. This position militates against good corporate governance 167 principles
and their enforcement, as shareholders are hindered from pursuing individual suits
when necessary. 168 A proper balance, therefore, needs to be struck.
163 [1966] EA 390.
164 Sealy, "Problems of Standing, Pleading and Proof in Corporate Litigation" in Pettet (ed), Company
Law in Change (London, 1987). Cited in Davies PL, op cit n 44, p 658.
165 Bottomley, op cit n 54, at 138.
166 Prince, op cit n 54, at 496.
167 "Corporate governance refers to the process and structures used to direct and manage the business
and affairs of the corporation with the objective of enhancing long term value for shareholders and
the financial viability of the business." See Bidin, "Corporate Law Directors' Duties and Creditor
Protection" [1998] 19 Co Law 188, at 189.
168 B . ,. , ibid, at 188.
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The change of attitude by the courts and their willingness to interfere in the internal
management of companies could promote investors' confidence in the management
of companies, as they would be assured of the effective monitoring of directorial
activities. Similarly, abolition of the need to demonstrate wrongdoer's control of the
shareholders for an action to be maintained by an individual would improve the
position of minority shareholders in respect of non-ratifiable breaches.
It is apparent that section 211 of the Act is too restrictive as it only allows members
to invoke the section when the affairs of the company are conducted in a manner
oppressive to some members of the company. It is submitted that adopting a
statutory provision that would encompass a wider interpretation would protect
shareholders in a more appropriate way. Such a provision should, for instance,
encompass conduct that disregards interests of the members. Such measures, which
have been adopted in Australia and New Zealand, would clearly neutralise the
limitations of the rule in Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others.
Also, given the difficulties encountered by shareholders who have to prove
oppression for a company to be wound up, there is a need to separate the winding-up
grounds from the protection of minority shareholders.
In spite of the changing nature of companies' legislation in other jurisdictions, the
Act appears to have remained static. The failure of both the Act and the courts to
adequately protect shareholders from directors of their companies will continue to
adversely affect the well-being of companies and the economy, unless more powers
are given to shareholders.
As the wind of change sweeps across Australia and UK as well as other common
law jurisdictions, I69 the task of ensuring that Kenya is not abandoned in a bygone
era lies squarely on the shoulders of the judiciary and Parliament.
169 Such as New Zealand.
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CHAPTER SIX
6.0 THE GOVERNANCE OF PARASTATALS
6.1 Introduction
One of the factors that has contributed to the poor state of the Kenyan economy' and
the indebtedness of the country to international lending agencies and western
countries2 is the mismanagement of public resources. A vast majority of public
enterprises have performed poorly over the years. In fact, parastatals owe a sizeable
percentage of all the debts of the country. Their mismanagement has, in some
instances, resulted in the insolvency3 of a number of parastatals. Parastatals are
bodies having a separate legal entity which earn their revenue from the sale of goods
and services and the government holds a majority shareholding in them. 4 The
government exercises immense control over parastatals, as it has powers to appoint
directors and issue directives of a general nature. 5 Parastatals are peculiar to most
African countries and have no direct parallel in the UK and other developed
countries. They were first established in Kenya by the colonial government to
provide services that were not provided by the private sector. Parastatals control key
sectors such as agricultural exports, transport and communications, manufacturing
According to a World Bank report, World Development Indicators, released on 30 April 2001,
Kenya was the only one of the 10 sub-Saharan countries with negative growth rates greater than 0.5
per cent in 1999. Although the economy of the country grew by 4.2 per cent between 1980 and 1989
and 6.5 per cent between 1970 and 1979, the growth had declined to 2.2 percent by 1993. The GDP
slowed down from 2.3 per cent in 1997 to 1.8 per cent in 1998. See Redfern, "World Bank's Dim
Picture of Kenya's Economy", Daily Nation, 1 May, 2001; "An Economy at War with Itself', East
African Standard, 25 April, 2001; Magero and Kanani, "Concern over Large Increase in Domestic
Debt", The East African 10 January, 2000.
2 A sizeable percentage of all the country's debt is owed by parastatals. See SRI International and
Mwaniki Associates, Parastatals in Kenya: Assessment of their Impact and an Action Plan for
Reform; Final Report Prepared for Kenya Association of Manufacturers, February, 1992, pp 36, 61.
3 The insolvency of Kenya Co-operative Creameries has been attributed to conflict of directors'
interests with those of the company. The directors were involved in making, for instance, irregular
purchasing decisions in total disregard of all the rules of competitive tendering. See "Power Games
Humble Giant Dairy Company", Daily Nation, 20 July, 1999.
SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 49.
5 Legal Notice No 59 of 25 February, 1987 exempted some parastatals from the State Corporations
Act 1987. These included the Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd, the National Bank of Kenya Ltd, the
Kenya National Assurance Co Ltd, and the Kenya Re-Insurance Corporation.
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and agricultural trade. 6 The poor performance of parastatals and the subsequent
insolvency of many of them has left many investors and creditors with heavy
losses. 7 For instance, the insolvency of Kenya National Assurance Company led to
the loss of millions of shillings by individuals who were insured by the company. In
spite of the consequences of parastatal mismanagement on the economy of the
country, the government has done little to address the problems affecting the proper
governance of parastatals.8
It has been 39 years since independence and the system of using parastatals to run
important industries established in Kenya during the colonial era, continues to thrive
under the same corporate framework. 9 Although parastatals were initially thought to
be powerful vehicles for economic development, most have been a drain on the
economy. Their products and services are usually exorbitantly priced, of inferior
quality, and delivery times are unreliable. 10 To improve their performance, the
government has elected to privatise them." The need for privatisation is attributable
to the failure of the State, as an owner of enterprises, to motivate the firms to realise
competitive business standards. I2 Despite the overall poor performance, parastatals
with foreign management" and those run by management agents have been
relatively successful due, at least, to their independence from the government. 14 For
6 G Barbara, Public Enterprise in Kenya: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why, (Colorado, 1991) 1.
7 Magero and Kanani, "Government Making Efforts to Save KNAC, Says Okemo ", East African
Standard, 3 April, 2001.
8 Failure by the government to address adequately the problems caused by corruption has made the
cost of doing business in Kenya one of the highest in the world. See Nyong'o, "How Bad Governance
Strangles Business", Daily Nation, 10 June, 2001.
9 Kenya attained independence in 1963. More than 100 parastatals were created between 1963 and
1978. See SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at v.
loibid p 1.
II The government has even privatised some profitable ones, such as Kenya Railways, because of
mismanagement of assets and resources. See "KR to go Public, Government Says", Daily Nation, 15
March, 2000.
12 S Estrin, "State Ownership, Corporate Governance, and Privatisation", in OECD, OECD
Proceedings: Corporate Governance, State Owned Enterprises and Privatisation, (Off Pubns OEEC
2781, 1998),p 11.
13 Despite General Motors being jointly owned by General Motors, the Kenyan government, and
Itochu Corporation (Japan), it has been profitable over the years. General Motors has a 57.7 percent
majority equity interest and management responsibility, Itochu Corporation has 4.5 percent equity,
and the government of Kenya owns 20.0 percent. See General Motors website
<http://www.gm.comicompany/corp_info/global_locationsikenya.htm >
14 SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 54.
149
example, despite being a parastatal, Mumias Sugar Company has been profitable
due to its management by a professional company, Booker Tate.I5
The difference in performance between parastatals that are closely linked with the
government and the ones that are not, underscores the important role played by an
independent board of directors in running a company efficiently. It is against this
background that this Chapter seeks to assess the reasons for the good performance of
some and the poor performance of others. The Chapter also appraises the historical
development of parastatals, the effects of their performance on the economy of
Kenya, and the initiatives adopted by the Kenyan government in order to streamline
their regulation. This assessment will shed light on the regulation of parastatals and
their management and whether there needs to be reform.
6.2 Background
6.2.1 Impact of Parastatals on the Kenyan Economy
In 2000, Kenya had a negative Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth rate of 2.4
per cent. 16 The poor state of the economy of Kenya has mainly contributed to the
country's heavy dependency on international lending agencies. I7 Despite this
dependency, the continuous structural adjustment of the extension of credit to the
country by the donor agencies, such as the IMF, has had little impact on the
economy of Kenya. I8 Increasing internal debts I9 have reduced the creditworthiness
15 In the past the government has unsuccessfully attempted to influence Tate's management decisions
relating to appointment and removal of directors, sugar allocations, and the cancellation of the
managing agent contract. See Shaw, "Mumias Privatisation and the Bigger Picture", Daily Nation, 30
September, 2001.
16 The only other African countries with negative growth rates were Zimbabwe, Eritrea, and Cote
d'Ivoire. Despite the state of insecurity in Sierra Leone, it managed a growth rate of 1.3 percent.
Similarly, the GDPs of Tanzania and Uganda grew by 2.7 percent and 2.2 percent respectively. See
World Bank Development Report 2002 < http: www.worldbank.org  wdr 2001/> Also see Redfern,
"Tanzania, Uganda Grew as Kenya Shrank", The East African, 1 October, 2001.
17 By 1996, external debt had grown to 77 per cent of the country's GDP. However, by November
2000, Kenya's external debt had increased from £16.2 million at the end of 1998 to £ 93.6 million.
See "An Economy at War with Itself', East African Standard, 25 April, 2001; Magero and Kanani,
ojo cit n 1.
16 In 1998, the World Bank's Operations Evaluation Department said only 57 per cent of its projects
in Kenya were satisfactory. See "An Economy at War with Itself', East African Standard, 25 April,
2001.
19 "Sacco Petitions State over Sh 600 Million Debt", Daily Nation, 8 September, 2001; Kikechi,
"TARDA on Verge of Collapse", East African Standard, 27 June, 2001.
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of the country. 2° In fact, debts owed by parastatals have paralysed operations of
some local creditors. For example, Reli Co-operative Savings and Credit Society
recently sought the help of the government to recover 591 million Kenyan Shillings
(£5.91 million) from Kenya Railways Corporation (a parastatal). Similarly, another
parastatal, Tana River and Athi River Development Authority (TARDA), which is
on the verge of insolvency, has sought the assistance of the government to recover
debts owed to it by another parastatal, Kenya Power and Lighting Company.21
Although parastatals accounted for about 11 per cent of GDP between 1986 to 1990,
they were responsible for a net outflow of three billion Kenyan shillings (£30m),
equivalent to 0.9 per cent GDP in 1991, from the central government. Parastatals
also consumed about 17 per cent of the gross fixed investment. In 1990, parastatals
owed 17 per cent (£ 633 Million) of the total public debt. Between 1973 and 1986,
parastatals accounted for an average of 35 per cent of the total external public debt.
As a result of such debts, international lending agencies 22 have been urging the
government to privatise parastatals in order to reduce public spending and improve23
their general performance. 24
To reverse the deteriorating performance of parastatals, the government, in 1986,
sought to increase the role of the private sector in order to foster dynamic economic
20 According to the World Investment Report by the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) for the year 2001, the foreign direct investment flows to sub-Saharan
Africa decreased from £ 5.6 billion in 1999 to £ 4.6 billion in 2000. See "PS Warns of FDI Outflow",
East African Standard, September 27, 2001.
21 Kikechi, op cit n 19.
22 The World Bank and the IMF are the most influential donor agencies in Kenya. The agencies have
been so influential that the IMF played a major role in the drafting of the Constitution of Kenya
(Amendment) No 2 Bill, 2001. However, attempts to initiate policy reforms by the agencies have not
been so successful. For instance, the liberalisation of the agricultural sector has led to the decline of
the sector, as Kenya's produce has not competed effectively with foreign produce. The poor quality of
Kenya's produce has been attributed to "unfavourable climatic and ecological conditions,
inappropriate technology, poor infrastructure, modest and obsolete equipment, a poor resource base,
inadequate research and unfavourable credit conditions." See Keng'ore, "Why We Should be Wary of
the World Bank, IMF", East African Standard, 1 October, 2001.
23 Apart from inefficiency of parastatals, other factors contributing to lack of foreign investment in
Kenya are: slow pace in privatising parastatals, general bureaucracy, bad infrastructure; crime, and
regulatory constraints. Pfizer recently attributed its decision to leave the Kenyan market to poor sales
brought on by increasing competition from generic drugs and unfavourable economic regulations.
Other companies, which have left, include Johnson and Johnson Ltd, which relocated to Zimbabwe,
and Dawa Pharmaceutical. They cited their reasons for leaving as: high power tariffs and electric
supply problems, heavy duties on imported raw materials, and a poorly performing economy. It is
feared that the departure of established drug companies could lead to an increase in fake generic
drugs. See Akoko and Ondego, "Pfizer to Pull Out of Kenya", Daily Nation, 6 September, 2001.
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growth. 25 The belief that resources are likely to be used more efficiently if they are
transferred to the private sector led the government to adopt a privatisation
programme.
Although the programme had started with the idea of reducing State spending and
enforcing market discipline, investors are still reluctant to conduct business in
Kenya. In fact, foreign ventures in Kenya have begun to relocate their enterprise
away from the country due to the few prospects of economic improvement. 26 Given
that there is a huge demand for limited capital and resources in the world, investors
are not likely to be attracted to countries without stable economic and regulatory
systems.27 In order to restore the confidence of investors and foster high economic
growth, the IMF28 has advised the country to implement measures to address
problems of governance, the pursuit of macroeconomics policies, and the
acceleration of structural reforms. 29 While some measures, such as privatisation,
may reduce the intervention of the government in the economy, it is not entirely
certain that corporate governance would necessarily improve, since private entities
can be as inefficient as state corporations.
6.2.2 Development of Parastatals
As stated earlier, parastatals were first established in Kenya by the colonial
government on the understanding that they would be the most appropriate
mechanism for providing services that were not provided by the private sector. 30 In
addition, it was felt that public enterprises were better placed to curb exploitation of
24 SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 36; Magero and Kanani, op cit n 1.
25 1986 Sessional Paper No 1 on Economic Management for Renewed Growth in, "An Economy at
War with Itself', East African Standard, 25 April, 2001.
26According to the United Nations Conference of Trade and Development's (UNCTAD) World
Investment Report 2001, Kenya is among the ten counties with the highest rate of foreign direct
investment outflows in Africa. The country had an outflow of about £ 56 million in 1999 and 2000.
According to the report, South Africa, Angola, Egypt, Nigeria, and Tunisia attracted investment
because of: primary extraction, political stability, suitable environment for investment, labour costs,
skills, technological advancement, and infrastructure. See Miring'uh, "Foreign Direct Investment to
Africa Drops", East African Standard, 19 September, 2001. Also see Keng'ore, "Business Finns
Wary of Kenya", Daily Nation, 25 April, 2001.
27 Consultative Forum for Corporate Governance in Africa Speech, Monday 30 October 2000,
Nairobi, Kenya < http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/countries/kenya/consultive_forum.htm>
28 IMF's relationship with Kenya started when it gave the country fmances to purchase the land
occupied by colonial settlers in order to resettle Africans. See Keng'ore, op cit n 21.
29 Ibid.
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consumers. Infrastructural services, such as ports, railways, airlines, post and
telecommunications, fell into this category. Crop marketing boards were also
established by settler farmers with a view to marketing their produce. 31 The majority
of them resembled co-operatives to a large extent because they had grower
representation on the boards of directors.
Before independence, the colonial government adopted the Swynnerton Plan in
order to develop a group of progressive middle-class African farmers. As a result,
the marketing boards that existed were reorganised to serve large numbers of
smallholders. Additional boards, such as the Cotton Lint and the Seed Marketing
Board and the Kenya Tea Development Authority, were created to cater for the
expansion.
Given that most Africans were peasant farmers, agricultural workers in settlers'
plantations, and workers in the State sector, the government sought to finance their
agricultural, commercial, and industrial entrepreneurship through Development
Finance Institutions (parastatals). These included: the Agricultural Finance
Corporation of Kenya (AFC), the Industrial and Commercial Development
Corporation (ICDC), and the Industrial Development Bank (IDB). Although these
parastatals were all successful in the 1960s and 1970s, some, such as AFC, started
experiencing liquidity problems when politically connected farmers, with large
farms, took loans with insufficient collateral and they continuously defaulted on
payments. 32
After independence, the Kenyan government established similar parastatals with the
intention of providing services of a monopolistic nature, Africanising the sector, and
313 By 1990, the parastatal sector had 255 firms, which employed 115, 000 people. Their wage bill
represented 40 per cent of the public sector and 22 per cent of the national wage bill. See SRI
International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at v.
31 For instance, the Land and Agricultural Board was established in 1931 to provide credit to settler
farmers. Other boards included the Agricultural Regulatory and Commodity Boards, which were
mainly established in the 1940s and 1950s for the purposes of marketing and regulating their
respective markets.
32 On 20 November 2001 unsecured loans owed to AFC were 2 billion Kenyan Shillings. See "Govt
to Write off AFC Debt" East African Standard, 20 November 20, 2001; Nyong'o, op cit 118; "Okemo:
AFC too Heavily Indebted" East African Standard, 25 October, 2001.
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redistributing regional income. 33As such, the growth of parastatals in Kenya can be
attributed to economic as well as social and political objectives. Given that there was
a shortage of local entrepreneurs with adequate capital and skills at independence,
the government considered it necessary to be involved both directly and indirectly in
the economy rather than relying on foreign capital. This enabled the government to
play the role of entrepreneur through the medium of parastatals. For example, the
Kenya Industrial Estate and the Industrial Commercial and Development
Corporation were established to assist local entrepreneurs to increase their
participation in the industrial sector. The government deemed it necessary to
establish more parastatals in order to facilitate development in sectors which were
not attractive to private investors. Such sectors often carried higher investment risks
or low returns and, therefore, did not attract investors unless the government reduced
risks by participating in joint ventures.
After independence, most foreign investors were wary of investing in Kenya due to
risks of nationalisation. As a result, they required the government to be a joint
partner in most ventures, which the government agreed to so as to attract foreign
capital, technology, and management skills.34
Although nationalisation of the existing parastatals was not the main objective of the
government, most parastatals created after independence assisted in the
Africanisation of the economy. The main players were firms that provided credit
and technical assistance. Such firms helped Africans to enter commerce. These
included: the Kenya National Trading Corporation that helped in development of
farms, the Kenya National Trading Corporation Industrial and Commercial
" By 1980s there were 223 parastatals, which increased to 255 by 1990. They have now (2001)
reduced to 207. Of the 255 in 1990, the government had a majority shareholding in 135 and minority
shareholding in 120. Parastatals established between 1963 and 1978 included the Development
Finance Corporation; the Agricultural Finance Corporation; the Agriculture Development
Corporation; the Maize and Produce Board; the Kenya Industrial Estates; the National Bank of
Kenya; the Transport Licensing Board; and the Kenya Reinsurance Board. See G Barbara, Public
Enterprise in Kenya: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why, (Colorado, 1991); SRI International and
Mwanilci Associates, op cit, n 2, 4; Omani "Government Pledge on Corruption", Daily Nation, 9
March, 2000.
34 To protect foreign investors, the government enacted the Foreign Investment Act in 1964, which
encouraged government shareholding in joint ventures with private partners. See SRI International
and Mwanilci Associates, op cit n 2, at 6.
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Development Corporation, and the National Construction Corporation that helped
local people enter the construction industry.
Since the government pursued a mixed economy strategy which allowed both the
public35 and private36 sectors to supplement each other, it had a commitment to
promote rapid growth, "equitable distribution of incomes, more balanced equitable
distribution of industries, 37 creation of employment opportunities, and the need to
supply certain goods and services considered essential to the people." 38 By
participating in the economy, the government sought to control various economic
sub-sectors by, for instance, conserving the scarce public capital resources and
offering services at low costs to consumers and producers. This was done with a
view to achieving African socialism goals, seeking to give political equality, social
justice, and human dignity to all. However, the difficulty in balancing all the
interests prompted the government to issue guidelines outlining how it would
implement its policies. It observed thus:
"The most important of these policies is to provide a firm
basis for rapid economic growth. Other immediate problems
such as Africanisation of the economy, education,
unemployment, welfare services, and provincial policies
must be handled in ways that will not jeopardise growth. The
only permanent solution to all of these problems rests on
35 It was considered essential for the government to participate in the economy in order to create
sensitive controls for the proper utilisation of resources. Government participation in the economy
was also used as a means of diffusing ownership to the public. This was the case in the large
enterprises such as General Motors, Associated Vehicle Assemblers (AVA), Kenya Textile Mills
(KTM), Kenya Breweries Ltd and Leyland Motors. See African Socialism and its Application to
Planning in Kenya, The Sessional Paper No 10 of 1965, 6.
36 The creation of a private sector with unrestricted rights was considered a danger as it could lead to
the division of the society along class lines. To prevent the growth of private monopolies, the
government created parastatals dealing with wholesale trade, such as Kenya National Trading
Corporation (KNTC) and Uchumi Supermarkets. See African Socialism and its Application to
Planning in Kenya, The Sessional Paper No 10 of 1965, at 13.
37 The government got involved in industries that were considered to be fundamental to industrial
development. Sectors regarded as fundamental to the economy included: textiles, chemical and
pharmaceutical, mining and construction, machinery and equipment, agro-processing, tourism,
finance and banking, electricity and water, and transport and communication. Development finance
institutions, such as the Development Finance Corporation and the Industrial and Commercial
Development Corporation, were earmarked to help in the establishment of basic industries. They
were also to offer professional advice as well as financial assistance to African entrepreneurs
venturing into commercial enterprises.
38 SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 7.
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rapid growth. If growth is given up in order to reduce
unemployment, a growing population will quickly
demonstrate how false the policy is; if Africanisation is
undertaken at the expense of growth, our reward will be a
falling standard of living."39
The government refrained from adopting nationalisation policies because of the fear
that the process would impede the creation of new assets, absorb state funds, and
contribute to the flight of private capital. It was considered that high growth needed
higher capital formation that could not be financed through domestic savings alone.
The reasoning being that "when an industry is nationalised, it must be operated
efficiently, cover its costs and earn a profit at least equivalent to the taxes paid when
operated privately."40
The expansion of parastatals in the 1960s and 1970s illustrates how crucial the
parastatal sector was in the development process of the economy. However, their
role seems to have changed by the late 1970s and, in turn, the international lending
agencies, 41 among other interest groups, started questioning their viability. 42 As a
result, Presidential Committees were set up in 1979 and 1982 to investigate the
financing of parastatals. The 1982 Committee found considerable flaws and noted:
"Government involvement in commercial ventures has
tended to tarnish the image of the government because the
parastatals and other ventures which are expected to be
viable have not been profitable. Moreover, in some cases,
minority share ownership by the government has served to
strengthen foreign ownership and control thus leading to
some de-Kenyanisation of the economy."43
39 Sessional Paper No 10, "African Socialism and its Application to Planning in Kenya", Republic of
Kenya, 1965, 18. Cited in G Barbara, op cit n 6, at 15.
40 ibid.
41 The agencies include the World Bank and the IMF. The two are usually referred to as the Bretton
Woods institutions.
42 Public enterprises played a positive role in Kenya's economy from independence until 1978. At
independence, parastatals contributed 11.2 per cent of GDP, which reached 14.4 percent in 1971, but
subsequently declined until 1977.
43 Republic of Kenya, The 1982 Working Party on Government and Expenditure, 1982, at 42.
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6.2.3 Nature of Parastatals
Presently, parastatals are deeply implicated in most fiscal problems of African
governments because of their inefficiency, losses, budgetary burdens, and poor
products and services." Occasionally, they achieve non-commercial objectives,
which are used as an "excuse for their poor economic performance." 45 Although the
international lending agencies have advocated total privatisation of public
enterprises,46 most of the bureaucrats of African governments have proposed
alternative measures, such as centralisation.
Due to the economic crisis facing Kenya from the mid 1970s, 47 the country has been
dependent on financial assistance from the World Bank and the IMF. To resolve the
economic crisis facing the country, these two bodies, in 1980, successfully urged the
Kenyan government to adopt structural adjustment programmes, which would
reduce government participation in productive activities. 48 Although the
government agreed to reduce its participation in the economy, some government
intervention was deemed necessary for the purposes of guiding appropriate
development of the country. The intervention was preferred in order to ensure a
stable, conducive and economic environment for private sector activities and to
provide administrative and social services, such as health and water, which the
private sector could not readily offer.49
6.2.4 Classification of Parastatals
Parastatals can be divided into four categories, namely:
" African governments are keen to privatise parastatals because of the losses resulting from their
inefficiency. By 1997, the World Bank had documented more than 2700 privatisations in Africa. See
Louw, "Making Privatization Work in South Africa", Economic Reform Today, Number 2, 1999 <
http:/ www.cipe.org/ert1e32 e32_05.php3>
45 J Nellis, Public Enterprises in Sub Saharan Africa, Washington DC: The World Bank 1986 in G
Barbara, Public Enterprise in Kenya: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why, (Colorado, 1991), 7.
46 Louw, op cit n 44.
47 Despite the government's investment of £1000 million in the parastatal enterprises, the Treasury
received only £2.2 million as dividends in the year 1978/79. Although the government had invested
in more than 300 enterprises, this amount was paid by only six enterprises. Republic of Kenya, op cit
n43, at 40-41.
48 The structural adjustment programme was meant to enhance the role of the private sector and
market forces, reduce government expenditure and its level of participation in the economy, budget
austerity, liberalisation of both domestic and external trade, and exchange rate management reforms.
SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 10.
°Republic of Kenya, op cit n 43, at 42.
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• Utilities: these are monopolies, which have little or no competition from the
private sector."
• Regulatory parastatals: these are semi-monopolies with specific roles to play.
Such roles may involve the development of a sub-sector, regulation of
production and prices,5I and marketing by the private sector.52
• Commercial or industrial parastatals: these engage in active competition with the
private sector.
• Development finance parastatals: these facilitate industrial development and the
participation of Kenya nationals in the economy. They achieve this objective by
providing funds to industrial and commercial concerns.53
6.2.5 The Legal Framework
The majority of commercially oriented parastatals are incorporated under the
Companies Act 1962. 54 Others, especially utilities and commercial regulatory
bodies, are incorporated under specific enabling legislation. 55All parastatals, in
which the government has controlling equity interests, either directly or through
public institutions, are governed by the State Corporations Act 1987. 56 However,
the President has the power to exempt a state corporation 57 from any or all of the
provisions of the State Corporations Act 1987. 58 Similarly, the nature of business of
a parastatal sometimes necessitates its exemption from the provisions of the State
5° These include Kenya Ports Authority, Kenya Power and Lighting Company, and Kenya Railways.
51 The Electricity Regulatory Board is endowed with the responsibility of setting of consumer prices
for electricity.
52 The Cotton Board, for instance, regulates the cotton sub-sector. Others include National Cereals
and Production Board and the Kenya Meat Commission.
53 They include Industrial Development Bank Ltd, Industrial and Commercial Development
Corporation, and Development Finance Company of Kenya.
54 The Companies Act 1962 (Revised in 1978) regulates all companies that are formed or registered
under the Act. This may include companies that are limited by shares or by guarantee and parastatals
that are registered under the Act. On the other hand the State Corporations Act 1987 regulates the
parastatals in which the government is the majority shareholder.
55 These include Kenya Railways, Kenya Airways, Kenya Post and Telecommunication Corporation,
and Kenya Ports Authority. Commercial regulatory bodies with specific enabling legislation include;
Cotton Board of Kenya; and Kenya Tea Development Authority.
56 Cap 446, Laws of Kenya. The Act was enacted following the recommendations made by the Report
and Recommendations of the (Philip Ndegwa) Committee on Review of Statutory Boards, Republic
of Kenya, May 1979, 19, para 81.
57 The State Corporation Act defines a state corporation as a "body corporate established before or
after the commencement of this Act by or under an Act of Parliament or other written law but not a
company incorporated under the Companies Act which is not wholly owned or controlled by the
government or by a state corporation." See s 29.
58 Section 29.
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Corporations Act 1987. 59 For instance, being involved in financial market dealings
may be a reason for exemption, as some measure of confidentiality may be required
in order to attract customers who would otherwise be wary of their financial secrets
being made public. Although such parastatals are accorded a large measure of
autonomy, they are not entirely free from government intervention.
Under the State Corporations Act 1987, a parastatal can be established as either a
statutory corporation or a company. Parastatals that are established as statutory
corporations are not registered under the Companies Act 1962. However, parastatals
that are established as ordinary companies are registered under the Companies Act
1962 and are subject to it to the extent that it does not conflict with the State
Corporations Act 1987.
As opposed to a statutory corporation, the division of powers of parastatal
companies is similar to that of private companies established under the Companies
Act 1962. Parastatal companies have, subject to the provisions of State
Corporations Act 1987, all the powers and privileges of a natural person. Their
power flows from the statute creating them and the State Corporations Act 1987.
Although statutory corporations have all the powers of a natural person, both the
statutes establishing them and ministerial directions sometimes limit their powers.
The State Corporations Act 1987 60 vests the power of appointing a board of
directors in the President 6I and the Minister. 62 The President is also empowered to
"give directions of a general or specific nature to a board with regard to the better
exercise and performance of the functions of the state corporation and the board
shall give effect to those directions." 63
59 Legal Notice No 59 of 25 February, 1987 made exemptions on the Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd,
the National Bank of Kenya Ltd, the Kenya National Assurance Co Ltd, and the Kenya Re-Insurance
Corporation.
60 Cap 446, Laws of Kenya.
61 Ibid s 6 (1) (a), the President appoints the chairman.
62 Ibid s 6 (1) (e), the minister appoints the chief executive officer and other members of the board.
63 Ibid s 7 (I).
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6.3 Reasons for Poor Performance
6.3.1 Supplementing the Private Sector
One of the reasons for the poor performance of parastatals is the fact that the
objective of some parastatals, as set out by the Kenyan government, is to foster
private sector activity rather than their own growth. This often results in conflicts of
objectives and can be regarded as a source of inefficiency. The need to assist the
private sector partly undermines the efficiency and solvency of parastatals, as the
need to have high profits is rarely on the agenda of some parastatals. 64 For instance,
despite being nearly half-owned by individuals and institutions, Kenya Power and
Lighting has continued to perform mandatory social roles, such as the rural
electrification programme. 65 Since such parastatals hardly compete with the private
sector, they lose the benefits that can accrue from competition. Conversely, the
State of Queensland in Australia has recognised the need to allow such competition.
Thus, the Hilmer Report on National Competition Policy recommended that:
"Markets within the state must not be unnecessarily
distorted. Each GOC (Government Owned Corporation)
must whenever possible compete on equal terms with the
private sector and to that end any special advantage or
disadvantage of the GOC because of its public ownership or
its market power must be removed, minimised or at least
made apparent. Where a GOC has excessive market power
there may be a need for structural reform to increase
competition and special monitoring may be necessary to
prevent market abuse."66
6.3.2 Appointment of Directors
The State Corporations Act 1987 gives the President a strong measure of control of
appointments. It allows the President to provide for the management of every public
64 G Barbara, op cit n 6, at 16.
65 On 10 May, 2001, the government owned 55.08 per cent of the company's shares. See "The
Paradox of Money Owed KPLC", Daily Nation, 20 November, 2001.
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corporation established under the State Corporation Act. 67 The President is also
empowered to determine the composition of the board of directors.68
Generally, a board of directors in a parastatal comprises of:
• Chairman appointed by the President
• Chief executive
• The Permanent Secretary of the parent Ministry
• The Permanent Secretary of the Treasury
• Less than seven other members who are not employees of the state corporation.
Three of these are required to be public officers, appointed by the Minister.
Due to the political nature of appointments, parastatal boards are composed of many
directors who are ex-civil servants with little or no private business experience. 69 As
the Daily Nation70 notes:
"In this country, as in the rest of Africa, people seek political
power, not to implement programmes or ideologies, but to
hand out benefits in the form of jobs and lucrative contracts
to their relations and political allies. And, what we call
political parties here are institutions, which are bereft of
programmes and ideologies. They are mere patronage
structures organised by the elite of various ethnic
communities for the purposes of capturing state resources for
members of their ethnic communities."7'
66 McDonough, "Corporate Governance and Government Owned Corporations in Queensland",
(1998) 10 Bond Law Review 272 at 289.
67 Section 3.
68 Section 6 (1) (a).
69 SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 119.
7° The Daily Nation Newspaper has been very critical of the government. In fact, the government
recently attempted to censor the media as a result of the increasing criticism of most of its policies.
The Attorney General sought to do this by introducing the Statute Law (Miscellaneous Amendments)
Bill 2001, but the bill was withdrawn when it became apparent that even the opposition Members of
Parliament would not support it. See Thulcu, "MPs Praised over Media Bill", Daily Nation, 15
December, 2001; Gaitho, "MPs to Determine Fate of Kenya Media", Daily Nation, 12 December,
2001.
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It is notable that research has attributed poor and ineffective management to the
appointment criteria, which is based on political influence rather than relevant
technical expertise. 72 Commenting on the effects of political appointments on
governance of parastatals the Stanford Research Institute (SRI) International
observes:
"A notable feature of the parastatals is that the Board
Chairman and the Chief Executive are government
appointees. The position of the Chief Executive is
particularly crucial since he is the technical head of the
parastatal. There is a general belief, however, that these
appointments are rarely granted on either merit or on a
competitive basis. This has had the effect of not only
constraining managerial capacity at the parastatal, but also
detrimentally affecting the morale of the technically
competent staff, further eroding the ability of the parastatal
to operate commercially."73
The appointment of directors by the President and the Ministers politicises
directorships. The directors, who sometimes serve concurrently as nominated
Members of Parliament and Assistant Ministers, 74act in the interests of their
appointors rather than the corporation. From an economic perspective, it is true to
say that the performance of directors of parastatals is constrained by the many
agency problems that arise from their political appointments. Although the directors
are appointed by the State, the State is not the principal because it derives its
mandate from the voters. As a result, both the State and the directors are agents of
the voters. This makes it difficult for directors to act in the best interests of
parastatals because the State sometimes requires them to pursue political interests in
order to meet the expectations of a strategic element of the electorate. This explains
why ministerial powers are often used to further political motives, such as enhancing
the image of a political party. In fact, a Member of Parliament recently told
71 Kisero, "Political Patronage Mother of Graft", Daily Nation, 1 August, 2001.
72 SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 119.
73 1bid, 50.
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Parliament that the Kenyan ruling party, KANU, owed the National Bank of Kenya
(a parastatal) over 600 million Kenyan Shillings, (£6 million) which the party was
not repaying despite the financial crisis of the bank. 75 Prior to this instance,
interference in the operations of the National Bank of Kenya by directors who were
political appointees had led the Central Bank of Kenya in 2000 to abolish the post of
Executive Chairman in finance parastatals.76
Irregular appointment of directors has attracted both local and foreign criticism. For
instance, the Parliamentary Public Investment Committee in 2000 urged the
Attorney General to introduce legislation that would empower Parliament to vet the
appointment of parastatal directors. 77 Similarly, the appointment of some three board
members to the membership of Electric Regulatory Board was recently challenged
by the World Bank for not meeting the requirements of the Electric Power Act. The
World Bank was concerned with the fact that the government ignored the autonomy
of the board and removed one of the directors who had vowed to run the company in
accordance with the Electric Power Act rather than the State Corporations Act
1987.78
Given that Kenya adopts subjective standards to assess directors' culpability,79the
courts are bound to consider the individual circumstances of directors while
assessing liability. As such, a vast majority of directors are likely to escape liability
for breach of their duties of skill and care. The appointment of qualified persons
would enhance the performance of the boards by raising the standard of care
expected from directors. Changing the selection criteria would be more effective
than enacting legislation to punish non-skilled directors because, as Luoga notes:
74 Kisero, "Privatisation Law is What Kenya Needs", Daily Nation, 10 January, 2001.
75 Teyie, "ICANU Owes National Bank over Sh600m", East African Standard, 24 October, 2001.
76 "Banks to Get Rid of Executive Chairmen", Daily Nation, March 3, 2000.
77 Ouma, "Age Limit for the Heads of Parastatals", East African Standard, 28 July, 2000.
78 Prior to this the government had removed and replaced arbitrarily the entire board. See
Mohammed, "World Bank Queries Status of ERB", East African Standard, 28 July, 2001 and Kisero,
"World Bank Rejects Raila's Answer", Daily Nation, 31 July, 2001; Kisero, "Rationalise Hiring and
Firing in Public Bodies", Daily Nation, 16 May, 2001.
79 Flagship Carriers Ltd v Imperial Bank Ltd, High Court Civil Case No 1643 of 1999 (Unreported),
Ruling per PJS Hewett.
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"It is irresponsible to enact laws which would operate
arbitrarily and onerously upon the non-skilled directors
where their presence is a reality and institutionalised."80
6.3.3 Remuneration
The implementation of the Ndegwa Committee of 1979 saw the setting of maximum
salaries for chief executives. As a result of this review, some wage employees,
because of union affiliation, were able to earn higher salaries than the lower cadre of
managers supervising them. Such discrepancy, coupled with the setting of salaries
of top parastatal executives by the Office of the President, contributes to lack of
managerial motivation, especially in finance parastatals where competition with the
vibrant better-paying private sector is intense.81
Additionally, present remuneration is based on a classification system that classifies
all parastatals into six categories from A to F. Although the classification is
supposed to rank parastatals according to their importance, it is generally believed
that the real classification depends on the closeness of the chief executive to the
government. Where a chief executive enjoys a particularly good relationship with
the government, his parastatal is likely to be given a higher ranking, even when it
does not deserve it. 82 Apart from affecting the motivation of directors, low
remuneration discourages them from observing strict business ethics.83
It is likely that the poor remuneration of parastatal directors affects the performance
of parastatals and contributes to their ineffectiveness in general.
6.3.4 Lack of Autonomy
While the Ndegwa Committee of 1979 attributed no responsibility to the central
government for the poor financial performance of parastatals, the 1982 Working
80 Luoga, "Duties of Company Directors in Tanzania: The Need for Legislative Reform", [1991]
East African Law Review 247, at 266.
81 G Barbara, op cit n 6, at 167.
82 SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 49.
83 The research conducted by SRI international and Mwaniki Associates established that the
managers of IDB (Industrial Development Bank) felt that their terms of service should have
corresponded with that of KCB (Kenya Commercial Bank). Although both firms are parastatals it
was not possible for the directors to have equal pay due to categorisation of IDB as a state
corporation and the exemption of KCB from the state corporation Act. See SRI International and
Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 50.
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Party on Government and Expenditure associated many of the financial problems
with central government control. However, it offered only a few suggestions. It
particularly castigated the presence of public enterprises in strictly commercial
sectors. It observed that in a competitive sector such presence might prejudice the
financial stability of parastatals. The Working Party recommended that:
"the Government should not direct a parastatal to carry out
policy related activities which might not be financially sound
without providing explicit subsidies for those activities."84
The Committee, however, favoured their involvement in sectors serving important
social functions. It is worth noting that the attempts made by the Ndegwa Committee
and the 1982 Working Party on Government and Expenditure were not very effective
in reforming parastatals. This view was supported by 85 percent of the respondents
who took part in a survey conducted in 2001 in Nairobi. 85
Since the board of directors86 is made responsible for the proper management of the
affairs of parastatals, it is accountable for funds and responsible for the financial
business and the management of the parastata1. 87 However, unlike private
companies, the ultimate internal control of parastatals lies in the government. The
goverment performs the role of the general meeting by appointing directors and
issuing directives.88
The Inspector of State Corporations plays an important role in the running of
parastatals, as he has the duty of advising the government on all matters affecting
the effective running of state corporations. He is also obliged to report to the
Minister in respect of management practices within any corporation and to report, to
84 Republic of Kenya, op cit n 43, at 42; G Barbara, op cit n 6, at 17.
85 The results of the survey are discussed in more details in Chapter Nine.
86 The number and composition of the board varies among parastatals. The number varies from 6 to
16. Although the board of directors has private sector representatives, the management role of private
representatives is undermined by the heavy government presence. Section 6 of the State
Corporations Act 1987 provides that the number of directors should be eleven of which at least four
should be private sector representatives, unless the specific enabling statute provides otherwise.
87 Section 15 (1) of the State Corporations Act 1987.
88 James and Ligunya, "Organizational Relationship and the Control of Parastatals in Tanzania",
[1972] 5 East African Law Review 39, at 45.
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the Controller and Auditor General (Corporations), any cases where moneys
appropriated by Parliament are not being applied by the state corporation for the
purposes for which they were appropriated. 89 Upon conclusion of investigations, the
Inspector has powers to disallow any item of account, which is contrary to the law or
to any direction lawfully given to a state corporation. He can also surcharge the
amount of any expenditure on the person responsible for incurring the expenditure.9°
The State Corporations Act 1987 entitles a person aggrieved by the decision of the
Inspector to appeal to the State Corporation Appeal Tribunal. The Tribunal may
confirm, vary, or quash the decision of the Inspector and subsequently remit the case
to the Inspector with such directions as the Tribunal thinks fit. Appeals from
Tribunal decisions lie in the High Court. 91 The fairness of decisions arrived at in the
Tribunal are questionable, as the Tribunal comprises of a chairman who is appointed
by the President and two other members appointed by the Minister.92
Since the State Corporations Act 1987 does not impose any limit on the ability of
Ministers to direct the board, the board of directors is not able to question or review
undesirable directions. Ministers are also not under any obligation to adopt sound
corporate governance practices. As such, the position of parastatal directors differs
from that of their counterparts in the private sector. For instance, parastatal directors
may escape liability for considering the interests of the government rather than those
of the corporation or the wider community. With such a structure in place, the
governance of parastatals can hardly be appropriate, as directors are more likely to
act in the interests of the government.
To reinforce transparency in the exercise of ministerial powers, the State of
Queensland in Australia requires the publication of any ministerial decision
89 Section 18 (1).
90 Section 19 (1).
91 Section 21(1) and (2). It is worth noting that the Tribunal has never been constituted since the
State Corporations Act 1987 came into force. Similarly, the State Corporation Advisory Committee,
which is meant to administer the law, has never been created. See Kisero, "Corporations Act has
Outlived its Usefulness", Daily Nation, 30 May, 2001.
92 Although the Law Society of Kenya and the Institute of Certified Public Accountants are required
to nominate ministerial appointments, the appointment of the chairman is not subject to such
requirements.
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affecting Government Owned Corporations (GOCs). 93 The State therefore has an
important role to play in the control of GOCs. However, directors of GOCs have the
power to make decisions regarding the use of resources. In fact, the corporatisation
process has sought to ensure that external controls placed on GOCs are only limited
to matters having major strategic issues.
The GOCs are subject to two systems of governance, namely the Westminster
political system and aspects of the corporations law. In monitoring GOCs,
therefore, Parliament adopts similar checks and balances as it does on the executive
and legislature for strategic decisions. 94 This makes the GOCs more accountable
than Kenyan parastatals. It is notable that without reinforcing accountability,
parastatals can hardly be expected to be profitable. As Hessel notes:
"To run a business enterprise, management must be accorded
ample power to manage, but to run it effectively, it must be
held accountable for the use of this power."95
Although parastatals do not have autonomy, some, such as Kenya Power and
Lighting, manage to remain in business due to lack of competition and heavy tariff
protection, 96 subsidies, and other special privileges. These privileges, in turn, make
it impossible for other companies to compete effectively with parastatals. In fact,
most of the seed companies in Kenya are already seeking liberalisation of the seed
sector in order to end the monopoly of the Kenya Seed Company.97
93 The GOCs share similarities with Kenyan parastatals because they were established to bring about
micro-economic reform in the state. In effect, they are meant to improve the "state's overall
economic performance and the ability of the government to achieve social objectives through
improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and accountability of GOC." See McDonough, op cit n 66, at
305.
)4 See Queensland Treasury Department, A Green Paper on Government Owned Enterprises
Queensland Government Printer, Brisbane, August 1990) at 8. Cited in McDonough, op cit n 66, at
l89.
Hessel, "How Corporate Governance Makes Privatization Succeed", [1995] 4 Economic Reform
roday <www.cipe.org/ert/e18/corp_gov.php3 >
6 Kenya Power and Lighting Company charges the highest electricity tariffs in Africa. See "Sack all
op KPLC Bosses, MPs Urge", East African Standard, 6 November, 2001.
70nyinge, "Companies Demand Liberalisation", Daily Nation, 20 September, 2001.
167
6.3.5 Overlapping Regulations
Parastatals are subject to overlapping regulations. For instance, although all directors
and chief executives of the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK) are
appointees of the Minister under the Kenya Communications Act, 98 CCK is still
governed by the State Corporations Act 1987 because it is a state corporation. As
such, the President is empowered by the State Corporation Act to appoint the chief
executives.
Additionally, parastatals are subject to direct regulation by Parliament. Parliament
scrutinises them under the legislation that establishes them. In most cases, the
government exercises control of parastatals through Ministers. Since all State
Corporations fall under a Ministry, a Minister has powers to give directions of a
general character to the organisation. Such directions may, for instance, be in
relation to matters appearing to affect the national interest. In such a situation, the
Minister has the responsibility of determining what constitutes national interest.
Unlike private companies, where a board of directors sets the objectives of the
company, the ministers are responsible for identifying such objectives in parastatals.
They are bestowed with the responsibility of setting both commercial and non-
commercial objectives. The board is accountable to the ministers who are in turn
responsible to Parliament. As such, accountability of directors is limited to the
financial performance of parastatals.
Additionally, excessive regulations, coupled with extensive ministerial intervention
in the functioning of the boards, tend to impair their ability to make commercially
sound decisions. Parastatals, including the ones with specific enabling legislation,
are required to:
• Report directly to the parent Ministry because the Ministry, in conjunction with
the Treasury, must approve parastatal establishment and the remuneration system.
99
• Obtain budget and investment approval from the Treasury. 100
98 Section 6 (a) and (b) of the Kenya Communications Act 1998 empowers the President to appoint
the chairman and the Minister to appoint the directors. Kenya Communications Act establishes the
CCK.
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• Justify their accounts before the Public Accounts Committee of Parliament.
Also, parastatals are subject to review by the Parastatal Review Committee, the
Auditor General (Corporation) 1 ° I , and the Inspector of State Corporation.
The numerous approval requirements have the overall effect of constraining the
ability of directors to make commercial decisions and to recruit and retain skilled
staff. Moreover, the expediency of the decision-making process is also rendered
ineffective by requirements of ministerial approval. For example, a Minister, in
consultation with the Parastatal Review Committee, has to give approval for the
employment of a chief executive. 102 The delay in obtaining such approvals is the
main causes of the inability of parastatals to make strategic decisions. 103 As such,
the process impacts negatively on the general operational performance of
parastatals.
The chief executive of a parastatal may be summoned by the Public Investment
Committee to answer, on behalf of the board, any question arising from the report
submitted to that committee by the Auditor General (Corporations). j°4
6.3.5 Fraudulent Transactions
The interests of directors are more likely to come into conflict with those of
parastatals, compared with the normal company situation, because of the excessive
control exerted on directors by politicians. Due to this control, directors of
parastatals have to take extra precautions to ensure they act in the interests of the
company. For instance, duties towards parastatals that are public enterprises are
made more onerous because of their involvement in price fixing. For some
" SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 47.
100 Borrowing by parastatals must be sanctioned by the Treasury. See SRI International and Mwanilci
Associates, op cit n 2, at 48.
101 Section 17 State Corporations Act 1987, Cap 446 Laws of Kenya.
102 Also, borrowing of money can only be exercised with the consent of the Minister. Remuneration
and reward system at the parastatal must be approved by the Minister, Treasury, Parastatal Review
Committee and the Inspectorate of State Corporations. SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op
cit n 2, at 48.
103 A survey of 12 pararastals conducted in October 1991 indicated that delays in obtaining
investment decisions extended to over nine months. In other cases, such as the contentious issue of
restructuring parastatals, decision takes more than two years. See SRI International and Mwaniki
Associates, op cit n 2, at 49.
1 " Section 30 A (6).
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commodities, prices are kept artificially low either to counter inflation or to make
some necessities affordable to consumers. Conversely, prices are set by others to
protect "inefficient enterprises or provide resources for cross-subsidisation." / °5
Most of the problems identified by the Ndegwa Committee continue to affect
parastatals. For instance, the Parliamentary Public Investment Committee in August
2001 revealed how directors of the National Social Security Fund abdicated their
duties and, in turn, irregularly awarded themselves executive treats. As a result, the
parastatal lost three billion Kenyan Shillings (£30 million) between 1996 and 1998.
Similarly, the Kenya Ports Authority paid allowances to board members above the
approved rates. Instead of the approved 1000 Kenyan Shillings (£10) per session,
board members were paid between 5000 to 10,000 Kenyan shillings (£ 50-100) per
sitting. 106
In addition, the Inspector of State Corporations declared the National Housing
Corporation (NHC) technically insolvent because of mismanagement. The directors
had commissioned real estate projects worth 319 million Kenyan Shillings (£3.19m)
without competitive bidding or getting the approval of the NHC board of directors.
It also lost 69 million Kenyan Shillings (£690,000) through deposits placed in the
collapsed Prudential Bank by the managing director, disregarding the protests by the
finance director, and the Treasury's directive, requiring all surplus funds in
parastatals to be invested in Treasury Bills and Bonds.1°7
6.3.7 Conditions imposed by International Lending Agencies
The privatisation programme has also contributed to the collapse of many
parastatals. The structural adjustment loans offered by donor agencies have
sometimes expressly obliged governments to privatise parastatals. 1 °8 Failure to
comply with the donor conditions results in withdrawal of aid and loans. The use of
—
1 °5 G Barbara, op cit n 6, at 8.
1' Gicheru, "MPs Watchdog Finds More State Looting", Daily Nation, 16 August, 2001.
107 Wachira, "NHS Insolvent, Top Official Warns Government", East African Standard, 27 April,
2000.
I " Privatisation was prescribed as a condition in 74 World Bank loans during 1980 to 1989. See
paliwala, "Privatisation in Developing Countries: The Governance Issue", [2000] 1 Law, Social
Justice & Global Development Journal (LGD) 2 <http: /elj.warwick.ac.uk/global/issue 2000-
vpaliwala.html>; Killick, "The Role of the Public Sector in the Industrialisation of African
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such conditions is clearly illustrated by the comments made in 1985 by the then US
Secretary of State, George Schultz, when obliging USAID officials to raise certain
issues with Less Developed Countries:
"Policy dialogue should be used to encourage LDCs to
follow free market principles and to move away from
government intervention in the economy....to the maximum
extent practical governments should rely on the market
mechanism-on private enterprise and market
forces...parastatals are generally an inefficient way of doing
business.. .in most cases, public sector firms should be
privatised." 109
Similarly, while announcing resumption of assistance to Kenya on 27 July 2000, the
IMF board set tough new conditions, which Kenya accepted as part of the aid
agreement. The conditions, which are likely to be politically unpopular,11°
included:111
• Introduction of a law binding public officials to declare their wealth and
liabilities.
• Weekly inspection of the Central Bank balance sheet by Fund officials in
Washington.
• Removing supervision of Ministry spending from permanent secretaries to
finance
officers
• Shifting district Treasury Officers from the President's Office to the Treasury
Developing Countries", Indust?), and Development No 7 (1983), 1467. Cited in G Barbara, Public
Enterprise in Kenya: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why, (Colorado, 1991), 9.
10° Killick, Ibid.
II ° In November 2001 Members of Parliament were outraged when they learnt that the World Bank
had forced the government into contracting specific procurement agents, namely Crown Agents and
GTZ. Kenya's Finance Minister also lamented that donor conditions have done little to improve
peoples' living standards. See "World Bank Pushed Govt into Hiring Agents", East African
Standard, 21 November, 2001; Mburu, "Regional Meeting Criticises Donor Conditions", The East
African, 29 October, 2001.
tIl By agreeing to the conditions, the government has been criticised for selling "away the country's
sovereignty for a song." See, "Did We Sell Our Soul to Get Aid from the IMF?"Daily Nation, 3
August, 2000.
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• Enacting an Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill.
• Submitting to Parliament, by June 30, 2001, audited public accounts for fiscal
years 1998/99 and 1999/2000.
• Offering for sale to a strategic investor 26 per cent of the shares of the Kenya
Commercial Bank (parastatal) by September 30, 2000.
• Sending financial information to the IMF's Africa Department, including the
Central Bank of Kenya's daily balance sheet.
• Submitting records on new external borrowing and loan guarantees to the Fund
within three weeks of the end of each month.
• Giving the IMF every month details of its Treasury bill operations, including
arrears on repayments and the size of stock.
• Making available monthly figures on domestic financing of the Budget,
implementation of the development budget, with detailed information on the
sources of financing, and monthly statistics on external debt repayments.
• Seeking approval of the Fund and World Bank before any new project is
introduced during the current financial year.112
Before these conditions were imposed, the IMF had been prompted to suspend
financial aid to Kenya in July 1997 as a result of the government's failure to act on
high-level corruption and follow key governance criteria. 113 The suspension of aid
influenced the decisions of other donors to withdraw their aid and, in turn, resulted
in an increase of interest rates and foreign investors avoiding doing business in
Kenya.114
Since the pressure to privatise prompts IMF and World Bank to offer loans with
restraints on the public budget, 115 the resultant limitation of public budget reduces
public investment which, in turn, contributes to the indebtedness of government to
parastatals.
112 Kenya was granted a three-year loan amounting to £ 139 million (Sh14.6 billion or £ 146 million).
See Kisero, "IMF Sets Tough Terms for Kenya", Daily Nation, 31 July, 2000.
113 The government of Netherlands also stopped funding environmental projects in Kenya when
Parliament rejected the Kenya Anti-Corruption Authority Bill. See Wanyonyi, "Netherlands Stops
Funding for Kenyan Projects", East African Standard, 19 September, 2001.
114 Akumu, "How IMF Will Pump in Funds", Daily Nation, 29 July, 2000.
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6.4 Parastatal Policy Reform
Since a proper structure to the board of directors is key to appropriate corporate
governance, lack of autonomy in the boards of directors impacts negatively on their
effectiveness. To assess how effective the parastatal boards are in discharging their
responsibilities, it is important to consider what the functions of an effective board
ought to be. According to Rogers CJ and, on appeal, the New South Wales Court of
Appeal in AWA Ltd v Daniels, a board ought to:
"Set the goals of the corporation; appoint the chief executive
of the corporation; oversee the plans of managers for the
acquisition and organisation of financial and human
resources towards attainment of the corporation's goals;
review at reasonable intervals the corporation's progress
towards attaining its goals."116
Similarly, the Capital Markets Authority of Kenya recognises the following set of
responsibilities as the most suitable for a board of directors:
• Define the company's mission, its strategy, goals, plans
and objectives including approval of its annual budgets;
• Oversee the corporate management and operations,
management accounts and review corporate performance
and strategies at least on a quarterly basis;
• Identify the corporate business opportunities as well as
principal risks in its operating environment including the
implementation of appropriate measures to manage such
risks or anticipated changes impacting on the corporate
business;
• Develop appropriate staffing and remuneration policy,
including the appointment of chief executive and the
115 Zulu, and Nsouli, "Adjustment Programs in Africa", Washington, DC: International Monetary
Fund, April 1985. Cited in G Barbara, Public Enterprise in Kenya: What Works, What Doesn't, and
Why, (Colorado, 1991), 8.
116 (1992) 10 ACLC 933 at 1013 per Rogers CJ; Daniels & Ors v A WA Ltd (1995) 13 ACLC 299 at
662 per Clarke and Sheller HA.
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senior staff, particularly the finance director, operations
director and the company secretary as may be applicable;
Review, on a regular basis, the adequacy and integrity of
the company's internal control and management
information systems including compliance with
applicable laws, regulations, rules and guidelines;
Establish and implement a system that provides
necessary information to the shareholders including
shareholder communication policy for the company. 117
With these functions in mind, it can be seen that the boards of directors in Kenya are
not responsible for setting parastatals' goals, as the function is the responsibility of
ministers. Given that the chief executives are appointed by the President, the
President, rather than the board, has the power to hire and fire. The inability of the
board to do so renders the task of imposing performance levels and sanctions
difficult. 118 Similarly, the lack of powers to impose sanctions on the chief executive
and other senior executives limits the ability of parastatals to meet their goals.
Directors of parastatals are not able to perform efficiently because the government,
rather than the directors, ought to comply with good corporate governance practices.
As a result it is true to say that "directors are appointed to a position that carries with
it all of the liabilities but are not given the power to carry out the roles that the law
imposes."119
This clearly shows the difficulty faced by directors of parastatals when performing
their duties. The overall inability of directors to perform efficiently leads to lax cost
control, poor quality and outdated financial accounts, inadequate management
information systems, and insufficient plant management and quality contro1.12°
Ill Capital Markets Authority Corporate Governance Practices for Public Listed Companies in
Kenya, Guidelines, December 2000.
118 World Bank, Bureaucrats in Business; The Economies and Politics of Government Ownership,
washington DC 1995 at 14. Cited in McDonough, op cit n 66, at 309.
119McDonough, op cit n 66, at 310.
120 SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 73.
174
In general, regulation of parastatal directors can hardly be as efficient as that of the
private sector due to government's intervention. While public companies have
shareholders 121 that can buy and sell shares, and monitor the activities of a company,
ownership of parastatals by the general public is rendered virtually compulsory by
payment of taxes which, partly, finance the operations of parastatals. Therefore,
since the wider community does not buy or sell shares as a reaction to the
effectiveness of management, they can only exercise indirect control of parastatals
through the ballot box at a general election. 122 Apart from the inability of
shareholders to scrutinise parastatals due to lack of trading in their equity, other
factors that deprive parastatals of the vital scrutiny by shareholders include the
inability of shareholders to remove directors of parastatals and lack of analysis of
operations of parastatals by external analysts, such as stockbrokers.123
6.4.1 Steps initiated by the Government
Although past government policy statements 124have emphasised the need to reform
the parastatal sector, the government did little towards this end until 1985 when it
established the office of the Auditor General (Corporations) in order to tighten the
control of the financial resources of parastatals by reviewing the enterprises
speedily. Similarly, the government sought to enhance investigative and supervisory
powers of the Inspectorate of State Corporations Advisory Committee by passing
the State Corporation Act in 1986. The State Corporations Act 1987 sought to
permit parastatal directors to make independent decisions, to hire staff and chief
executives, and to determine their wage rates.125
As a result of the success of the privatisation programmes in other countries, the
government, in 1991, sought to privatise the commercial parastatals, close down the
non-viable ones and reform or restructure the essential utilities and strategic
parastatals. At this time, privatisation of public utilities had been successfully
—
121 'Property rights' theorists attribute the poor performance of parastatals to lack of individual stake
in the assets of the enterprises. See Paliwala, op cit n 108, at 2.
1221McDonough, op cit n 66, at 294.
123 Ibid, at 288.
124 Report and Recommendations of the (Philip Ndegwa) Committee on Review of Statutory Boards,
Republic of Kenya, May 1979 and Republic of Kenya, op cit n 43, at 42.
125 Other institutions established to facilitate reform included the Parastatal Review Committee which
was established in 1980s to review the performance and problems affecting all the parastatals in the
countrY.
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carried out in other countries, such as the UK goverment under Mrs Thatcher.126
Apart from increasing efficiency, privatisation in the UK attracted public interest in
state corporations. 127 It is notable that 91 per cent of the respondents who took part
in a survey conducted in 2001 in Nairobi took the view that privatisation of
parastatals in Kenya would improve accountability.
Whilst this measure may partly reduce the adverse impact on the economy, it is
doubtful whether privatisation is the only appropriate step for Kenya to take, given
that management and operational constraints are not the only factors affecting
parastatals. I28 Besides, without effective regulation of directors, private enterprises
can be equally inefficient.
Past attempts to reform parastatals in Kenya emphasised the strengthening of control
mechanisms. For instance, in 1992, following negotiations with the World Bank the
Minister for Finance attempted to introduce in Parliament three Bills, which would
have allowed the Treasury to take over control of parastatals from the Office of the
President. The Treasury was meant to exercise its powers in parastatals as a
shareholder, delegating powers to the directors in order for the corporate structure to
be similar to that of the private sector. They also sought to curb the excessive
powers of the State Corporations Act 1987 by abolishing the office of the
Inspectorate of State Corporations. However, the government rejected the Bills
before they were debated in Parliament, as they undermined presidential powers to
appoint directors.129
Recent attempts to enhance the performance of parastatals have favoured
privatisation. The goverment has sought to implement a comprehensive parastatal
reform programme, which includes the privatisation of all non-strategic parastatal
126 After the commencement of privatisation, the management of state owned enterprises improved
and as a result accounted for 11 percent of Britain's GDP. Much of the public enterprise out-put came
from state enterprises in telecommunications, gas, electricity, water, rail transport, and postal
services. SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 73.
127 After Amersham International was offered for sale in 1982, it subsequently made a pre-tax profit
of £22 million in 1987.
126G Barbara, op cit n 6, at 8.
129 "Leakey Rejects Plea to Exempt Telkom from Act", Daily Nation, 12 September, 2000; Kisero, op
cit n 91.
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enterprises and the rehabilitation and reform of all strategic enterprises. 130 The
objectives behind the reform programme include:
• Reduction of the financial and administrative burden that parastatals impose on
the government.
• Increasing efficiency through an improvement of the enabling environment for
the private sector.
• Raising government revenue from privatisation sales and liquidations.
• Eliminating preferential treatment to allow a level playing field for the private
sector. 131
6.4.2 Privatisation Bottlenecks
Although the poor performance of parastatals, coupled with pressure exerted by the
donor community and the Kenyan private sector to have parastatals privatised, has
increased, it might take a long time to finalise the process of privatisation due to
constraints, such as: the reluctance of the government 132 to sell or give up profitable
enterprises, I33 placing a high priority on unprofitable parastatals which do not attract
buyers, opposition from employees arising from fear of retrenchment, intellectual
ideologies against privatisation, a narrow field of qualified buyers, lack of developed
capital markets, I34 lack of necessary expertise 135 to support the process, lack of
D° The 1982 Working Party on Government and Expenditure had recommended the privatisation of
parastatals, which could be well handled by the private sector, and the liquidation of non-viable ones.
See Republic of Kenya, op cit n 43, at 42.
DI Government of Kenya, Kenya's Parastatal Reform Programme, A document presented for
discussion to the Consultative Group Meeting of Kenya's donors in Paris, November 1991.
132 By 1991, the Parastatal Reform Policy Committee had made the decision to privatise 139 non-
strategic parastatals. A survey conducted by SRI international on privatisation plans indicated that
the manufacturing company executives were supportive of the privatisation plans. Some of them,
however, doubted whether the government was committed to implementing the reforms fully. See
SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2, at 69.
133 The Nairobi Stock Exchange Chief Executive, Kibuga Kariithi, recently attributed the delay in the
privatisation of Telkom and Mumias companies to lack of political will. See Mogusu, "Privatisation
Delays Due to Lack of Political Will-NSE", East African Standard, 11 September, 2001.
134 Donald, "Privatization: Persuading a Skeptical Public", Center for International Private Enterprise
Publication, 2000 <www.cipe.orgiert1e08/2across.php3>
135 The government, in 2000, virtually scrapped the key unit, Executive Secretariat and Technical
Unit (ESTU), which used to regulate the parastatal reform programme in Kenya. The unit is now
comprised of only two people. It was scrapped as a result of donor pressure. Most of the donors to
the country preferred to have advisers from the World Bank rather than local ones. As a result of lack
of expertise, some institutions, such as Mumias Sugar Company, Chemilil Sugar Company, and the
Kenya Reinsurance Corporation, have managed their own privatisation. See "Government Scraps
Reform Body", Daily Nation, September 26, 2000.
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transparency in the divestiture programme, 136 lack of legislation to govern the
process, 137 and an uncertain investment climate.138 Also, parastatals set up as mixed
joint stock companies in Kenya contain certain restrictions about the transferability
of all or certain classes of shares and provide pre-emptive rights to existing
shareholders, which have to be complied with. 139 These are clear indications that the
existence of parastatals in the Kenyan market might continue.
It is therefore possible for miscreant directors to continue benefiting from parastatals
due to lack of adequate safeguards to cater for the privatisation process. At the
moment, there is no law to deal with sensitive privatisation issues, such as: valuation
of parastatals, procedure for selecting buyers, use of specific sale techniques,
financing of share purchases, and the allocation of privatisation process. 14° As such,
there is nothing to prohibit concentration of ownership of privatised state assets in
the hands of well connected individuals and multinational corporations. 141 For
example, a recent acquisition of East Kenya Bottlers by a South African company,
Coca Cola Sabco, and the plans to acquire two other companies were recently
criticised by the President for giving Coca Cola Sabco a 70 per cent stake in the
entire carbonated soft drinks market contrary to the monopoly laws.142
As the current programme stands, it is not possible to safeguard shareholders' and
employees' rights to buy shares in parastatals because the entire programme is
manipulated 143 by politicians. Illustrative of the manipulation is the free take over of
National Milling Corporation by the Premier Flour Mills of Nakuru; the selling of
Kericho Tea Hotel to Ms Sololo Investments for a paltry IS million Kenya shillings
136 "Yes, Privatisation Must be Speeded Up", Daily Nation, 19 October, 2000.
137 Oman, "Government Pledge on Corruption", Daily Nation, 9 March, 2000.
138 Kipkorir, "Making the Most Out of Privatization", in Centre for International Private Enterprise,
"promoting Economic Reform in Africa", <www.cipe.orgiert/e04/7africa.php3>
139 Section 74 (1) of the Act provides that holders of not less in the aggregate than fifteen per cent of
the issued shares of a special class of shares may apply to court to have the variation cancelled, if
they did not consent to or vote in favour of the resolution of variation.
140 "Transparency Required in the Privatisation of the Sugar Industry", East African Standard, 16
October, 2001.
141 Few indigenous Kenyans have bought the privatised firms to date. See Ngotezi, " Parastatal
Bosses are Political Retirees", The East African, 24 April, 2000.
142 "Okemo, Kijirah in Dilemma", East African Standard, 4 September, 2001.
143 When the privatisation programme started in 1992, the Government issued some guidelines to
guide the process, but politicians manipulated them, as the guidelines did not have the force of law.
See Kisero, op cit n 74.
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(£150,000) ; and the selling to politicians of Golf Hotel of Kakamega, Kisumu
Sunset Hotel, Homa Bay Hotel, and Marsabit Hotel)"
Even the utilities, which are likely to be retained in the long run because they are
profitable will still have a sizeable amount of shares owned by the government.
6.4.3 Private Sector versus Parastatals
Corporate governance in the private sector differs significantly with that of
parastatals. In the private sector, sanctions and incentives are used to make directors
perform their duties with a view to maximising profits. For instance, the market for
shares is a sanction used against directors in the sense that shareholders can sell their
shares if they are dissatisfied with the management. Outside shareholders also
provide a sanction against directors because directors may be dismissed in the event
that a lower share price may lead to a take-over. 145 In addition, the threat of
insolvency might discipline directors because such a threat may provide incentives
for directors to manage the business of a company prudently and, in turn, this will
safeguard their reputation and jobs. Moreover, the efficiency of a company may be
promoted by rewarding directors with handsome rernuneralion \Atm the.i
performance is sound.
Although some of the above sanctions may be effective in some instances, some
have limitations. For instance, despite the possibility of transferring shares by
shareholders when they are dissatisfied with the performance of the management, a
transfer of shares would not be effective if the amount of shares transferred is not
substantial. Besides, it might be difficult and costly for shareholders to collect the
necessary information that would enable them to convince other shareholders
concerning the failings of the entity. Undoubtedly, in the event of such limitation the
prospects of deterring pursuit of personal objectives by the management would be
minimal.
The state, as the principal shareholder, contracts with the management to run
parastatals. From an economic perspective, it can be argued that weaknesses in the
144 Kisero, Ibid.
145 S Estrin, op cit n 12, p 14.
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governance of paraststals arise as a result of lack of sufficient market incentives and
disciplines. Unlike the private sector, the public sector does not have a market for
shares which provides sanctions against poorly performing management. As such,
shareholders in parastatals have no exit options. Given that the market for corporate
control is absent, the parastatal is never under the threat of take-over and the board
under the threat of replacement. This contributes to the poor performance of the
board of directors due to lack of incentives to perform effectively. In addition, since
parastatals are often bailed out by the State, it can be argued that the lack of the
threat of insolvency also contributes to weak governance. 146 This problem is
compounded further by the fact that civil servants are not rewarded as a result of
improved performance. Lack of economic motivation can thus be a major factor
contributing to inefficiency.
Whilst the private sector has a single principal and agent, namely the shareholders
and the managers, there are multiple agents in parastatals. Since the State derives its
mandate from the voters, the State and the board of directors are both agents of the
voters. Serious agency problems arise as a result of this complexity. I47 For instance,
given that politicians are accountable to voters they are likely to lose sight of the
commercial goals of a parastatal whilst attempting to please strategic parts of the
electorate. The economic efficiency of parastatals is also undermined by the fact that
the politicians do not have personal equity stake in the entities. As a result, they
have no financial incentive to ensure parastatals are managed effectively.148
Due to the fact that public enterprises adopt political settings, it is generally believed
that the public nature of parastatals makes them inherently inefficient and
unprofitable due to inefficient controls. 149 As a result, there is a popular belief that
privatisation is a panacea for their inherent problems. McDonough illustrates the
undesirable nature of a state corporation as a medium for improving a state's
economic performance thus:
146 OECD, OECD Proceedings: Corporate Governance, State Owned Enterprises and Privatisation,
(Off Pubns OEEC 2781, 1998), p 8.
147 J Brumby and M Hyndman, "State Owned Enterprise Governance: Focus of Economic
Efficiency", in OECD, OECD Proceedings: Corporate Governance, State Owned Enterprises and
privatisation, (Off Pubns OEEC 2781, 1998), p 33.
148 Ibid, p31.
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"By creating a hybrid company/statutory corporation the
government has left open the issue of corporate governance.
The model does not allow for the directors to act, as they
should, as fiduciaries of the organisation that they are
appointed to direct. Adopting the corporate structure in the
context of GOCs should mean embracing and applying it
within a government context with all its imperfections.”15°
The failure to adhere to effective corporate governance can largely be attributed to
the present state of parastatals. Parastatal banks, until very recently, have remained
profitable and efficient despite the presence of competing local and multinational
banks and their success can be attributed to being subject to less influence from the
Ministry of Finance, as ministerial influence has made the business sector so wary of
government's involvement in business. As such, government's attempts to regulate
business are being rejected. For instance, the attempt to introduce a Bill in
Parliament that would empower a parastatal, the Horticultural Crops Development
Authority, to regulate I51 the horticultural sector 152has been opposed by the Fresh
Produce Exporters Association of Kenya. The Association claimed that sufficient
regulation is already being carried out by the private sector and that the involvement
of government would result in inefficiency, which has been witnessed in other
sectors regulated by the government, such as tea and coffee.153
Apart from the good past performance of parastatal banks, agricultural parastatals
also performed well for two decades after independence. Being large and complex
149 Y Aharoni, The Evolution and Management of State-Owned Enterprises, (Cambridge, Mass.,
1986), Chapter 5.
'McDonough, op cit n 66, at 310.
151 Similar attempts to create an additional parastatal to manage rural electrification was opposed by
Kenya Association of Manufacturers because it would have increased production costs of electricity
and, in turn, increase electricity tariffs. See Njuguna, "KAM Opposes New Electricity Company
Plan", Daily Nation, 10 September, 2001.
152 The horticultural sector is the second highest foreign exchange earner in Kenya. Flowers, fruits
and vegetable exports earned 14 billion Kenyan Shillings in 2000. See Akumu, "Industry Says No to
New Law", Daily Nation, 7 September, 2001.
153 Ibid. Also see Nyambala, "FPEAK Rejects Proposed Levy", East African Standard, 29 September,
2001.
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organisations they served large numbers of smallholder farmers. 154 Although
privatising public utilities might amount to exploitation of the public interest, which
is often guaranteed by parastatals, it can be argued that the floatation of shares might
help ailing parastatals to boost their efficiency and profitability by raising capital
and creating an interest group that would demand transparency and accountability.
The adoption of this strategy has enabled Kenya Power and Lighting Company to
remain profitable for a long time. I55 Since some parastatals appear to have failed as
a result of subsidising some class of producers and consumers, they would have to
stop subsidising such groups for their performance to improve. 156 This being the
case, the resultant improvement can be attributed to policy reform rather than
privatisation per se. It remains true, that such policy reform is achievable even
without privatisation. I57 Although, the privatisation of some parastatals has
enhanced their performance, 158 privatisation can hardly be said to be an end in itself,
as private monopolies have the capacity of being as inefficient as parastatals in the
absence of a strict regulatory framework. For instance, the failure to plan effectively
before the liberalisation of the Kenya economy has affected some sectors, such as
agriculture. Farmers have attributed the decline in rice production in the country to
the unplanned take-over of the government schemes. As the Provincial
Commissioner of Central Province stated recently:
"Kenya has managed to liberalise policy but not practice.
When we were under the controlled system, it was easy to
blame the goverment. Under liberalisation, there is no one
to blame"159
154G Barbara, op cit n 6, at 54.
155 The company is, however, experiencing liquidity plans and the government has proposed to bail it
out. Although the Minister for Energy maintains that the liquidity problems are not as a result of
mismanagement, opposition Members of Parliament have opposed initiatives to save the company.
Most of the companies' debts were accrued before it was exempted from the State Corporations Act
1987. In November 2001, the government and related organs owed the company 3.1 billion Kenyan
shillings. See "Sack All Top KPLC Bosses, MPs Urge", East African Standard, 6 November, 2001;
"The Paradox of Money Owed to KPLC", Daily Nation, 20 November, 2001; G Barbara, Public
Enterprise in Kenya: What Works, What Doesn't, and Why, (Colorado, 1991), 166.
156G Barbara, op cit n 6, at 166.
157 Ibid.
158 The privatisation of Kenya Airways has transformed it from a loss making parastatal to a
profitable one. See Mogusu, op cit n 133.
159 "Free Market Stabilises Agriculture, Asserts PC", Daily Nation, 25 September, 2001.
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Thus, it is notable that protection of some sectors of the economy might be in the
national interests of the country. Such protection might forestall the outward flow of
resources, which has been accelerated by the ownership of privatised companies by
foreign companies. I6° Policies designed to protect the national economy of a country
are already being used by a vast majority of countries. For instance, the US
government imposes a 170% tariff on sugar from other countries in order to protect
its sugar industries.161
Whilst privatisation can enhance efficiency and profitability, 162 it is also possible for
the process to impact negatively on private companies' liquidity, labour, and social
stability. Indeed, in the absence of sufficient safeguards, it is not inconceivable that
some imprudent directors might find their way to the boardrooms of privatised
companies. To avoid such an eventuality the government needs to do more in terms
of streamlining the privatisation process. This is because lack of transparency in the
privatisation process increases political and social costs, as it makes the selection of
buyers less efficient and contributes to loss of public confidence in the process. For
privatisation to be successful, there is also a need to have in place a stable corporate
governance structure for privatised firms. As SRI International notes:
"Policy reforms to ensure competitive markets in areas of
pricing, trade, policy reform, flexible labour policies, and
elimination of legal monopolies are all needed in order to
maximise the efficiency gains from privatisation. Not all of
these policies can be adjusted at once, nor should
privatisation be delayed until all these problems are solved.
Private enterprise development and policy reform should be
built into the privatisation process in an interactive way.
160 Foreign companies own most of the privatised companies because the locals have limited capital
and skills. See Njenga, "How Anglo-Saxons Continue to Enslave Africans", East African Standard, 3
June, 2001.
16 ' It imposes a 140% tariff on sugar from the European Union, 265% on Japanese sugar, 30% on
Russian sugar, 80% on Indian sugar, 130% on South African sugar, 35% on Australian sugar, and
27.5 % on Brazilian sugar. See Keng'ore, op cit n 21.
162 Kenya Airways became competitive and profitable after privatisation. See "KR to go Public,
Government Says", Daily Nation, March 15, 2000.
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Privatisation should be used as a catalyst for further reform
in these areas."163
The Government prefers to divest its interests in parastatals by selling to strategic
partners rather than offering of shares to the public. Although the Government could
be adopting this strategy on the basis that the capital market in Kenya is not well
developed, there is a possibility that it also seeks to exploit the process in order to
engender political patronage.
6.5 Conclusions
The poor performance of parastatals has had adverse effects on the economy of
Kenya. Although the initial objective of having parastatals was to foster the
development of the private sector and the provision of public services, the current
state of parastatals' management, and the way that they are regulated, militate
against the attainment of such objectives. In fact, as a result of their indebtedness to
the government, parastatals have been a drain on, rather than a boon to, the
economy.
It is clear that the regulatory framework in place is ineffective. Having been adopted
at independence, the framework can hardly be effective in regulating today's
business environment, which has become sophisticated due to technology and
globalisation.
As such, failure on the part of the government to adopt workable solutions to resolve
inefficiency can only make the crisis worse.
The overlapping regulations governing parastatals, coupled with the political
appointment of directors, make it difficult to ensure that there is accountability in the
sector, as directors' impartiality and integrity is often compromised.
Although it true to some extent to say that the poor performance of parastatals has
been caused by their role in supplementing the private sector, poor remuneration,
and the policies of international lending agencies, clearly a vast majority of
parastatals experience liquidity problems, as a result of the presidential and
163 SRI International and Mwaniki Associates, op cit n 2.
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ministerial control of their operations. This results in the parastatals being run, not in
the interests of the corporation, but for political interests. Thus, the corporation can
be protected by empowering another independent body, such as Parliament, to vet
the appointment of directors. Given that the arbitrary ministerial directions play a
role in limiting parastatals' powers to pursue their objectives, requiring ministers to
present in Parliament such directions can also reinforce accountability, as Parliament
would demand accountability and require ministers to adopt corporate governance
practices. Having such an arrangement in place would facilitate the appointment of
qualified persons, and in turn, enhance the performance of the boards by raising the
standards of care expected from directors.
Although privatisation of parastatals would give them autonomy, and in turn,
increase efficiency by reducing political influence, there is a need to have in place
effective regulations that would not only guide the privatisation process but also
protect the privatised corporations from abuse. This is because the lack of effective
regulation of directors that occurs in the private sector is not only mirrored in
parastatals, but its detrimental effects are even more obvious.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
7.0 SELF-REGULATION OF DIRECTORS
7.1 Introduction
As a result of the dependency of Kenya' on donor funding, the country has recently
experienced increased pressure to reduce the need for Government intervention in
the economy. The influence of donor agencies has particularly encouraged the
country to reduce the need for regulation in the future by utilising private market
forces. Organisations, such as the Commonwealth Association for Corporate
Governance and the Commonwealth Secretariat, have encouraged African countries
to adopt practices that would contribute to more effective self-regulation (Self-
regulation arises when a group of individuals or institutions regulate their activities
in their common interests without government encouragement or monitoring) 2 of
corporations both before and after full privatisation. 3 Addressing the consultative
forum for corporate governance in Nairobi, the Commonwealth Association for
Corporate Governance representative said that:
"I suggest to you, here today, that the incentive to the
corporation is to adopt internationally accepted standards of
governance and business practice to promote its prosperity
and to attract investment. While on the other hand, the
incentive to the state is to strengthen the economy and
discourage mismanagement through a credible regulatory
and commercial framework as I have already said."4
1 The dependency has been so entrenched that the Attorney General of Kenya recently submitted
draft graft laws for approval to the IMF before the Cabinet and Parliament saw them. See "Welcome
to Kenya, IMF's Little Colony", Daily Nation, 20 May, 2001.
2 See Baggot, "Regulatory Reform in Britain: The Changing Face of Self-Regulation", (1989) 67
Public Administration 435 at 438.
3 Consultative Forum for Corporate Governance in Africa speech by the Commonwealth Association




Despite the pressure by the donor agencies, some Kenyan policy makers prefer a
local set of policies to those imposed by the donor agencies. For instance, the
Nairobi Stock Exchange Chairman in 2001 criticised the implementation of the
International Accounting Standards (LAS) on the basis that they were only
favourable towards foreign owned multinational banks, as Kenya's banks were
constrained by the short term nature of Kenyan deposits. Another reason advanced
against the IAS was that the Kenyan judicial system discourages the quick
dispensation of commercial cases. 5 Similarly, the Kenyan Parliament recently
disagreed with the wishes of the Treasury, the World Bank and the IMF° by passing
a bill limiting the interest rates of banks. 7 The passage of this bill, coupled with the
widespread public support and sentiments against the bankers association for a lack
of sense of corporate citizenship, clearly indicated the mistrust of self-regulation by
the industry.8
Self-regulation arises when an association of individuals or institutions delegates to
prescribed individuals the supervision of their activities. On the other hand,
governmental regulation involves supervision by civil servants working in a
government ministry. As such, whilst self-regulatory codes bind members of
organisations on the basis that they have agreed to be bound by them as part of the
group, governmental regulations bind members of organisations because they have
the force of law.9
5 "Banker, NSE Chief Riled by IAS", East African Standard, 17 May, 2001.
6 The IMF policies have been criticised by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
(UNCTAD) for extending its surveillance to financial sector issues in borrower countries causing
flawed diagnosis and undermining their sovereignty. UNCTAD links the East Asia economic crisis
to donor agencies excessive conditionalities. To improve the global money market, UNCTAD
advocates for balanced treatment of debtor and creditor nations regarding standards, codes,
transparency and regulation; more symmetrical surveillance; more stable exchange rates; less
intrusive conditionality and more democratised and participatory multilateral institutions and
processes. See "Global Trends and Prospects and Financial Architecture", UNCTAD's Trade and
Development Report 2001 in "UN wants Financial Markets Reformed", Daily Nation, 8 May, 2001.
7 Commenting on the ineffectiveness of IMF's remedies, Professor Joseph Stilglitz, a senior fellow at
the Brookings Institution and former World Bank's Chief Economist said, "IMF experts believe they
are brighter, more educated and less politically motivated than the economists in the countries they
visit. In fact, the economic leaders from those countries are pretty good in many cases brighter or
better educated than the IMF staff, which frequently consists of third-rank students from first-rate
universities.. .Trust me I have taught at Oxford University, MIT, Stanford University, Yale
University and Princeton University, and the IMF almost never succeeded in recruiting any of my
best students." See, op cit n 1.
8 "Are Kenyans Demanding Back a Pound of Flesh?" The East African, 25 December, 2000.
9 Codes are unofficial or self-regulated set of rules while regulations are official rules set by the state.
See Kihumba, "Setting Governance Policies; Codes or Regulations?" A Panel Discussion Paper
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In view of the complex nature of corporate governance issues, it is important to
analyse the particular circumstances of the legal and regulatory system, business
structure, cultural characteristics and heritage of Kenya before making suggestions
for adopting a framework to address issues of corporate governance. 10 This chapter
seeks to establish whether self-regulation by directors would be more effective than
statutory control. In doing so, it will compare self-regulation with governmental
regulation and assess the recommendations made by the donor agencies with a view
to identifying the most suitable system for Kenya.
7.2 Background
In order to adopt a market-friendly regulatory framework, the country has made
significant steps to establish a code" of practice for directors, as an incentive to
honest and prudent behaviour. The Private Sector Corporate Governance Trust
(PSCGT) I2 of Kenya has drafted principles and a sample code for corporate
governance. I3 The code is based on the Commonwealth Association of Corporate
Governance Guidelines. The guidelines have been designed with emerging and
transitional economies in mind. However, they also accommodate some of the more
advanced requirements of international investors and multilateral international
agencies. The guidelines consist of fifteen principles of corporate governance
targeted at boards of directors and corporations with a unitary board structure. The
principles apply to boards of directors in public, private, family owned or state
owned corporations. They are also applicable to executive and non-executive
directors, Non Governmental Organisations (NG0s) and other such agencies.
Presented at the Global Conference on Corporate Governance on 10-11 July, 2000 in the Southern
Connecticut State University New Haven, USA <
http: www.gcgforg library speeches/Kihumba.doc>
I ° Op cit n 3.
11 A code is "a set of rules which are accepted as general principles, or a set of written rules which
state how people in a particular organisation or country should behave. See Cambridge International
Dictionary of English, (Cambridge University Press, 1995). The OECD defines codes as
"commitments voluntarily made by companies, associations or other entities, which put forth
standards and principles for the conduct of business activities in the market place. See OECD
Working Party of the Trade Committee, Codes of Corporate Conduct; An Inventory, 1998, p 5.
12 The Private Sector Initiative for Corporate Governance was in March 1999. Its mission is "to
formulate and put in place principles and a code of best practice for corporate governance in Kenya
and to develop a sustainable institutional framework for the implementation of those principles so as
to enhance and improve national and regional capacity, capability and competitiveness for wealth
production and creation through viable, efficient and profitable business enterprises." See
<v, ww.corporategovernance.co.ke>
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Although the code drafted by PSCGT is not yet in force, I4 it is worth noting that
Kenya has other codes of conduct regulating various professions. I5 Since other
professional societies have utilised codes of conduct, it has been argued that the
same approach should be adopted in the corporate realm. 16 The Code generally
focuses on the protection of investors by, for instance, emphasising the need to have
disclosure of financial information by directors, the appointment of audit
committees, risk management and discouraging insider dealing.I7
Sometimes, self-regulatory arrangements develop into fully-fledged self-regulatory
organisations with internal statutory rules; dedicated financial resources; formal
structures involving shareholders, managers, and employees; codes of conduct; and
oversight procedures. I8 The responsibilities of a self-regulatory organisation usually
involve the regulation of market participants, dispute resolution and enforcement
actions and pre-commitment of resources. Self-regulatory authorities are
strengthened when members pre-commit resources which are used when a member
experiences insolvency problems. Due to pre-commitment each member is
encouraged to keep a check on the other. In turn, this promotes enforcement of
information disclosure rules. I9 By regulating market transactions, a regulatory
authority ensures that transactions are dealt with by each member according to
13 See http: www.combinet.net/governance/FinalVer  finlyndx.htm
" Kenya is not exceptional because even other countries formulated their codes of corporate
governance in the 1990s. One of the first codes to be published was by a Cammittee onthe Ficyaacg
Aspects of Corporate Governance chaired by Sir Adrian Cadbury in Britain on 1 December, 1992.
The Cadbury Committee was sct up in 1991 by The Financial Reporting Council, The London Stock
Exchange and the Accountancy profession to examine the financial aspects of corporate governance.
Consequently, the Cadbury Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance (London: Gee, 1992) was issued in 1992. It summarised the recommendations on
directors as a 'Code of Best Practice. See B Pettet, Company Law (Pearson Education Limited, 2001)
p 209.
15 Outside the professional organisations, such as the Law Society, the medical, and the accountancy
professions, the government has also given power to Non-Governmental Organisations (NG0s) to
regulate themselves. In doing so, the government sought to protect both the NGOs and the citizens
from the unscrupulous NG0s. The government was prompted to do so by, first, the improvement of
the relationship between itself and the NG0s. Second, the donor pressure from IMF and World
Bank. See Yaansah, "An Experiment in NGO Self-Regulation in Kenya", in "Self Regulation
Report-Kenya" (Washington DC; International Centre for Not-for Profit Law) p 1.
<www.icnl.org/journalkoliss/Kenyasr.html>
16 Kihumba, op cit n 9.
17/bid.
Is Bossone and Promisel, "The Role of Financial Self-Regulation in Developing Economies,




agreed rules. 20 Rules on information disclosure and sharing help a self-regulatory
authority to achieve its objectives, as there can be no incentives for honest behaviour
if participants conceal information.
Since codes control the conduct of a small or restricted group of persons by offering
guidance within the group, it can be argued that they enable groups to have integrity,
viability and survival. 21 While the implementation of codes can hardly be successful
at the corporate level without the full commitment of the board and encouragement
at the national leve1, 22 the codes themselves need to be based on practical and real
issues that local corporations consider important. As a result, local corporations
must be involved in the formulation of codes.23
7.3 Regulation of Market Participants
To ensure that market participants have an adequate level of reputation, a regulatory
authority sets admission criteria requiring willing participants to meet minimum
standards of capital creditworthiness and expertise. For instance, despite there being
no self regulatory authority for directors in Kenya, the Private Sector Corporate
Governance Trust (PSCGT), which was established in 1999 to promote good
corporate governance in Kenya, has been running courses for directors with a view
to enhancing their competence.24
A regulatory authority may also require new members to be introduced by existing
ones, who act as guarantors of the candidate's reputation. A self-regulatory
authority also sets the rules of conduct governing member relationships and their
business activity. This may include rules of ethical behaviour, compliance with
membership obligations, sound performance and maintenance of minimum levels of
financial strength. The compliance requirement reduces costs between members.
20 Ibid.
21 Kihumba, op cit n 9.
22 Organisations having genuine interests in corporate governance are also important in promoting the
usefulness of the codes. For an organisation to achieve this objective, it is considered necessary for it
to engage in training, research, collecting and collating information, recognising and making awards
to organisations that maintain high standards of corporate governance. In addition, the organisation
needs to be independent, objective, and professionally competent to undertake these tasks. See
Kihumba, op cit n 9.
" Ibid.
24 <V1' \A 1,\ . corporategovernance.co.ke>.United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry has
leaflets that are designed to promote awareness. See <http://www.dti.gov.uk >
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Self-regulatory authorities also impose criteria for sanctions in the event of non-
compliance. When members engage in serious misconduct, they risk suspension
and exclusion from the organisation.
Although self-regulatory bodies are meant to have no links with the government,
some of the self-regulatory authorities that supervise the affairs of companies, equity
markets, and financial services, have some level of government involvement. In the
UK, for instance, the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 stipulates the
requirements needed for a company's shares to be listed for trading on a stock
exchange. It also governs the affairs of the firms carrying on investment business.
The statute however confers most regulatory powers on the Treasury while the
Financial Services Authority (FSA) has the responsibility for administering many
aspects of the legislation.
The factors that have been associated with the need to formulate codes of corporate
governance in the last decade have been identified as:
• Globalisation, which has been made possible by technology, trade
liberalisation and a "freer" less controlled uni-polar world.
• Corporatisation and privatisation which has seen the world control of
economic and social resources being directed less and less by the State and
more and more by the private corporate sector.
• Democratisation which has meant the expansion of individual freedoms
including the right to know how agents manage resources placed in their
hands.
• Competition, which has been made possible by globalisation and
liberalisation, has put into focus the need for high performance and
enlightened leadership.
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• High profile corporate abuse and failures (Maxwell, BCCI, Barings, etc)
which has startled regulators, investors and society out of their slumber.
• Shareholder	 activism	 driven	 by	 increased	 democratisation,
institutionalisation of investments.
• Stakeholder activism driven by environmentalists, trade unionists, consumer
rights activists, enlightened and public responsive governments, enlightened
capitalism etc.25
In their "Standards of Self-Regulation of the Securities Markets" the International
Capital Markets Group (1992) identifies the following main benefits of self-
regulation:
• "In self-regulation, it is possible to impose ethical standards, which go
beyond those which can be imposed by statutory legislation.
• Self-regulators are directly accountable to their members. Self-regulatory
systems have built-in motivation to regulate for effectiveness and least
interference.
• Self-regulation operates in an environment where there is a willingness to
accept regulations formulated from within for the common good of the
group.
• Self-regulators, being "part" of the group understand the issues more
intimately and are therefore more sensitive to the needs of the regulated and
the whole group.
• The regulated have an opportunity to participate at all levels of the self-
regulatory process thereby making it easier to appreciate and accept new
regulations.
25 Ibid, p 5.
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• Self-regulation has a built in system of checks and balances in that the
regulated see it as their duty to exposes non-compliance.26
• Self-regulators have the ability, being the players, to comprehend complex
regulatory problems at an early stage and to develop corresponding solutions
to these issues before they reach a stage where they can disrupt the group
operations.
• Self-regulators have at their disposal a reservoir of resources, which are
sometimes available at no cost and within easy reach.
• Self-regulation is more comprehensive yet much cheaper than official
regulation to operate and implement.
• As a result of self-regulation, governmental resources including funds and
personnel are freed to be used where they are most effective. This optimises
use of scarce resources."27
In order to assess whether the advantages of self-regulation would apply to Kenya, it
is important to discuss some in more details.
26 In the UK, there is high level of compliance with the Code of Best Practice. A survey conducted
by Pensions Investment Research consultants indicated that 93% of a sample of FTSE All Share
Index companies have a board made up of one-third of non-executive directors. This complies with
the Hampel Report, which recommended that non-executive directors should be more than one-third
of the board, as they would not play an effective role if they were made up of less. The Hampel
Report was published following the establishment of the Committee on Corporate Governance
chaired by Sir Robert Hampel in 1995 (Hampel Final Report on Corporate Governance (Gee,
London, 1998).
The Committee produced a document, which was a set of principles, and a code, which embraced
Cadbury (Cadbury Report on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (Gee, London, 1992),
Greenbury (Sir Richard Greenbury, Directors' Remuneration: The Report of a Study Group ( Gee,
London, 1995), and their own work. The London Stock Exchange published the document in March
1998 as the draft combined code. Although the Combined Code is not part of the rules, it is an
appendix to FSA Listing Rules. See Hampel Report, para 3.14.
27 Kihumba, op cit n 9, p 4.
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7.4 Advantages and Disadvantages of Codes
7.4.1 Dispute Resolution
For a self-regulatory authority to be successful, there is a need for the adjudication
process and dispute resolution to be efficient. An efficient adjudication process, for
instance, offers advantages over the national courts in Kenya, as the judicial process
is slow. Kenya is one of the Commonwealth countries with the highest number of
pending court cases. Some court cases in Kenya take more than a decade to be
finalised. 28 Commenting on the state of the judicial system in Kenya and the
introduction of International Accounting Standards, the Daima Bank Managing
Director, Sam Muumbi, argued against IAS on the basis that the Kenyan judicial
system discourages quick dispensation of commercial cases. He took the view that
the slow judicial process would be inconsistent with the IAS spirit, whose financial
disputes are settled within 90 days. 29 Given that the Kenyan judicial process
prejudices the smooth application of some measures, which require expedient
settlement, there is little chance of self-regulation being effective, unless alternative
dispute resolution procedures are adopted.
7.4.2 Good Leadership Focus
It can be argued that directors are offered motivation to achieve higher performance
by codes that give them the goa1 39 upon which they should focus. For instance, the
Kenya Private Sector Initiative for Corporate Governance strategy paper states:
"Within the private sector, the corporation has been
identified as the principal organ through which business is
28 "Kenya Ranked High in Pending Cases List", East African Standard May 17, 2001.
290p cit n 5.
30 Principle Al of the UK's combined code provides that "every listed company should be headed by
an effective board which should lead and control the company." Code provisions A.1.1 to A.1.6
provide that the board should meet regularly; the board should have formal schedule of matters
specifically reserved to it for decision; there should be a procedure agreed on by the board for
directors in the furtherance of their duties to take independent professional advice if necessary, at the
company's expense; all directors should have access to the advice and services of a company
secretary; all directors should bring an independent judgement to bear on issues of strategy,
performance, resources, including key appointments and standards of conduct; every director should
receive appropriate training on the first occasion that he or she is appointed to the board of a listed
company. Pettet B, op cit n 14, p 209.
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transacted. It is not surprising therefore that attention should
now focus on the leadership role in corporations."31
Such a focus serves as a constant reminder to directors and, in turn, promotes good
corporate governance by laying emphasis on the need for ethics, integrity and
probity in the conduct of business.32
7.4.3 Re-awakening of Shareholders
Although shareholders are the owners of business enterprises, they have had in the
past a dormant role in the governance of companies. As illustrated in Chapter Five,
whilst it is the shareholders who have the responsibility of appointing and removing
directors, it is not always possible for them to do so especially when they constitute
the minority. This is because they cannot litigate in the name of the company, as the
company is the only body that is entitled to sue a miscreant director 33 Despite this
enforcement restriction, there has been an increase in shareholder activism in the
recent past. Illustrative of this is a recent uncommon demand by a Kenya
Commercial Bank shareholder for an extraordinary meeting to discuss the operations
of the bank. In addition to rejecting the re-election bid of three directors who were
retiring by rotation, the shareholder contended that shareholders had lost faith in
directors over the heavy losses incurred by the bank. 34 Since the existing regulations
for directors are bulky and difficult to understand, there is no doubt that the activism
of shareholders can be enhanced by a clear stipulation of the role of shareholders in
corporate governance. The Private Sector Corporate Governance Trust's (PSCGT)
first principle of corporate governance in Kenya obliges shareholders to:
"Jointly and severally protect, preserve and actively exercise
the supreme authority of the corporation in general meetings.
They have a duty, jointly and severally, to exercise that
supreme authority of the corporation to ensure that only
competent and reliable persons, who can add value, are
31 Kihumba, op cit n 9.
32 Ibid.
33 Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others [1966] EA 390. The rule in Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2
Hare 461 was applied in this case.
34 Kihumba, op cit n 9.
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elected or appointed to the board of directors, ensure that the
board is consistently held responsible and accountable for
the efficient and effective governance of the corporation so
as to achieve corporate objectives, prosperity and
sustainability, change the composition of the board that does
not perform to expectation or in accordance with the
mandate of the corporation."35
7.4.4 Interface with Regulations
Since the individuals who make and implement regulations may not be properly in
touch with the impact their decisions have, regulation from outside can yield
enforcement problems in the regulated market. As a result, self-regulation can be a
good alternative in certain circumstances.
Although self-regulatory codes are thought to be effective in achieving the intended
results, regulations may sometimes be more effective as they tend to be stricter. For
regulations to be effective, Kihumba argues that they must be guided by the
following principles:
"Regulating when it is absolutely necessary to regulate;
regulations must be simple and clear as complex regulations
are expensive to apply and difficult to be complied with;
regulations must be specific and targeted as it is important to
understand the nature and complexity of the problem to be
controlled; regulations must be flexible enough to
accommodate future changes to the problem or matter under
regulation; regulations should not be made to punish non-
compliance, but rather to assist compliance as sanctions
should be tools of correction and not punishment; regulations




Given that self-regulation authorities need autonomy to a large extent in order to be
effective, the limited leadership role of the government may lead to incoherent
policies and regulations being implemented by self-regulatory authorities.37
7.4.5 Flexibility
Changing circumstances in the market tend to militate against regulation because the
public officials who administer the regulatory scheme do not act promptly. Given
that the process of changing the law through Parliament is slow, self-regulatory
authorities are considered more appropriate to effect such changes as they do not
have the "same onus as public bodies to give public notice, consult interest groups,
or take analogous procedural steps before making rule changes."38
Another problem associated with public bodies is their tendency towards rigidity
and
bureaucracy. Since bureaucrats are seen to be too preoccupied with past. pt aetices
and technical details, they are hardly likely to be flexible. As Cheffins observes, the
regulated community is most likely to be uncomfortable because they "will feel that
they are having to deal with pointless, time-consuming procedures administered by
individuals suffering from an obsession with format."39
A self-regulatory regime, on the other hand, can regulate in a manner that ensures
that there is no obsession with format, and the relationship between interested
parties is not confrontational as the regulatory authority has the same attitude as the
regulatory community. Illustrative of the smooth operation of a self-regulatory
authority is the UK's Take-overs Panel whose rule making and administrative tasks
are flexible and expedient.49
It is worth noting, however, that self-regulatory bodies can sometimes be as rigid as
public regulatory bodies. For instance, the Securities and Investment Board (SIB)
37 In the UK, for instance, self-regulation has led to fragmentation of regulatory responsibility, which
can lead to overlap of jurisdiction. Several regulatory authorities exist. These include: the Take-over
Panel, Accounting Standards Board, Financial Services Authority, and SRO. Similarly, while the
Bank of England, the DTI and the Treasury supervise company affairs, none of these acts as a leader.
38 BR Cheffins, op cit n 36, p 379.
39 Ibid, p 379.
4° Calcutt, "Company Law Lecture - the Work of the Take-over Panel" (1990) 11 Co Law 203 at 206.
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produced bulky rulebooks in 1980 to be implemented by regulators. This led to
complaints by financial institutions and subsequently culminated in the provision of
a more flexible approach to rule-making by the government and the SIB. 41
Another factor that might contribute to lack of flexibility on the part of self-
regulatory authorities is the composition of the staff. Where the regulatory
authorities are staffed with civil servants, they are more likely to perform in a
manner similar to that expected from government agencies.42
The flexibility of regulatory authorities may also be affected by excessive regulatory
backing. Since self-regulatory authorities sometimes rely on Parliament to provide
statutory backing to their policies, there is usually a danger of eroding their
flexibility.43
Another factor that casts doubts on the desirability of flexibility is that flexibility can
have negative effects. Although flexibility allows the regulatory authorities to
amend rules in light of the changing circumstances, arbitrary and quick amendments
might prejudice a part of the regulated community in that there may be little or no
chance to submit views on changes.
Also, flexibility might adversely affect fair adjudication. For instance, a regulatory
authority wishing to adjudicate expeditiously on matters might opt to exclude vital
evidence or witnesses." However, such problems posed by lack of flexibility can be
resolved by imposing procedural requirements. 45 Also, to make the rule making of
regulatory authorities fair by ensuring all interested parties are consulted, Parliament
41 Companies Act 1989 Ss. 192, 194, and 195.
42 In the UK, former civil servants have continued to fill key posts in SIB. See BR Cheffins, op cit n
36, p 382.
43 Senior SIB officers in the UK have voiced concern over this. See BR Cheffins, op cit n 36, p 382.
44 The UK's Take-over Panel has been criticised for failing to permit lawyers to present cases and for
failing to allow parties to cross-examine each other's evidence directly. See Jowel, "The Take-over
Panel: Autonomy, Flexibility and Legality", [1991] Public Law 149 at 156-157. Illustrative of the
failure of the regulatory authorities is the case of R v Panel on Take-overs and Mergers exparte
Guinness Plc [1989] 1 All ER 509 where the court criticised the panel for declining to grant
Guinness, the take-over bidder, adjournments to prepare its case more thoroughly and for failing to
allow the various witnesses requested by Guinness.
45 In the UK, Parliament has set down guidelines requiring regulators acting within the mandate of
the Financial Services Act 1986 to have reasonable and fair procedural rules to deal with the
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may compel authorities to take into consideration all the relevant submissions from
interested parties before making amendments.46
As the foregoing analysis shows, flexibility is not always a positive attribute.
7.4.6 Expertise
Self-regulatory authorities are also preferred on the basis that their officials are
usually in a better position to understand the conduct with which they dea1. 47 In view
of the technical nature of the duties of directors, it has been considered necessary to
have self-regulation, rather than governmental regulation, as civil servants are
considered to be less likely to be as knowledgeable as their counterparts in the
private sector as far as technical issues surrounding regulation of directors go.
Moreover, authorities are better placed to formulate rules and practices which are
pertinent to the industry because they can more effectively enforce disclosure rules
by peer monitoring.48 As a result, the authorities have an incentive to keep up with
institutional and organisational development in other countries. 49 As Cheffins notes:
"The proximity which a self-regulatory body has to the
market place should leave it well positioned to contact and
recruit industry members to volunteer some time or to work
on the staff on an ongoing basis. If people with practical
experience take on a key role, a self-regulatory authority
should be in close touch with what is going on. This is
important because, as the chairman of the stock exchange
said in 1992, practitioners tend to have the keenest noses
which is something that cannot be matched by people of
limited experience, however intelligent and well qualified."50
disciplinary matters and membership. The guidelines stipulate that authorities must have appeal
mechanisms.
46 In the US, the Administrative Procedure Act requires the SEC, together with all other federal
agencies, to publish proposed regulations and seek written comments of interested parties. Also, the
UK's Financial Services Act 1986 in Ch V, Schedule 2 and 4 identifies certain matters which
regulatory authorities have to deal with. See BR Cheffins, op cit n 36, p 385.
47 R Baldwin et al, Regulation and Public Law (London; Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1987) at 45-6.
48 Bossone and Promise], op cit n 18, p 9.
49 Ibid, p 3.
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Although self-regulatory bodies offer the expertise advantage, they might be as
inefficient as government agencies when they retain permanent staff who
subsequently lose touch with the practices of the day. Moreover, Kenya might
suffer from lack of institutional and human resources, which might constrain the
effectiveness of an authority. Again, given that there is limited competition in the
security markets of Kenya, self-regulation may not be sufficient to ensure safe
markets.
7.4.7 Cost
Pitted against statutory regulations, self-regulatory codes are usually preferred
because the regulated community is considered less likely to comply with statutory
regulations, as they are imposed on players by the regulators. Besides, they are
considered to be more expensive to administer than self-regulatory codes.
It is true to observe that government regulation generates some costs, as the officials
administering the law have to be paid. On a similar note, a self-regulatory authority
also incurs costs of maintenance. Since experts are able to handle complaints
expeditiously, self-regulatory authorities are able to operate in more cost-effective
ways than the government. 51 The same point can be made in relation to flexibility.
Since a self-regulatory authority is able to amend its regulations easily, it can do so
and as a result save more costs than a governmental agency. When the government
does not control a self-regulatory authority, it saves the costs that would otherwise
be paid to civil servants by the government.52
It is notable that the cost of running a regulatory authority is borne by the industry in
question, which in turn passes the costs on to its investors and customers. So, the
burden is passed on to the private sector, which in turn operates as a tax on the
market participants. Although this might appear not to have distinct cost
advantages, requiring practitioners to pay the costs of regulation appears to be in
order because the misdeeds arising from an unregulated professional environment
50 BR Cheffins, op cit n 36, p 387.
51 Ibid, p391.
52 Longstreth, "The SEC After Fifty Years: An Assessment of its Past and Future, (1993) 83 Colum L
Rev 1593 at 1598.
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would affect the practitioners and affect their standing in the community. 53 Although
the costs are subsequently borne by the customers, this can be justified on the basis
that it benefits the country as a whole to have a properly regulated market.
In view of the existence of parastatals in Kenya, self-regulation might offer more
effective cost controls than the present government control, which does not have
effective measures of detecting when directors are not performing their duties well.
Despite the advantages of self-regulation, it is worth noting that self-regulation
authorities do not always offer cost advantages especially where authorities are
established pursuant to a statute. In such circumstances, they are usually required to
meet certain criteria for them to be recognised.54
7.4.8 Bias
Self-regulation suffers from a distinct disadvantage for being susceptible to
favouring, or appearing to favour, the interests of the members at the expense of
other interests. 55 However, the media and public attention can sometimes reduce the
risks of bias in a self-regulatory authority.56
Government supervision is also capable of being biased towards some members.
For instance, the regulation of parastatals in Kenya by the Treasury and the
Ministers has not been efficient because the government protects the interests of
directors rather than those of the public. Illustrative of such bias is the appointment
of a former chief executive of the Nyayo Tea Zone Development Corporation, Mr
Isaiah Cheluget, as a commissioner with the Electoral Commission of Kenya,
despite the failure on his part to pay money owed to the corporation and the
numerous attempts made by Parliament to recover the money from him. 57 A
regulatory authority may also become dependent on the regulated community where
53 I Ayres and J Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the Deregulation Debate (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1992) p 114.
54 For the UK's stock exchange to retain its status, it must provide adequate monitoring and
enforcement mechanisms and must ensure that business is conducted in an orderly manner so as to
protect investors. See Financial Services Act 1986, Sch 4, 5.2.
5 Financial Services in the United Kingdom, CND 9453, (London: HMSO), 1985 at 15. For more on
the lack of autonomy in self-regulating authorities see BR Cheffins, op cit n 36, p 398.
56Baggot, op cit n 2, at 445.
57 "Probe M'Mukindia, Kiplagat-PIC", East African Standard, 29 July, 2000.
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the existence of the authority is dependent on the continued existence of the industry
in question. In such a situation, the regulations are not likely to be strict on the
industry lest they affect their future interests.58 As a result, the possibility of bias in
self-regulatory authorities does not provide conclusive evidence as to why they
should not be adopted.59
Also, self-regulatory authorities come with the risks of them being turned into
cartels, which discourage competition. Moreover, the tensions between the
managers and the authorities responsible for such authorities might discourage
participation, hence diminishing long-term confidence in the market.
7.4.9 Enforcement Problems
A regulatory authority operating without direct statutory backing bears the risk of
not being effective as it would not have legislative authority to investigate,
prosecute, or punish misconduct.° However, giving self-regulatory authorities
enforcement powers is not without difficulties. Where an authority has adjudicatory
responsibilities, the enforcement objective of the authority might demoralise
investigating officers when complaints are struck out. Besides, an adjudicator who
has previously worked as an investigator with the same authority is likely to be
partial when deciding a matter.61
However, given the scarce resources of the government to enforce rules, self-
regulation by the private sector can be favourable as it can raise resources, which
would be used effectively to promote adjudication expediency.
58 BR Cheffins, op cit n 36, p 403.
59 For a detailed analysis of bias see BR Cheffins, op cit n 36, p 397-405.
60 In the mid-1980s, such criticism was levelled against the Take-over Panel, The State Exchange,
and The Accounting Standards Council for operating without direct statutory backing. This has since
changed and some, such as The Financial Services Act 1986, provide enforcement powers to the self-
regulatory authorities. See BR Cheffins, op cit n 36, p 412; Boyds "Ethics and Corporate
Governance: The Issues Raised by the Cadbury Report in the United Kingdom", (1996) 15 J of Bus
Ethics 167 at 172.
61 In the UK, the Financial Services Act 1986 authorises the Financial Services Tribunal to hear
appeals from investment firms, which the SIB has declined to authorise, or has disciplined.
202
7.5 The Way Forward
To promote greater business contribution to environmental and social progress, the
International Chamber of Commerce favours business principles rather than codes
and regulations. The principles are favoured as they:
"Play an important role in bridging cultural diversity within
companies and in enhancing awareness of societal values
and concerns. This is primarily a matter of persuasion and
peer pressure rather than prescription. Business considers
that demands by potentially unaccountable external groups
seeking to impose codes and assert the right to independently
audit companies' compliance are counterproductive. The
diversity of voluntary business initiatives and principles is
both a resource and a source of innovation for addressing
societal challenges. Their voluntary nature enables
companies to find solutions and make improvements that
regulations and command and control approaches could not
have set in motion."62
Although codes of corporate governance are sometimes preferred to government
regulations because they are said to protect and promote the interests of
stakeholders, good corporate citizenship, corporate social responsibility and
corporate philanthropy, 63 that proposition can be refuted on the basis that companies
can refuse to adopt codes of conduct, which would ultimately defeat their purpose.64
Besides, even when they are adopted, they can still be narrow in scope. A survey by
OECD in 1998 revealed that commitments to engage in corrupt practices, restrictive
business practices or safeguarding property are less widespread in the industry. After
62 "Responsible Business Conduct: An ICC Approach," Policy Statement, International Chamber of
Commerce, 6 May 2000. Article 7 of the International Chamber of Commerce Rules of Conduct to
combat Extortion and Bribery obliges enterprises to draw up their own codes consistent with the ICC
Rules and to apply them to the particular circumstances in which their business is carried out.
63 Kihumba, op cit n 9.
64 A survey by a private consulting agency, the Control Risks Group, has shown that multinationals in
most instances either adopt corrupt practices or withdraw their investments from a corrupt country.
See "Fighting Corruption in Developing Countries and Emerging Economies: The Role of the Private
Sector", Summary of OECD Development Centre Conference; Washington DC, 22-23, February
1999, p 2.
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examining 233 codes it was noted that 85 of them dealt with only one aspect of
conduct among five possible aspects, namely fair business practices, observance of
rule of law, fair employment and labour rights, environmental stewardship, and
corporate citizenship. Codes for companies operating in light industry covered
labour issues more than others. On the other hand, companies operating in heavy
industries were noted to include environmental issues more than those in other
sectors. 65 Therefore, some corporations will only respond to stronger regulation and
close monitoring by NG0s, trade unions, and consumer groups.
In light of the growing power 66 of multinational corporations and the subsequent
imbalance of the power of the government, it is easy for multinational corporations
to escape liability in a country with a weak regulatory regime. 67 The power wielded
by multinational corporations enable them to out-negotiate the governments of
poorer countries while making investment decisions. Since a country like Kenya is
in need of foreign capital, it can hardly refuse concessions that are demanded.
Although some of the companies succumb to pressure to adopt sound practices, the
destruction of the environment, disregard of regulations, racism, and other vices are
common occurrences. 68 Commenting on the ineffectiveness of self-regulation, a
research co-ordinator at UN Research Institute for Social Development (UNRISD),
Peter Utting, observed:
"While multinational corporations would prefer to comply
through voluntary initiatives, the public interest can only be
fully served through stronger regulation and monitoring."69
65 See OECD Working Party of the Trade Committee, Codes of Corporate Conduct; An Inventory,
1998, p 12.
66 According to a report, Visible Hand, by the UN Research Institute for Social Development
(UNRISD), some 60,000 corporations account for more than one-third of world exports. In 1998, the
annual revenues of the top five corporations were more than double the total GDP of the 100 poorest
countries. See "Corporate Responsibility Not Just About Standard Setting", Inter Press Service News
Agency, Fifth Issue, 30 June 2000. <www.ips.org/geneva/3006 pageldanielle.htm>
67 In India, the Union Carbide's gas leak in Bhopal killed about 15,000 people while Shell Company
has continued to abuse human rights and pollute the environment in Nigeria. See, Ibid.
68 Despite the failure to put in place enough environmental safeguards, the Kenyan Government has
continued to back a Canadian company, Tiomin Ltd, in its bid to mine Titanium. Similarly, in the
1990s, Shell was criticised for gratuitous destruction of environment in Nigeria. Also, the Cameroon
government continues to defend French firms that are destroying virgin forests through illegal
logging. See "The Downside of the Much Hyped Globalisation", Daily Nation, 20 May, 2001.
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In the absence of internationally binding rules for corporations, national legislative
measures will not effectively regulate directors of multinational corporations.7°
According to a survey conducted in 2001 in Nairobi, 7I 69 percent of the
respondents, who were all professionals, were against self-regulatory codes. 72 The
disadvantages of having a self-regulatory scheme prompted the majority to feel that
a self-regulatory code would not be successful, unless underlying problems, such as
corruption, are solved.
The 1999 Human Development Report also called for a multilateral code of conduct
because it considered multinational corporations to be too important for self-
regulation. This initiative was, however, denounced by the UN Secretary General
when he dismissed the recommendations as unnecessary and instead promoted a
"Global Compact" which was aimed at challenging business leaders to enact nine
voluntary principles derived from UN agreements on labour standards, human
rights, and environmental protection. 73 Although many business associations, such
as the International Chamber of Commerce, have endorsed the "Global Compact"
there is no doubt that "the compact risks weakening the role of national
governments, trade unions and stronger forms of civil society activism."74
The report noted that corporate social responsibility should not concern itself with
standard setting and compliance but "should also be about companies paying rather
than avoiding taxes to welfare minded states."75
69 Op cit n 66.
7° A survey conducted by the Trade Directorate of the OECD on 233 codes of conduct submitted by
OECD member governments and non-governmental sources revealed that only 18% of the codes
explicitly cite international standards set by the ILO Conventions, UN Declarations, and other
international instruments. See OECD Working Party of the Trade Committee, Codes of Corporate
Conduct; An Inventory, 1998. Commenting on the need to have international regulations, the
President of Dutch Progression Foundation, Marcello Palazzi, observed that: "if we have transatlantic
mergers, we need to have global competition and anti-trust legislation." See, op cit n 66.
71 The survey is considered in detail in Chapter Nine.
72 The Kenyan Parliament recently disagreed with the wishes of the Treasury, the World Bank and
the IMF by passing a bill limiting the interest rates of banks. See, op cit n 1.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Along the Mexican and USA border, where companies have established factories in tax free zones,
many municipalities lack adequate funds for proper infrastructure and schools. See, Ibid.
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7.6 Conclusions
Although self-regulation has some distinct advantages over statutory regulation and
may well be effective in some countries, it is also evident that self-regulation does
not always offer clear-cut advantages. Thus, adoption of self-regulation in Kenya
will not necessarily guarantee an effective regulatory framework for directors.
Whilst self-regulation might reduce interference by the government in the market
and the reluctance to punish miscreant directors, it will not be effective where self-
regulatory authorities will need to resort to the judiciary for enforcement. However,
although self-regulation might be effective if alternative dispute resolution
procedures are adopted to resolve disputes, its effectiveness may well be affected by
the various conditions which militate against seff-regufation in Kenya. SCICA
conditions may include poor organisation of the private sector, corruption, and the
lack of international obligations. With the widespread corruption in Kenya, some
directors and regulators might have difficulty avoiding participating in corruption
when their competitors continue to engage in it. Since it is easier for the private
sector to operate under a democratic system with an effective legal system and
where the government is committed to fighting corruption, there is a need for the
country to initiate changes in the current political and economic order so as to enable
self-regulation of directors to be effective in the future.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
8.0 DISQUALIFICATION OF COMPANY DIRECTORS
8.1 Introduction
Disqualification of directors protects the public by placing a prohibition on a
miscreant director being involved, for a specific period, in the management of
companies.' As well as preventing people without the necessary qualifications from
managing companies, disqualification orders serve as a deterrent to those who might
be tempted to engage in fraudulent activities. 2 Therefore, where a director breaches
his obligations and, as a result, occasions loss to creditors, the public interest
requires that the misconduct be punished by disqualification.3
Given that the State has the responsibility of providing an unbiased commercial
environment, which ensures that the production of companies takes place smoothly
and that the public is protected from miscreant directors, there is a need to balance
these conflicting interests for the sake of a healthy economy. Although strict
regulations in relation to the disqualification of directors may ensure that unfit
directors do not serve on boards, it is undoubtedly the case that over-regulation or
stringent disqualification proceedings may result in fewer people being interested in
serving as directors. This would in turn adversely affect the economy, as few
companies would be able to attract appropriate and competent directors.
Although shareholders generally decide who sits on a board of a company, some
exceptions regarding the people they can choose are imposed by Parliament. The
Companies Act4 (the "Act") contains some provisions that prescribe those who are
able to act as directors. 5 As shareholders are not always able to prosecute errant
'S Griffin, Personal Liability and Disqualification of Company Directors, (Hart, 1999) p 131.
2 R v Kazmi (1984) 7 Cr App Rep 115 at 116.
3 Per Vinelott J in Re Stanford Services [1987] BCLC 607 at 620.
4 Cap 486, Laws of Kenya.
5 The Act makes provisions for share qualifications of directors (s 183), minimum age of appointment
which is twenty-one years (s 186), disqualification of undischarged bankrupts (s 188), restraint on
fraudulent persons from managing companies (s 189), and disqualification of persons of unsound
mind and absence from meeting of directors for six months (Table A, Article 88).
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directors, disqualification provisions supplement other provisions that seek to
protect creditors and other stakeholders.6
Despite the existing requirements for the appointment of directors 7 and the
disqualification provisions, companies continue to be run by incompetent, negligent,
and fraudulent directors who have contributed to the insolvency of other companies.8
Some 45 parastatals and other companies in which the Government has shares have
been placed in receivership since 1980. Some of the directors who are responsible for
the collapse of such companies have not only been appointed to other directorships,
they have also been appointed to the Cabinet.9
For instance, despite the public outcry and prosecution l ° that followed the
investigation of the former managing director of Kenya Posts and
Telecommunications (KPTC), Mr Kipng'eno Arap Ng'eny, for masterminding the
loss incurred by the corporation, he was retired in 1993 and appointed to head the
Kerio Valley Development Authority." According to the 1990/91 Auditor General's
Report on the Kenya Posts and Telecommunication, the managing director was
responsible for a number of fraudulent dealings. First, in 1985, the corporation lost 9
million Kenyan Shillings (£90, 000) after making payments to a firm of advocates to
wind up the former Kenya External Telecommunications Corporations (KETC). The
payment was made despite the fact that KETC was in the process of being merged
with KPTC. I2 The winding-up process was rendered a sham when the two
companies merged. Secondly, by 30 th June 1990, the corporation had failed to remit
6 In view of the difficulties encountered by minority shareholders in pursuit of errant directors,
directors are unlikely to be accountable for their defaults unless the board changes hands or the
company goes into liquidation. See Hicks, "Disqualification of Directors-Forty Years On" [1988]
JBL 27 at 28.
According to sections 183 (1) and 186 of the Act, directors must be natural persons, they must have
share qualifications, and minors may not be appointed as directors.
8 "45 parastatals, Govt firms in receivership" East African Standard, 12 July, 2001.
9 Ibid.
I ° He was charged with fraud on July 17, 2000. See "Drama as Ng'eny is Finally Charged" East
African Standard, 18 July, 2000.
His prosecution followed the recommendations made by the Parliamentary Public Investments
Committee. See "Minister Quizzed on Sh 250 Million" Daily Nation, June 1, 2000.
12 K Kibwana, et al, The Anatomy of Corruption in Kenya: Legal, Political and Social-Economic
Perspectives, (Nairobi: Claripress, 1996) p 73.
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to various public authorities statutory deductions from staff salaries amounting to
176.5 million Kenyan Shillings (£1, 765,000).13
Despite several recommendations made by the Parliamentary Public Investment
Committee that the people it adversely named should be charged in court and barred
from holding public offices, such individuals continue to serve in high positions
both in the government and the private sector. 14 As a result of such irregularity, the
Public Investment Committee has proposed that legislation should be enacted to
enable Parliament to vet all nominees for the leadership of parastatals. 15 The
Committee in its Ninth Report highlighted the weakriesses of the present regulatory
framework by citing the example of the former chief executive of the Nyayo Tea
Zone Development Corporation, Mr Isaiah Cheluget, who had failed to pay money
owed to the corporation despite numerous attempts to recover the money from him
by Parliament. Despite this default he was subsequently appointed a commissioner
with the Electoral Commission of Kenya. 16 As the Daily Nation notes:
"The tragedy in Kenya is that those who have mismanaged
the Government, the Development Finance Institutions, and
even multinational corporations are those who continue to
circulate in and out of Goverment as ministers, assistant
ministers, advisers and so on."17
Such cases have done much to reduce the confidence of investors. In fact, the survey
conducted in 2001 in Nairobi established that disqualification orders in Kenya are
extremely rare. Ninety-two percent of the respondents agreed with this statement. 18 It
is against this backdrop that this chapter examines whether the disqualification
restrictions provided for by the Act are adequate to protect the interests of the
corporate entity, creditors, and other stakeholders.
13 Ibid.
14 "Leakey, Wako Grilled by PIC", East African Standard, 9 March, 2000.
15 "New 'List of Shame' Tabled in Parliament", East African Standard, 28 July, 2000.
16 "Probe M'Mukindia, Kiplagat-PIC", East African Standard, 29 July, 2000.
17 Nyong'o, "How Bad Governance Strangles Business", Daily Nation, 10 June, 2001.
18 The results of the survey are discussed in detail in Chapter Nine.
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8.2 Grounds for Disqualification
In Kenya, a director must cease to be a director if he fails to take up any prescribed
shares within two months of his appointment. 19 A director is automatically
disqualified if he becomes an undischarged bankrupt or if he makes any arrangement
or composition with his creditors generally. 29 Other grounds, which necessitate
disqualification of directors, include whether he is prohibited from being a director
by reason of any order made under section 189. The section restrains fraudulent
persons from managing companies. Further grounds for disqualification contained in
the Act include: where a director is of unsound mind; 21 where he resigns his office
by notice in writing to the company; 22 or he is absent without permission for more
than six months from meetings of the directors held during that period.23
8.2.1 Bankrupts
Persons who are undischarged bankrupts are barred from acting as directors under
the Act. The Act provides:
"If any person who has been declared bankrupt or insolvent
by a competent court in Kenya or elsewhere and has not
received his discharge acts as a director of or directly or
indirectly takes part in or is concerned in the management of,
any company except with the leave of the court, he shall be
liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or
to a fine not exceeding ten thousand shillings or both."24
As people who have failed to manage their finances, bankrupts are automatically
disqualified from taking part in the management of companies. As such, their
disqualification is not dependent upon wrongdoing, negligence, or the making of a
disqualification order by the court. However, a bankrupt may apply to court for
19 The Act, section 183.
20 Ibid, section 188.
21 Article 88 (d), Table A.
22Ibid, Article 88 (e).
23 Ibid, Article 88 (f).
24 The Act, section 188 (1).
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leave to act as a director. 25 For leave to be granted, the bankrupt must show that he
or she may be safely involved in the management of companies.26
Acting as a director while disqualified results in criminal penalties and personal
liability27 for the debts and other liabilities of any company in whose management a
disqualified person was involved.28 The personal liability extends to any person
involved in the management of the company who knowingly acts on the instructions
of a disqualified person.29
In the UK, the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 3° (hereinafter referred
to as "CDDA") prohibits individuals who are undischarged bankrupts from acting as
directors.3I A director can also be disqualified on grounds of unfitness for entrusting
the management of a company to someone known to be bankrupt or disqualified.32
Apart from the automatic disqualification of undischarged bankrupts, all other
grounds for disqualification require a court order specifying the duration of
disqualification.33
Disqualifying bankrupts from managing companies is helpful as it prevents them
from starting a business and raising credit using a limited liability company.34
8.2.2 Management of the Company
The Act requires the court, in its discretion, 35 to disqualify a person who is guilty of
an offence as a director or promoter of a company, or in any way, whether directly
25 The Act, section 188 (1).
26 Section 188 (2).
27 Section 188 (1).
28 Section 323 (1).
29 The Act states "any persons who were knowingly parties to the carrying on of the business in the
manner aforesaid shall be personally liable." See Ibid section 323 (1) (a).
30 The UK government introduced the Act to curb abusive practices as it was adopting a free market
philosophy. The new laws were meant to punish miscreant directors and thereby deter misconduct.
They were also aimed at facilitating screening so as to make it difficult for unsuitable individuals to
run companies and in turn protect the public. Between 1998 and 1999, 1,284 disqualification orders
were made under section 6, 20 under section 8, and 178 under the other provisions. See BR Cheffins,
Company Law, Them)), Structure, and Operation (Clarendon Press, 1997) p 551; See S Mayson et al,
Company Law, 17th Edition (Blackstone, 2000) p 720.
31 Section 2, 11.
32 Re Moorgate Metals Ltd [1995] 1 BCLC 503.
33 The Insolvency Bill 1985 unsuccessfully attempted to introduce automatic disqualification where a
director has been involved in more than one insolvent company. See Parry, "Personal Insolvency as a
Restriction on Involvement in Company Management", [1999] Insolvency Lawyer 199 at 200
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or indirectly, is concerned or takes part in the management of a company. The Act
provides thus:
"Where a person is convicted of any offence in connection
with the promotion, formation or management of a company;
or in the course of a winding up a company it appears that a
person has been guilty of any offence for which he is liable
(whether he has been convicted or not under section 323); or
has otherwise been guilty, while an officer of the company,
of any fraud in relation to the company or of any breach of
his duty to the company, the court may make an order that
the person shall not, without leave of the court, be a director
of or in any way, whether directly or indirectly, be concerned
or take part in the management of the company for such
period not exceeding five years as may be specified in the
order."36
The phrase "in connection with management" does not only refer to offences
involving misconduct in the company's affairs, but includes the entire purpose for
which the company exists.37
The provision is somewhat vague, as it is possible for a wide range of people,
including employees in the lower cadre of the company, to be involved in indirect
management. This makes it difficult for a disqualified person to ascertain what role
he might assume once a company employs him.38 For instance, since the concept of
management involves policy-making and decision-making activities which affect the
34 Hicks, op cit n 6, at 30.
35 Disqualification arising from such grounds in some jurisdictions, such as Australia, is automatic.
As such, a director, when applying for leave to act, bears the burden of proving why the order should
not be made. For a detailed analysis on automatic disqualification see Australia's Corporations Act
2001, section 206 B; Hicks, "Making and Resisting Disqualification Orders", (1987) 8 Co Law 243.
36 Section 189 (1 ).
37 R v Austen (1985) 7 Cr App R 214. Since it is difficult to formulate a rule, which would
adequately, cover all wrongdoing unrelated to the company, Drake argues that disqualification on
such grounds should be reserved for the Articles. See Drake, "Disqualification of Directors-"The Red
Card", [1989] JBL 474 at 477.
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company as a whole, or a substantial part of it, and which may affect its financial
standing, 39a management consultant advising on financial management may be said
to be concerned in the management of the company for the purposes of
disqualification.40
As a result, full disqualification might not only remove a person from the board°
but also make him unemployable. 42 Although a person may apply for a declaration
or for leave to act, there can be no doubt that the slow and expensive judicial process
would adversely affect directors who have been automatically disqualified.43
Therefore such a broad disqualification is clearly inappropriate if it occurs
automatically.44
8.2.3 Fraud
The Act provides for disqualification as a result of fraud. A court may disqualify a
person from taking part in the management of a company if a person is "convicted of
any offence in connection with the promotion, formation or management of a
company."45 A person can also be disqualified if, in the course of winding up of a
company, it appears that he, while an officer of the company, has been guilty "of any
fraud in relation to the company or of any reach of his duty to the company. vt46
In contrast to the Act, the Ghanaian Companies Code provides for disqualification
on the basis of conviction of any offence (not necessarily relating to a company)
involving fraud or dishonesty. The conviction need not be in Ghana. Similarly,
Singapore, in 1967, adopted the Australian version of disqualification for criminal
38 In Re Altim Ply Ltd [1968] 2 NSWLR 762 the applicant wanted leave of the court to be in charge of
the New South Wales branch of a company making window frames. This was assumed to be a
function of the management and the court refused to grant leave to take the job.
39 Commissioner for Corporate Affairs v Bracht [1989] VR 821.
40 R v Campbell [1984] BCLC 83.
41 The Ghanaian Code imposes specific restrictions to prevent errant directors from being concerned
in company management even when he is not a director. See section 186 (1) (b) Ghana's Companies
Code.
42 Where disqualification does not disqualify a director from serving a corporation as an employee, it
cannot be said to have the effect of taking their livelihood away. See Leigh, "Disqualification Orders
in Company and Insolvency Law", (1986) 7 Co Law 179 at 183.
43 Automatic disqualification may be justified in cases of personal insolvency and criminal offences.
See Hicks, op cit n 6, at 41.
44 Automatic disqualification was rejected in England and Singapore. See Hicks, op cit n 6, at 41.
48 Section 189 (1).
46 Section 189 (1) (b) (ii).
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offences47 to cover not only offences in connection with the promotion, formation or
management of corporations, but also offences involving fraud or dishonesty not
connected with the company, where the maximum penalty is more than three
months imprisonment, whether imposed or not.
Sufficient grounds, rather than mere allegation of fraud, need to be established in
order to prove fraud under the Act. The onerous duty of proving fraud was
illustrated in the case of Kassam Ebrahim v Tait 48 where the Official Receiver
applied under section 196 of Uganda's Companies Ordinance 49 for the public
examination of company directors, Kassam Ebrahim and Mohamedali Damji. The
company, Kassam Ibrahim & Co Ltd, was incorporated for the purposes of taking
over a business formerly carried on in partnership involving the two directors. The
Official Liquidator alleged that the partnership was insolvent at the time that the
company was formed. The liquidator therefore sought to have a public examination
of the directors on the basis that the incorporation was fraudulent on the creditors of
the company. He also sought to recover two sums of money that were said to have
been received by the directors from the company, and to hold them personally liable
for the debts of the company. Finding that the Official Receiver had failed to prove
fraud, Law CJ followed the judgement of Lord Halsbury in Ex parte Barnes,50
which provided that:
"In order to give the Court jurisdiction to make such an
order, there must be a finding of fraud, and a finding of fraud
against an individual who is thereby made subject to being
summoned before the court.... I do not mean that the
particular word 'fraud' must be used, but that such facts must
be found by the Official Receiver as suggests fraud against
the person incriminated: and that there must be an individual
person incriminated: it is not enough that there is a general
47 Singapore Companies Act, section 154.
48 [1935] EACA 51.
49	 05Cap 1 .
5° [1896] AC 146.
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finding that fraud must have existed somewhere, which
would mean nothing." 51
A reason that influenced the opinion of Law CJ concerning the fact that the Official
Receiver had not proved fraud was that the money received, by Kassim Ebrahim,
from the company as part of the purchase price of his interest in the partnership
business did not raise any suspicion. Moreover, the Receiver did not show when the
sum was received, what the capital of the company was, and how the formation of
the company constituted fraud on the creditors.52
As a result of the onerous burden of proving fraud in Kenya, disqualification, only
on grounds of fraud when a company is a going concern, might be insufficient to
ensure commercial propriety and foster an appropriate business environment. This
reason led the UK's Cork Committee to favour disqualification based on the
wrongful acts of directors rather than fraud. 53 Thus, section 214 of the Insolvency
Act followed as a result of the recommendations of the Committee. A director
therefore becomes liable for the wrongful trading of the company where the
company has gone into insolvent liquidation and at some time before the
commencement of the winding up of the company the director knew or ought to
have concluded that there was no reasonable prospect that the company would avoid
going into insolvent liquidation. A liquidator may apply to court for a declaration
that a person who is or has been a director is liable to make a contribution to the
assets of the company. 54 However, it is a defence for a director to show that he took
every step with a view to minimising the potential loss to the creditors of the
51 [1896] AC 146 at 152.
52 [1935] EACA 51 at 57.
53 Section 188 of the UK's Companies Act 1948 gave courts the power to disqualify a director
following conviction for fraud in the operation of a company. This was widened by the Companies
Act 1976, section 28 (1) which allowed disqualification for persistent default. Section 3 of the
Companies Act 1981 extended the provision further by empowering the making of disqualification
orders to liquidators, receivers, and managers of the property of a company. All the provisions were
consolidated in the Companies Act 1985, section 300, which preceded the Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986. Although a director had to be associated with two successive insolvencies
before he could be disqualified under section 300, he may now be disqualified under section 6 of the
1986 Act if the court is satisfied that he has been a director of a company which has at any time
become insolvent (whether while he was a director or subsequently) or that his conduct as a director
of that company makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a company.
54 Section 214, Insolvency Act 1986.
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company. A disqualification order may also be made against a director found liable
for wrongful trading.55
It is not possible for a director to be disqualified in Kenya unless he been convicted
of any offence in connection with the promotion, formation, or management of a
company; or the company is in the process of being wound up and it appears that a
director is guilty of any fraud or breach of duty in relation to the company. 56 This
provision renders it impossible to disqualify directors for breach of duties when a
company is a going concern. Thus, broadening the scope of section 189 (1) to
provide for disqualification arising from breaches of duty when a company is a
going concern would make it more of a deterrent. This may be achieved by
disqualifying directors on the basis of their unfitness to act in the management of
companies, a ground which is applied in the UK. This ground of disqugification is
considered in the following section.
8.2.4 Unfitness
A director in Kenya cannot be disqualified 57 for being unfit to be involved in the
management of a company. Thus, whilst breach of duty is a sufficient ground for
disqualification if a company is in the course of winding up, 58 fraud needs to be
proven for a director to be disqualified when the company is a going concern. 59 In
contrast, a director in the UK can be disqualified under section 8 of the CDDA for
being unfit 6° when the company is a going concern. The Secretary of State can
make an application under this section for a disqualification order where it appears
to him, from an Inspector's report, that it is necessary in the public interest to have
the director declared unfit. In such an event the court can exercise its discretion to
make a disqualification order where it is satisfied that the conduct of a director in
55 Section 10, CDDA.
56 Section 189 (1) of the Act
57 Section 6 of the CDDA obliges the court to make a disqualification order against an individual if it
is satisfied that he is or has been a director of a company which has become insolvent and that his
conduct as a director of that company makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a
company.
58 The Act, section 189 (1) (b) (ii).
59 Section 189 (1).
In determining whether a director is unfit under both sections, section 9 obliges the courts to have
regard to matters mentioned in Part I of the schedule I. In case the company has become insolvent,
the court must have regard to matters mentioned in part II of schedule 1.
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relation to the company makes him unfit to be concerned in the management of a
company.
In the UK, the CDDA makes it compulsory for a judge to make an order, under the
unfitness ground, if the terms of the legislation are satisfied. 61 For a director to be
declared unfit, the court must be satisfied that the director has exhibited gross
incompetence or conduct in breach of commercial morality that constitutes a danger
to the public. 62 This may arise, for instance, where a director conducts business in
total disregard of the interests of creditors. In Re Ipcon Fashions Ltd 63knowledge by
the director that the company was insolvent when he siphoned off its business to
another company, incurring liability to the old company, was held to be a ground for
disqualification. Similarly, in Re McNulty's Interchange Ltd64 a director who had
no new ideas about improving the business of a company, which was continuously
accumulating debts, was liable for disqualification. 65 Explaining what makes a
person unfit in the UK, Browne Wilkinson VC said in Re Lo Line Electric Motors
Ltd:
"Ordinary commercial misjudgement is in itself not
sufficient to justify disqualification. In the normal case, the
conduct complained of must display a lack of commercial
probity, although I have no doubt that in an extreme case of
gross negligence or total incompetence disqualification could
be appropriate."66
61 Section 6-9.
62 Per Hoffmann J in Dawson Print Group Ltd v Princo Ltd (Unreported, 9 April 1986, ChD). In
assessing unfitness the court, by virtue of section 6 (1) (b) considers the conduct of the director in
relation to that company and any other company or companies. For more details see Hicks, op cit n 6,
at 33.
63 (1989) 5 BCC 733
64 (1988) 4 BCC 533
65 In Re Douglas Construction (1988) 4 BCC 553 a director had put a lot of his own money into the
company in order to keep it going and was held not to have contravened the principles of business
morality. Hoffmann J in Dawson Print Group Ltd v PrillCO Ltd (Unreported, 9 April 1986, ChD)
found a director not liable for failing to pay debts due to the Crown and continuing to trade when he
ought to have known that the company was insolvent. This was different from the judgement of
Vinelott J in Re Stanford Services Ltd (The Times, 29 April 1987) where he rendered the commercial
test unhelpful and disqualified a director for two years for using money collected as VAT or PAYE as
part of their cash flow needs.
[1988] Ch 477 at 486.
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The courts have, therefore, refused to disqualify directors for mere mismanagement,
as the aim of disqualification is the protection of the public and not punishment of
directors. 67 It therefore follows that despite the mandatory nature of section 6 of the
CDDA, the courts may decline to disqualify a director in the absence of sufficient
evidence to prove unfitness. 68 Although the courts assess whether a director should
be disqualified on the balance of probabilities, the amount of evidence required to
find a director liable is often more onerous than that, 69 as the evidence required
extends the standards of proof beyond the civil one. Given that the application of
the balance of probabilities test would lead to disqualification of many directors, the
onerous standard of proof is thus applied in favour of directors so as to ensure that
they continue to run companies where risk is not apparent.70
While assessing unfitness, the courts examine the role of directors in making the
company insolvent. For instance, the failure to provide goods and services which
have already been paid for, giving preference to one group of creditors over
another, 71 or entering into a transaction at an undervalue would be pointers to
unfitness.
8.2.4.1 Incompetence
In Australia, a disqualification order can be made where a director acts dishonestly
or fails to exercise reasonable care. 72 As such, a conviction is not a prerequisite for
a disqualification order. The courts and the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission require the respondent to show why he should not be disqualified. 73
This involves assessing matters of incompetence or breach of duty. Similarly, in
87 Per Henry LJ in Re Grayan Building Services Ltd [1995] BCC 554, at 577.
68 In Re Arctic Engineering Ltd (No 2) [1986] BCLC 253 persistent defaults by an accountant in
making necessary returns did not result in disqualification since there was no dishonesty.
69 Laddie J in Re Living Images Ltd [1996] 1 BCLC 348 favoured the view that the evidence against a
director ought to be overwhelming rather than indicative of the directors' wrongdoing.
70 Griffin, " Standards of Proof Applicable to S 6 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act
1986" (1997) 18 Co Law 24 at 25; Hoey, "Disqualifying Delinquent Directors" (1997) 18 Co Law
130 at 132.
71 Paying only those creditors who pressed for payment and taking advantage of those who did not in
order to provide the working capital has been held to amount to unfitness. See Re Sevenoaks
Stationers Retail Ltd [1991] Ch 164 (CA).
72 Section 206F (1) (c) empowers the Australian Securities and Investments Commission to disqualify
a person from managing corporations for up to five years if the Commission is satisfied that
disqualification is justified.
73 For UK, see section 8 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
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New Zealand a disqualification order can be made in a case where a director has
acted in a reckless and incompetent manner.74
In the UK, the Jenkins Report of l962 75 proposed that directors ought to be
disqualified if they had acted in an improper, reckless or incompetent manner in
relation to the affairs of a company. 76 Although it was argued that this proposal was
excessive on the basis that the standard required to prove recklessness and
incompetent behaviour is not as high as that for proving unfitness, the test is used in
the assessment of unfitness following insolvent liquidations which involves
consideration of questions of commercial incompetence.77
In assessing both recklessness and incompetence, 78 courts pay attention to the need
to allow directors to take commercial risks. For instance, seeking and acting on
competent outside advice79 in the event of financial difficulties" is evidence of
competence even when the advice does not forestall the insolvency of a company.81
Given that directors would always be found liable for negligence if any collapse of
business was treated as evidence of negligence, consideration of the risks they take
gives them room to manage companies without interference.82
Although breach of duty is a sufficient ground for disqualification when the
company is in the course of winding up in Kenya, the unfitness ground in the UK is
24 New Zealand's Companies Act 1993, section 383.
75 Report of the Company Law Committee, June 1962, Cmnd 1749, paras 80, 85.
76 The Repoit had proposed that a series of insolvent liquidations would be a pointer. See Hicks, op
cit n 6, at 43.
77 For a detailed analysis see, S Griffin, op cit n 1, p 171.
78 Ibid, p 169.
79 Although the CDDA was effective in dissipating public dissent in respect of directors misconduct,
it has been criticised for discouraging the best directors from assuming directorships and usage of
company expenses by directors to hire expensive professional advisers, rather than attempting to
solve the problem, to the detriment of shareholders and creditors. See BR Cheffins, Company Law,
Theoty, Structure, and Operation (Clarendon Press, 1997) p 552; B Pettet, Company Law (Pearson
Education, 2001) p 453; Hicks, "Advising on Wrongful Trading: Part 2" (1993) 14 Co Law 55 at 58.
80 In the event of disqualification arising after liquidation of a company, it is the creditors who bear
the costs of disqualification proceedings as the office holder in charge is paid out of the company's
assets in priority to all other claims. Despite not benefiting from directors' disqualification, creditors
are made to bear such costs. Where directors contest disqualification orders a great deal of legal
expenses are to be expended. See CDDA, section 7 (3), Insolvency Act 1986 section 115.
81 Re Douglas Construction Services Ltd [1988] BCLC 397.
82 Davies PL, Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law, (6th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 1997) p 686.
In Re Richborough Furniture Ltd [1996] 1BCLC 507 a director was disqualified for three years for
lack of experience, knowledge, and understanding.
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more appropriate, as it is wider. For instance, the company does not have to be in the
course of winding up for the unfitness ground to be applied. The unfitness ground
also introduces a desirable application of objective standards, 83 such as breach of
commercial morality, gross incompetence, recklessness, and being a danger to the
public, by which to judge the conduct of directors. 84 Therefore, whilst a director who
fails to monitor and supervise delegated activities would escape liability for being
judged subjectively in Kenya, he can be disqualified on the ground of unfitness in
the UK. 85 The application of objective standards has, in effect, raised the standards
of skill and care in the UK.86
The provisions in Singapore, UK, and Australia therefore adopt a wider scope than
that of the Act. The fact that the Singapore and Australian Acts disqualify directors
automatically without requiring a disqualification order from the court makes the
enforcement easier by speeding up the disqualification process. The onus is usually
on the disqualified person to apply to court for leave to direct a company.87
8.2.5 Filing Returns
In Kenya, whilst the failure to file annual returns by a director makes a director
liable to a fine, 88 it is not a ground for disqualification. However, in the UK 89 and
Australia90 the courts can disqualify a director for up to five years for being in
default of filing returns with the Registrar of Companies. Although the failure to
comply with the reporting requirements of legislation, such as failure to file annual
accounts, produce audited accounts, and to keep proper accounting standards, is a
separate ground for disqualification in the UK, it is also an indicator of unfitness. A
director is liable to disqualification under this section if breaches occur
83 The application of objective standards is illustrated in AB Trucking and BAW Commercials (Ch D
June 1987, Unreported) where the respondent was said to be incapable of understanding the
commercial reality of accounts and thus incapable of discharging his duty to the public. Harman J
disqualified the respondent for four years for falling below an objective standard. See Dine,
"Disqualification of Company Directors" (1988) 9 Co Law 213.
84 For a detailed analysis of the standards see Dine, "Disqualification of Company Directors" (1988) 9
Co Law 213; Dawson [1987] BCLC 601; and Re Stanford [1987] BCLC 607.
85 Re Barings Plc (No.5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433.
86 Re D'Jan of London Ltd [1994] 1 BCLC 561, per Hoffmann U. See also Walters, "Directors'
Duties: The Impact of the CDDA of 1986" [2000] 21 Co Law 110.
87 Hicks, op cit n 6, at 33.
" Section 125 (3), The Act.
89 Section 3, CDDA 1986.
9° Corporations Act 2001, sections 4, 10, 285.
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persistently. 9I In contrast to the UK provision, the Australian provision captures a
wider scope, as it covers all breaches of companies legislation, rather than only
those dealing with the filing of returns or other documents.
Given that disqualification under this head improves the level of compliance in
filing, it raises the accountability of directors to shareholders because shareholders
and others are able to keep track of the affairs of the company. It is, therefore, to be
supported for inclusion in the Act.
8.3 The Length of disqualification orders
Under section 189 a disqualified director is prevented from being involved in the
management of companies for a period not exceeding five years. Other jurisdictions
have recognised the need for longer periods of disqualification. For instance,
Australian courts can disqualify a person from managing corporations for a period
that the Court considers appropriate. 92 The UK's CODA imposes a minimum
disqualification for unfitness of two years and a maximum of fifteen years.93
The Nigerian Law Reform Commission of 1987 recommended that directors who
have been convicted of company related offences or any other offences should be
disqualified for a mandatory ten years after conviction. 94 Five years disqualification
after conviction was found to be too lenient. The Nigerian Commission rejected the
Jenkins'95 proposals to the effect that a person who has persistently failed to comply
with the Act should be disqualified for a further five years after release from prison,
on the basis that it was excessive and could therefore deter even the best people
from accepting directorships. The Commission also recommended the broadening of
the scope of the persons disqualified to include infants less than 18 years.96
91 Breaches are said to occur persistently if it is shown that a person has been convicted in more than
three instances within five years for failing to provide information. See s 3 (2) and (3), CDDA 1986;
Re Artctic Engineering Ltd [1986] 1 WLR 686.
92 Corporations Act 2001, section 206C and 206 E.
93 Under Section 6, CDDA. In assessing the appropriate length of the disqualification order, the court
considers: the nature of the offence, whether it was closely connected with management, the nature of
the person's involvement in the offence, his general character and reputation etc. See Hicks, op cit n
35, at 246.
94 Nigeria Law Reform Commission, Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law:
Volume 1-Review and Recommendations, 1987 p 184.
95 Report of the Company Law Committee, June 1962, Cmnd 1749, paras 80, at 85.
96 Nigeria Law Reform Commission, op cit n 94, p 184. Section 186 (1) of the Act imposes the age of
21 as the minimum age for appointment.
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Furthermore, it took the view that it was necessary to utilise a mandatory
disqualification on the basis that a discretionary one could still enable fraudulent
directors to find their way to boards with the consent of the courts.97
Given that there are many directors who are involved in repeat offences, the period
of disqualification of five years is insufficient.
8.4 Procedure for Disqualification
In Kenya, application for a disqualification order can be made by the Official
Receiver, liquidator of the company or by a person who is or has been a member or
creditor of the company. 98 Enabling creditors and members to make applications for
disqualification enhances the process for the disqualification of miscreant directors,
especially where the Attorney General would not otherwise take action due to lack
of independence. However, given that the ability of creditors and members to make
an application might be constrained by lack of financial resources, a public
independent body might protect their interests more effectively.
In the UK, the court may make a disqualification order under the following
circumstances: where a person is convicted of an indictable offence "in connection
with the promotion, formation, management, or liquidation of a company"; 99 for
persistent breaches of companies legislation; lw for fraud in the course of winding
up; mi and where a person is convicted for failure to comply with the companies
legislation. 102 The Secretary of State is empowered to make an application for
disqualification. 103 However, if the company in question is in compulsory
liquidation, the Secretary of State may direct the Official Receiver to make the
97 It also sought to incorporate Article 87 of Table A in relation to vacation of office. Article 87
provides for a director to vacate office if he does not take up his shares after the required period,
when he becomes bankrupt, he becomes of unsound mind, he resigns, he is absent for more than six
months without permission of directors. See Nigeria Law Reform Commission, op cit n 94, p 185.
98 Section 189 (4).
99 CDDA, Section 2 (1).
1 °° Ibid section 3.
101 Ibid section.
102 Ibid section 5.
103 Section 7 (1) (a).
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application.'' Similarly, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission can
also apply to court for disqualification orders.1°5
The Ghanaian Code provides that such an application can only be made by the
Registrar, Official Trustee, or by the liquidator of any body corporate. Professor
Gower w6recommended this measure in order to prevent malicious applications.
Although the adoption of such a provision in Kenya might curb malicious
prosecution to some extent, it is also possible for the provision to restrict the number
of persons who institute proceedings to the detriment of creditors. Since
government interference in the duties of public officials is not uncommon, there is a
danger of fewer cases being brought to court if the scope of persons who can apply
is not widened.'
In Kenya, the Registrar, as an official in the office of the Attorney General, is less
likely to enforce the disqualification provisions due to political interference.108
Given that the Attorney General is a member of Cabinet, he rarely acts
independently despite the existing constitutional guarantees which safeguard his
independence. In the past, this has clearly been illustrated by several cases.
First, the fact that the Parliamentary Public Investments Committee has questioned
the Attorney General over an alleged failure to prosecute persons named in corrupt
deals lends credence to lack of independence on his part.1°9
104 Section 7 (1) (b). The UK's Cork Committee(Report of the Review Committee on Insolvency Law
and Practice, Chairman Sir Kenneth Cork, Cmnd 8558 (1982) recommended that apart from
Secretary of State and the Official Receiver, liquidators and creditors should be permitted to make
applications, as limiting the applications to the Insolvency Service was considered inadequate due to
the fact that the Service might not have enough information about directors, especially when the
company is wound up voluntarily and therefore the Official Receiver is not involved. Although
liquidators, administrators and receivers are required to report to the Secretary of State on the conduct
of directors, the quality of information is not always of the right quality. Another factor that would
affect the effectiveness of Insolvency Service is the quantity and quality of resources utilised to
enforce the provision.
105 Under the Corporations Act 2001, ASIC may apply for disqualification of a person: for
contravening a civil penalty provision (section 206C), "if within the last 7 years, the person has been
an officer of 2 or more corporations when they have failed" (section 206D) etc.
106 He drafted the Final Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Working and Administration of
the Present Company law in Ghana, 1961.
107 Leigh, "Disqualification Orders in Company and Insolvency Law" (1986) 7 Co Law 179 at 182.
108 "Anti-Corruption, Economic Crimes Bill Debate Rages", East African Standard, 21 July, 2001 and
tip,,-G in Spotlight for Sloppy Drafts", East African Standard, 25 July, 2001.
io9op cit n 14.
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Secondly, as mentioned in Chapter Three, the Attorney General was reluctant to
prosecute those implicated in the Goldenberg fraud despite the fact that the
Government lost $ 400 million in public funds to Goldenberg International Ltd,
trading gold and diamonds that Kenya does not produce."° Although some directors
have been prosecuted, some senior government officials in charge of the Ministry of
Finance and the Central Bank have not been investigated.ffi
Thirdly, the Ninth Report of the Public Investments Committee recommended that
the Registrar of Companies should be dismissed over a transaction in which the
former Kenya Posts and Telecommunications (KPTC) irregularly lost 6, 569, 345
Kenyan Shillings (£65, 693). The Registrar was accused of failing to avail himself
of information on the transaction in which KPTC bought 196 maisonettes at 64,
680,000 Kenyan Shillings (£646, 800) and then sold them for the same amount to
the Office of the President six years later. The failure on the part of the corporation
to include an amount of 6, 569, 345 Kenyan Shillings (£65, 693) in respect of legal
fees led to a direct loss of the same amount to the corporation.112
Fourthly, the lack of political will on the government to enforce disqualification
provisions can also be discerned from a recent proposal by the Attorney General
which sought to grant amnesty to individuals who had committed economic crimes
before December 1, 1997. The implementation of the proposal, which is contained
in the Anti-Corruption and Economic Crimes Bill 2000, would have grave
implications on corporate governance, as companies would not be able to recover
money from miscreant directors. 113 Besides, some cases, which are pending in
court, against directors would come to an end."4
II ° Investigative series by Sarah Elderkin in the Daily Nation, 30 July - 6 August, 1993.
III Holman & Wrong, "Moi Weighs Tough Corruption Probe", Financial Times, 28 July, 1997.
112 "PIC Unearths Massive Sh 673m Fraud at KPA" East African Standard, 38, 2000.
113 Although the Bill undermines the conditions of the donor institution conditions to the
Government, IMF supported the Bill. See "Amnesty Proposal Angers Opposition" Sunday Standard,
July 15, 2001.
114 According to the Bill, the amnesty would not apply to persons who were under investigations or
were prosecuted by the former KACA, the A-G or the police for corruption related offences prior to
December 22, 2000. It was also not meant to apply in the cases of offences committed by persons
who were not in Kenya or against whom a warrant of arrest was outstanding on December 2000. See
"Amnesty Proposal Angers Opposition", East African Standard, 15 July, 2001.
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The fact that the Attorney General favoured the granting of amnesty to errant
persons rather than investigating the offences and subsequently seeking the
disqualification of those, for instance, responsible for companies' fraud is a clear
indication of the interests that he protects. However, in spite of the possible
drawbacks that might arise as a result of the implementation of the amnesty clause,
the clause might also have some considerable benefits. First, given that the
prosecution of past economic crimes might take many years to finalise, the
implementation of the amnesty clause would enable the courts to deal more
effectively with present economic crimes. /15 Second, the clause might jump-start the
transition process by making politicians less apprehensive of losing power and
wealth as a result of a comprehensive reform of the Caw and Iess Cikety to try to
cover up the past. 116 As Rev. Musyimi states:
"as long as fear of future prosecution or other troubles
related to past abuses consumes significant players in
Kenya's current political elite, their willingness to effect
and/or allow a smooth political transition is limited."117
8.5 Enforcement of Disqualification Orders
The implementation of a disqualification framework would hardly be effective
without reliable enforcement mechanisms. To satisfy the objectives of
disqualification orders, the Act makes a disqualified person who gets involved in the
management personally responsible for the debts of the company incurred while he
was so involved. The responsibility attaches where it appears in the course of
winding up that any business of the company has been carried on with intent to
defraud creditors of the company or for any fraudulent purpose.118
115 The Attorney General reckons that it would take between ten and twenty years to work through
past economic crimes. See Ochieng, "Call for Amnesty Team on Graft and Clashes", Daily Nation, 2
August, 2002; Wachira, "Repent, Amnesty Seekers are Told", East African Standard, 2 August,
2002.
116 The initiatives of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa enhanced the political
transition process.
Ill Rev Musyimi, "Towards National Reconciliation in Kenya", Address given to Transparency
International-Kenya Open Forum on Whether Kenya should be Thinking of an Amnesty for
Economic Crimes, on 26 April, 2001, at Norfolk Hotel Ballroom.
http://www.tikenya.org/documents/RevMutavaMusyimiSpeechOnAmnesty.doc
118 Section 323 (1). In the UK, a person who acts or who is willing to act on the instructions of a
person he knows to be disqualified can also be disqualified under section 15, CDDA. Section 214 of
the UK Insolvency Act 1986 gives the court a discretion to declare, on the liquidator's application,
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8.5.1 Limited and Conditional Orders
The Act does not make provision for limited and conditional orders. The courts
therefore either impose absolute disqualification orders or make no disqualification
orders. Limited and conditional orders may be useful in instances where the courts
feel that it may, for instance, be appropriate to disqualify a director from a public
company and not a private one 119 in order to safeguard commercial interests.120
Therefore, where damage to the company is not apparent, conditional
disqualification orders are useful because they allow the courts to balance the
interests of the public, employees and the director in question and, in turn,
encourage enterprise and protect creditors at the same time. Thus, where the courts
are reluctant to impose absolute disqualification due to their harsh consequences,
they might be far more amenable to making limited and conditional orders. For
instance, the UK courts can give directors leave to act under certain
circumstances. 121 It is possible for the leave to act to be utilised as a limited
disqualification order where a director is allowed to serve in certain capacities
only. 122 Similarly, Australian courts may impose such conditions or limitations as
they think fit. 123 Thus, the courts can protect creditors effectively by use of
conditional orders rather than the far-reaching absolute disqualification orders.
that a director be liable to contribute to an insolvent company's assets where he is guilty of wrongful
trading. This occurs when a director before the commencement of business knew or ought to have
known that there was no reasonable prospect of avoiding insolvent liquidation and he failed to take
every step to minimise potential loss to creditors. The court may also order disqualification for up to
fifteen years. See Insolvency Act 1986, sections 213 -214; Hicks, op cn n 6, 46.
119 Hicks, op cit n 6, at 42.
120 In Re Majestic Studios [1989] BCLC 1, Morgan Davies J allowed a director to continue trading
after a disqualification order on condition that he was accountable to an independent assessor. In so
doing the court was able to save fifty jobs which were at risk.
121 In Re Lo-Line Electric Motors Ltd [1988] 3 WLR 26 a director was disqualified for a three year
period but permitted to remain as a director of two companies so long as a named qualified
accountant remained a director of the company. In Re Majestic Studios [1989] BCLC 1, Morgan
Davies J allowed a director to continue trading after a disqualification order on condition that he was
accountable to an independent assessor. Such conditions are not different from the conditional orders
given in other jurisdictions. See Hicks, op cit n 35, at 247.
122 Hicks, op cit n 35, at 247.
123 Section 206G (1) of the Corporations Act 2001 enables the courts to grant leave to manage
"corporations, particular class of corporations or a particular corporation." Under Section 206G (2)
the court determines the conditions and exceptions to accompany the leave. In Re Magna Alloys &
Research Pty Ltd (1974-76) 1 ACLR 203 at 207 a person was given leave to take part in the
management of three specified companies when their boards were controlled by independent non-
executive directors. Similarly, in Re Leomond Properties Pty Ltd (1983) 1 ACLC 1370 leave to be a
director of seven companies was given following conviction for handling stolen crucifixes. In Re
Minimix Industries Ltd (1982) 1 ACLC 511 a New Zealand court gave a person leave to be a




In view of the delay of proceedings in the Kenyan courts, Kenya might need to
adopt a disqualification regime that does not clog up the court system. The adoption
of undertakings by directors, for instance, would enable disqualification proceedings
to be settled without reference to the courts. The directors would undertake not to be
involved in the management of companies for a specific period of time. Such
undertakings have already been adopted in the UK. The Insolvency Act 2000
empowers the Secretary of State to accept the undertaking of a director without
requiring him to admit the actual basis of disqualification. While such undertakings
might be expedient and cheaper on the public purse, they might pose a problem in
that directors might accept a period of disqualification to avoid the cost burden for
defending disqualification proceedings.' 24 Besides, the Insolvency Service might be
tempted to accept undertakings in order so as to achieve the policy objective of
disqualifying many directors.I25
8.5.3 Register of Disqualified Persons
Whilst Kenya has no provision for a register of disqualification orders, the Ghanaian
Code requires the Registrar to publish a register of disqualified persons in the
Gazette and maintain it for the purposes of public inspection. 126 Similarly, the UK
Secretary of State maintains a register of disqualification orders, I27 which is open to
inspection free of charge. I28 The register can be inspected at Companies House in
London within fourteen days of making a disqualification order. The court sends the
particulars of the order to the Secretary of State for entry in the register. In addition,
any variation and grant of leave to act must be communicated to the Secretary of
State. 129 Similarly, section 243 of the Australian Corporations Law requires the
124 Walters, "Directors Disqualification: The Vice-Chancellor's Address to the Chancery Bar
Association" (2000) 21 Co Law 90.
125 Walters, "Bare Undertakings in Directors Disqualification Proceedings: The Insolvency Act 2000,
Blackspur and Beyond", (2001) 22 Co Law 290 at 297.
126 Section 186 (7) provides that "where any order is made or leave is granted under this section the
court making the order or granting leave shall forward a copy to the Registrar who shall cause a
summary thereof to be published in the Gazette. The Registrar shall maintain a register of orders
made under this section and shall enter thereon particulars of each order and any leave granted and
such register shall be open to the inspection of any person."
127 This was introduced in the UK by the Companies Act 1976.
128 Section 18, CDDA 1986. Similar provisions exist in Australia see section 1274AA, Corporations
Act 2001.
129 S Mayson, op cit n 30, p 727.
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Australian Securities and Investments Commission to keep a publicly available
register of disqualified company directors.
In Kenya, as there is no publication, it is not possible to enforce disqualification
orders adequately, as a director might secretly continue to act. To ensure effective
enforcement of disqualification orders, there is need to publicise the orders given by
the courts.
8.6 Conclusions
The disqualification regime in Kenya fails significantly to deter directors who might
be tempted to engage in activities that are detrimental to the well-being of a
company. Although the present provisions do provide for disqualification of
directors, they are not as effective as they might be. Some provisions in the other
jurisdictions discussed above are clearly more stringent than the Act. Kenya needs to
broaden the scope of provisions, offences, and grounds covered by the Act in order
to prevent errant directors from finding their way to boardrooms, and to stamp out
corruption.
The disqualification framework only enables a director to be disqualified on the
basis of fraud when a company is a going concern. Thus, a director cannot be
disqualified on the basis of breach of duty, unfitness, and failing to file returns. A
director can only be disqualified, under section 189, for breach of duty when a
company is in the course of winding up. This does little to raise the standards of the
conduct of directors and to protect the public from miscreant directors. This
provision would be more of a deterrent if it also covered unfitness of directors when
the company is a going concern.
Although creditors and shareholders can make applications for disqualification,130
their interests might be compromised when their financial resources are constrained.
This problem might be resolved by establishing a publicly funded body with the
mandate to make such applications. The body ought to be independent from the
political establishment so as to be effective.
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A public register of disqualification orders would offer more protection to creditors
and the general public because they would be in a position to register their protest
where a disqualified person manages companies. The use of limited or conditional
disqualification orders by the courts as opposed to absolute prohibition would serve
directors well because they would give courts some flexibility, which would protect
both the interests of the creditors and commercial interests.
Whilst broadening the scope of disqualification would go a long way to regulating
directors more effectively, it is worth noting that some stringent provisions, such as
automatic disqualification, might punish directors far too much in spite of their
usefulness to creditors.





A survey conducted by the International Chamber of Commerce between 1999 and
2000 indicated that foreign ventures by multinational corporations were likely to
increase in Africa in the following three to five years.' According to the survey,
Kenya was not one of the most favoured markets. 2 The most favoured were South
Africa, Egypt, Morocco, Uganda and Nigeria. 3 In the past, some companies have
objected to entering into the Kenyan market due to its regulatory framework. For
instance, Vodafone Airtouch only entered into the Kenyan market after Safaricom
(Kenya), its commercial partner, was exempted from the State Corporation Act.4
Initially, Vodafone Airtouch feared that the State Corporations Act would hamper its
effectiveness, 5 as it gives the government immense powers to run corporations.6
Thus, the current regulatory framework in Kenya appears to be a disincentive for
investments. 7
It is against this backdrop that a survey was conducted between October 2001 and
January 2002 in Nairobi to establish what views exist in Kenya concerning the
regulatory framework and whether aspects of the legal framework in Kenya need to
I The survey produced 63 responses from companies with 1.6 million employees abroad and foreign
sales of US $ 625 billion from their affiliates abroad alone. Only 3% of the responding companies
were headquartered in Africa. In all, only 6% of the respondents said they plan to decrease their
investments or pull out of Africa altogether. See Kassar, "Private Sector Growth is Good News out
of Africa", Journal of Commerce, 23 March 2000.
2 Akoko and Ondego, "Pfizer to Pull Out of Kenya", Daily Nation, 6 September, 2001.
3 Nigeria and South Africa have reformed their company laws considerably. See NigeriaLaw Reform
Commission, Working Papers on the Reform of Nigerian Company Law: Volume 1-Review and
Recommendations, 1987; South Africa, The King Report on Corporate Governance, 2001.
"Cap 446, Laws of Kenya.
5 Kisero, " Vodafone's Bid for Shares in Safaricom Still Unclear", Daily Nation, 4 April, 2000.
6 Commenting on the difficulties experienced by most African states in privatising their
telecommunications industries, the World Bank country representative, Makhtar Diop, recently stated
that few foreign investors would not be willing to put their money in markets where the government
was still a service provider. See Akumu, "State Control Blamed for Problems in Privatising Telecoms
Companies", Daily Nation, 8 March, 2002.
7 The Nairobi Stock Exchange's Chief Executive, Kibuga Kariithi, in February 2000 attributed the
failure to implement a Central Depository System to the absence of enabling legislation to make it
work. He felt that putting in place the system would attract foreign investors, as it would eliminate
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be changed. This Chapter analyses the data collected from the survey with a view to
assessing whether the current regulatory framework for directors and companies has
any general adverse effects on the performance of directors. The survey sought to
identify problems in the regulatory framework for directors. It also sought to
establish possible solutions to the problems that would, if implemented, facilitate
commercial activity and therefore encourage economic growth, investment, and
stability in Kenya. In general, the aim of the survey was to obtain some empirical
evidence concerning many of the issues raised already in this study. The specific
issues assessed by the survey are:
• the main factors that have contributed to the poor performance of companies in
Kenya.
• the extent to which donations from the resources of companies contribute to their
poor performance.
• whether companies would benefit from obliging directors to assume social
responsibilities.
• whether the codification of English common law principles, which are applicable
in Kenya, 8 would make the law more accessible and easier to understand.
• whether directors take their duties in relation to skill, care, and diligence
seriously.
• whether the enforcement mechanism for shareholders is effective.
• the factors that have contributed to the poor performance of parastatals and the
possible measures that might improve their performance.
• whether multinational corporations do have regard to responsibilities that they
have to fulfil in other countries.
• whether self-regulation by directors would be more effective than the current
statutory regulation.
• whether a non-statutory statement of the duties of directors would promote
awareness.
paperwork in the transfer of ownership of the share certificate as evidence of title. See Alcumu, "New
NSE System to Cost $2 Million", Daily Nation, 29 February, 2000.
8 Section 3 (1) of the Kenya's Judicature Act permits the application of the common law and doctrines
of equity in force in England as at 12th August 1897. However, decisions of English courts given
after the reception date are not of binding authority in the courts of the territory, though they are
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• whether foreign companies avoid doing business in Kenya due to the apparent
weak corporate regulatory framework.
• whether miscreant directors are ever punished for their misconduct, how frequent
disqualification orders are, and whether a stricter disqualification regime would
deter miscreant directors.
9.2 The Empirical Data
The data for this research was collected through questionnaires and interviews. A
questionnaire was sent in October 2001 to 200 individuals in Kenya. The range of
persons questioned was broad and comprised of 102 directors, 38 advocates, 16
academics, 12 company secretaries, 10 economists, 4 Judges of the Court of Appeal,
4 stock brokers, 4 senior officials from the Attorney General's Chambers, 3 Members
of Parliament, 3 auditors, and 4 senior officials from the Capital Markets Authority
of Kenya and Nairobi Stock Exchange. Fifty-six responses were received (a response
rate of 28 per cent). The responses were received from 18 directors, 17 advocates, 6
company secretaries, 3 economists, 2 Judges of the Court of Appeal, 2 auditors, 2
Members of Parliament, 1 official from the Attorney General's Chambers, 1
academic, 1 official from the Capital Markets Authority, and 1 stock broker. Two
individuals did not indicate their profession.
Ten individuals were also interviewed in Kenya between January 7 and January 25,
2002. Interviewees 1 - 7 were advocates, interviewee number 8 was an academic,
and interviewees 9 and 10 were directors.
Selection of the participants was made from the above persons in order to have a
sample that represents individuals dealing, directly or indirectly, with the legal
framework that regulates directors.
The questionnaire contained three sections. Section A and B asked the respondents to
comment on governance issues that are likely to affect the performance of
companies. In particular, Section A asked general questions relating to reasons for
the poor performance of companies. The respondents were given a choice of four
entitled to the highest respect if the English law has not been subsequently modified. See Amollo,
"Reviewing 100 years of common law in Kenya", (January 1999) The Advocate 16 at 17.
232
answers to each question. Section B listed several statements and asked the
respondents to state whether they strongly agreed, moderately agreed, had no view,
moderately disagreed, or whether they strongly disagreed with the statements.
Finally, Section C invited the respondents to elaborate on any of their responses or
comment on any other issues that they deemed important and appropriate.
The Chapter sets out each of the questions put, seeks to incorporate some comments
made in section C and those obtained from interviews, and then provides some
commentary on the results of the analysis.
Question 1: Which of the following factors have led to the poor performance of
companies in Kenya? (A) Outdated laws, (B) Weak economy, C) Lack of an
effective democratic political regime, (D) Gross mismanagement of companies
(E) Other factors (Please specify)
The first question was answered by 51 respondents. Ten per cent chose outdated
laws, 29 per cent chose a weak economy, 25 per cent chose lack of a democratic
political regime, and 36 per cent chose gross mismanagement of companies.
Question 2: What is your view as to the significance of allowing company
directors to make donations? (A) They assist in promoting certain purposes,
such as charity and education, (B) They enhance the image of companies and
the country as a whole, (C) They encourage corruption, (D) Other views (Please
specify)
This question was answered by 55 respondents. Forty-six per cent felt that donations
promote certain purposes such as charity and education. Fifteen per cent took the
view that donations enhance the image of companies and 39 per cent felt that they
encourage corruption.
Question 3: Directors breach their duties because (A) The Companies Act is
bulky and therefore difficult to understand, (B) Important common law
principles are not codified in the statute, (C) They engage in competition with
their companies, (D) Other reasons (Please specify)
The question was answered by 38 respondents. Thirty seven per cent said that it is
because the Act is bulky and therefore difficult to understand, 39 per cent felt that it
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is because important company law principles are not codified in the statute, and 24
per cent attributed it to the competition that directors have with their companies.
Comments made in Section C in relation to the foregoing issues indicated that the
Act ought to be revised in order to reflect social and economic changes in the
country. It was also confirmed that the government has been reluctant to reform the
Act.
Interviewee number 6 attributed abuse of duties to "a lot of technicalities in the
Companies Act making it possible for a rogue director to hide behind the same."9
Other factors, according to this interviewee, contributing to the poor performance of
companies were noted as corruption, patronage, lack of ethics, state involvement in
the running of companies, multiple directorships, poor role models, the practice of
"stage managing" annual general meetings, insider loans that are not serviced,
nepotism in recruitment, and an ineffective judiciary which contributes to undue
delays in the courts. Interviewee number 3 also noted that "short term and immediate
personal benefits cloud the long term objectives of the company and the economy as
a whole, especially for the publicly quoted companies."10
With regard to donations, interviewee number 4 felt that they are not always useful,
as they are prone to abuse. He attributed the insolvency of one company to political
donations. He also averred that it is the person making the donations, rather than the
company, who gets the credit. As such, he stated "such an action should only be
done with the approval of the shareholders and where a ceiling has been set of how
much the director can take towards such a purpose."
Interviewee number 8 stated that "there is a need to have accountability in the public
sector for there to be accountability in the private sector." 12 He observed that
directors might be compelled to engage in corrupt practices in order to gain access to
a market that is controlled by corrupt public officials. Interviewee number 1013
9 Interview conducted on 23 January, 2002 in Nairobi.
I ° Ibid, 11 January, 2002.
II Ibid, 18 January, 2002.
12 Ibid, 22 January, 2002.
13 rbid, 18 January, 2002.
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confirmed that political interference with the operation of companies is common in
both parastatals and the private sector.
Commentary
It is evident from questions 1 to 3 that most of the respondents felt that companies
performed poorly not only because of the nature of the laws, but also because of
other factors, such as the political environment in the country. Although 29 per cent
of the respondents in question 1 attributed poor performance to outdated laws, 25 per
cent felt that lack of a more democratic regime was more crucial. It is true to say that
both of these factors have contributed to the mismanagement of companies. The
significant majority of the respondents (36 per cent), who felt that gross
mismanagement of companies has been the cause of poor performance, confirms
this.
Responses to Question 2 clearly indicate that donations from companies' resources
are beneficial. Forty-six per cent felt that donations promote useful purposes and 15
per cent considered them useful for the purposes of enhancing the image of the
company. However, a significant number (39 per cent) felt that donations encourage
corruption. The responses against donations could have been influenced by past
abuse of political donations in Kenya. In the past, donations by directors of
parastatals have been given to the government in return for political favours among
other personal benefits. Such donations subsequently occasion heavy losses to
shareholders and creditors.14
Question 4: Company directors should assume social responsibilities in order to
facilitate effective participation of employees in economic activities.
This question was answered by 55 respondents. Fifty-seven per cent agreed with the
statement, 10 per cent had no view, and 33 per cent disagreed.
Interviewee number 10 felt that imposing a responsibility on companies in Kenya to
be socially responsible could have undesirable results due to the poor economy of
14 The fact that many former directors of KCC (Kenya Co-operative Creameries-in receivership) have
gone on to become Members of Parliament illustrates how good KCC has been as a spring board for
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the country. I5 He contended that such an initiative is likely to succeed in more
developed economies. Interviewee number 1 16 took the view that companies assume
some social responsibilities, not because of the need to enhance their image, but to
reduce their tax liabilities.
Commentary
A majority of respondents (57 per cent) in Question 4 took the view that directors
ought to consider social responsibilities so as to facilitate participation of employees
in economic activities. This view confirms that a company cannot be regarded as
just the association of shareholders because it also encompasses others who make
commitments to it, namely employees, suppliers of goods and services, and
customers. As such, a company would ultimately benefit by satisfying wider social
objectives by ensuring productive relationships with a range of interested parties.17
Question 5: Company law principles relating to directors should be codified in
the Companies Act to make the law more accessible.
This question was answered by 55 respondents. Ninety-six per cent agreed, 2 per
cent (consisting of one person) had no view, and 2 per cent (consisting, again, of one
person) disagreed.
Commentary
It is evident that a clear majority (96 per cent) of the respondents felt that
codification is absolutely necessary. The need for such a change is supported by the
fact that 76 per cent of respondents in Question 3 felt that directors breach their
duties because the important company law principles are not codified in the Act and
that the Act is difficult to understand.
political positions. See "Politics is killing the dairy industry", Market Intelligence Business and
Finance Journal, June 21, 2000 <http://www.rni.co.ke/archive/september/industry.html >
15 Interview conducted on 18 January, 2002 in Nairobi.
16 Ibid, 7 January, 2002.
17 A framework that is competitive and beneficial to the economy, the medium through which a
company operates, should cater for both internal and external interests. See The Company Law
Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic
Framework, February 1999, p 10.
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Question 6: Directors take their duties in relation to skill, care, and diligence
seriously.
This question was answered by 54 respondents. Forty-six per cent felt that directors
took their duties seriously, 6 per cent had no view, and 48 per cent felt that they did
not.
Commentary
Although more people felt that directors do not take their duties seriously, the 46 per
cent that thought otherwise cannot be ignored. The number that felt that directors
take their duties seriously can be attributed to the responses given by directors.
Given that a majority of the respondents were directors (18), they might have been
reluctant to admit lack of skill and care on their part or on the part of colleagues. In
addition, it may well be that the directors quite genuinely felt that they do exhibit a
degree of care and skill that can reasonably be expected from persons of their
knowledge and experience. It is notable that this is the standard of care expected
from directors in Kenya. 18
Question 7: There is no effective mechanism for shareholders to enforce
liability of directors.
Fifty-six individuals responded to this question. Eighty nine per cent agreed and 11
per cent disagreed. Although some of the comments made in Section C indicated
that the Act has its shortcomings, they also noted that some of its useful provisions
have not been utilised. The government (Registrar of Companies) was singled out as
one of the bodies that is reluctant to enforce the provisions of the Act.
It was also mentioned that shareholders are disadvantaged because of difficulties in
obtaining public documents from the Companies Registry. It was felt that lack of
modern technology in the Registry was contributing to delays. Indeed, interviewee
number 1 (an advocate specialising in corporate practice) I9 confirmed that the
registry is so disorganised that company searches sometimes take at least three
weeks to finalise.
18 Flagship Carriers Ltd v Imperial Bank Ltd, High Court Civil Case No 1643 of 1999 (Unreported);
J Ogolla, Company Law, (Nairobi: Focus Publications, 1997) p 176.
19 Interview conducted on 7 January, 2002 in Nairobi.
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Another reason for the lack of effective enforcement was considered to be that there
are no supervisory agencies established to monitor the conduct of directors. The
professional bodies that regulate their members, who are directors, were thought to
be ineffective, as they do not strictly observe rules and regulations. A few of those
mentioned were the Law Society of Kenya, the Kenya Institute of Management, and
the Kenya National Chamber of Commerce & Industry.
Interviewee number 7 stated that "loss of faith in the judicial system affects the zeal
of shareholders to sue." 20 He contended that the judicial system does not offer
incentives to shareholders to sue directors. He also observed that directors are
usually unlikely to endorse the commencement of proceedings against one of their
own. Interviewee number 10 stated that "ignorance on the part of shareholders
contributes to lack of enforcement."21
Commentary
It is evident from Question 7 that a clear majority (89 per cent) agreed that there is
no effective enforcement of the liability of directors. It is notable that the company
is the only body that is entitled to sue a miscreant director in Kenya, 22 as his duties
are only owed to the company. 23 As interviewee number 424 contended, it is possible
for directors to escape liability when they form and control a majority of the
shareholders because minority shareholders are precluded from pursuing
enforcement suits unless the company has been a victim of a fraud or the conduct
complained of is oppressive 25 to the interests of some shareholders.
The fact is, as noted by several respondents, that the inefficiency of the judiciary
discourages shareholders from enforcing directors' liability more readily.26
20 Ibid, 18 January, 2002.
21 Ibid, 18 January, 2002.
22 Proceedings may be instituted against a de facto or shadow director as well as a retired director,
estate of a deceased director, and a bankrupt director. See Curtis's Furnishing Stores Ltd v Freedman
[1966] 2 All ER 955. Proceedings may be instituted in the name of the company on the authority of
the board of directors, a receiver manager or liquidator, or the General Meeting.
23 Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare 461.
24 Interviewee conducted on 18 January, 2002 in Nairobi.
25 The Act, s 211.
26 The subject of judicial reform is beyond the scope of this research. For more on judicial reform see
Republic of Kenya, The Report of the Committee on the Administration of Justice, 1998, Chapter 9,
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Question 8: Inadequate management controls have affected parastatals'
performance.
This question was answered by all the 56 respondents. Ninety-four per cent agreed
and of these 88 per cent strongly agreed with the statement.
Question 9: Reforms initiated by the 1982 Working Party on Government and
Expenditure and the Philip Ndegwa Committee on the Review of Statutory
Boards 1979 have had little impact in improving the performance of
parastatals.
Fifty-five respondents answered this question. Eighty-five per cent felt that the
reforms had little impact and 15 per cent had no view on the matter.
Question 10: Privatisation would make directors' roles in parastatals more
accountable.
This question was answered by 56 respondents. Ninety-one per ceat felt that it
would make directors more accountable, one person had no view, and 7 per cent
thought it would not.
Some comments made in Section C indicated that the problems of poor performance
of directors can be traced back to the time when the Duncan Ndegwa Report of
1971 27 allowed directors and employees to engage in other businesses. As such,
cases of conflicts of interest and neglect of duties are common.
Others took the view that privatisation would not enhance the performance of the
privatised companies unless there is separation between ownership and
management. One respondent felt that the management should be professional and
not be appointed by shareholders. It was suggested that the performance of
privatised companies would be enhanced by the reduction of the stake of the State in
parastatals to less than 25 per cent. In addition, the enactment of privatisation
legislation was thought necessary, as it would guide and control the process of
11 <http: www.lawafrica.com reports go.asp?file—kwach.xml> ; Amollo, "Judicial Reform", The
Advocate Magazine, December 2000.
27 Republic of Kenya, "Report of the Commission of Inquiry: Public Service and Remuneration
Commission" (Duncan Ndegwa Report) 1971 in Courtney Nelson's Development Strategies,
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privatisation which has been slow and partisan. It was felt that privatisation at the
moment favours foreign investors and it can only benefit local investors if it is
postponed until there is the accumulation of local capital and reorganisation of the
co-operative societies. This, it was contended, would enable the co-operative
societies to acquire ownership of privatised companies, and, in turn, enable local
investors to have a stake in the companies.
Interviewee number 8 felt that the privatisation process should be strictly controlled
to ensure that local investors have a majority stake in the running of strategic
companies, such as the Kenya Power and Lighting Company and Kenya Railways.28
However, interviewee number 1 stated that "privatisation is welcome provided that
the privatised companies are run properly."29
Commentary
It is evident from Question 8 that inadequate management controls have been
responsible for the poor performance of parastatals. This was supported by 94 per
cent of respondents. The overwhelming majority who agreed also nearly corresponds
to those who thought that the divestiture of state interests in parastatals would
enhance accountability (91 per cent felt that privatisation would improve
accountability). Eighty five per cent in Question 9 also agreed with the statement that
past attempts by the government to reform parastatals have been unsuccessful.
It is true to say that the control of parastatals by the government renders it difficult
to enforce liability against directors, as the government protects them. It is possible
that a majority of the respondents attributed lack of management controls in
parastatals to the control exerted by the government.
However, it was interesting to note that 6 per cent of the respondents thought that
there would be no change, unless the stake of the government's share is reduced
significantly to less than 25 per cent and the privatisation process streamlined. This
"Administration and Economic Planning in Eastern Africa: A Ford Foundation Program Evaluation",
1977 <http://www.developmentstrategies.org/Archives/1977ReviewEastAfrica/rea6.htm>
28 Interview conducted on 22 January, 2002 in Nairobi.
29 Ibid, 7 January, 2002.
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is because some respondents confirmed that the process was slow and partisan. This
clearly shows the apprehension that exists in relation to management by the State.
As mentioned by some respondents, the poor performance of parastatals can also
partly be attributed to directors' competition with their institutions. A total of 24 per
cent in Question 3 attributed breach of duties to competition by directors with their
companies. As comments in Section C show, this problem can be traced back to the
early 1970s when the Duncan Ndegwa Report of 1971 was issued. The report made
recommendations which permitted civil servants to own and participate in private
businesses as an incentive for them to remain in the civil service. 30 Although the
measure might have enabled the government to retain civil servants, it also made it
possible for directors and other workers to put themselves in positions where their
personal interests conflicted with those of companies. For instance, it is possible for
a director to hold multiple directorships 31 on various boards. Although the service of
some directors might be useful to companies where they serve as a source of non-
executive talent,32 clearly serving in multiple roles makes it difficult for directors to
avoid breaching their duties.
Question 11: Directors of multinational corporations operating in Kenya do not
have regard to responsibilities which they have in other countries.
The question was answered by 54 respondents. Forty-five per cent took the view that
multinationals do not have regard to such responsibilities, 22 per cent had no view
on the matter, and 33 per cent felt that they did.
3° Republic of Kenya, op cit n 27.
31 Multiple directorships are recognised by both the Companies Act and Table A. Section 201
requires particulars of all directorships to be contained in the register of directors and secretaries.
Table A, article 78 allows a director to "become a director or other officer of, or otherwise interested
in, any company promoted by the company or in which the company may be interested as
shareholder or otherwise, and no such director shall be accountable to the company for any
remuneration or other benefits received by him as a director or officer of, or from his interest in, such
other company unless the company otherwise directs."
32Both the Greenbury's Report (Directors Remuneration: Report of a Study Group chaired by Sir
Richard Greenbury, July 4, 1995) and Cadbury Committee (Report of the Committee on the Financial
Aspects of Corporate Governance, 1992) underscore the supervisory role of the non-executive
directors. They are also a good source for non-executive talent for other companies.
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Interviewee number 433 highlighted the need to regulate multinationals effectively,
as most are prone to abusing their positions due to their immense wealth and ability
to influence. He also felt that a vast majority of them do not invest adequately in
Kenya. Interviewee number 1 34 asserted that the government is attempting to control
multinationals to some extent. As an indication of this she cited a case where the
government refused to approve an attempt by Coca-Cola to take over all soft drinks
subsidiaries in the country.
Commentary
A majority of respondents (45 per cent) felt that multinational corporations in Kenya
do not accept responsibilities that they have in other countries. 35 The interviewee
who felt that there is a need to regulate multinationals more strictly, as there exists
an inequality of bargaining power between them and the State, also supported this
view. It is true that multinational corporations 36 rarely take measures to invest
locally or to stop the abuse of their considerable economic and social power. 37 They
do this because the government may discourage the creation of stricter legislative
and enforcement frameworks on the basis that they would risk being construed as
hostile towards strong foreign investors.
Question 12: In light of Kenyan circumstances, self-regulation by directors
would be more effective than statutory control.
This question was answered by 55 respondents. Sixty-nine per cent took the view
that self-regulation would not be effective, one person had no view on the matter,
and 29 per cent thought it would.
33 Interviewed on 18 January, 2002 in Nairobi.
34 Ibid, 7 January, 2002.
35 "Multinational companies and privatised utilities are not vehicles for the business venture of their
shareholders. They are entities with their own aspirations, goals, and histories. The largest of them
have annual turnovers greater that the GNP of most sovereign states." See Bamford, " Directors'
Duties: The Public Dimension" (2000) 2 Co Law 38 at 38.
36 Muchlinski, "The Accountability of Multinational Enterprises and the Right to Development: The
Compensation of Industrial Accident Victims from Developing Countries," [1993] Third World
Legal Studies, 189 at 192.
37 A Drzemczewski, European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law (Oxford University Press,
1983) Ch 8. Cited in Muchlinski, ibid, at 191.
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Commentary
It is clear from the views obtained that a majority of the respondents (69 per cent)
were against38 self-regulatory codes. 39 The disadvantages of a self-regulatory
scheme might have prompted the majority to feel that a self-regulatory code would
not be successful, unless underlying problems, such as corruption, are solved.
Question 13: A non-statutory statement of directors' duties would offer useful
guidelines to directors.
Fifty-five respondents answered this question. Sixty-two per cent felt that the non-
statutory statement would be useful, 6 per cent had no view, and 32 per cent felt that
it would not.
Comments made in Section C in relation to awareness indicated that directors are
more likely to comply with regulations if they understood their obligations. 40 A
director of several parastatals admitted that he has never read the recommendations
made by two committees41 established to streamline the operations of parastatals. He
also claimed that he has never been told what is expected of him as a director.
It was also felt that the awareness of shareholders should be encouraged to ascertain
when they ought to enforce liability against miscreant directors. To raise levels of
awareness, it was felt that simplified company books and pamphlets should be
published. It was also deemed necessary for directors of public corporations to
38 The Kenyan Parliament recently disagreed with the wishes of the Treasury, the World Bank and
the IMF by passing a bill limiting the interest rates of banks. See "Welcome to Kenya, IMF's Little
Colony", Daily Nation, 20 May, 2001.
39 At a seminar organised by Kenya Institute of Policy Planning, Research and Analysis on 16 May
2001, Mr Jimnah Mbaru, criticised the implementation of the International Accounting Standards
(IAS) on the basis that they were only favourable towards foreign owned multinational banks as
Kenya's banks were constrained by the short term nature of Kenyan deposits. Another reason
advanced against the IAS was that the Kenyan judicial system discourages the quick dispensation of
commercial cases. See "Banker, NSE Chief Riled by IAS", East African Standard, 17 May, 2001.
40 The UK's Hampel Final Report on Corporate Governance (Gee, London, 1998).
recommended that directors should have guidelines to help them understand their duties. The report
culminated in the publication of 'The Combined Code' of best practice. The code was published by
the London Stock Exchange on 25 June 1998 as part of the listing rules. However the code has no
force of law. The code incorporated the recommendations made by the Cadbury Committee Report
(Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London: Gee, 1992)
and the Greenbury Committee Report 1995 (Directors' Remuneration: Report of a Study Group
Chaired by Richard Greenbury, 1995).
41 The Philip Ndegwa Committee on the Review of Parastatal Boards 1979 and the 1982 Working
Party on Government and Expenditure.
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undertake a certified course, 42 and to use simple language in the memorandum and
articles of association in order for them to be easily understood. The need to have
minimum qualification requirements for appointment of directors in public
companies was identified by several interviewees.
Commentary
It is notable that the Private Sector Corporate Governance Trust (PSCGT) has begun
promoting corporate governance awareness among the Kenyan public. The Trust
was founded in March 1999 to promote good corporate governance. 43 This initiative
is commendable because it is likely to enhance the competence of directors and the
activism of shareholders.44
Question 14: Adoption of international standards of corporate governance
would establish standards of good practice in management of companies.
Fifty-four respondents answered this question. Ninety two per cent agreed, one
person had no view, and 3 people disagreed with the statement.
Question 15: Foreign companies avoid doing business in the Kenyan market due
to the weak corporate regulatory framework.
This question was answered by 54 respondents. Fifty-four per cent agreed, 6 per cent
had no view, and 40 per cent disagreed with the statement.
Commentary
According to the data obtained in Question 15, it would seem that the corporate
regulatory framework in Kenya is a disincentive to foreign investment. Although
this is the case, the respondents (40 per cent) who felt that it was not a disincentive
could have attributed the avoidance of the Kenyan market to other factors, such as
42 The UK's Cadbury Report (Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate
Governance (London: Gee, 1992) para 4.19 also suggested that directors should take internal or
external training. It is notable that since 1983 the UK's Institute of Directors (TOD) has been offering
a Company Direction Programme leading to an IOD Diploma in Company Direction. It also
introduced a new professional qualification in June 1999 called the certificate of Chartered Director
(C Dir). See B Pettet, Company Law, (Pearson, 2001), 224.
43 <WM. W.COrporategovernance.co.ke>
44 United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry has leaflets that are designed to promote
awareness. See <http://www.dti.gov.uk>
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corruption. Interviewee number three 45 felt that political patronage and corruption
have adversely affected the competitiveness of Kenya's regulatory framework.
Similar sentiments were identified in the responses given in Section C. It is true to
say that mismanagement of companies can be linked to the numerous opportunities
tempting directors to engage in corruption.
Question 16: There is little chance of directors being sued for breach of duties
when companies enter liquidation.
Fifty-four respondents answered this question. Eighty-nine per cent felt that there is
little chance for such an action, 4 per cent had no view, and 7 per cent felt that such
actions are frequent.
Question 17: Directors' disqualification orders are extremely rare.
This question was answered by 55 respondents. Ninety-two per cent agreed, 4 per
cent (consisting of 2 people) had no view, and 6 per cent moderately disagreed with
the statement.
Question 18: An effective disqualification regime of directors would promote
standards of corporate governance.
Fifty-four respondents answered this question. Ninety-eight per cent agreed with the
statement and 1 person (making up 2%) had no view on the matter.
Comments made in Section C in relation to disqualification indicated that the
penalties in the Act are ridiculously low. Interviewee number 4 46 also felt that
imposing penal sanctions on errant directors would deter misconduct. He
particularly emphasised that individuals have been careful not to breach corruption
laws with criminal penalties.
Commentary
The data reveals that disqualification orders are very rare and that a stricter
disqualification regime would ensure that unfit directors do not serve on boards.
The responses could be a reflection of the many companies that are still run by
45 Interviewee conducted on 11 January, 2002.
46 Ibid, 18 January, 2002.
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incompetent, negligent, and fraudulent directors due to lack of a proper47
disqualification regime.48
9.3 Conclusions
This empirical research has shown that the regulatory framework for directors has
serious flaws which need to be addressed urgently in order to minimise the adverse
effects caused by mismanagement of companies. The data appears to be consistent
with the views taken in numerous newspaper articles in the past ten years that the
regulatory system is extremely ineffective and is detrimental to the Kenyan
economy.
The data reveals that companies perform poorly not only because of the nature of the
laws, but also because of other factors, such as a weak economy, the political
regime, corruption, and mismanagement. These factors, for instance, affect the
effectiveness of the judiciary and, in turn, contribute to loss of confidence in the
judicial system by citizens. As such, directors are able to escape liability easily
because shareholders are unlikely to trust the courts to enforce effectively the
provisions of the Act.
Company law in Kenya remains largely inaccessible due to lack of codification. The
present status makes it difficult for directors and shareholders to ascertain their
obligations. This, therefore, prevents directors from taking their duties in relation to
skill and care seriously. Since the level of directors' awareness is low, a non-statutory
statement of directors' duties would offer useful guidelines to directors, as they are
more likely to comply with regulations if they understood their obligations.
Publication of simplified company books and pamphlets may also go along way
towards promoting awareness.
47 "The tragedy in Kenya is that those who have mismanaged the Government, the Development
Finance Institutions, and even multinational corporations are those who continue to circulate in and
out of Government as ministers, assistant ministers, advisers and so on." See Nyong'o, "How Bad
Governance Strangles Business", Daily Nation, 10 June, 2001.
48 Some 45 parastatals and companies in which the Government has shares have been placed in
receivership since 1980. Some of the directors who are responsible for the collapse of such
companies have not only been appointed to other positions of directorships but they have also been
appointed to the Cabinet. For example, despite the allegations levelled against the former managing
directors of the defunct Kenya National Assurance and Kenya Posts and Telecommunications
Corporations, Henry Kosgey and Kipng'eno arap Ng'eny respectively, the two were appointed to
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Although some respondents felt that imposing a responsibility on companies in
Kenya to be socially responsible could have undesirable results due to the poor
economy of the country, it was evident from the data that such an initiative is useful,
as failure to have regard to social roles may affect the productivity of companies.
The data has also shown that although donations can help certain good causes, they
are often open to abuse.
The data reveals that self-regulation would not be as effective as statutory regulation
in Kenya. This is because there are some underlying problems, such as corruption,
which need to be minimised for self-regulation to be effective.
It has been shown that inadequate management controls have been responsible for
the poor performance of parastatals. Also, past attempts by the government to
reform parastatals have been unsuccessful. In fact, past reforms have enabled
directors and employees to be involved in competing businesses with parastatals
hence encouraging neglect of duties and conflicts of interest. Given that the stake of
the Government in parastatals enables it to exercise control over their boards of
directors, divestiture of the interests of the State in parastatals remains one of the
options that may well enhance their performance.
Although the corporate regulatory framework is clearly a disincentive for foreign
investment, multinational corporations operating in Kenya do take advantage of the
ineffective regulatory framework for directors. Thus, they rarely have regard to
responsibilities that they have in other countries. Indeed, most are prone to abusing
their power because of their immense wealth and the inequality of bargaining power
between them and the State.
It is evident that directors are rarely sued for breach of duties when companies enter
liquidation, and they are also rarely disqualified. An effective disqualification
regime would therefore promote standards of corporate governance. The responses
are reflective of the dire need there is to make the disqualification regime stricter.
direct other companies and subsequently appointed to the Cabinet. See "45 Parastatals, Govt Firms in
Receivership" East African Standard, 12 July, 2001.
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Overall the empirical data demonstrates that there is an urgent need to effect reforms
in the law and the environment within which companies operate so as to raise the
standards of corporate governance, and in turn, promote the competitiveness of the




As mentioned in Chapter 1, the common law principles applicable in Kenya are not
codified in the Act. 3 As such, the Kenyan courts apply English common law
principles and have hardly adopted a Kenyan approach to the interpretation of the
Act.4 The duties of directors are also regulated by fiduciary duties, statutory duties,
and the Nairobi Stock Exchange Listing Rules. These rules, especially the case law,
do not clearly set out the law for directors and the stakeholders of the company. It is
evident from the empirical data that a clear majority (96 per cent) of the respondents
felt that codification is absolutely necessary. This is supported by 76 per cent of
respondents in Question 3 who felt that directors breach their duties because
important company law principles are not codified in the Act. Potently, the failure
to have the law codified renders adherence to the law problematic and it renders it
impracticable for various interest groups to have easy grasp of the duties and
responsibilities of directors.5
It was demonstrated in the early chapters of this study that the common law rules on
the regulation of directors is unclear. Because of this, the rules should be clarified in
a legislative framework so that they can provide clear guidance to directors and the
stakeholders on the responsibilities of directors. The clarification of rules would not
only provide an opportunity to correct defects in the present law,6 but also raise
standards of corporate governance by making the law accessible and its enforcement
perhaps more achievable.
Although codification would make the law accessible, it is notable that some
commentators have argued against it on the basis that the courts would still face the
3 Chapter 486, Laws of Kenya.
4 In Flagship Carriers Ltd v Imperial Bank Ltd, High Court Civil Case No 1643 of 1999
(Unreported), Mr PJS Hewett indicated that a subjective test, as laid down by Romer J in Re City
Equitable Fire Insurance Co (1925) Ch 407, should be applied to assess the standards of directors'
duties of skill and care. The application of both the subjective and the objective standards has been
favoured in other jurisdictions, as it raises the standards expected from directors. See Re D 'Jan of
London Ltd [1993] BCC 646 (UK), Norman v Theodore Goddard [1992] BCC 14 at 15 (UK), and
Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438 (Australia).
5 In the UK, it has been proposed that that a statutory statement should be formulated to make the
doctrine useful as a guide to directors. See DTI, The Company Law Review Steering Group: Final
Report: Final Report, 2001, p 41; Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and
Formulating a Statement of Duties (Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 153, London:
Stationery Office, 1998), Part 15.
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difficulty of balancing between entrepreneurial risk taking and reasonable prudence.
As such, they have argued that the courts should "not be trusted without firm
statutory guidance to appreciate the realities which beset a modern company
director, and are likely to be too restrictive and inhibiting." 7 Full codification of the
duties of directors has also been criticised on the basis that it would not augur well
for directorial responsibility due to the constant changing nature of legal regulations
on responsibility. 8 The adoption of the language of the cases may also make the
codes inaccessible, unless the wording of clauses avoids ambiguity.9
Whilst some of the arguments against codification may be sound, a dear wordiag, of
the clauses would avoid the ambiguitymand, in turn, offer useful guidelines to the
courts. It is submitted that codification of the common law principles is necessary
because it would not only be useful to the courts but also make it easier for directors
to understand their responsibilities and enable stakeholders to appreciate what they
should expect from directors, something that has been difficult because of the
inaccessibility of the common law.
10.3 Awareness
The performance of companies can be enhanced by ensuring directors have certain
essential knowledge, such as knowledge of: relevant law; their duties,
responsibilities, and liabilities; financial analysis; strategy; business ethics and
effective decision making. Thus, it is important for directors who do not have the
6 Sheikh, "Company Law for the 21' Century: Part 2: Corporate Governance", [2002] 13 (2) ICCLR
88, at 88.
7 Santow, "The Codification of Directors' Duties: Some Observations from an Australian Standpoint
on the Joint Consultation Paper of September 1998 issued by the Law Commission of the United
Kingdom" (2000) 2 ICCLR 127, at 144.
8 A similar recommendation was favoured by UK Law Commission, Company Directors: Regulating
Conflicts of Interests and Formulating a Statement of Duties, Cmnd 4436, HMSO, London, 1999,
paras 4.48, 5.19-5.20, and 5.38. The Commission observed "we expect that the law will need to
continue to evolve incrementally as circumstances require. The commercial context is consistently
changing. It is important that the law retains the capacity to develop. For this reason we think that a
full codification of directors' duties would not be desirable. To set out in statute duties that are still
developing might restrict their ability to adapt to changing circumstances." See paras 4.27-4.28.
9 Birds, "Making Directors do their Duties" [1980] Co Law 67, at 67. The learned commentator
observes that the past attempt to codify secret profit rules (Clause 52 (2) Companies Bill 1973;
Clause 44 (3)-(6) Companies Bill 1978, refers to conflict of duty and interest without considering the
real understanding of the cases to determine the sort of factual situations covered.
I ° In the past clauses in the UK Companies legislation have adopted the language of cases
establishing fiduciary obligations. Professor Birds observes that the past attempt to codify secret
profit rules (Clause 52 (2) Companies Bill 1973; Clause 44 (3)-(6) Companies Bill 1978, refers to
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requisite knowledge to undergo some training so that they can perform more
effectively. The empirical data has shown that 62 per cent of the respondents felt
that a non-statutory statement of directors' duties would offer useful guidelines to
directors. It is submitted that the measures initiated by the Private Sector Corporate
Governance Trust (PSCGT) 11 to promote corporate governance awareness among
the Kenyan public are useful because they are likely to enhance the competence of
directors and the activism of shareholders. 12 Awareness can be enhanced further by
having more organisations with similar objectives and the publishing of simplified
company books and pamphlets. Directors of public corporations should be required
to undertake a certified course in order to enhance their competence. This is
consistent with recommendations made by the UK's Cadbury Report. 13 The report
suggested that directors should take internal or external training. It is notable that
since 1983 the UK's Institute of Directors (TOD) has been offering a Company
Direction Programme leading to an IOD Diploma in Company Direction. It also
introduced a new professional qualification in June 1999 called the certificate of
Chartered Director (C Dir). 14
10.4 Directors' Role in Social Responsibility
The directors of a company owe duties of good faith to the company. 15 According to
economic contractarian theories, companies should not be concerned with the
interests of employees and other stakeholders because their prime purpose is to
maximise the wealth of shareholders. 16 This obligation does not give directors room
to take into consideration 17 the interests of employees or other stakeholders. 18 This
conflict of duty and interest without considering the real understanding of the cases to determine the
sort of factual situations covered. See Birds, ibid, at 67.
11 The trust was founded in March 1999 to promote good corporate governance. See
<IA ww.corporategovema tice.co.ke>
12 United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry has leaflets that are designed to promote
awareness. See <http://www.dti.gov.uk>
13 Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (London: Gee, 1992)
para 4.19.
14 B Pettet, Company Law, (Pearson, 2001), 224.
15 Percival v Wright [1902] 2 Ch 421. Directors may, however, stand in a fiduciary relationship to
the members if members authorise them to negotiate on their behalf. See Briess v Wolley [1954] AC
333
16 Jensen and Meckling, "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership
Structure", (1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305.
17 It is notable that some companies encourage employees to purchase shares, offer gratuities, and
medical attention. See P Thomas, Private Enterprise and the East African Company, (Tanzania
Publishing House Ltd, 1969) p 29.
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position focuses on the narrow interests of members rather than the long-term
interest of the enterprise. The current regulatory framework is a barrier to profit
sacrificing behaviour because it fails to appreciate that it is for the general benefit of
the corporate entity to "consider itself as a citizen with a role to perform in a social
as well as in an economic context." 19 This has adverse effects on Kenya's societal
interests. For instance, employees are vulnerable because there is no statutory
protection which permits directors to offer compensation by making ex gratia
provision for employees. 20 Moreover, directors are not under any obligation to
establish pension schemes for employees or to safeguard the long-term interests of
employees by running their company efficiently.
According to the concession and communitarian theories, the company is an entity
having both a public role and a private one. 21 It is therefore necessary for a company
to recognise the interests of employees and creditors because they contribute
immensely to the success of the company.
Whilst it has been argued that the ultimate objectives of companies are to generate
maximum value for shareholders, 22 there can be no doubt that maximising
shareholder value does not achieve maximum prosperity and welfare for the society
in which the company operates. 23 An appropriate corporate governance system
" For social responsibilities, such as donations, to be lawful they must be authorised by the
company's memorandum or reasonably incidental or conducive to carrying on the business of the
company (Tomkinson v South-Eastern Railway Co (1887) 35 Ch D 675). In Germany the duty of
directors is broadly expressed to include employees and the public interest. Section 309 of the UK
1989 Companies Act obliges directors of a company to have regard to the interests of the company
employees. In practice, however, enforcement of this duty is rendered inconsequential by the ultimate
control of shareholders and the fact that the duty is owed to the company rather than employees. It is
therefore difficult for employers to enforce it unless shareholders are in favour of such enforcement.
Although employees do not have a remedy under the section, the section might be able to confer
immunity to directors, who can rely on it to claim that their neglect of duty was due to employees'
considerations. See Fulham Football Club v Cabra Estates [1994] 1 BCLC 363 (CA) in Company
Law Review Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic
Framework, February 1999, p 31.
19 P Thomas, op cit n 17, p 14.
20 This is allowed in the UK. See section 719 of the Companies Act 1985 and section 187 of the
Insolvency Act 1986.
21 M Stokes, "Company Law and Legal Theory" in Legal Theory and Common Law (W Twinning,
ed, 1986) pp 155, 162.
22 This is the enlightened shareholder approach. See M Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking
Corporate Governance for the twenty-first Century (1995) in The Company Law Review Steering
Group, op cit n 18, p 31; J Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility, (Clarendon Press, 1993)
p 260.
23 This is the pluralist approach. See Blair M, Ibid.
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demands harmony between different stakeholders whose common objective is the
success of the corporation. 24 For instance, having regard to social responsibilities
might improve the reputation of a company with customers and potential employees
and, in turn, boost sales and the productivity of employees. 25 It is possible that the
creation of a stable social environment in which the company operates would also
profit the company by bringing in new business. In the UK, for instance, Marks and
Spencer's community expenditure has been justified on the basis that urban disorders
would reduce the purchasing power of its customers and, in turn, entail an end to its
260 stores. 26 In fact, the empirical data in Chapter 9 has clearly shown that directors
ought to consider social responsibilities so as to facilitate participation of employees
in economic activities (57 percent of the respondents felt so).
Although it might be the case that requiring directors to have regard to the interests
of employees would not be suitable for a developing economy which is keen to
attract investments, 27 it remains true to say that the failure to take the interests of
employees into consideration adversely affects the productivity of employees and, in
turn, the performance of the company. Given that companies and the society as a
whole stand to benefit from consideration of community interests by directors, it is
important to require directors to have regard for social responsibilities. It is thus
submitted that the duties of directors ought to focus on the long term interests of the
enterprise rather than the narrow interests of members. 28 Directors ought to weigh
the interests of stakeholders while making decisions because companies can enhance
their long-term productivity by sacrificing profits in the short term. 29
24 S Sheikh and W Rees, Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, (Cavendish Publishing
Limited, 1995).
25 .1 Parkinson, op cit n 22, p 261.
26 Ibid, p 294.
'' This position was favoured in Nigeria. See Nigeria Law Reform Commission, Working Papers on
the Reform of Nigerian Company Law: Volume 1-Review and Recommendations, 1987 pp 203-204.
28 Schedule 2, of the draft Companies Bill prepared by the UK's Company Law Steering Group
requires directors to foster good relationships with employees, suppliers, customers, environment,
and members. See para 2 in Sheikh, op cit n 6, at 88.
29 C Villiers, European Company Law: Towards Democracy (Ashgate Publishers, 1998) p 203. Cited
in Paton, "Codification of Corporate Law in the United Kingdom and European Union: The Need for
the Australian Approach", [2000] 11(9) ICCLR 309, 316.
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Given that it would be impossible to enforce a provision requiring directors to have
regard to the interests of employees, 30 as directorial duties are owed to a company
rather than employees, it would be preferable to give employees full voting rights
within a company by allowing employees to nominate representative directors. Such
representative directors would be able to protect the interests of employees by
voicing their concerns at the board level. In the event that representative directors
are outvoted and directors continue with misconduct, the representatives would be
able to challenge managerial conduct as minority shareholders, 31 where the
employees own shares. 32 Further protection might be given to employees by
enabling employees to call for the investigation of the company by the Registrar of
Companies where misconduct of directors affects the interests of employees. 33 It is
notable that the Act is prohibitive, as it only allows a member to call for the
investigation of a company. 34 It is submitted that employees ought to be given this
right without being required to provide security for costs, something that would be a
barrier to employee action.
10.4.1 Multinational Corporations
According to an empirical study conducted by Bornschier and Stamm, 35 entry of
multinational corporations in a market contributes to short term economic growth,
but reduces long term growth performance. Since multinational corporations are
foreign owned, their ultimate objective is to maximise profits for their Western
owners and not to improve the welfare of the host countries.36
30 Professor David Milman has suggested that section 309 of the UK's Companies Act 1985, which
requires directors to have regard to the interests of employees, can be made more effective by
enabling a recognised trade union to invoke it. See D Milman, "From Servant to Stakeholder:
Protecting the Employee Interest in Company Law", in D Feldman and F Meisel (ed), Corporate and
Commercial Law: Modern Developments, (Lloyds of London Press, 1996) p 170.
31 In the UK courts have said that employee shareholders cannot enforce the expectations of
employees, unless the concerned entity was a small private company in which the employee was a
key figure in its operations. As such, section 459 of the Companies Act 1985 has not been applicable
in all circumstances. See Re A Company No 00477 of 1986 [1986] BCLC 376 and Re Unisoft Group
Ltd. (No 3) [1994] 1 BCLC 609; D Milman, ibid, p 170.
32 Section 56 (3) of the Act permit companies to loans to employees to acquire shares in the company.
33 Professor David Milman has suggested that employees should have "an express right to call for the
investigation of their company by the DTI." See D Milman, op cit n 30, p 170.
34 Section 165 (1).
35 V Bornschier and H Stam, "Transnational Corporations" in The Law of the Business Enterprise (S
Wheeler, ed, OUP 1994), pp 333-334.
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Although directors of multinationals are required to have regard, in some countries,
for the interests of stakeholders, such as employees, 37 they are not required to take
similar interests into consideration in Kenya. The empirical data confirms that
multinational corporations in Kenya do not accept the same responsibilities that they
have in other countries. 38 (Forty-five per cent took the view that multinationals do
not have regard to such responsibilities, 22 per cent had no view on the matter, and
33 per cent felt that they did). It is notable that whilst multinational corporations
have legally binding rights vis-à-vis the state and citizens, they do not have
corresponding responsibilities for labour standards, human rights, or environmental
protection. 39 Although multinational corporations make positive contributions to
Kenya's economy, the failure to require them to have regard to the interests of
employees and other stakeholders is both biased and discriminatory, 40 as it
exonerates them from standards that they have to meet in other countries. 41
The failure of multinationals to invest locally or refrain from abusing their
considerable economic and social power, 42 is attributable to unfair international
trade rules, the reluctance of the government to create a strict legislative framework
lest it is construed as hostile towards strong foreign investors, and their influence on
political life which often results in corruption of the democratic process.43
Commenting on the need for business to have political protection, the general
36 Office of Technology Assessment, U.S. Congress, Multinationals and the National Interest:
Playing by Different Rules (US Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1993), pp 1-4. Cited
in J Dine, Company Law, (Sweet & Maxwell, 2001) p 6.
37 Section 309 of the UK's 1989 Companies Act.
38 "Multinational companies and privatised utilities are not vehicles for the business venture of their
shareholders. They are entities with their own aspirations, goals, and histories. The largest of them
have annual turnovers greater that the GNP of most sovereign states." See Bamford, "Directors'
Duties: The Public Dimension" (2000) 2 Co Law 38 at 38.
39 Kirkpatrick et al, "The OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment", [1998] 4 International
Trade Law and Regulation, 125.
4° Article 26 of ICCPR states that all persons are entitled without any discrimination to the equal
protection of the law and that "the law shall ... guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
41 Section 309 of the UK's 1989 Companies Act requires directors to have regard to the interests of
employees. However, this section is of little practical value because employees are unable to enforce
it due to the fact that the duties of employees are owed to the company.
42 A Drzemczewski, European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law (Oxford University Press,
1983) Chapter 8. Cited in Muchlinski, "The Accountability of Multinational Enterprises and the
Right to Development: The Compensation of Industrial Accident Victims from Developing
Countries," [1993] Third World Legal Studies, 189 at 191.
43 Karliner, The Corporate Planet, tracing the "capture" of the U.S. Government. Cited in Janet Dine,
op cit n 36, p 6.
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manager of Shell Nigeria stated in 1995 that "for a commercial company trying to
make investments, you need a stable environment.... Dictatorship can give you
that."44
Although the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) have created rules to govern cross-border trade in goods and
services, they have not established comprehensive rules on investment which would
act as a safeguard against abuse of power by multinational corporations. 45 In fact,
most multilateral rules on trade are protective of foreign investors rather than the
host country. For instance, Article III of GATT 1994 requires a host country to
provide a foreign investor treatment no less favourable than that accorded to
domestic investment or investors. Similarly, the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related
Investment Measures (TRIMs Agreement) prohibits the imposition of certain
performance requirements on foreign investment by host countries.46 The initiatives
of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) have also
been more skewed towards the protection of foreign investors rather than the host
countries. For instance, apart from excluding developing countries from the OECD
negotiations which led to the drafting of Multilateral Agreement on Investment, the
draft rules made no provisions for the obligations of investors. Instead, the rules
prohibited various performance requirements which can be used by host countries to
promote local business. These include: technology transfer requirements, hiring of
local personnel requirements, and nationality requirements for executives and
members of the boards of directors. The only existing safeguards against abuse of
power are the OECD non-binding guidelines for multinational enterprises. The rules
cover, inter alia, employment and industrial relations, environmental protection,
technology transfer, and the disclosure of information. However, the guidelines are
of little practical value because they are not enforceable.47
44 Ibid.
45 Schlegehnilch, "WTO: Why Still No Multilateral Rules for Foreign Direct Investment", [2000] 6
(3) International Trade Law and Regulation, 78, 78.
46 ibid.
47	 •Kirkpatrick et al, op cit n 39, at 125; Schlegelmilch, "International Rules on Foreign Direct
Investment: A New Challenge for the World Trade Organisation", International Trade Law and
Regulation, [1996] 2 (6), 212, at 214.
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Due to the immense wealth of multinational corporations, their ability to out
negotiate the Government in various transactions, the support given to them by their
home governments, and the international trade regulatory framework, it is unlikely
that the Kenyan Government would be able to enter into bilateral treaties which are
•as favourable as those existing between developed countnes. 48 It is submitted that
fair multilateral rules on investments should be adopted in order to provide a level
playing field by protecting the host country as well as foreign investment. These
rules should be enforced by an effective and unbiased international institution.
10.4.2 Donations
Although the consideration of social responsibilities has positive effects, it is
important to regulate some undertakings, such as the giving of donations, because
they are prone to abuse. This was confirmed by the 39 percent of respondents in
Question 2 of the questionnaire who felt that donations encourage corruption.
Although it may well be argued that donations by companies to political parties have
social benefits in that they enable the policies of parties to be effective, such
donations do not directly solve social problems. In the past, donations have been
given to the Government in return for political favours among other personal
benefits, which subsequently occasioned heavy losses to shareholders and
creditors. 49 The abuse of donations should be safeguarded by limiting the amount
that can be given, obliging directors to disclose donations in the accounts of the
company, 50 or requiring the consent of shareholders before giving substantial
donations.
48 Parties to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are prohibited from lowering
health, safety, or environmental standards in order to attract investment. See NAFTA, Chapter 11,
Article 1101 and onward, in Schlegelmilch, ibid, at 214.
49 The fact that many former directors of KCC (Kenya Co-operative Creameries-in receivership) have
gone on to become Members of Parliament illustrates how good KCC was as a spring board into
political positions See "Politics is killing the dairy industry", Market Intelligence Business and
Finance Journal, June 21, 2000 <http://www.mi.co.ke/archive/september  industry.html>
50 In the UK companies have a statutory duty, under the s 235 of the Companies Act 1985, to disclose
donations for political purposes in excess of £ 200 in the report of directors. In addition, schedule 18
of the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 inserted a new Part XA to the
Companies Act 1985, which prohibits a company from making any donation to any political party, or
to any EU political organisation, or incurring any EU political expenditure, unless the donation or
expenditure is approved by the company in a general meeting.
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10.4.3 Corruption
Company law in Kenya recognises the onerous duties of directors as fiduciaries. It
obliges them to act in good faith, for the benefit of the company, and avoid conflict
of interest situations. 51 However, in spite of these requirements it is apparent, as the
empirical research shows, that corruption is a key factor contributing to breaches of
fiduciary duties. When directors abuse the resources of a company through
corruption, 52 they not only threaten the liquidity of the company, but also contribute
to: stagnation of the economy, inadequate physical and social infrastructure, and
poorly functioning political systems.
Given that corruption affects the well-being of both corvorate entides ami ae
economy of Kenya, companies have a collective interest in reducing corruption
levels. Thus, the benefits which accrue to a company as a result of corruption cannot
be "reasonably incidental to the carrying of the company's business." 53 A director
cannot, therefore, engage lawfully in corruption to maximise the profits and, in turn,
promote the prosperity of the company. 54 Besides, due to the illegality of corrupt
practices, the constitution of a company cannot confer lawfully powers on directors
to pursue such practices in the interests of the company. Due to the rampant nature
of corruption, it is submitted that the responsibility of directors should be enhanced
by utilising the proper purpose doctrine to ensure that any exercise of power for
collateral purposes by directors is set aside for not being in the best interests of the
company. 55
51 For example, in Flagship Carriers Ltd v Imperial Bank Ltd, op cit n 4, Mr PJS Hewett stated that
directors must act: bona fide in the interest of and for the benefit of the company as a whole, for
proper purposes and in a proper manner, in a sense as quasi-trustees for the company assets so that
they can, for example, be held liable should they misapply any of the same, not to make secret
crofits, and to avoid conflicts of interests and duty.
2 Section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Cap 65, Laws of Kenya, defines corruption as
"receiving, agreeing to receive, or soliciting some form of material advantage from someone for the
performance or non performance of their public duty. Given that this definition is only limited to
public bodies and public servants, the Government has tabled a bill in Parliament, namely the Kenya
Anti-Corruption and Economics Crimes Bill 2001, which seeks to widen the scope of the definition
to include the private sector. See Hon A Wako, "The Kenya Anti-Corruption Bill 2001:
Memorandum of Objects and Reasons",
<http://www.lawafrica.com/specials/memorandumofobjects.htm>
53 Per Eve J in Re Lee, Behrens and Co Ltd [1932] 2 Ch 46 at 51.
54 J Parkinson, op cit n 22, p 268.
55 Re The Highlands Commercial Union Limited [1957] EA 851.
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Since the international regulatory framework is not effective in proscribing acts of
corruption and, in general breach of fiduciary duties, changes in the Kenyan law and
institutional reforms of the judiciary and civil service may well not eliminate corrupt
practices associated with fiduciaries. The reason for this is that the inequality of
bargaining power between the State and the multinational corporations makes it
possible for corporations to flout rules and discourages the Government from
imposing stringent measures. The failure of the industrialised countries to oblige
multinational corporations, which have a seat in their jurisdictions, to implement56
the OECD Convention 57 also enables the corporations to engage in corrupt
practices. 58 It is submitted that this trend should be reversed by the imposition of
uniform conditions at home and in the host countries by the OECD Convention and
recognition of multinational corporations as international law subjects with
obligations towards good governance, environment, and society.
10.5 Competing with the company
To reduce instances of conflicts between the interests of the company and the duties
of a director, it is important to provide expressly that a director may not engage in
anything that might result in a conflict of his private interests and his duties as a
director. Codifying the rules relating to use of a company's information, opportunity,
and property would clarify when a director is not allowed to gain advantage unduly.
56 The provisions of a treaty entered into by the Government.. .do not become part of the municipal
law.. .save in so far as they are made such by laws of that country." See East African Community v R.
[1970] EA 457.
57 The Convention, which criminalises foreign bribery, was passed on November 21, 1997 in the
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Since the convention cannot
directly pass laws, the Convention only works through committing member states to pass legislation
outlawing bribery of foreign public officials. United States criminalised transnational bribery in the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977. It has also enacted the Organisation of American States'
Convention against Corruption. See Gantz, "Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The
Emergence of a New International Legal Consensus." 18 Northwestern Journal of International Law
and Business 282 (1997). Cited in Kimberly, "The Problem of Corruption: A Tale of Two Countries
(Kenya, Uganda)", [1998] 18, 12 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 524 at
530.
58 In some countries, such as Germany and Belgium, bribes have been tax deductible. OECD
Convention defines the offence of bribery as, "any intentional offer, promise or gift bestowing any
undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through an intermediary to a foreign public
official, for that official or for a third party in order that the official act or refrain from acting in
relation to the performance of official duties in order to obtain or retain business or other improper
advantage in the conduct of international business." See Low et al, "The International Anti-
corruption Standards of the OECD and OAS: A Comparison with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act." Cited in Moran, "Bribery and Corruption: the OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions", [1999] 8 (3) Business Ethics: A
European Review, 141, at 143.
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The definition of the terms "relevant information" and "opportunity" would need to
be defined so as to assist the courts with their interpretation. 59 It would also be
necessary to lay out the consequences for the contravention of the rules in order to
make directors accountable for any benefits gained. Limiting the number of
directorships° that a director may hold might also reduce the chances of competition
with the company. It is also necessary to require a director to obtain consent from
his company before he can hold more than two directorships and prohibiting
executive directors from becoming non-executives of any competing companies.
10.6 Contracts with the company
Breaches of the duties of directors arise often when directors enter into transactions
with companies. It is important to require directors to act in utmost good faith whAst
transacting with a company or on its behalf The Act requires a director who is
interested in any contract to declare the nature of his interests at a meeting of
directors. 61 This does not offer adequate protection to shareholders when fellow
directors connive or take a lenient stand, especially if they are likely to have to
disclose their own interests in the future. 62 Besides, this requirement becomes
ineffective if contracts are not brought before the board in practice. It is therefore
necessary to require directors to make such disclosures to the general meeting.
Given that article 84(3) of Table A appears to exempt directors from disclosure to
the general meeting, provided they disclose to their boards, 63 there is a need to
expressly codify its meaning in order to avoid imputing the possibility of allowing
directors to be in a conflict situation. 64 The provision ought to require expressly that
59 Similar suggestions were made in Sheikh, op cit n 6, at 121.
6° Multiple directorships are recognised by both the Companies Act and Table A. Section 201
requires particulars of all directorships to be contained in the register of directors and secretaries.
Table A, article 78 allows a director to "become a director or other officer of, or otherwise interested
in, any company promoted by the company or in which the company may be interested as
shareholder or otherwise, and no such director shall be accountable to the company for any
remuneration or other benefits received by him as a director or officer of, or from his interest in, such
other company unless the company otherwise directs."
61 Section 200 (1).
62 A single director could constitute a meeting. See Neptune (Vehicle Washing Equipment) Ltd v
Fitzgerald [1996] Ch 274.
63 For differing views expressed as to the effect of s 205, see, Birds, "The Permissible Scope of
Articles excluding the Duties of Company Directors" (1976) 39 MLR 394.
64 Australia's Corporation Act 2001, s 199A, stipulates expressly that an officer of a company cannot
be exempted from a liability to the company.
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directors should not enter into a transaction in which he has an interest, unless the
members have given consent.
10.7 Duties of Skill, Care, and Diligence
Although the Kenyan Capital Markets Authority requires directors of publicly listed
companies to be familiar with basic accounting principles and be "informed, vigilant
and effective overseers of the financial reporting process and the company's internal
controls," 65 there is no statutory provision requiring directors to have expertise and
experience in the management of companies. Thus, the courts 66 assess their liability
subjectively67 by expecting them to exhibit a degree of care and skill that can
reasonably be expected from persons of their knowledge and experience. 68 A
director's knowledge, skills and experience are therefore taken into consideration
when considering their liability. It is, therefore, possible for directors to go
unpunished as a result of negligence arising from their ignorance or inexperience.
Although this law was inherited from English law, it is notable that English case law
has evolved to the point where the subjective test has been replaced by an objective
one69 which requires a director to possess the skill that "may reasonably be
expected from a person undertaking those duties". 7° However, English courts still
partly apply the subjective test by recognising that modern day directors are not
expected to exhibit greater degree of skill than may reasonably be expected from
someone undertaking such duties. 71 As such, English courts apply both the
subjective and objective standards to assess the conduct of directors.
Alcumu, "Stiff New Rules for Companies", Daily Nation, 26 January, 2002. It is also a requirement
under the London Stock Exchange, Listing Rules, paras. 3.8 However, there is no reasonable standard
of general management. Directors are not under a duty to deliver services with reasonable care and
skill because they are exempted from s. 13 of Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982.
66See Flagship Carriers Ltd v Imperial Bank Ltd, op cit n 4, 11.
°Hicks, "Directors' Liability For Management Errors", (1994) 110 LQR 390, at 390.
68 Although a "foolish director" would not be liable for making foolish decisions resulting in loss to
the company, he would be liable for making very foolish decisions since it is not reasonable to expect
a foolish director to make very foolish decisions. See J Ogolla, Company Law, (Nairobi: Focus
Publications, 1997) p 176.
69 Professor Gower, however, argues that the test laid down by Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire
Insurance Co Ltd is partly objective and subjective.
70 Hicks, op cit n 67, at 390.
7I Theodore Goddard [1992] BCC 14. Schedule 2, of the draft Companies Bill prepared by the UK's
Company Law Steering Group requires a director to exercise the care, skill, and diligence which
would be exercised by a reasonably diligent person with both the knowledge, skill, and experience
which may reasonably be expected of a director in his position; and any additional knowledge, skill,
and experience which he has. See para. 4; Sheikh, op cit n 6, at 88.
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Whilst directors continue to abuse their duties, neither the Kenyan Parliament nor
the courts have, so far, seen the need to raise the standard of care, skill, and
diligence expected from directors. Assessing liability subjectively72 protects
miscreant directors, 73as they are able to go unpunished by pleading ignorance and
inexperience. 74 Given that there is no minimum qualification criteria set for
directors, the introduction of an objective element in the assessment of their
standards of skill and care would raise their standards of performance. 75 However,
since it is not practicable to expect a director to exhibit greater degree of skill than
may reasonably be expected from someone undertaking such duties, 76 there is a need
for the court to consider the skill, knowledge, and experience of a director. 77 Thus,
applying both the objective and the subjective tests is necessary because:
• It strikes a balance between reasonable expectations and maintains some degree
of competence by considering individual circumstances of a director as well as
the objective element requiring directors to have some degree of common
intelligence.
• Small businessmen desirous of making independent decisions to direct their own
companies would be unable to make such decisions in the event that all directors
are judged by the same standards.
• Since directors with good expertise would be accountable for what they know,
the general standards of conduct would improve.
72 Flagship Carriers Ltd v Imperial Bank Ltd, op cit n 4.
73 In Dovey v Cory [1901] AC 477 Cory, a director, wrongfully assented to certain payments and
advances having honestly relied on the advice given by Chairman and General Manager of the bank.
He was found not to be negligent of his duties after due consideration of his company's business and
his position in relation to it. Similarly, Neville J in Re Brazilian Rubber Plantations & Estates Ltd
[1911] 1 Ch 425 at 437 was of the view that directors are under a duty to exercise reasonable care
having regard to their knowledge and experience, which "an ordinary man might be expected to take
in the same circumstances on his own behalf"
74 Nolan, "Maxwell Improper Purposes" (1994) 15 Co Law 85 at 87.
75 In Daniels and Others v Anderson and Others (AWA case) (1995) 16 ACSR 607 at 658, the New
South Wales Court of Appeal observed that old cases which imposed the subjective test and gross
negligence were outdated. The subjective duty of care, skill, and diligence expected from a director
was described as remarkably low.
76Modern courts in Australia and the U.K. still recognise the subsistence of the subjective element.
See Theodore Goddard [1992] BCC 14.
77 English and Australian courts apply both the subjective and objective standards to assess directors'
negligence. See Ipp, "The Diligent Director" (1997) 18 Co Law 162 at 163.
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Although it may be necessary to impose restrictive provisions in order to enhance
the accountability of directors, it is undoubtedly the case that directors may
experience difficulties whilst making decisions if they cannot establish their
potential liabilities with certainty. This may, in turn, dissuade them from taking
business risks. As a safeguard against such an event, courts must protect directors
who make honest, informed, and rational judgements that a reasonable person in
their position would make.78
Directors in Kenya are also not required to give continuous attention to the affairs of
the company. Instead, competence performance by directors or their delegates in
periodical board meetings suffices. 79 Courts in other jurisdictions have curbed
neglect of duty by imposing liability for non-attendance of board meetings and
entrusting delegates to carry out the affairs of the company. 8° It is submitted that
directors ought to be required to give continuous attention to affairs of the company
so as to avoid neglect which may occasion loss to a company.
10.8 Enforcement of Liability.
It is evident from Chapter Five that the power of shareholders to control directors is
minimal. The empirical data also shows that a clear majority (89 percent) agreed that
there is no effective enforcement of liability. The law does not enable shareholders
to enforce liability against miscreant directors because the corporate entity principle
bars shareholders from enforcing their claims. 81 The company is the only body
that is entitled to sue a miscreant director, 82 as his duties are only owed to the
78 Australia's Corporation Act 2001, s 180 (2), provides that the standard of care under statute law is
met if directors, in making business decisions inform themselves about the subject matter, make the
decisions in good faith, rationally believe it is in the best interest of the company, and do not have a
material personal interest in the subject matter of the subject.
79 Per Romer J in Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd [1925] Ch 407 at 429-9. The case
formulated three principles, namely (i) the subjective test of skill which does not require a director to
exhibit, in the performance of his duties, a greater degree of skill than may reasonably be expected
from a person of his knowledge and experience, (ii) a director is not bound to give continuous
attention to the company's affairs, (iii) a director can trust an official to perform duties that can be
entrusted to him in accordance with the articles.
89 Bowerman v Hammer (1919) 250 US 504. Kavanaugh v Gould (1918) 223 NY 103, 199 NE 237; Nigeria
Law Reform Commission, op cit n 27, p 173.
81 The power to litigate in the company's name is vested in the board of directors and the general
meeting. See Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others [1966] EA 390 (applying Foss v Harbottle
(1843) 2 Hare 461).
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company. 83 As such, the shareholders of a company whose directors form and
control the majority of shareholders face enforcement difficulties because they
cannot litigate in the name of the company, as the majority decision is binding on
the minority. In the past, courts have been most reluctant to interfere with the
internal management of companies, they have adhered to majority rule.
Whilst the exceptions to the rule enable a minority shareholder to sue in the name of
the company where, for instance, the majority is committing a fraud on the minority,
a shareholder is still required to discharge the onus of establishing fraud. 84 Thus,
although the enforcement restrictions85 imposed on minority shareholders by the rule
in Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others, 86 preserve the corporate and
collective nature of the company, they restrict the power of the individual
shareholder to enforce the rights of a company.
Whilst statutory provisions enable any member of a company who complains of the
oppressive nature of the conduct of the affairs of the company on some part of the
membership to make an application to the court by petition for an order, 87 the
remedy is too restrictive since a shareholder has to prove that a defendant has
overwhelming contro1 88 of the company and that "the facts would justify the making
of a winding up order on the ground that it was just and equitable that the company
should be wound up." 89 Given that the courts interpret the notion of "oppression" in
a narrow sense, 90 there is a heavy onus of proof placed on minority shareholders
82 Proceedings may be instituted against a de facto or shadow director as well as a retired director,
estate of a deceased director, and a bankrupt director. See Curtis's Furnishing Stores Ltd v Freedman
[1966] 2 All ER 955. Proceedings may be instituted in the name of the company on the authority of
the board of directors or the General Meeting. See Article 80, Table A of the Act.
83 Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others, op cit n 81.
84 Although the courts in the United Kingdom have accepted that the term 'fraud' may cover breaches
of duty, intentional acts of discrimination, and unintentional abuses of corporate power, it is not
certain whether Kenyan courts would adopt a similar definition. See Knight v Frost [1999] 1 BCLC
364.
85 The restrictions are aimed at discouraging wasted litigation, discouraging multiple actions, and
underscoring the principles of majority rule and separate legal personality.
" [1966] EA 390.
87 The Act, s211.
88 Birch v Sullivan [1957] 1 WLR 1247.
89 Section 211(1) (b), The Act. For an illustration of how onerous it is to prove that it is just and
equitable to wind up a company under section 211 see Mohamed Mitha and Others v Ibrahim Mitha
and Others [1967] EA 575 and Sverre Haug and Others v Buhemba Mines (1953) 20 EACA 28. If
the court is convinced that it is just and equitable to wind up the company the shareholders have to
convince the court to grant the oppressive conduct remedy rather than the winding up order. See Re
Bellador Silk Ltd [1965] 1 All ER 667.
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which makes it easy for miscreant directors to escape liability when they form and
control the majority of the shareholders. 91 It is also possible for directors to escape
liability if what is complained of is an omission, threatened future conduct or a
single instance of an oppressive conduct, rather than a continuing course of
oppressive conduct.92
The UK's Companies Act 1985 93 has replaced the notion of "oppression" and
allowed a shareholder to bring action if the conduct of directors constitutes "unfairly
prejudicial conduct". This remedy is better than the Kenyan one because a single
event which may be an act, an omission, or threatened future conduct is sufficient to
constitute unfairly prejudicial conduct. 94 Importantly, the act complained of does not
have to satisfy the grounds for the granting of a winding up order on the just and
equitable ground. In addition, the terms "unfair" and "prejudice" have a wide scope
and it is not necessary to prove that the act complained of was conducted in bad
faith. 95 It is submitted that the Kenyan statutory oppression remedy should be made
more effective by abolishing the need to prove that the defendant has overwhe)mjng
control and that it is just and equitable to wind up the company.96
Although section 211 of the Act enables a member or the Attorney-Genera1 97 to
apply for court relief as a result of oppressive nature of the conduct of the affairs of
the company, the section cannot be invoked as a result of hardship suffered by
Conduct is regarded as oppressive if it is burdensome, harsh, and wrong. See Scottish Competitive
Co-operative Wholesale Society Ltd v Meyer [19591 AC 324.
91 To sue under the minority oppression head, shareholders have to prove a defendant's
overwhelming control of the company.
92 Clark, "Unfairly Prejudicial Conduct: A Pathway Through the Maze", (2001) 22 (6) Co Law 170,
171.
93 Section 459 (1).
94 Clark, op cit n 92, at 171
95 Re RA Noble & Sons (Clothing) Ltd [1983] BCLC 273. The breach of constitution and legitimate
expectations can be a ground for a claim under the section.
96 In New Zealand, for instance, shareholders are no longer required to show lack of probity or want
of good faith on the part of directors This has been made possible by the liberalised approach adopted
by the courts following enactment of section 174 of the Companies Act 1993. Although the
liberalised approach enhanced shareholders' rights to remedy personal wrongs, it did not enhance
shareholders' ability to enforce corporate causes of action Berkhahn, "Derivative Action in Australia
and New Zealand", (1998) 10 Bond LR 74 at 91; Thomas v HW Thomas Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 686 at
693.
97 The Attorney-General is empowered to petition when the case falls under section 170 (2), which
allows the Attorney General to petition for a winding-up order.
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directors, employees, creditor, or debenture-holder, where they are not members.98
Similarly, the remedy under section 459 of the UK's Companies Act 1985 is limited
in scope because the only persons who can invoke the section are members of a
company or a person to whom shares have been transferred or transmitted by law.99
In contrast, the Canadian Business Corporation Act IN regards a registered holder or
beneficial owner, and a former registered holder or beneficial owner of a security of
a company as being able to qualify as complainants for the purposes of applying for
judicial relief as a result of oppressive conduct. The court can grant judicial relief if
such a complainant satisfies the judge that some oppressive conduct has unfairly
prejudiced the interests of any security holder, creditor, director, or officer.1°1
The class of persons covered by the term "members" for the purposes of suing on
behalf of the company, where affairs are being conducted in an oppressive manner,
in Nigeria includes "persons who have suffered or are Mce1y to suffer from conduct
which is prejudicial to their interests." IO2 Other persons included in the definition of
a member include:
• "The personal representative of a deceased member
• Any person to whom shares of a member have been
transferred or transmitted by operation of law
• A director or an officer or former director or officer of the
company
• A creditor of the company
• The Corporate Affairs Commission in a case where the
Commission has received any adverse reports on the conduct
of affairs of any company as a result of any investigation
98 Section 26 of the Act refers to members as subscribers to the memorandum of association who
become members on its incorporation. It also refers to any other person who agrees to become a
member and whose name is entered in the register. In Re Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd (1970) 3
All ER 57 at 67, the term member was interpreted to include a deceased member's personal
representative. Also see Re Lundie (1965) 2 ER 692.
99 For a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of section 459 in the UK see Clark, op cit 1192, at 171.
IN Section 247 (2).
loi Lowry, "The Oppression Remedy: A Canadian Approach", [1991] JBL 196, 196.
102 Nigeria Law Reform Commission, op cit n 27, p 237
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carried out by it; and any other person who in the discretion
of the court, is a proper person."1°3
Whilst it can be argued that allowing a shareholder of a related body corporate to
make an application regarding a company in which he has no stake is undesirable,1°4
there can be no doubt that there is a need to widen the class of persons that can seek
a remedy from the court. Since creditors may also petition the court for winding-up
orders on such grounds, they should also be empowered to seek relief under this
section. Although it may be argued that such a step would open a floodgate of
claims, the assertion can be refuted if the institution of proceedings depended on
securing the leave of the court, for the courts would be able to strike out frivolous
claims at the leave stage.
Although there is a need to preserve the collective nature of corporate decision-
making and to prevent mass shareholder litigation on any matter with which the
shareholders are dissatisfied, there can be no doubt that the need to sustain
accountability demands expedient enforcement of the duties of directors. The
present position is skewed towards the preservation of corporate entity rather than
enforcement of liability. It is necessary to strike a balance between the two interests
because appropriate corporate governance can hardly be realised unless a legal
system has in place a mechanism that facilitates prompt and expedient resolution of
disputes within a company. Enabling shareholders to enforce the rights of the
company more readily would be a safeguard against the tendency of directors to
escape liability. For instance, shareholders would be adequately protected if they are
enabled to litigate in the name of the company without having to discharge the
heavy onus required to establish that directors have overwhelming control of the
company.
I nbid p 247.
1 °4McDonough, "Proposed New Statutory Derivative Action-Does it go Far Enough?" (1996) 8 Bond
LR 47 at 58.
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It is submitted that Kenya ought to follow other jurisdictions which have opted not
to apply the rule in Foss v Harbottle when it stands in the way of justice.105
Although the Kenyan Capital Markets Authority now requires public listed
companies to have "a mechanism for representation of minority shareholders
without undermining the collective responsibility of the directors," I °6 shareholders
are still not in a position to enforce the rights of a company where directors form and
control a majority of the votes. It is thus necessary to have a statutory provision
enabling minority shareholders to enforce the rights of the company. 1 °7 For instance,
a statutory derivative action would enable a shareholder to bring an action on behalf
of a company if the company is unwilling to invoke its litigation powers. Whilst it
may well be argued that a statutory derivative action would interfere unduly with the
decision making role of the board, there can be no doubt that the courts would assess
the extent to which a decision of the board should be challenged. 1 °8 As a safeguard
against frivolous suits by shareholders, it is submitted that persons invoking the
derivative action should seek leave of the court in order to establish their bona fides,
inaction of the company, whether the action is in the best interests of the company,
and whether there is a serious issue to be tried.109
Shareholders should be given more powers to enforce the liability of directors by
relaxing the inspection and investigation provisions under the Act. The Act enables
a court to appoint one or more competent inspectors to investigate or inspect the
affairs of a company having a share capital, if an application is made by either more
than 200 members or members holding not less than one tenth of the shares
issued. 11 ° In the case of a company not having a share capital, the application ought
to be made by more than one-fifth in the number of persons on the company's
105 The Corporate Law Economic Program Act 1999 of Australia inserted a right to bring a "statutory
derivative action" as Pt 2F IA of Australia's Corporations Act. Companies Act 1993 of New
Zealand has a similar provision. See s 165.
106 Akunia, "State Control Blamed for Problems in Privatising Telecoms Companies", Daily Nation,
8 March, 2002.
101 Courts in other jurisdictions, such as Australia and New Zealand, have shown the tendency of not
applying the rule in Foss v Harbottle when it stands in the way of justice. See Pt 2F lA of Australia's
c orporations Act 2001; The Companies Act 1993 of New Zealand, s 165; and Thomas v HIV Thomas
Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 686 at 693.
108 Paton, op cit n 29, 315.
109 These are some of the grounds that have to be satisfied before a person can get leave of the court
in Australia to pursue a statutory derivative action. See s 237 Corporation Law 2001.
110 Section 165 (1) (a)
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register of members." It is evident that a shareholder who is incapable of
mustering the required majority carmot make an application under this section. As a
result, he would not be able obtain documentary evidence for the purposes of taking
action against directors. As it stands, the provision is too stringent and ought to be
relaxed in order to accommodate more investigations. Alternatively, shareholders
should be entitled to have access to relevant documents.112
Given that a member is required to provide the registrar with security for costs when
he wishes the affairs of the company to be investigated, wit is submitted that this
requirement should be abolished because it deters a member who is unable to
provide the security for costs from pursuing individual suits. I14 Although this
requirements helps to prevent frivolous and vaxatious claims, a public body with a
mandate to investigate the affairs of companies would be better suited to investigate
the claims made by individuals in order to pursue the genuine ones.
10.9 Parastatals
The poor performance of parastatals is attributable to the failure of the state, as an
owner of enterprises, to motivate the firms to realise competitive business
standards. 115 It is evident from the empirical data that inadequate management
controls contributed substantially to the poor performance of parastatals. This was
supported by 94 percent of respondents in the empirical study. It is also the case that
divesting the interests of the State in parastatals through privatisation would improve
accountability (91 percent supported this).
It is apparent that the State Corporations Act 116 politicises the appointment of
directors by vesting the powers of appointment in the President" and the
Ibid.
112 The USA has removed the common law position of non-accessibility. See Nigeria Law Reform
Commission, op cit n 27, p 249.
113 The security required in Kenya amounts to Kshs 10, 000 (£ 100).
114 The Nigerian Law Reform Commission also recommended the relaxation of Nigeria's inspection
and investigation provisions on the grounds that they barred many shareholders from enforcing
directors' liability. See sections 157-167 of the Nigerian Companies Act 1968.
115 S Estrin, "State Ownership, Corporate Governance, and Privatisation", in OECD, OECD
Proceedings: Corporate Governance, State Owned Enterprises and Privatisation, (Off Pubns OEEC
2781, 1998), p 11.
116 Cap 446, Laws of Kenya.
Ill S 6 (1) (a), the President appoints the chairman.
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Minister. 118 The appointees therefore act in the interests of their appointors rather
than the corporation. It is submitted that this trend can be reversed by requiring all
appointments to be made by an independent body, such as Parliament.
Excessive regulations coupled with extensive ministerial intervention in the
functioning of the boards impair their ability to make commercially sound decisions
and enforce accountability. For instance, the inability of the board to dismiss
executive officers renders difficult the task of imposing performance levels and
sanctions. 119 This is because parastatals are governed by overlapping laws and
regulations. Although each parastatal is governed according to the Act of Parliament
under which it was established, they are all governed under the State Corporations
Act 12° and the administrative circulars which are issued frequently by the office of
the President and the Ministers. The lack of powers to impose sanctions on the Chief
Executive and other senior executive also limits the ability of boards of parastatals
to meet their goals. Given that companies can hardly achieve efficiency unless
directors are given the autonomy to steer the companies forward, I21 it is submitted
that the interests of the State in parastatals should be divested in order for the board
of directors to function effectively.
Although privatisation of parastatals would give the board of directors autonomy,
and in turn, increase efficiency by reducing political influence, I22 the transfer of
property rights to new owners does not necessarily guarantee that sound corporate
governance structures and processes are established and sustained. 123 Thus, there is
a need to have in place effective regulations that would not only guide the
privatisation process but also protect the privatised corporations from abuse. 124 Such
legislation would reduce political and social costs which are borne as a result of
118 s 6 (1) (e), the minister appoints the Chief Executive Officer and other members of the board.
119 Chief executives, as appointees of the President, can only be sacked by the President. World Bank,
Bureaucrats in Business; The Economies and Politics of Government Ownership, Washington DC
1995 at 14 in McDonough, "Corporate Governance and Government Owned Corporations in
Queensland", (1998) 10 Bond LR 272 at 309.
120 The Act attempts to bring all corporations under one uniform law.
121 S Sheikh and W Rees, op cit n 24.
122 Kenya Airways became competitive and profitable after privatisation. See "KR to go Public,
Government Says", Daily Nation, March 15, 2000.
123 "Transparency Required in the Privatisation of the Sugar Industry", East African Standard, 16
Gctober, 2001.
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having unclear rules regarding the selection of buyers. In the past, parastatals have
been sold at discounted prices to politicians. 125 Moreover, privatisation of some
parastatals, such as Telkom Kenya, has stalled because of a failure on the part of
politicians to agree on the shareholdings in the privatised corporation. I26 It is
submitted that the privatisation process should be governed by an autonomous body
which is answerable to a body, such as Parliament, that cannot be easily the subject
of interference.
10.10 Self regulation
Despite the pressure on the Kenyan Government to reduce its intervention in the
economy, self-regulatory codes are likely to have little utility in themselves because
of the possibility of directors not being effective in policing themselves. As ae.
empirical data in Chapter 9 shows, a majority of the respondents preferred statutory
control to self-regulation. The empirical data shows that a majority of the
28respondents (69 percent) were actually against 127 self-regulatory codes. 1 It is
notable that due to corruption and lack of a strict mechanism to enforce the codes of
discipline, the use of self-regulatory codes by professional societies in Kenya has
been largely ineffective. 129 In fact, responses to Question 7 of the survey
questionnaire indicated that most professional bodies do not strictly observe rules
and regulations. A few of those mentioned in the responses were the Law Society of
Kenya, the Kenya Institute of Management, and the Kenya National Chamber of
Commerce & Industry. It is submitted that statutory control of directors would have
more effect in Kenya than self-regulation. Under the current system, a self-
regulatory regime ought to be supplemented by strict government regulation until
such a time that it is possible to have an effective full self-regulation regime.
124 Few indigenous Kenyans have bought the privatised firms to date. See" Parastatal Bosses are
Political Retirees", The East African, April 24, 2000.
125 Kisero, "Meddlers to be Shut out of State Firms", Daily Nation, 28 May, 2002.
126 Kisero, "New Law may Stymie the Vultures", Daily Nation, 29 May 2002.
127 The Kenyan Parliament recently disagreed with the wishes of the Treasury, the World Bank and
the IMF by passing a bill limiting the interest rates of banks. See "Welcome to Kenya, IMF's Little
Colony", Daily Nation, 20 May, 2001.
128 The implementation of the International Accounting Standards (IAS) has been criticised on the
basis that the standards are only favourable towards foreign owned multinational banks as Kenya's
banks were constrained by the short term nature of Kenyan deposits. Another reason advanced
against the IAS was that the Kenyan judicial system discourages the quick dispensation of
commercial cases. See "Banker, NSE Chief Riled by IAS", East African Standard, 17 May, 2001.
129 Rugene, "AG Praises Efforts to Keep Media Discipline", Daily Nation, 8 May, 2002.
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10.11 Disqualification
The empirical data reveals that disqualification orders are very rare and that a stricter
disqualification I30 regime would ensure that unfit directors do not serve on
boards. 131 A stricter disqualification regime would protect the public by placing
prohibitions on errant directors being involved, for a specific period, in the
management of companies. As well as preventing people without the necessary
qualifications from managing companies, disqualification orders may also serve as a
deterrent to those who might be tempted to engage in fraudulent and improper
activities, and those who are unfit to act.
Whilst a director can be disqualified for breaches of duty when a company is in the
course of winding UP, I32 fraud needs to be proven against the director when the
company is a going concern. 133 As such, a director in Kenya cannot be disqualified
for being unfit to be involved in the management of a company. 134 This is to be
contrasted with the UK I35 and Australia. Directors in Australia 136 and New Zealand
can also be disqualified for acting dishonestly, failing to exercise reasonable care,
and acting in an incompetent manner. I37 Given that the duty of proving fraud in
Kenya is onerous, I38 the remedy of disqualification on grounds of fraudulent trading
130 Disqualification of directors protects the public by placing a prohibition on the errant director
being involved, for a specific period, in the management of companies. See S Mayson et al, Company
Law, 17th Edition (Blackstone, 2000) p 679.
131 Eighty nine percent of the respondents felt that there is little chance of directors being sued for
breach of duties when companies enter liquidation. Ninety-two percent of the respondents also felt
that directors' disqualification orders are extremely rare. Ninety-eight percent agreed with the
statement that an effective disqualification regime of directors would promote standards of corporate
governance.
132 Under section 189 (1) (b) (ii) a director may be disqualified for fraud or breach of duty if the
company is in the course of winding up. A bankrupt is also precluded from being a director under
section 188.
133 Section 189 (1).
"4 Explaining what makes a person unfit in the UK, Browne Wilkinson VC said in Re Lo Line
Electric Motors Ltd [1988] 3 WLR 26,"Ordinary commercial misjudgement is in itself not sufficient
to justify disqualification. In the normal case, the conduct complained of must display a lack of
eounercial probity, although I have no doubt that in an extreme case of gross negligence or total
incompetence disqualification could be appropriate."
135 Section 6 of the UK's CDDA. Also see Re Barings Plc (No 5) [1999] 1 BCLC 433; AB Trucking
and BA W Commercials (Ch D June 1987; Dine, "Disqualification of Company Directors" (1988) 9
co Law 213.
136 Whilst determining whether to disqualify a directors the Australian courts take into consideration a
elifector's conduct in relation to the management, business or property of any corporation. See s 206 E
(2). For UK, see section 8 of the Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 ("CDDA").
131 New Zealand's Companies Act 1993, s 383.
138 Kassam Ebrahim v Tait [1935] EACA 51.
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is somewhat insufficient. It is submitted that directors should be disqualified on the
basis of wrongful acts rather than fraud.
Directors who have been responsible for the insolvency of several companies in
Kenya are not precluded from acting as directors, I39unless they have been
disqualified following bankruptcy I40or conviction for fraud.' It is necessary to bar
such directors from assuming other directorships for a specified time in order to
safeguard against abuse of companies that they might mismanage.
In Kenya, the failure to file annual returns by directors only makes them liable to a
fine, I42 while in Australia, I43 directors can be disqualified for up to five years for
being in default of filing returns with the Australian Securities and Investments
Commission. It is necessary to adopt this ground of disqualification in Kenya
because it would enable shareholders to keep track of the activities of a company
more effectively.
Under section 189 of the Act a disqualified director is precluded from being
involved in the management of companies for a period not exceeding five years.
Other jurisdictions have recognised the need for longer periods of disqualification.
For instance, Australian courts can disqualify a person from managing corporations
for a period that the Court considers appropriate.' UK's Company Directors
Disqualification Act 1986 ("CDDA") imposes a minimum disqualification of two
years and a maximum of fifteen years: 45 It is submitted that longer periods of
139 Section 323 of the Act imposes personal liability for debts of the company and other liabilities on
those persons who were knowingly party to fraud.
14° The Act, section 188 (1). Under section 189 of the Act, a disqualified director is precluded from
being involved in the management of companies for a period not exceeding five years. The UK's
CDDA 1986 imposes a minimum disqualification of two years and a maximum of fifteen years for
unfit conduct.
141 The Act, section 189 (1). It is an offence in the UK for a director of a wound up company, within
five years, to be a director or concerned in the management of a company known by the same name
or so similar a name to suggest an association with the liquidating company. See section 216,
Insolvency Act 1986.
142 Section 125 (3), The Act.
143 Corporations Act 2001, sections 4, 10, 285.
ma Corporations Act 2001, sections 206C and 206 E.
145 In assessing the appropriate length of the disqualification order, the court considers; the nature of
the offence, whether it was closely connected with management, nature of the person's involvement
in the offence, his general character and reputation etc. See Hicks, "Making and Resisting
Disqualification Orders" (1987) 8 (6) Co Law 243 at 246.
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disqualification should be imposed so as to deter miscreant directors and keep them
away from boardrooms for longer periods.
The lack of a register of disqualification orders in Kenya makes it impossible to
enforce disqualification orders when a director continues to act secretly. It is
important to have such a register because it facilitates effective enforcement of
disqualification orders and brings to light any disqualified director. This would
enable creditors and the general public to be able to know that a person is
disqualified and, therefore, register their protests when a disqualified person
manages a company. 146
In sum, broadening the scope of disqualification provisions, offences, and grounds
covered by the Act would prevent miscreant directors finding their way to, or
remaining in, boardrooms.
10.12 Conclusions
The codification of the duties of directors, as well as the other provisions suggested
above, would not only simplify the legal requirements, but also their presentation. It
would provide an opportunity to clarify and broaden the rules and provisions that are
unclear and restrictive. This would allow directors and the stakeholders of the
company to understand more easily the duties and responsibilities of directors. The
understanding would, in turn, be likely to enhance the performance of directors and
promote shareholder activism. All these are necessary ingredients of an appropriate
and robust corporate governance system.
146 The Ghanaian Code, s 186, requires the Registrar to publish a register of disqualified persons in
the Gazette and maintain it for the purposes of public inspection. Similarly, the UK Secretary of State
maintains a register of disqualification orders, which is open to inspection free of charge. Section 18,
CDDA 1986 provides that the register can be inspected at the Companies House in London within
fourteen days of making a disqualification order. The court sends the particulars of the order to the
Secretary of State for entry in the register. In addition any variation and grant of leave to act must be




This thesis has demonstrated that in spite of the important role played by a limited
liability company in enabling capital to be accumulated and invested in risk-taking
enterprises, the ability of the company to contribute positively to the economy is
constrained by ineffective regulation of directors. The poor performance of a vast
majority of companies and the Kenyan economy is traceable to the poor and, in
some cases, fraudulent performance of boards of companies. The current regulatory
framework, whose origin can be traced back to the colonial government, is not only
inadequate, but also too outdated to serve the interests of modern day companies and
a modern society. In spite of the outdated and ineffective nature of the law, external
factors, such as corruption, have also militated against the proper performance of
directorial duties. The corrupt political system has contributed to the failure to
safeguard social and economic rights of Kenyans. This in turn explains why the
Government has failed to protect the interests of stakeholders of companies and
enforce the liability of miscreant directors effectively. Such protection can be
achieved by reforming both the environment within which companies operate and
the Companies Act (the "Act") in order to raise the levels of accountability and
responsibility of directors.
Although the Act and rules of common law define the obligations of directors, they
contain rules that are cumbersome and difficult to understand. Therefore, this
constitutes a barrier to directors knowing what is expected of them. Since the ability
of Kenyan courts to develop the law might be hampered by external factors, such as
lack of resources to purchase law reports, the law relating to directors should be
codified in order for the courts and other interest groups to have easy grasp of the
duties and responsibilities of directors.' Although codification would not necessarily
'In the UK, it has been proposed that that a statutory statement should be formulated to make the
doctrine useful as a guide to directors. See DTI, The Company Law Review Steering Group: Final
Report: Final Report, 2001, p 41; Company Directors: Regulating Conflicts of Interest and
Formulating a Statement of Duties (Law Commission Consultation Paper No 153, London:
Stationery Office, 1998), Part 15.
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dispense with the need to seek statutory interpretation from case law, it is
undoubtedly the case that it would make the law more accessible. In addition to
making the law accessible, it is necessary for directors who do not have the requisite
knowledge to undergo some significant training in order to perform effectively. This
is likely to raise the levels of corporate governance by enhancing the competence of
directors and the activism of shareholders.2
Although the duties of directors are owed to the company itself, this thesis has
demonstrated the need for the duties of directors to include a wider constituency
than that of shareholders. Whilst it may be argued that the ultimate objectives of
companies are to generate maximum value for shareholders, 3 this thesis has shown
that maximising shareholder value does not achieve maximum prosperity and
welfare of the society. 4 As such, it is necessary for directors to weigh the interests of
stakeholders against the immediate interests of the company when making decisions
because companies can enhance their long-term productivity by sacrificing profits in
the short term. 5 Failure to do that may, for instance, result in widespread consumer
activism in the global market which would damage the reputation of a company that
is not socially responsible. Requiring directors to take social responsibilities into
account would also reduce the abuse of the economic and social power 6 of
multinational corporations. Given that multinational corporations use their powers to
out-negotiate the Government in transactions, there is a need for fair rules on
investment which would act as a safeguard against abuse of power. 7 The reason for
2 United Kingdom's Department of Trade and Industry has leaflets that are designed to promote
awareness. See <http: /www.dti.gov.uk>
3 This is the enlightened shareholder approach. See Blair M, Ownership and Control: Rethinking
Corporate Governance for the twenty-first Century (1995). Cited in The Company Law Review
Steering Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework,
February 1999, p 31; J Parkinson, Corporate Power and Responsibility, (Clarendon Press, 1993) p
260.
4 This is the pluralist approach. See M Blair, Ownership and Control: Rethinking Corporate
Governance for the twenty-first Century (1995). Cited in The Company Law Review Steering
Group, Modern Company Law for a Competitive Economy: The Strategic Framework, February
1999, p 31.
5 Paton, "Codification of Corporate Law in the United Kingdom and European Union: The Need for
the Australian Approach", [2000] 11(9) ICCLR 309, 316.
6 A Drzemczewski, European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law (Oxford University Press,
1983) Ch 8. Cited in Muchlinski, "The Accountability of Multinational Enterprises and the Right to
Development: The Compensation of Industrial Accident Victims from Developing Countries,"
C1993] Third World Legal Studies, 189 at 191.
Schlegelmilch R, "WTO: Why Still No Multilateral Rules for Foreign Direct Investment", [2000] 6
(3) International Trade Law and Regulation, 78, 78.
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this is that the present day rules developed by the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
are more protective of foreign investors than the host countries.
In spite of the considerable benefits that are likely to be drawn from the assumption
of social responsibilities by directors, it is still important to have effective regulation
in place because some undertakings, such as the giving of donations, are likely to be
abused by miscreant directors. Due to the rampant nature of corruption in Kenya, it
is not unlikely for donations to be given to politicians in return for political favours.8
Although Kenyan company law obliges directors to act in good faith, for the benefit
of the company, and avoid conflict of interest situations, 9 there is a litany of
breaches of duties by directors, especially when they engage in corruption. Since
corruption affects the well-being of both corporate entities and the economy of
Kenya, companies have a collective interest in reducing corcupeian 	 Elus,
benefits which accrue to a company as a result of corruption cannot be "reasonably
incidental to the carrying of the company's business."  A director cannot, therefore,
engage lawfully in corruption to maximise the profits and, in turn, promote the
prosperity of the company." Besides, due to the illegality of corrupt practices, the
constitution of a company cannot lawfully confer powers on directors to pursue such
practices in the interests of the company.
Local and international initiatives are needed to eliminate the problem of corruption
in Kenya. This is because powerful and influential foreign investors are also active
participants in corruption. Moreover, the inequality of bargaining power between the
State and multinational corporations may also discourage the Government from
imposing stringent measures. Therefore, there is a need for Western countries to
oblige multinational corporations, which have a seat in their jurisdictions, to
8 The fact that many former directors of KCC (Kenya Co-operative Creameries-in receivership) have
gone on to become Members of Parliament illustrates how good KCC was as a spring board into
political positions. See "Politics is killing the dairy industry", Market Intelligence Business and
Finance Journal, June 21, 2000 <http://www.mi.co.ke/archive/september  industry.html>
9 In Flagship Carriers Ltd v Imperial Bank Ltd, High Court Civil Case No 1643 of 1999
(Unreported), Mr PJS Hewett stated that directors must act: bona fide in the interest of and for the
benefit of the company as a whole, for proper purposes and in a proper manner, in a sense as quasi-
trustees for the company assets so that they can, for example, be held liable should they misapply any
of the same, not to make secret profits, and to avoid conflicts of interests and duty.
10 Per Eve J in Re Lee, Behrens and Co Ltd [1932] 2 Ch 46 at 51.
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implement 12 the OECD Convention l3which proscribes corrupt practices. I4 The
presence of uniform conditions at home and in the host countries would go a long
way towards reducing corruption.
The extent to which directors have failed to meet levels of reasonable diligence,
good faith, and honesty has been demonstrated in this thesis. Reforms that are
protective of the public interest are needed in order to raise levels of responsibility
and accountability in the performance of directorial duties.
Conflicts between the interests of the company and the duties of a director can be
reduced by expressly providing that a director may not engage in anything that
might result in a conflict of his private interests and his duties as a director. It is
therefore important to codify the common law rules relating to use of a company's
information, opportunity, and property. This would clarify when a director is not
allowed to gain advantage unduly. Directors also ought to be required to act in
utmost good faith whilst transacting with a company or on its behalf, in °Ida to
prevent breaches of duty which arise when directors enter into transactions with
"J Parkinson, op cit n 3, p 268.
12 "The provisions of a treaty entered into by the Government.. .do not become part of the municipal
law.. .save in so far as they are made such by laws of that country." See East African Community v R.
[1970] EA 457.
13 The Convention, which criminalises foreign bribery, was passed on November 21, 1997 in the
Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). Since the convention cannot
directly pass laws, the Convention only works through committing member states to pass legislation
outlawing bribery of foreign public officials. United States criminalised transnational bribery in the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act in 1977. It has also enacted the Organisation of American States'
Convention against Corruption. See Gantz, "Globalizing Sanctions Against Foreign Bribery: The
Emergence of a New International Legal Consensus." 18 Northwestern Journal of International Law
and Business 282 (1997). Cited in Kimberly, "The Problem of Corruption: A Tale of Two Countries
(Kenya, Uganda)", [1998] 18, 12 Northwestern Journal of International Law and Business, 524 at
530.
14 In some countries, such as Germany and Belgium, bribes have been tax deductible. OECD
Convention defines the offence of bribery as, "any intentional offer, promise or gift bestowing any
undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through an intermediary to a foreign public
official, for that official or for a third party in order that the official act or refrain from acting in
relation to the performance of official duties in order to obtain or retain business or other improper
advantage in the conduct of international business." See Low et al, "The International Anti-
corruption Standards of the OECD and OAS: A Comparison with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act." Cited in Moran, "Bribery and Corruption: the OECD Convention on Combating the Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions", [1999] 8 (3) Business Ethics: A
European Review, 141 at 143.
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companies. It is also important to limit the number of directorships 15 that a director
may hold in order to reduce the chances of competition with the company.
Given that modern day directors have to operate within a business environment
which has become more sophisticated because of technology and globalisation, the
Kenyan Parliament and courts have to play an active role in the internal
management of companies so as to protect shareholders. This is because the rising
standards of the global economy demand higher standards in the performance of
directorial duties. Raising the standards of performance would protect shareholders
who are often not in a position to track continuously the conduct of directors.
Chapter Four has shown that it is possible for directors to go unpunished as a result
of negligence arising from their ignorance or inexperience because the courts assess
their liability subjectively. Introducing an objective element in the assessment of
directorial duties would raise standards because directors would be expected to
possess the skill that "may reasonably be expected from a person undertaking those
duties". 16 However, the need to apply subjective standards cannot be ignored
because a board consists of directors with diverse qualifications and experiences.
Besides, it is not practicable to expect a director to exhibit a greater degree of skill
than may reasonably be expected from someone undertaking such duties. I7 This
explains why it is important to apply both the subjective and objective standards to
assess directors' conduct.
A corporate governance mechanism that facilitates prompt and expedient resolution
of disputes within a company raises the levels of responsibility and accountability.
Failure to have such a mechanism in place is likely to result in dissipation of the
resources of the company and time in protracted litigation. Since the power of
15 Multiple directorships are recognised by both the Companies Act and Table A. Section 201
requires particulars of all directorships to be contained in the register of directors and secretaries.
Table A, article 78 allows a director to "become a director or other officer of, or otherwise interested
in, any company promoted by the company or in which the company may be interested as
shareholder or otherwise, and no such director shall be accountable to the company for any
remuneration or other benefits received by him as a director or officer of, or from his interest in, such
other company unless the company otherwise directs."
16 Per Hicks, "Directors' Liability For Management Errors", (1994) 110 LQR 390, at 390. Also see
Norman v Theodore Goddard [1991] BCLC 1028 where Hoffmann J observed that "a director who
undertakes the management of the company's properties is expected to have reasonable skill in
property, but not in off shore tax avoidance."
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shareholders to control directors is limited, shareholders cannot be adequately
protected unless they are able to recover moneys due to them and also recoup losses
suffered by them as a result of the action of directors. The powers of shareholders to
enforce the liability of directors is limited by the corporate entity principle which
bars shareholders from enforcing their claims. This is because the company is the
only body that is entitled to sue a miscreant director, as his duties are only owed to
the company. Since the courts are reluctant to interfere with a majority decision, the
shareholders of a company whose directors form and control the majority of
shareholders face enforcement difficulties because they cannot litigate in the name
of the company.
There is a need to respect the decision of majority shareholders because interfering
with their decision would make investors believe that the only changes that would
be binding for a company are those that are supported unanimously. Investors would
hardly be attracted to a company with such a policy because of the trust they have in
voting as a mechanism for approving changes. 18
Although there is a need to respect the decision of the majority, there is also a need
to protect minority shareholders when their interests are under threat. Whilst the
exceptions to the rule in Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others, 19 enable a
minority shareholder to sue in the name of the company where, for instance, the
majority is committing a fraud on the minority, the exceptions are not entirely useful
because a shareholder is still required to discharge the onus of establishing fraud. 20
The protection offered to minority shareholders should be enhanced by enabling
them to litigate in the name of the company without establishing, first, that there is
fraud. Since minority shareholders, who claim that the conduct of directors is
oppressive, are required to establish that directors have overwhelming control of the
'Modern courts in Australia and the U.K. still recognise the subsistence of the subjective element.
See Theodore Goddard [1992] BCC 14.
18 BR Cheffins, Company Law: Them)), Structure, and Opreation, (Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1997),
v 18.
9 Musa Misango v Eria Musigire & Others [1966] EA 390 (applying Foss v Harbottle (1843) 2 Hare
461).
20 Although the courts in the United Kingdom have accepted that the term 'fraud' may cover breaches
of duty, intentional acts of discrimination, and unintentional abuses of corporate power, it is not
certain whether Kenyan courts would adopt a similar definition. See Knight v Frost [1999] 1 BCLC
364.
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company and that it is just and equitable to wind up the company, 21 their chances of
enforcing the rights of the company are also limited. Such shareholders can be
protected by relaxing the burden of proof required of them when the rule in Musa
Misango v Eria Musigire & Others stands in the way of justice. Requiring
shareholders to seek leave of the court before initiating proceeding can act as a
safeguard against frivolous suits by shareholders because the courts would be in a
position to establish their bona fides, the inaction of the company, whether the
action is in the best interests of the company, and whether there is a serious issue to
be tried."
The powers of shareholders to enforce the liability of directors can be enhanced
further by relaxing the inspection and investigation provisions under the Act which
are at odds with the interests of shareholders.
Parastatals have contributed to the poor state of the Kenyan economy 23 and the
indebtedness of the country to international lending agencies and western countries24
due to mismanagement. The role of the State in running parastatals has been
ineffective due to its failure to have adequate management controls. The lack of
management controls is attributable to the politicisation of the appointment of
directors by the State Corporations Act. 25 This statute vests the powers of
appointment in the President 26 and the Ministers. 27 The statute has concentrated
power in the institution of the President, hence making it unaccountable for
appointing incompetent directors to head parastatals. Directors often act in the
interests of their appointors rather than the corporation. In addition, the performance
21 A shareholder is required to prove this under the statutory oppression remedy.
22 These are some of the grounds that have to be satisfied before a person can get leave of the court in
Australia to pursue a statutory derivative action. See s. 237 Corporation Law 2001.
23 According to a World Bank report, World Development Indicators, released on 30 April 2001,
Kenya was the only one of the 10 sub-Saharan countries with negative growth rates greater than 0.5
per cent in 1999. Although the economy of the country grew by 4.2 per cent between 1980 and 1989
and 6.5 per cent between 1970 and 1979, the growth had declined to 2.2 percent by 1993. The GDP
slowed down from 2.3 per cent in 1997 to 1.8 per cent in 1998. See Redfern, "World Bank's Dim
Picture of Kenya's Economy", Daily Nation, 1 May, 2001; "An Economy at War with Itself', East
African Standard, 25 April, 2001; Magero and Kanani, "Concern over Large Increase in Domestic
Debt", The East African 10 January, 2000.
24 A sizeable percentage of all the country's debt is owed by parastatals. See SRI International and
Mwaniki Associates, Parastatals in Kenya: Assessment of their Impact and an Action Plan for
Reform; Final Report Prepared for Kenya Association of Manufacturers, February, 1992, pp 36, 61.
25 Cap 446, Laws of Kenya.
26 S 6 (1) (a), the President appoints the chairman.
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of the boards of directors in parastatals is constrained by excessive regulations and
extensive ministerial intervention in the functioning of the boards. These factors
impair their ability to make commercially sound decisions and enforce
accountability. Shortcomings can be resolved by giving directors autonomy by
separating the State and parastatals. Although the Government has started the
process of privatisation, it should also focus on establishing an effective regulatory
framework for private companies which would ensure that the resources of
privatised companies are not abused by miscreant directors.
Whilst the intervention of the State in parastatals is largely to blame for their poor
performance, its intervention in the economy can be beneficial in respect of the
regulation of directors. Whilst self-regulation might have the positive effect of
reducing the interference of the Government in the market and the reluctance to
punish miscreant directors, it is unlikely to be effective where self-regulatory
authorities need to resort to the judiciary for enforcement. Other conditions which
militate against self-regulation in Kenya include poor organisation of the private
sector, corruption and lack of international obligations. Self-regulation is unlikely to
be fruitful unless the underlying problems are solved.
In order for a regulatory framework to raise the levels of responsibility and
accountability of directors, it is important to have an effective mechanism for
disqualifying miscreant directors from running companies. This would have the
effect of protecting the public by placing prohibitions on errant directors being
involved, for a specific period, in the management of companies. Disqualification
orders would also prevent people without the necessary qualifications from
managing companies and serve as a deterrent to those who might be tempted to
engage in fraudulent activities.
The law should ensure that directors who have been responsible for the insolvency
of several companies in Kenya and other fraudulent ones are precluded from acting
as directors for a specified time in order to protect companies. The period of
disqualification should be long enough to serve as a deterrent and protect
27 S 6 (1) (e), the minister appoints the Chief Executive Officer and other members of the board.
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companies. The introduction of a register of disqualification would enable creditors
and the general public to monitor disqualification orders with a view to ensuring that
disqualified directors do not continue to act secretly.
Although a more far-reaching change is required in Kenya to develop an efficient
legal system, the implementation of the recommendations for reform suggested in
this thesis would go a long way towards making the regulatory framework for
directors more stringent and competitive. As Wabwile notes:
"After a century of legal dependence on English law, time
has come for us to reconsider this state of affairs. With over
three decades of independence, Kenya's legal system has
come of age. The country's legal system has to be recast
afresh in a comprehensive law reform programme. Such
reforms would have the tendency of delinking this country's
legal system from that of England, thus opening up new
space for juristic development."28
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